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PART I


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I have to inform you that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue have approved the Royal Central Asian Society for the purposes of Section 16, Finance Act, 1958, and that the whole of the annual subscription paid by a member who qualifies for relief under that Section will be allowable as a deduction from his emoluments assessable to income tax under Schedule E. If any material relevant change in the circumstances of the society should occur in the future you are requested to notify this change.

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## THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

The following is the first of a series of articles describing the principal works published in the U.S.S.R. on the subject of the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics and their borderlands—namely, Persia, Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet. The series is being contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford.

EVER since the last century, when Russian colonial rule was established over a large part of Central Asia, most of the published literature on this region has been in the Russian language, and has remained largely inaccessible to English readers. Even before the Revolution both the quality and the quantity of this literature were considerable, but during the past 30 years, and particularly since 1950, it has assumed formidable proportions and now covers a wide range of subjects barely touched upon in literature published in any other language.

The importance of Russia's dominating position in Asia has greatly increased since the Revolution. Ever since the Tsarist acquisition of Transcaucasia and Turkestan, the southern fringe of the Russian Empire has been largely peopled by Muslims. Before 1917 these people not only played no part in the government of Russia, but they were not used to any important extent by the Russian government to promote its eastern policies. Now, however, spread out along the southern frontier of Soviet Asia, between the Mongolian People's Republic and the Caspian Sea, there are six Soviet Socialist Republics organized and developed on lines quite different from those followed during the Tsarist period. Two of these republics—Kazakhstan and Kirgizia—abut on China; three—Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—on Afghanistan; and two—Turkmenistan and Azerbaydzhan—on Persia.

Except for the Tadzhiks, of whom there are about one million, nearly all the Muslims are of Turkish or Turkic origin, and speak languages closely resembling each other and also the Turkish of Turkey. Over the borders of the republics, in Persian, Afghan and Chinese territory, there are hundreds of thousands of people of the same nationalities. Thus there are nearly four million Azerbaydzhanis and 200,000 Turkmens in Persia; 350,000 Turkmens, one million Uzbeks and two million Tadzhiks in Afghanistan; and 500,000 Kazakhs and 75,000 Kirgiz in China.

Since the territorial redistribution of 1924 which led to the creation of these six republics, their economy has been greatly developed, largely as a result of extensive colonization by non-Asians from the western part of the U.S.S.R. Collectivization and mechanization of agriculture and systematic industrialization have resulted in a very considerable increase in economic output. There has also been a great advance in general and technical education. The result of all this is that whereas before the Revolution the material condition of the Muslim peoples of Transcaucasia

and Central Asia was much the same as that of adjacent countries, it is now very much higher.

In the early years of the Revolution, Soviet leaders cherished the hope that the newly created Muslim republics on the southern fringe of the Union would serve as a kind of cultural and economic bridge whereby Soviet influence could be extended over the rest of Asia. Various obstacles lay in the way of this plan, and in effect until recently Soviet efforts seem to have been directed more towards segregating the Muslims of the Union from their co-religionists outside, than towards promoting intercourse between them. Now, however, a determined though as yet cautious attempt is being made on the one hand to interest the countries of the Middle East and South Asia in the material development achieved in the eastern republics of the U.S.S.R., and on the other to encourage the peoples of the republics to take an interest in the affairs, and particularly in the cultural and political affairs, of the Middle East and South Asia.

The whole area involved is one of particular interest and importance to the Royal Central Asian Society; and it is with a view to keeping members and other readers of the Journal informed on the principal Soviet publications dealing not only with the six Muslim republics of the Union but also with the adjacent countries of Persia, Afghanistan, China (Sinkiang), and Tibet that arrangements have been made to provide a regular feature on the subject in each issue of the Journal. It should be noted that Russian geographical usage in respect of this region differs from the Western. There are two terms for Central Asia—*Srednyaya Aziya* and *Tsentral'naya Aziya*. The first, strictly speaking, refers only to the four republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia; but it is often extended to include the great republic of Kazakhstan. The second term is applied to the whole Asian hinterland, *i.e.* Tibet, Sinkiang and Mongolia, as well as Soviet Central Asia. In the present series the term Soviet Central Asia will be used to refer to the area occupied by the four Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Azerbaydzhan, which according to the Soviet conception is part of Transcaucasia, will be referred to separately.

Since the number of Soviet publications relating to the Muslim republics and their borderlands is very large—over 60 works have been published during the past year—it will only be possible to deal with those of general interest. Books on technical subjects and those whose sole object is propaganda will not ordinarily be treated. The analysis which follows contains descriptions of the most important books which have appeared since June, 1957. Subsequent analyses will deal with a selection of the books—and occasionally articles—which have appeared since each preceding analysis.

## I. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

### *The Land*

There is no dearth of factual information on the geography or economy of Soviet Central Asia today. A work that will without doubt prove to be the standard geography of the area is the symposium, edited by E. M. Murzayev, *Soviet Central Asia: A Physical Geography* (*Srednyaya Aziya*).

Fiziko-geograficheskaya kharakteristika. Institute of Geography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. 648 pp. Illustrated. Moscow, 1958.) This clearly printed and well produced work contains chapters by specialists on the general geography of the area, its relief, climate, glaciation, hydrography, soils, flora, and fauna, and a final section giving detailed descriptions of the various regions of the area. The book is completed by an extensive bibliography containing some 460 titles (of which only three are non-Soviet); an index of the more important geographical names; and a glossary of Latin plant names. A folder contains coloured soil and plant maps.

Economic geographies of the various republics are also available. The period under review saw the appearance of such works on the *Azerbaydzhan S.S.R.*, the *Kazakh S.S.R.*, and the *Turkmen S.S.R.* (All published by the State Publishing House of Geographic Literature, Moscow, 1957; they contain 445, 734 and 451 pages respectively.) These works have a standard pattern: the first part consists of chapters on the history, population, physical features, and economy of the republic, and the second of detailed descriptions of the geography and economy of the various regions of each republic. Of particular interest is the study devoted to Kazakhstan: this boom republic with its vast area, sparse native population, and hardly touched natural wealth is the subject today of intense industrial and agricultural development. Between 1939 and 1956 some two million settlers, mostly Slavs, have come to the republic to swell the population from 6,146,000 in 1939 (57 per cent. of whom were native Kazakhs) to nearly eight and a half million in 1956. In particular the recent "virgin lands" scheme added to the influx of Slav colonizers. No precise totals are given in the book, although details are given for certain regions; but it may be assumed that the Kazakhs now make up barely a third of the republic which bears their name. Particular attention is paid in the book to stressing the "multi-national" and "all-Union" society that is emerging in the republic, especially in the cities.

Companion volumes to the economic geographies are statistical handbooks published for each of the Union republics. The period under review saw the appearance of such works on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: *Economy of the Uzbek S.S.R.* (Narodnoye Khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy S.S.R. Tashkent, 1957. 197 pp.) and *Economy of the Kazakh S.S.R.* (Narodnoye Khozyaystvo Kazakhskoy S.S.R. Alma-Ata, 1957. 381 pp.). These works consist of tables giving production and development figures for every aspect of social and economic life in the given republic. There are tables for each branch of industry and agriculture showing changes in output since 1913 for each area of the republic; tables showing the increase in numbers of every type of school and higher educational establishment and their students; tables indicating trade turnover for shops in each area, sums deposited in savings banks; and tables showing increases in numbers of qualified workers, of hospitals, cinemas, clinics, books and periodicals.

On a very much more popular level are pamphlets such as *Kirgizstan in the Brotherly Family of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.* (Kirgizstan v bratskoy sem'ye narodov S.S.S.R. Kirgiz State Publishing House,

Frunze, 1957. 62 pp.). Although unashamedly propagandist, the booklet contains useful figures for industrial and agricultural output and a chapter on "the rise of the material and cultural level of the workers."

Soviet geographical writing is not confined to Soviet territory. In October, 1957, *Modern Persia: A Handbook* (Sovremennyy Iran. Spravochnik. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1957. 718 pp. Maps, appendices, indexes) was published by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The book is divided into four main sections: the country and its population; the economy; history, politics and social conditions; and culture. There are appendices containing the texts of important State documents; lists of administrative divisions, tribes, and military and naval ranks; and details of cost of living, the monetary system, and weights and measures. It has indexes of personal and geographical names, and each main section of the work is completed with a short bibliography. As a whole the work contains a wealth of factual information that cannot be found elsewhere in one volume; the historical section is, however, marred by inaccuracies and tendentiousness.

January, 1958, saw the publication of *Tibet: A Physical Geography*, by B. V. Yusov (Tibet. Fiziko-geograficheskaya kharakteristika. State Publishing House of Geographical Literature, Moscow, 1958. 223 pp.). The contents include chapters on the history of the exploration of Tibet; physical features, climate, hydrography, flora and soils, fauna, and, on the pattern of most Soviet geographies, a final section giving detailed accounts of the various regions. There is a short glossary of Tibetan place-names, an index of geographical names, and a bibliography of some 150 titles. This competently written book appears to be a compilation of other works, especially modern Chinese writings. An interesting chapter is that on exploration; it deals fairly with West European explorers, but gives pride of place to Russian travellers, such as Przheval'skiy, and mentions briefly some recent Chinese expeditions.

### *The People*

A thorough study of the anthropology of the peoples inhabiting Soviet Central Asia is L. V. Oshanin's *The Anthropological Composition of the Population of Soviet Central Asia and the Ethnogenesis of its Peoples* (Antropologicheskii sostav naseleniya sredney Azii i etnogenez yeye narodov. Yerevan University: Trudy XCVI, Yerevan, 1957. 139 pp.). In an introductory chapter the author sets out his general principles and conclusions, namely that the autochthonous population of the area were of europeoid type who, in subsequent centuries, were more or less submerged by mongoloid races. In later chapters, the author considers each of the peoples inhabiting the area (including the Kazakhs), on the basis of physical type. There are seven pages of photographs.

The ethnography of the peoples of Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan is dealt with in S. A. Tokaryev's *Ethnography of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.* (Etnografiya narodov S.S.S.R. Moscow, 1958. 615 pp., of which 97 pp. are devoted to Central Asia). There are sections on the principal peoples, *i.e.* the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks,

and Azerbaydzhanis, and a final section on minority peoples such as the Uygurs, Persians, Arabs, and Dungans. Like Oshanin, Tokaryev mentions the still considerable Jewish community in Bukhara. The book, which is directed at the general reader, contains quite good illustrations and some sketch maps.

The oral epic literature of the peoples of the Muslim republics is examined in the symposium *Problems of the Study of the Epics of the Peoples of U.S.S.R.* (Voprosy izucheniya eposa narodov S.S.S.R. Edited by I. S. Braginskiy and others. Gorkiy Institute of World Literature, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 291 pp., of which more than half concern the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus). The book is the first of a series, the second number of which will be devoted solely to the Kirgiz epic *Manas*. Contributors to the present volume are all specialists in the field: there are general articles by V. I. Chicherov, V. M. Zhirmunskiy (who was criticized for his theories in 1949), and A. K. Borovkov. Uzbek epic literature is examined by Kh. T. Zarifov, Tadzhik by Braginskiy, and Azerbaydzhani by M. Takhmasib. The contributions are scholarly and contain much interesting and little-known material. In view of the polemics over previous Soviet writings on Asian epic literature (a summary of recent attitudes is given in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1956: "The re-examination of the Soviet Asian epics, 1948-55"), the present volume is remarkably unbiased in its approach and well repays study. An interesting fact to emerge is that many of the epics are still alive among the people today; although Zhirmunskiy for one deplores the fact that the older generation of bards are dying out, leaving none to take their place.

In general, little can be gleaned from Soviet writings about the private way of life of the native population of the Muslim republics. Of particular interest, therefore, is the pamphlet by Dosmukhamed Kshibekov entitled *Feudal Bay Survivals and How to Overcome Them* (O feodal'no-bayskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenii. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1957. 73 pp.). The author considers harmful legacies from the past among the Kazakhs under four heads: tribal survivals, attitude to women, Islamic survivals, and survivals from the nomadic way of life. Harmful tribal survivals are practices such as the sheltering of criminals by their kinsmen and the appointment to administrative posts of kinsmen irrespective of their qualifications. In the chapter on women, the author gives examples of the recent practice of *kalyim* (bride-purchase), bigamy and even polygamy, and the abduction of young girls, frequently from school. Among harmful religious practices, the author mentions in particular fasting and the observance of religious feasts, both of which seriously interfere with production. Less serious are the survivals from the nomadic way of life: these include lack of cleanliness in the home (especially eating with the fingers), ignorance of the advantages of gardening and tree-planting. Although the author produces individual examples for each of these malpractices, little indication is given of the extent to which they are practised. He does, however, mention that many of them are widespread among the Kazakh youth, and the very publication of the pamphlet suggests that the problem is still alive.

## II. HISTORY

All Soviet historical writing has naturally to conform to Marxist-Leninist theory whereby the historical process is seen as a development from primitive communal society, through slave-owning, feudal, or feudal-tribal, societies, to capitalism and socialism. Such strict periodization, particularly when applied to Eastern peoples whose history is not normally viewed in such terms in the West, may lead the non-Marxist reader to reject the work as unscholarly and propagandist. Nonetheless, many Soviet histories of the Central Asian peoples are the result of serious research and scholarship and are of unique value in that they use source material not available in the West. It should be borne in mind, however, that Soviet writing on the history of the Central Asian and other Muslim peoples since the establishment of Russian rule in the latter half of the last century is coloured not only by Marxist theory, but also by the official Soviet view, current since the last war, that Russian rule was for the ultimate benefit of the native peoples and that true progressives were those who understood this and who worked for brotherhood between the great Russian people and the native population. Russia, it is constantly emphasized today, was both the bringer of Communism and the saviour from Western imperialist domination.

### *Turkmenistan*

A typical example of the best and worst in Soviet historical writing is the two volume *History of the Turkmen S.S.R.* (Istoriya Turkmenskoy S.S.R. Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Ashkhabad, 1957. Vol. I, Book 1—495 pp.; Vol. I, Book 2—531 pp.; Vol. II—718 pp.). Vol. I, Book 1 covers the period from the very earliest times to the eighteenth century; Vol. I, Book 2 the period from the nineteenth century to the October Revolution; and Vol. II the Revolution itself, the Civil War, and the period up to 1957. As the editors point out in the introduction to the first volume, the Turkmen Republic is a very recent creation and its history must therefore be largely the history of the neighbouring states or empires who in the course of centuries ruled over the area and its inhabitants. When established in 1924, the Republic covered most of the former Tsarist province of Transcaspia plus a large part of the Khanate of Khiva and a small part of the Emirate of Bukhara. The editors comment: "The history of the Turkmen and their ancestors is so closely interwoven with that of neighbouring peoples that to limit . . . the history of Turkmenistan to events concerning only the past of the Turkmen people themselves is quite impossible, the more so since previously existing ethnic and political frontiers are far from always coinciding with present ones." The work is, however, given unity by its emphasis on the social and economic forces apparent in each period. The source material used is extremely varied: for the earliest times up to the Middle Ages—archæology, some of the most recent discoveries being made since the last War; for the classical era—Greek and Roman writers and ancient Persian inscriptions; for the third to eighth centuries—Chinese sources are almost the only material available; for the seventh to sixteenth centuries there is

an abundance of Arab, Persian, and Tadzhik literature; for later centuries there are the archives of the Khanate of Khiva preserved at Leningrad, descriptions by Western travellers, and from 1882 onwards the Russian State archives. While Vol. I, Book 1 contains much interesting and new material presented from an original angle, Vol. I, Book 2, and still more Vol. II, appear too biased for the non-Marxist reader. In Vol. I, Book 2, for instance, no mention is made of the massacre that followed the Russian capture of Geok-Tepe in 1882, and British travellers of the same period, in particular O'Donovan, are described merely as intelligence agents and provocateurs. In Vol. II the aims and activities of General Malleson's force in Transcaspia during the Civil War are distorted and exaggerated. Most of Vol. II is concerned with economic and cultural development from the end of the Civil War to the present. It mentions briefly the earthquake that destroyed Ashkhabad in 1948 but gives little account of the damage; and still more briefly the Main Turkmen Canal, a vast project that was to have given life to the Kara-Kum desert but over which silence has reigned since 1953. Both Books of Volume I contain indexes of proper names, geographical names, and names of tribes and peoples; Vol. II has no index. Volume I, Book 2 and Volume II have extensive bibliographies and chronological summaries. All volumes are illustrated, with some colour plates; the standard of reproduction is, however, low. All volumes have map plates at the end.

### *Uzbekistan*

The period under review has seen the appearance of a great number of works on the history of the Central Asian peoples during the Soviet period. Many of these works were produced to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution and provide general pictures of the great changes through which Soviet Central Asia has passed in the last forty years. This vast area of desert and oasis, mountain and steppe, which not long since was the home of nomadic herdsmen and primitive agriculturalists barely touched, except in the Russian administered regions by western civilization or industry, has now become a prosperous region of highly developed industry and modern agriculture. While Soviet writers are justly proud of the speed and thoroughness of their country's achievements, it should be borne in mind that the picture they draw is in many respects one-sided: little mention is made of the suffering caused by the Civil War and the collectivization drive, or of the fact that the progress achieved has been largely due to the influx of Russian technicians and Party workers. It is true that Soviet Central Asia today has reached a level of prosperity unheard of before but to some it may be an open question whether in fact the means were justified by the end.

In the Uzbek Republic, three works have appeared on the pre-war period: *An Outline History of the Building of Socialism in Uzbekistan, 1917-37*, by V. Ya. Nepomnin (Ocherki istorii sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva v Uzbekistane. Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 1957. 219 pp.); the pamphlet *The Struggle for the Consolidation of the Soviets in Uzbekistan, 1926-29*, by Dzh. Mukhitdinov (Bor'ba za ukrepleniye sovetov v Uzbekistane. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1957. 75 pp.);

and the pamphlet *From the History of the Soviet School in Uzbekistan*, by S. Radzhabov (Iz istorii stroitel'stva sovetskoy shkoly v Uzbekistane. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1957. 126 pp.). Of these three works, Nepomnin's book is the fullest and most interesting: it is in fact a political history of the area now covered by the Uzbek Republic from the outbreak of the Revolution until the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1937. In a useful introduction the author gives a summary of the theory behind Soviet policy in Central Asia and follows this with a short review of Soviet literature and source material on Uzbekistan; in this review he includes periodicals and several works now considered outdated or even ideologically unsound. In a brief first chapter, Nepomnin outlines the background to the October Revolution in Turkestan; he refutes the theory that the Revolution was "imported" to the area by Russian workers and is at pains to emphasize that the oppressions under which the native population laboured gave them aims identical with those of the Russian workers. Chapter Two gives an account of political developments from 1917 to 1924 in the Communist Turkestan Republic and in Khiva and Bukhara; this is a clear summary of Bolshevik policy and measures taken during this most confused period; but Nepomnin never wavers from his theory that every opposition movement (the Kokand<sup>d</sup> autonomous government, the Basmachi partisans, or the communist opposition in Bukhara—all of which he briefly describes) was in fact against the true popular interest and inspired by the upper classes, or the clergy, or from abroad; the popular masses, he implies, knew all along that their interests were best served by the Bolsheviks. In Chapter Three, Nepomnin covers the period from the national demarcation of Central Asia (1924) and the formation of the Uzbek Republic (1925) until the inception of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928; and in Chapter Four, the period of the First and Second Five-Year Plans. These two chapters contain interesting accounts of industrial and agricultural development, in particular the advance of the cotton industry. Emphasis is given to the bitter "class struggle" which accompanied collectivization. The success of Communist policy can be seen, Nepomnin concludes, in the present prosperity of Uzbekistan.

Fuller accounts of aspects touched on in Nepomnin's book are to be found in the two pamphlets. That by Dzh. Mukhitdinov (not to be confused with N. A. Mukhitdinov) deals with the election campaigns to the local soviets (councils) in Uzbekistan in the years 1926-29 and the political and economic background to them. The outstanding feature of the period was the implementation of the land and water reforms which are said to have strengthened the position and sharpened the political consciousness of the poorest peasants. The pamphlet is illustrated by interesting but poorly reproduced photographs of contemporary events.

Radzhabov's pamphlet gives a full account of the development of education in Uzbekistan from 1930 to 1941. Subjects dealt with include the supply and training of teachers, the growth of the school network, the provision of text-books, language teaching, and the school attendance of girls. The pamphlet contains interesting tables: thus the number of children attending school grew from 75,000 in 1924-5 to 1,241,500 in



1940-1; the percentage of girls among the school population increased from 9.6 (in the villages) and 20.1 (in the towns) in 1927-8 to 41.7 (in the villages) and 40.7 (in the towns) in 1938-9; in 1936, of the 739 students at the Uzbek State University in Samarkand, 44.6 per cent. were Uzbeks, 15.6 per cent. were other natives, and 39.8 per cent. were non-natives (*i.e.* presumably Slavs). At the same time all the 19 professors were "non-native." Radzhabov emphasizes the great importance of the change from the Latin to the Cyrillic alphabet in 1939, and in his conclusion affirms that the successes of Soviet education policy can be seen by the fact that today there is no illiteracy in Uzbekistan.

### *Tadzhikistan*

There are two new books on the history of Tadzhikistan in the Soviet period. Both are general histories and cover much the same ground. One is an *Outline of Soviet Tadzhikistan, 1917-57*, by M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharanov (Ocherk istorii sovetskogo Tadzhikistana. Tadzhik State Publishing House, Stalinabad, 1957. 503 pp.) and the other, *The Tadzhik S.S.R.—A Sovereign Soviet State*, by S. Radzhabov (not the same as the author of the pamphlet described above) (Tadzhikskaya S.S.R.—suverennoye sovetskoye gosudarstvo. Tadzhik State Publishing House, Stalinabad, 1957. 348 pp.). Both works have bibliographies, that in the *Outline History* appearing fuller and more useful; neither has an index. The *Outline History* is undoubtedly the more serious work. The first three chapters cover the period 1917-28, when the area now covered by the Tadzhik Republic shared the history of the Uzbek Republic. Tadzhikistan, like Uzbekistan, was created out of the former emirate of Bukhara, together with some territory from what was formerly Russian Turkestan; from 1924-9 it was an autonomous area within the Uzbek Republic, and from 1929 onwards a Republic in its own right. In succeeding chapters the book covers the periods 1929-32, 1933-7, 1938-41, when collectivization was completed and industrialization advanced; later chapters cover the war years (1941-5), the rehabilitation period (1946-52) and the successes of recent years (1953-7). Radzhabov's book has much the same subject matter but is written in a lighter and more discursive vein. It contains, however, a full chapter on the constitution of the Tadzhik Republic, and concludes with a rosy picture of Tadzhikistan today in a chapter entitled "Soviet Tadzhikistan—a beacon of socialism in the East." This is a revival of Stalin's phrase used in the early days of the Revolution, when it was hoped to draw neighbouring Asian countries to Communism by the example of Central Asia. Although today the Central Asian republics are proudly shown to Asian visitors, there is no mention of foreign contacts in Radzhabov's chapter.

### *Kirgizia*

A similar general study of Soviet Kirgizia is *The Formation and Development of the Kirgiz Socialist Nation*, edited by S. K. Kerimbayev and V. P. Sherstobitov (Formirovaniye i razvitiye kirgizskoy sotsialisticheskoy natsii. Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1957. 290 pp.). In the first chapter a general description is given of the Kirgiz people in

the years preceding the Revolution. In Marxist theory the criteria for nationhood are common language, common territory, common economic life, and common psychological make-up as manifested in a common culture. Since it is claimed that under Soviet rule the Kirgiz have become a nation, the authors, in the first chapter, examine how far these four criteria can be applied to the Kirgiz before the Revolution, when they were still a primitive tribal people. The first chapter thus has a section on the beginnings of economic development which were apparent particularly after the Russian annexation (1860-70); a study of the distribution of the Kirgiz, many of whom were still semi-nomadic, and of the administrative divisions of their territory under Russian rule; an interesting study of the Kirgiz language and literature; and a final section on Kirgiz culture, the most important example of which is the great epic *Manas*. The long second chapter which makes up the bulk of the book (pp. 77-221) is concerned with the development of the Kirgiz people from the Revolution up to the outbreak of the Second World War. An opening section describes the political events of the revolutionary period; this is followed by sections on economic development, on territorial changes (Kirgizia progressed from an autonomous area within the R.S.F.S.R. in 1924 to a full Republic in 1936), on language and literature development, and cultural growth. The two concluding chapters describe Kirgizia during the war years and in 1946-57. Of particular interest in this work are the sections on the development of the Kirgiz language. There is no bibliography, although many sources are given in footnotes, and there is no index.

A full and interesting account of education in Kirgizia is given by A. E. Izmailov in *An Outline History of the Soviet School in Kirgizia in the Past Forty Years, 1917-57* (Ocherki po istorii sovetskoy shkoly v Kirgizii za 40 let. Kirgiz State Pedagogic Publishing House, Frunze, 1957. 383 pp.). In six chapters the author deals with the pre-revolutionary period (mentioning briefly the Jadid "new method" schools), the revolutionary years 1917-23, the first years of Kirgiz autonomy 1924-9, the pre-war years 1930-40, the war period 1941-5, and the post-war period 1946-57. There is a final section on developments since the Nineteenth and Twentieth Party Congresses. The work is illustrated with contemporary photographs. There is no index or bibliography. The book bears witness to the remarkable achievements made in the field of education by the Soviet Government, especially in Kirgizia, which was one of the most backward areas of the Union. Today 100 per cent. literacy is claimed.

### *Kazakhstan*

The theory of the benefits of Russian rule is the main theme of E. B. Bekmakhanov's *The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia* (Prisoyedineniye Kazakhstana k Rosii. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1957. 340 pp.). The book is divided into two main parts: "The Union of the Great and Middle Hordes with Russia" and "The progressive consequences of the Union of Kazakhstan with Russia"; the period covered is thus the whole of the nineteenth century. The union of the Lesser Horde with Russia in 1731 is not discussed in detail. The first part con-

tains chapters on Kazakh society and its economy in the early nineteenth century, the international significance of Kazakhstan's position, and the attitude of the Kazakhs to the Russians. The second part contains chapters on the development of the Kazakh economy in the second half of the century after the annexation, the Kazakh enlightenment, and the development of the revolutionary movement in Kazakhstan. In spite of a certain tendentiousness, apparent particularly in sections on the benefits of Russian domination, this is a scholarly work, the chapters on Kazakh society and economy at various periods being particularly detailed and well-documented.

Two important works have appeared on the economic history of Kazakhstan in the Soviet period. They are: S. A. Neyshtadt's *The Socialist Transformation of the Economy of the Kazakh S.S.R. in 1917-37* (Sotsialisticheskoye preobrazovaniye ekonomiki Kazakhskoy S.S.R. v 1917-37 godakh. Kazakh State Publishing House, Alma-Ata, 1957. 379 pp.) and P. M. Alampiyev's *The Liquidation of Economic Inequality Among the Peoples of the Soviet East* (Likvidatsiya ekonomicheskogo neravenstva narodov sovetskogo vostoka. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958, 451 pp.). Neyshtadt's book gives a general picture of economic development in the first twenty years of the Soviet regime in Kazakhstan: he deals with changes in agriculture, industry, trade and finance. In an interesting section on collectivization in Kazakhstan (pp. 222-42) the author attempts to explain away the sufferings of the Kazakhs, and in particular of the nomads who were forcibly settled, by ascribing them to mistakes made by the local authorities or to opposition by the upper classes. He quotes figures for the staggering loss of farm stock: the number of horses in 1933 was only 11.4 per cent. of that in 1929, the number of large cattle—23 per cent., of sheep and goats—10.6 per cent. He does not, however, mention the loss of life that accompanied the forced collectivization: the population of Kazakhstan dropped from nearly four million in 1926 to little over three million in 1939 according to official Soviet censuses in these years.

Alampiyev's book, which is a considerably better produced and printed work than Neyshtadt's, is concerned primarily with the growth of industry in Kazakhstan. He argues that the "economic inequality" of the Soviet East, of which Kazakhstan is a typical area, has been eliminated by the development of all types of industry: in particular the development of heavy industry, and the processing of the natural products of the area, which in Tsarist times were exported to metropolitan Russia for processing, have raised the importance of the Kazakh economy to the whole Union. After two introductory theoretical chapters, Alampiyev describes industry in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan, the re-establishment of industry after the Civil War, industrialization during the pre-war Five-Year Plans, the state of Kazakh industry on the eve of the war, and a final description of industrial development during and after the war. There is also an interesting chapter on the training and supply of skilled and unskilled labour in which he describes the difficulties which confronted primitive Kazakhs on first working in modern industrial plants. This is a serious and informative book.

### *The Revolution and the Civil War*

The period under review has seen the publication of some interesting and important works on Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan during the revolutionary and Civil War period. M. Vakhobov's *Tashkent in Three Revolutions* (Tashkent v period trekh revolyutsiy. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1957. 284 pp.) gives a political history of Tashkent from the eve of the 1905 revolution until the February and October Revolutions in 1917; there are interesting sections on political developments among the native population including the Jadid movement, on the "September events" of 1917. There is a bibliography but no index. A more detailed account of the 1905 Revolution in Tashkent and Russian Turkestan is A. V. Pyaskovskiy's *1905-7 Revolution in Uzbekistan* (Revolutsiya 1905-7 godov v Uzbekistane. Uzbek Institute of Party History, Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1957. 254 pp.). Both these books emphasize that the aims of the Russian workers and the native population were identical.

There are two new collections of documents: one—*The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Kirgizia* (1917-20), edited by S. B. Zhantuarov (Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya i grazhdanskaya vojna v Kirgizii. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1957. 428 pp.)—and the other—*Turkmenistan During Foreign Military Intervention and the Civil War* (1918-20), edited by Sh. Tashliyev (Turkmenistan v period inostrannoy voyennoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny. Turkmen State Publishing House, Ashkhabad, 1957. 569 pp.). Both works contain much valuable archive material; the documents are preceded by introductions and followed by chronologies. Unfortunately neither has an index.

On the Civil War there are two regional studies: one a very brief pamphlet on partisan activities in Semirech'ye from June 1918 to October 1919 is A. Yelagin's *From the History of the Heroic Struggle of the Semirech'ye Partisans* (Iz istorii geroicheskoy bor'by partisan Semirech'ya. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1957. 49 pp.); the other is a book by Ye. A. Tokarzhvskiy entitled *From the History of Foreign Intervention and the Civil War in Azerbaydzhan* (Iz istorii inostrannoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny v Azerbaydzhan. Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1957. 331 pp.). An interesting feature of this very angled account is that the author minimizes the hostility between Britain and the Central Powers and attempts to prove that the true aim of both was to destroy Soviet power.

In conclusion, there is an important new publication of Lenin's writings on Central Asia, *V. I. Lenin on Central Asia and Uzbekistan* (V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii i Uzbekistane. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1957. 179 pp.). A common feature of the books reviewed above is that they all ascribe to Lenin's genius the success of Soviet policy in Central Asia. Lenin, they affirm, laid the foundations of Party theory on the national question, and this theory has been consistently and successfully put into practice; the vicissitudes through which both theory and practice in fact passed are minimized, as is Stalin's importance as the first

Commissar of Nationalities. It is thus interesting to turn to this new collection of Lenin's writings which comprise some longer theoretical articles, or extracts from articles and books, and several brief telegrams and notes. The selection covers the period from 1899 to 1922. In his pre-revolutionary writings, Lenin emphasized the rights of the minority peoples of the Russian empire to self-determination and even secession; Russian Turkestan in one article (1917) is compared to French Algeria or British Ireland. After the Revolution these rights are reaffirmed but outweighed by practical emergencies of the Civil War period: thus in 1918 Lenin assigned 50 million roubles for irrigation works in Central Asia in order to supply the Russian textile industry with cotton. Until the end of 1919, metropolitan Russia was cut off from Central Asia by White forces, but central Russia's need of Central Asian raw materials is reaffirmed once contact is re-established. On the ideological side, the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the East and the destruction of antiquated social orders is emphasized at the expense of the rights of nations as they are to self-determination. ("We certainly do not want the Khivan peasant," Lenin wrote in 1917, "to live under the Khivan khan.") The solution to these conflicting demands is a union of socialist republics.

A. S.

# VISIT TO MONGOLIA

By GROUP-CAPTAIN H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 22, 1958, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It seems rather a work of supererogation on my part to be introducing to you Group-Captain Smallwood, whom most of you probably know a great deal better than you know me. However, he and I first knew each other a very long time ago, so long ago that it must seem to both of us to have been in some previous existence.

Group-Captain Smallwood has had a distinguished career in first the Indian Cavalry and then in the Royal Air Force. I understand that one of his activities forty years ago was to map out an air route from Peking to Urga. As you will realize, he has retained his adventurous spirit and his intrepidity to such an extent that he spends his holidays revisiting those areas. He has just returned from a visit to Urga, which now enjoys a much longer name which I cannot even venture to pronounce. Group-Captain Smallwood will now describe his visit and show a film.

**Y**OUR Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel very embarrassed by the kind remarks the Chairman has made, and I implore you not to believe any of them. The trip I am about to describe was made in company with Dr. Charles Bawden, who is with us now, and partly with Dr. Robert Rupen, who came from the United States of America to see some of the country. It was an unusual and peculiar state of affairs in that the personnel of the so-called Cultural Mission consisted of Dr. Rupen, a well-known Mongolist who has written a great deal about the country, Dr. Charles Bawden, who is at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, and myself. Dr. Bawden came to our rescue on many occasions, when the language defeated us, by writing down in ancient script the word we were searching for. I owe him an immense additional debt because I am the world's worst photographer. Whenever I wanted to take a photograph, I called on Charles Bawden, and he immediately brought a wonderful light meter along, with the result that I managed to secure a great many beautiful photographs.

I should like, before saying more, to show a film lent me by the Government of Mongolia, because it will give the background to my talk by showing what the country looks like.

The invitation to visit Mongolia came from a Government department in Ulan Bator, a department which functions somewhat in the same way as the British Council in England. It is the Ministry of Cultural Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and so on, rolled into one and known as the Peace Committee. They are a most hospitable department and nearly killed us with kindness and hospitality. There was no attempt to pump us full of propaganda. We were shown everything we wanted to see, even some things we did not. We were only shown one collective farm, and that in course of development.

Before I left England there was a feeling expressed by some of my friends that I should never return from so wild and impossible a country.

Personally, I had no fear in that regard, as I had crossed the Gobi Desert forty years ago, when the people were not too friendly towards us; I then had no difficulty in returning to England, and I anticipated no difficulty on this occasion.

I will not bore you with the details and delays of our flight out, but an interesting fact was that in Moscow I had the pleasure of meeting the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Reilly, a member of this Society, and Lady Reilly, a daughter of Sir Percy Sykes, who was at one time an Honorary Secretary of the Society. Hence I was on a very good wicket from the moment I landed there.

From London to Copenhagen we flew by the Swedish Air Line, and on to Moscow in a pure jet—one of the astonishing Russian T.U. 104s. The piloting and general arrangements were extremely good, though I cannot say we received the same attention as one receives on the B.O.A.C. from their charming air hostesses; apart from that everything went well. From Moscow we flew on to Omsk and Irkutsk. We landed at Omsk in the dark, and, as we were disembarking, a charming young Russian lady—an Intourist Guide—came up to the plane and asked: "Are there any English here?" "Yes," said Bawden and I, to which she graciously replied: "What, two in one day; I am in luck." That guide took us over and gave Bawden and me a room each in a hopelessly overcrowded hotel. There had been a weather hold-up, and literally hundreds of Russian travellers were sleeping in camp beds distributed over every inch of floor space.

Next morning we flew off to Irkutsk, where we left the care of the Russians and transferred into a twin-engine turbo-prop Ilyushin aircraft with Chinese pilots and crew. They took us to Ulan Bator. There I suffered a slight disappointment when we landed because, many years ago, when I laid out an aerial route to Urga (as Ulan Bator was then called) I had based the airfield to the south of the town; in other words, on the Chinese side. The Russians, when they went in and were influenced by the Mongolians, put the airfield on the north side of the town. However, it was an excellent airfield, on which we landed in considerable comfort. We were met by Mr. Zagd, head of the Peace Committee, and other members of it; we were presented with large bouquets of flowers and conducted to large Zim limousines, which took us to the luxurious Government guest house, at which we stayed in considerable comfort.

I show a view of the Government rest house, a few miles outside the capital. You will note that the view from the front of the house resembles a Scottish glen; the scenery is beautiful, the heavy forest being part of what used to be known as God's Garden. In the time of the Living Buddha, the whole of the area belonged to him, and part of his revenue was derived from selling the Asiatic wapiti's horns. They were ground up and fetched their weight in silver, being thought among Eastern races to be a very strong aphrodisiac. It seems odd for the Living Buddha to have dealt in that way, but that was a fact.

In the Cinema in Ulan Bator there was an interesting contrast in that the people still wore their native clothes. An even greater contrast was a man in his plum-coloured robe riding his pony, and nearby a modern

truck which probably came from Russia or Czechoslovakia, and, just beyond, the huge Government building—quite a change from the buildings I knew forty years ago.

One of the first visits we paid while in Ulan Bator was to the Gadang Monastery. There are few monasteries remaining in Mongolia now. Lamaism is disappearing. Gadang Monastery is kept as a show-place, and here there are precious relics to be seen. We were entertained by the Hambelun lama, the senior lama of Mongolia. He is also a member of the Peace Committee. Entertaining us to luncheon, he and his fellow lamas were jovial and cheerful hosts, presenting us with ceremonial scarves and snuff boxes.

I show the inside of the hospitality- or reception-yurt in which we were entertained, the yurt being a felt-covered tent with beams running from the side walls up to a point in the centre at which there is a hole so that smoke and bad air can escape.

The Religious Museum in Ulan Bator is a somewhat dreary building; little interest is taken in it and it is not kept up as it might be. The old summer palace of the last Living Buddha was of interest.

On the Sunday we spent in Ulan Bator we were taken to see the sports—archery, wrestling and so on. There is a charming custom in that, when a man pulls his bow and looses the arrow, the people sing good wishes to the arrow in its flight. A view of the wrestling, taken from the grandstand, shows their zest for colour-conscious feeling evident everywhere.

On the outskirts of Ulan Bator we saw a group of yurts. The main surround consists of a sort of trellis around which is put a thick felt mat of camels' hair and sheeps' wool; in addition to the camels' hair there is a canvas screen which keeps out rain, so that, on the whole, a yurt is a comfortable place in which to live. In fact, the Government are experiencing difficulty in persuading the nomads to give up their yurts and live in the new centres.

The country over which we travelled on the road to Western Mongolia consisted of rolling steppes which seemed to go on for ever; one went over a low pass and came out on to another valley exactly like the one before. It was typical steppe country. We met a camel caravan on the move, and Dr. Bawden had a chat with an ancient herdsman; there are not many people on the steppes and, when anyone appears, the nomads are only too glad to have a chat. We had a fascinating meeting with an old Mongolian shepherd who had owned a large flock of sheep. He had taken them into the capital and sold them for a very good price, and he pulled out an enormous bundle of tugrik\* notes. It spoke well for the honesty of the people that he was able to travel, unescorted, carrying so large a sum of money. To the herdsman who had chatted with us we gave a glass of vodka, into which he dipped his fingers, cast a little on one side, dipped again and cast a little on the other side. And then he drank to appease whatever gods there were for the luck which had come his way.

On our way we passed also a number of lakes, around which the grass grew luxuriantly and herds of cattle grazed, obviously getting a good living off the land. We passed a small encampment with shelters for the cattle

\* The tugrik or local currency. 2·30 tugrik = 1 rouble.



in very cold weather. There is a bridge over the Orkhon river, and as one crosses it one sees a notice in the Mongol language saying "No smoking," the theory being that if one dropped a match on the dry wooden structure of the bridge it would be disastrous.

We came to Chagan Bai Sing, translated as the White House, though about that I am not certain; evidently, however, Washington was not the first place to have a White House. Chagan Bai Shing was built in 1610 for one of the rulers and later ruined by internecine warfare. In the background there is a typical steppe scene showing an attempt at cultivation. At one time the Mongols thought that to dig in the ground was not only stupid, but dangerous, because of the release of all sorts of evil spirits who should be below ground. Now they have overcome that superstition and large areas of land are ploughed; there is a great deal of barley to be seen; also many herds of cattle; in fact, the animal husbandry of the Mongolians is of a high order. They have succeeded in breeding an animal known as a hainag, a cross between a yak sire and a cow. The first cross produces a strong creature of immense use in pulling carts over the rough countryside; the second cross is not so successful.

Another ancient ruin is the Black House—Hongtai Ju Yin—which is much older than the White House, dating back probably to the tenth century. Many people have been there hoping for finds, but there is little to be found on the surface. We did come across a few oddments there and round the White House, and also in the ruins of Karakorum, which was once the capital of the Mongol Empire.

From the Black House there was a view from a sort of battlement over a huge area of the country, with the river in the distance. Although the White House was knocked to pieces, there is a reproduction in Ulan Bator showing what the old house used to look like. The compound inside was used as a sort of midden, much like one sees in the case of French farm-houses.

There was a stupa outside the walls of the Black House, and our French-speaking Mongol interpreter climbed to the top. We had a highly-skilled English-speaking Mongol interpreter, but he had to part from him. Although the French-speaking Mongol was a good fellow, he was not of the same quality as the man who had to go. The latter was intensely interested in all the visits we paid; he was also rather like the apochryphal Englishman who said: "It's a fine day, let's go and kill something," for this man had a little .22 rifle and he could not resist firing at every bird he saw. He put a pencil in the ground, walked back 25 yards and knocked it over with two shots out of three.

In the central courtyard of the Black House is a carved stone of immense antiquity, and there is an ancient custom of saying a prayer and dropping a stone on the head of what looks like a tortoise. There are all sorts of theories about the stone: it is said that it was a memorial stone. It is not at all easy to say what its real history is. It has a Thibetan inscription on one side and a Mongol inscription on the other.

Our French-speaking Mongol interpreter was also cultural attaché, who spoke not only Mongol but a little Chinese, and was a most valuable aide. Our chauffeur could not speak English, but in spite of that we all

got on extraordinarily well together. At the end of one day, when he had had an accident, we came into Tsetserlig, an aimak, or provincial capital. Bawden and myself, and the Mongolians who were with us as a sort of staff, were taken to sleep in one room in the Rest House. When we asked where the chauffeur was to sleep, our hosts looked very surprised and replied, "He'll sleep in the car," whereupon Charles Bawden said, "When we get back to England and tell people there that the chauffeur had to sleep in the car while we, who have done no work at all, slept in luxury, they will be very surprised." Actually, our chauffeur was given a bed, but not before that need had been made known. He had worked very hard and deserved a bed.

We had a Zim motor-car which took us over most of the country, although it really was not the ideal car for the purpose. Going over one of the rough roads, we hit a rock and the clutch-plate broke. We only limped into Tsetserlig with difficulty and had to leave the car there for repair. We were at the provincial capital of a province and able to call on the assistance of the local Governor, who produced a Russian jeep with five seats, and much more suited to the journey we were making. For some days we travelled in that vehicle whilst the luxurious Zim was being repaired; I believe a spare part had to be brought from the capital.

Tsetserlig, the provincial capital, was not a big place but interesting as showing the difference between it and the actual capital of the country. We visited the museum at Tsetserlig, in which there were many interesting objects, some rather strange. One department was entirely composed of specimens of biscuits, cakes and sweets made in the factory in Ulan Bator. Among the old things was a wonderful stele on an ancient tortoise base. When we had been round the exhibits, the curator asked us to sign the visitors' book, adding that we were the first Englishmen to have visited that museum. Whilst at Tsetserlig we noted that the local buses were as overloaded as in most Eastern countries.

There is at Tai Ghuru a rock covered with all sorts of interesting inscriptions. It is said that there was a hole at that spot out of which came a serpent which caused a good deal of trouble, so the gods came along and put the stone over the hole so that the serpent could not get out again. The modern version describes the man who put the huge stone over the hole as "a people's hero." The inscriptions on the rock are in Thibetan, Mongol, old scripts and new scripts, but one of the most interesting things about the rock was a fish drawn on one of the facets, as representing Christianity.

While near the rock we ran into the Czech Archæological Expedition, with whom we had a good deal of converse. There were some grazing camels nearby, and the archæologists were amusing themselves by getting on and off them. We went to the ruins at Karakorum, and one of the most interesting old remains was a stone turtle, which might be fifth or sixth century, with a stele sticking up out of its back.

We had various views of Erdeni Tso, a famous monastery, founded by the convert Khan Abdai in 1586. In a close-up view we see the wife of the keeper of the place and her staid little daughter, with whom Charles Bawden fell in love at once, and she was very pleased to be made a fuss

of. Mongol children are, as a rule, absolutely charming, which reflects the exceedingly kind treatment their parents mete out to them. I have never heard a cross word spoken or seen anger shown to a Mongol child. The children are forthcoming and friendly; they think nothing of speaking to a foreigner as if they had known him all their lives; their natural charm is a good augury for the new generation.

Inside Erdeni Tso there was, in the old days, a stadium and a swimming pool. The place is still kept in fairly good order and the old buildings have been repaired. The square building inside the compound was at one time the residence of one of the princely lamas. Though rather dilapidated, there is still a good deal to be seen inside that stupa-walled compound. The courtyard beyond became better and better as we went on in. We were able to take a comprehensive photograph of the various temples. There are three temples to Buddha all alongside one another, the centre being dedicated to Youth, the left to Old Age, and the right to Middle-age. That dedicated to Old Age was full of beautiful old relics, and on the first floor we wandered about and saw bowls of votive offerings with their treasures. There were highly-decorated doorways.

I am reminded of an incident at Tsetserlig when we were shown a place which had been a lama's residence. We asked to be allowed to go inside, but were told, "It is top secret; you cannot go there." Bawden and I, being rather troublesome, said, "The door is open, let's look." With great difficulty we managed to get inside the compound, but were told we must not go into any of the buildings. We said we did not wish to, but there were some highly-decorated doors which Bawden said he would like to photograph, and he was told, "You cannot photograph that one, but you can photograph this." Both doors were next to one another; the highly top-secret door which Bawden was not to photograph had in front of it an ordinary weighing machine, which was looked upon as a secret piece of machinery of which no foreigner should be allowed to take a photograph!

I mentioned that we met some Czechs engaged in archæology. They have formed a joint party with some Mongolians and are undertaking a great deal of excavation. There are in the country some 200 sites of ancient remains already located. The Mongolians themselves are keen and anxious to reveal the secrets of their past, and they undertake a great deal of digging.

When we visited the site at Tungyukuk it was interesting to see the method adopted. Already there have been some valuable finds, and there is no shadow of doubt that they will find a great deal more. We also saw some diggings about 20 miles from the capital, where a number of articles had been unearthed, including golden bowls which have been placed in the National Museum in Ulan Bator.

Stele were found at Tungyukuk, and also a large stone, on which were recorded many historical events, and the design on which might be termed modern, although it dates back to the seventh and eighth century A.D.

After we had inspected the diggings, we were taken into the hospitality yurt, and the Mongol in charge of the diggings (Namnandorzh) and the Czechs entertained us in the most generous manner. After we had eaten

and drunk quite a lot, a bottle of Russian champagne was produced and little bowls handed round to everybody. Before we drank, one of the Czechs, who had a little English, rose and said, "I should like to propose the health of the Queen of England; we in Czechoslovakia admire Great Britain very much." We were mostly pleasantly surprised. It was, however, typical of the many touches of goodwill with which we met wherever we went.

On our way back to the capital we visited the coalmines at Nalaikha, and, after having braved the depths of those mines, we were taken for a long drive on a picnic outing. From the hill on which we picnicked, we looked down upon the Tola river valley and the summer camp created for the Pioneers, a group of young people, who are taken for a special treat to this summer camp, amidst most beautiful scenery.

A photograph taken at Nalaikha, near the coal-mines, shows a cart with an ancient form of wheel, with one cross-piece, as usual in Mongolia, but round the wheel there is a modern rubber tyre. If that is not a contrast between ancient and new, I do not know what is. The cart is, moreover, drawn by a hainag, the cross between a yak sire and a cow. Another contrast is that between the modern buildings and the Mongolians in the clothes they have worn for a hundred years and more.

I thank you all for listening so patiently, and now I shall be pleased to answer any questions.

Miss M. W. KELLY: Did you hear or see anything of Molotov? Is he not in Ulan Bator?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I knew that Molotov had been appointed as Ambassador to Ulan Bator. I was asked by some friends if I would like to see him, and I said I would very much like to do so. Forty-eight hours later I asked where Molotov was and they replied that they did not know where he was at that moment. I asked again forty-eight hours later and my friends replied that he had gone to Moscow. Probably he had no particular wish to meet a travelling Englishman. He, however, appeared shortly afterwards on the occasion of the Anniversary Parade which you saw in the opening film and which celebrated the country's independence. It has now been independent for thirty-seven years, and the thirty-seventh Anniversary Parade took place whilst Dr. Bawden and I were away in the steppes. Molotov was seen and photographed there with other people.

Asked the height of Ulan Bator,

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD replied: Just under 4,000 feet, and round it there are hills rising to great heights.

Mr. KENT: We were told that the lamas and lamaism were disappearing. Is there no longer a representative of the Thibetan lama?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: One could say there is a representative because the lama of the town would pay tribute to the Living Buddha if there were one. After the Living Buddha died and the Court of Lamas suggested they should appoint another, there was no great enthusiasm, and since then lamaism has gone down and down.

Mr. KENT: Do the people take to that readily?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I would think that in no Eastern country could one eliminate religion, though at times it peters out. It could, in fact, be said that there is now little religion remaining in Mongolia, but there are still a certain number of people who get consolation from their religion. When I made my farewell speech at the dinner given us, I said I was glad to note that the Government had not completely eliminated the lamas because obviously a certain number of those in the country derive consolation from their presence. At the same time, there is no doubt that the country was terribly poor under lamaism, because when every third son went into the priesthood it meant fewer people of use from the point of view of production. All the lamas did was to pray and turn prayer-wheels. That did not advance the economy of the country. The decline in the number of lamas means more men are able to take part in the cultivation of the land and so on, which is to the material advantage of all concerned.

Asked how long the visit to Western Mongolia lasted and in what year it took place,

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD replied: On this last visit, this summer, we were in Mongolia for three weeks; when I went there forty years ago I was in the country between two and three weeks, but there was then not so much to see.

Asked if he had seen many wild animals,

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD said: Not many animals but a number of different birds: Demoiselle cranes flew around the lakes, duck, eagles and a few small birds. When I saw our interpreter, who shot at all birds, aiming at a hoopoe, I stopped him.

Mr. LANGE: Was the language on the stone found near Ulan Bator rendered in Cyrillic alphabet or in the Russian language? I believe most Mongolians would not understand the Russian language.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: That is true; most do not understand the Russian language; but a number are learning Russian and some go to Moscow to do so. Actually the Cyrillic alphabet is used in Mongolia and it is not, in characters, unlike Russian. Most notices on the shops appear to be in Russian, but they are really in Mongolian. The old script about which Dr. Bawden knows is still comprehensible to many Mongols. In Inner Mongolia, where the Cyrillic script was adopted, they have given it up and gone back to the old script partly because the Chinese wish that.

Asked the relationship between Inner and Outer Mongolia,

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD replied: No relationship. Inner Mongolia is completely controlled by China. Outer Mongolia, though this is difficult for many to realize, is an independent country. It is so often thought to be one of the Soviet Republics. I remind you that it has been an independent country for thirty-seven years.

H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE: In one of the photographs I noticed a Russian shrine. Could Group-Captain Smallwood say who was buried there?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: There are shrines and statues all over the place, some to Mongol heroes, some to Russian heroes. Lenin is represented. To my mind they did not seem to mean much to the Mongolians.

We walked by an important statue going into the Academy of Science at Ulan Bator, but no one seemed impressed.


Mr. LAMBAIT: In view of the number of lakes we saw in the photographs, is the country well irrigated from the point of view of agriculture?

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: It is an enormous country; there is a large area to the south, the Gobi Desert, in which there is practically no water. I believe about five per cent. of Outer Mongolia is almost desert, or semi-desert. There are a few lakes in the steppes and some important rivers, the Tola and Orkhon among them, but they are not navigable. They help grass to grow and are therefore important in the maintenance of the herds which are still most important from the point of view of the country's economy.


Mr. RUDOLF MAYER: The wheels shown on the cart near the coal-mines were exactly the same as those seen on ancient chariots.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: I believe there is a direct connection; it is not improbable that Alexander left some of his chariots in the country.


The CHAIRMAN: It now only remains for me to thank Group-Captain Smallwood on your behalf for what I am sure you will all agree has been a most interesting lecture. I do not accept his statement that he is "the world's worst photographer." Far from it. We thank you very much indeed, Group-Captain Smallwood. (*Applause.*)



A HAINAG CROSS BETWEEN YAK AND COW. NOTE PRIMITIVE WHEEL SHOD WITH RUBBER TYRE



MEMORIAL TABLE NEAR THE WHITE HOUSE, INSCRIPTION IN TIBETAN AND MONGOLIAN. LEFT TO RIGHT, MONGUL CULTURAL ATTACHÉ, CHAUFFEUR AND MONGUL-FRENCH INTERPRETER



THREE TEMPLES TO BUDDHA AT ERDENI TSO



YURTS OUTSIDE ULAN BATOR





PART OF THE GADANG MONASTERY AT ULAN BATOR



THE GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE AT ULAN BATOR, THE CAPITAL



VIEW OF THE KUWAIT OIL COMPANY'S MAIN OFFICE LOOKING TOWARDS  
THE DISPLAY CENTRE, AHMADI MARCH 58



A NEW SCHOOL IN KUWAIT TOWN, APRIL 58

# DEVELOPMENT IN KUWAIT

By E. A. V. DE CANDOLE, C.M.G., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, December 3rd, 1958, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—In the unavoidable absence of Sir Hugh Dow, our Chairman, the very pleasant duty has fallen to me to take the chair at this meeting, and to introduce Mr. de Candole who is going to talk to us. Actually, however, there is no need for me to introduce Mr. de Candole for he is well known to so many present, but this does give me an opportunity of adding something I would like to say, and that is that Great Britain has sent out a very fine group of men over a very large number of years into various parts of the world in which they have given a lifetime's work, become proficient in the language, the literature and the culture of the country in which they have been working and have given of their best to build up administrations in those countries.

Mr. de Candole, having spent a lifetime in the Sudan, retired, and then took up a new appointment in industry. The credit which is due to these men is not often given either in the Press or in various publications, but the publications of the Royal Central Asian Society do provide a forum in such work which brings to the notice of members and, we hope, a wider field, the valuable work done and the knowledge available. We in industry are extremely fortunate to be able to get a lifetime experience in the particular work in which Mr. de Candole and other colleagues are engaged, and who come into industry where there are problems unconnected with the technical side which are today extremely difficult, and where we have the advantage of the type of men who have gone out into the world to do this work.

I should like to pay that tribute not only to Mr. de Candole but to all those who have given that help in industry and are doing so today. I do not propose to take up more time because you have come to hear Mr. de Candole and so I ask him now to give his lecture.

**T**HIS talk will deal mainly with Government developments in Kuwait, although I shall also touch on some current developments in the oil industry. I should perhaps mention that I have just completed a three-year stay in Kuwait as head of the Kuwait Oil company's Town office, which is responsible for the Company's relations with the Government and the commercial community in Kuwait. I have thus been in close touch with recent State developments and Kuwait opinion generally.

While in Kuwait a month or two ago I was informed that much harm had been caused to British relations with Kuwait by malicious comment in English newspapers. Here is an example from a London weekly paper in July last: "Kuwait is not a progressive state. The huge new hospitals, schools and reservoirs are merely a façade concealing corruption, profligacy and brutality on a breath-taking scale. The £110 million annual oil royalties are regarded as the Ruler's personal income, for which he is not accountable."

All this is grossly untrue and calculated to cause much damage. The Ruler treats the oil revenues as a sacred trust which he is responsible for using in the best interests of his country and people, as I hope to show in the course of this talk.

### GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

At the head of the State is the Ruler, who is chosen from within the Sabah family in the direct line from the great Shaikh Mubarak who ruled from 1896-1915. The present Ruler is H.H. Shaikh Abdulla al Salim al Sabah. The Sabah dynasty was established in 1750.

Under the Ruler is a Council of State of the twelve senior members of the Sabah family which acts as an advisory body to the Ruler.

The government is organized in twenty-two departments on the usual lines.

In addition there is a Development Board of Kuwaiti officials to superintend the development programme financed out of the oil revenues.

Each department is under the general supervision of one of seven Presidents who are senior members of the Sabah family.

The Finance Department falls directly under the Ruler.

Each Department has a Kuwaiti Director and Assistant Director selected from the cadre of 1,800 classified officials. This cadre includes Palestinians, Egyptians, Iraqis, Lebanese, as well as over 100 British staff. The tendency is for a gradual replacement of Western staff by Arabs as in Middle East generally.

One reads sometimes in English papers, and even hears from our diplomatic friends that Kuwait is governed by an out-dated patriarchal system and needs democratic reforms. If this is so, it is the business of Kuwaitis, not of us. But in fact, is it strictly true? On the one hand Kuwait has, in the course of the past ten years, replaced patriarchal rule by departmental government. On the other hand, one might well ask where Western democratic systems have succeeded in the Middle East. After a brief flowering they have been cut out and sometimes replaced by authoritarian régimes far less tolerant than the so-called autocratic Shaikhly rule of Kuwait.

### GOVERNMENT FINANCE

The revenue of Kuwait State is made up mainly from the oil revenues (which have for the past three years been running somewhere around £100m). To this must be added Customs dues comprising perhaps another £2m. This is a very healthy revenue for a small territory with a population, according to the 1957 census, of some 206,000. There is no taxation other than Customs dues and an income tax on corporate bodies ranging from 5 per cent. to 50 per cent. in proportion to the scale of profits. The revenues are administered by the Director of Finance.

I here wish to correct a commonly held error that the Kuwait revenues are divided into three equal parts: the Ruler and his family, Government expenditure, and foreign investment. May we first get this matter straight for the record. The Ruler in fact takes no part of the State revenue, nor do his family, other than the comparatively moderate salaries paid to senior members in respect of the offices they hold as Presidents of Government Departments. It is, therefore, misleading to call the oil revenues the personal income of the Ruler, as they are paid straight into the Government Treasury and the Ruler does not draw on them at all. For invest-

ment there is a board in London which handles the surpluses transferred from the Government Treasury in Kuwait. The income of the Ruler and the Kuwait Shaikhs comes from private property, mainly in land. The Ruler sets an example of austerity in his mode of life. Most of the Shaikhs do not live on an extravagant scale, although they have heavy traditional entertainment responsibilities. They also carry out their functions as Heads of Departments in a conscientious and efficient manner.

A break-down of the Kuwait budget shows an expenditure of somewhere about £85m (including development expenditure), leaving a balance of some £15m to £20m for investments.

The expenditure is divided among the Government Departments, Public Works and Development being the heaviest item at about £27m or nearly one-third of the total. About £7m each is being spent on Education and Public Security and about £5m on Public Health and Medical services.

The normal increase in annual state expenditure keeps pace with the steady increase in oil revenues, and is well inside the total revenue, with a surplus for investment for the future.

#### DEVELOPMENT PLAN

I should first say that the developments have been mainly planned and carried out by the Kuwaitis with the assistance of a handful of foreign experts, including about 100-150 British staff. In the early stages, British contractors were employed with Kuwaiti partners, who did some excellent work, but this system did not suit the Kuwaitis, and since then ordinary construction has been done by P.W.D. and local contractors, and only specialized projects handled by foreign firms. The Oil Company is not concerned with the State economic planning or public works other than to provide natural gas for power, bitumen for road work and semi-technical plant to help out in a jam. The Oil Company also assists municipal development and private enterprise in the Ahmadi area, the centre of the Oil Company's operations. It also co-operates in the fields of education, training and social welfare.

The main expenditure is on the Public Works and Development programme, which is proceeding according to a plan initiated in 1952, but since substantially modified to conform to changing requirements and new techniques.

These developments fall under nine main heads: Town Planning, Electricity, Water Supply, Education, Health, Ports, Roads, Housing, Others.

##### *Town Planning*

This involves the conversion of the old seaport into a modern city with broad thoroughfares and traffic roundabouts, new markets to replace the congested covered shops, new Government Offices and public buildings, and the replacement of sub-standard buildings by modern brick or concrete construction.

A British firm of Town Planning consultants is responsible for the planning side—the execution is carried out by P.W.D.

Considerable progress has been made in demolition of old buildings, and the town is now intersected by broad dual-carriageway boulevards with roundabouts at intersections.

Generous compensation is paid to the owners of demolished buildings in the form of cash or a new house in the suburbs.

The second part of the plan involves the expansion of the new town outside the walls (demolished in 1957) by the development of eight self-contained neighbourhood units accommodating 48,000 people with their own mosques, primary schools, clinics, light industries, shops and civic centres. There will be two secondary schools for every four neighbourhoods.

Planning on similar lines is being extended to the villages along the coast.

I should here say something about the way in which State development projects are carried out. Skilled consultants are employed for the planning of all projects. These have up till now been mainly British. Major engineering projects are then put out to tender among a group of approved tender companies who have to be in partnership with Kuwaiti firms. The approved list for projects over £750,000 includes 7 German firms, 5 British, 1 Dutch, 1 Yugoslavian, 4 Austrian, 1 American and 1 Lebanese. Competition is becoming keener and British firms will have to work very hard to keep their place in the Middle East field. I may say that this applies to the oil industry as well as construction engineering.

Roads and Housing Schemes and new schools are not put out to tender but carried out direct by P.W.D. or Education Department with use of local contractors.

### *Electricity*

The first Power Station of 30,000 Kws which was designed and constructed by British firms was completed in 1952, and a second one adjoining it, of 40,000 Kws, has just been completed by an Austro-Kuwait firm, making a total generating capacity of 70,000 Kws. These plants are fuelled by natural gas piped from the oil fields. Distribution is by 33 KV and 11 KV ring mains and a series of sub-stations. The service includes extensive street lighting of the latest type. Neon lighting is coming into use on a large scale.

Smaller power stations have also been constructed for the villages of Jahra and Fahahil.

### *Water Supply*

Among the public utility projects, pride of place must be given to the sea-water distillation plant at Shuwaikh—also designed and constructed by a British firm—which is the biggest in the world. The plant consists of five units, each providing one million gallons per day. To date, four units have been completed. The plant is powered by gas-fired boilers and steam-driven turbines, thereby keeping the running costs at an economical level. Natural gas for this purpose is piped from the oil fields 25 miles away.

There is also a brackish water supply of 200,000 gallons daily from wells at Suleibiya.

Water is stored in three reservoirs, each of three-million gallon capacity. Distribution is by road tankers from a chain of filling stations, to which a piped water supply is led from a system of reservoirs and header tanks.

Plans are being prepared for a £4m water distribution system, Phase 2, with duplicate mains for drinking water and saline water for flushing. This will be followed by a sewage scheme, Phase 1 of which will cost £2½m.

The Shatt al Arab project, designed to provide a supply of sweet water, either by canal or pipeline, from the Shatt al Arab at Basra, has not been abandoned. The survey was made in 1954; it remains to secure the political agreement with Iraq. The total capacity of the canal scheme was estimated at 75,000,000 gallons per day at a capital cost of Rs.25,600,000, and the cost of the same quantity of pipeline at Rs.26,500,000.

### *Education—Schools*

Kuwait is justly proud of its educational experiments and the number and perfection of design and equipment of its schools. There are 76 State Schools in Kuwait. Education is provided free of charge in State Schools for boys and girls from the kindergarten to the secondary level. School meals served from a central kitchen and clothing is also provided free.

All boys who pass the secondary level are entitled to free University or equivalent outside Kuwait, either in Egyptian or Lebanese universities or in U.K. or U.S.A. The number of boys and girls studying abroad is at present 346, of whom 162 are in U.K.

### *Secondary School, Shuwaiḫh*

This at present provides education for 855 boys between 14 and 18. It is a magnificently conceived project on the most up to date and spacious lines, a main central classroom block with fine assembly theatre seating 2,000; six boarding houses, each designed for 200 boys, laboratories, art school, library, dining hall, mosque, teachers' bungalows, swimming pool, stadium, gymnasium, tennis courts and football ground. The games played are football, volley ball and tennis. Students from other Arab countries are welcomed.

This School was designed and built by a Lebanese firm, and its ultimate future is as the University of Kuwait; it has been planned with this intention.

### *Primary Schools in Kuwait*

There are over 70 Primary and Intermediate schools, similar to the Secondary school, and five mixed kindergartens.

The first three Primary Schools in Kuwait were designed and built by British firms.

Girls' schools have not been forgotten. There is a Secondary School for 165, and primary schools and kindergartens for over 10,000 girls. A new girls' secondary school is being built on the coast west of Kuwait.

### *Technical and Commercial Education*

Shuwaikh Technical School has at present 152 boys studying engineering and technical subjects.

There is a Commercial School for 1,025 pupils in Kuwait, also schools for blind boys and blind girls.

The State also maintains primary schools at Bombay and Karachi, and Sharjah and Ras al Khaima in the Gulf.

Altogether the number of pupils is approximately 30,227, of whom 19,341 are boys and 10,886 girls. Total number of teachers is 1,048 male and 660 female, including Palestinians, Egyptians and Iraqis.

There are some 400 Kuwaitis receiving University and post-Secondary education abroad—of which 162 are in U.K.

### *Medical Services*

Kuwait is also famed for its generous and up-to-date medical services. Treatment is free to all, Arab or European. During my stay in Kuwait, my family and myself benefited from the first-class treatment available there. There are at present two general hospitals, T.B. sanatorium and mental hospitals. Construction has started on a new 500-bedded hospital (the Sabah Hospital) at Shuwaikh, which will cost £2½ million. A second T.B. sanatorium of 300 beds and a hospital for infectious diseases are also planned.

There are 21 State clinics with emergency beds in Kuwait and outlying villages.

The Oil Company has recently started construction of a new 200-bedded general hospital at Ahmadi to replace the present hospital at Magwa, five miles away. There are also clinics for employees at Ahmadi and Mina al Ahmadi.

Medical treatment is free; the State employs a large staff of doctors, including Palestinian, British, Iraqi and Egyptian. There are also doctors in private practice. Some Kuwaitis have recently qualified, and others are under training in U.K. and elsewhere. The Director of Medical Services is British.

There is also an American Mission Hospital with 65 beds in Kuwait, founded in 1911.

### *Ports*

A new port is being constructed at Shuwaikh in Kuwait bay at a cost of Rupees 23 million. Up to now all but the smaller freighters have had to discharge five miles off. The new scheme provides for an entrance channel and a deep anchorage basin for ships up to 28 ft. draught, a dhow basin in the bay, and a quay of pre-stressed concrete 2,400 ft. long with alongside berths for four medium-sized freighters. The scheme involves some difficult dredging, as the sea bed is tough rock. It also provides for harbour buildings, including Customs offices and transit shed and storage accommodation. The intention is that the old town harbour shall be done away with, but that is being resisted by the dhow owners and sea captains. This project is being carried out by an American firm.



While on the subject of ports, mention must be made of the new pier which the Oil Company is building at a cost of £8m on the coast four miles north of the present pier at Mina al Ahmadi to expand oil loading facilities. This pier runs out into deeper water than the other one, and is designed to handle three of the largest tankers now under construction simultaneously. The pier length is 5,700 ft., compared with South Pier 4,140 ft., and the pier head is in 55 to 60 ft. of water, depending upon the state of the tide. Pipelines and connections to tankers will allow average loading rates of 5,000 tons an hour, with a maximum rate of 6,750.

### *Roads*

Over 280 miles of paved roads have been constructed inside and outside the town. The number of motor vehicles is 30,000, which is proportionally one of the world's greatest traffic densities. There is a well-planned system of perimeter double track roads designed to circulate traffic round rather than through the town and to provide the new neighbourhood units with efficient communications. New trunk roads include a coast road linking the east end of Kuwait city with the Company-road system at Ahmadi, and another to the village of Jahara, 20 miles west of Kuwait. This latter road will shortly be extended to the Iraq frontier a further 75 miles, construction of which will start in January 1959.

Another new road planned is an esplanade along the old harbour front from Dasman Palace to Shuwaikh, involving the demolition of some of the picturesque old harbour buildings, and will entirely change the character of the old water front. Roads are designed and built by P.W.D.

### *New Projects*

New projects, for which funds have been allocated, are as follows: Sabah Hospital, to start December 1958 (£3.25m); Finance Department, to start May 1959 (£1.5m); Municipality Department, to start December 1958 (£1.6m); Printing and Publishing Department, to start January 1959 (£1m); Law Courts, to start May 1959 (£1.25m); Social Affairs Department, to start September 1959 (£.75m); Post, Telegraph and Telephone Department; Automatic Telephone system, 4,000 lines; Education Department offices; Abattoir, to start May 1959; Fish and Meat Market, under construction; Vegetable Market, to start January 1959; Central Fire Station, to start January 1959; Government Hotel, to start May 1959; Town Drainage, Phase 1 (£2.4m); Town Water Distribution, Phase 2 (£4.2m).

### *Government Hotel*

The new 400-bed Government Hotel is being designed by Raglan Squire and Partners, and is scheduled for completion late in 1960. The site is on the coast near the old Jahra Gate, a very accessible position. The plans conform with up-to-date Western pattern, five storeys, with basement kitchen and service area and ground floor reception, shops and restaurant. The first floor has a large public lounge and terrace. There is also a roof dining garden and terrace. A swimming pool will adjoin it.

### *International Airport*

Messrs. F. S. Snow and Partners are the consultant engineers, and construction will start in January 1960.

The site adjoins the Kuwait-Ahmadi road about seven miles south of the town. The airport will be of Class A international standard, with a main runway 6,000 ft. long, capable of handling the largest civilian aircraft at present contemplated.

### *Neighbourhood Units*

Seven suburban neighbourhood centres are planned for construction in the next 18 months around the circumference of Kuwait Town. Each unit includes municipal centre, schools, clinic, shops with flats over, mosque, library, police station, restaurant, public hall and telephone and post office.

### *Housing*

The Government are building 850 lower-income houses in 1958 in the new neighbourhood units.

Previously, 1,202 houses have been built under this scheme, about 180 in Kuwait City and the remainder in the neighbourhood units on the circumference.

A tremendous amount of private building is going on in the suburbs of Kuwait, mostly architect-designed houses of substantial modern design. There is a Government loan scheme open to Kuwaitis of lower-income groups, and plans are being prepared for a labourers' village of modern, low cost houses.

### *Trade and Industry*

Before the discovery of oil, Kuwait's prosperity was built on seafaring and trading. The Kuwait merchant and sea captain had a reputation for enterprise and skill extending far beyond their shores, and with the growth of the oil industry the Kuwait economy is now a very thriving one. The merchants travel all over the world in the course of business. One of the leading men told me recently that he had visited America, six European countries, Ethiopia, Sudan, Japan and Libya all in the course of one year. The country has to import practically all its requirements. Britain is Kuwait's largest supplier of iron and steel, engineering plant and machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment, textiles, woollens and worsteds; U.S.A. supplies vehicles and machinery; Japan, cement and fabrics; India, timber and textiles; Iraq supplies sheep, meal, barley, dates and fodder; Germany, electrical equipment, hardware, iron and steel, building materials and furniture; Italy, iron and steel, general merchandise and textiles; Holland, tinned foods, fats and sugar; Persia and Lebanon, fruit and vegetables; Switzerland, watches and electrical equipment. The import of alcoholic drinks is very strictly controlled.

Total imports valued £57.4 m sterling in 1957, of which, including Kuwait Oil Company's imports, 43 per cent. came from United Kingdom,

and this phenomenal flow of goods has averted inflation. Currency in circulation is about Rs.200m, and local deposits in banks Rs.642m.

Much of the oil revenues is injected into the local economy in the form of State development construction, compensation for demolished housing and land expropriated and oil company local expenditure. The Company's purchases in the Kuwait market in 1957 totalled Rs.17.7m, and payments to local contractors for construction work for the Company exceeded Rs.45m.

All this has produced great prosperity among the merchants, who make more use of their capital than is usual in the area. Some industries are being organized on a semi-nationalized basis, part of the capital being provided by the State. Among the local capital enterprises initiated recently are the Kuwait National Bank, with a capital of Rs.446 million, Kuwait Airways, in association with B.O.A.C., Kuwait Cinema Company, which has built three new cinemas, seating each over 2,000 in the past 18 months, and the Kuwait Shipping Company, whose first tanker of 45,000 tons has just been built in Japan. To enable this Company to engage in international shipping under the Kuwait flag, a Kuwait maritime code is now being drawn up and will shortly be enacted by the Ruler.

While Kuwait's traditional industry of dhow building is now declining, other industries are arising in Kuwait. The Government has a sand-lime brick plant with an annual capacity of 40 million bricks, and a pre-cast concrete factory. A remarkably large industry is soft-drink production with nine sizable plants. Other private industries include tile making, pre-cast concrete plants, motor engineering, light engineering, and the making of oxygen, furniture and wrought iron.

A Kuwait Gas Company has recently been formed for the refining and utilization of gas for domestic and other uses.

I will conclude with a brief description of the Oil Town of Ahmadi. When oil production started in 1947, it became the Kuwait Oil Company's task to construct and establish from scratch the necessary amenities and services of a complete township for the staff and labour required to operate an oilfield at the earliest possible date. The site chosen was a desert ridge about 22 miles south of the City of Kuwait, overlooking the sea about five miles away. Construction started in 1948. A paved road was built from Kuwait and another from the coast on the site chosen for the Company's terminal, where an oil loading pier, boat harbour, power station, water distillation plant and refinery were constructed.

In the course of ten years, Ahmadi has grown into a town with about 2,500 inhabited homes for all categories of Company employees and 11,500 inhabitants. The town has its own public electricity distribution system, piped water supply, automatic telephone system, main drainage system and air conditioning distribution. It contains three mosques and Protestant and Catholic churches. The amenities include playing fields for cricket, football and hockey, tennis and squash courts, three well-equipped clubs for different categories, each with its swimming pool and cinema, a guest house and restaurant for staff, and a large restaurant for labour, a post office and two shopping centres. There is a large industrial area with workshops, transport lines and stores, a tank farm for the storage of

oil, main offices and a fire station. On the medical side, a new hospital with 200 beds is under construction, and there are three clinics for out-patients. There are four schools for children of staff, two provided by the State, catering for 2,000 children in all. Public Security is looked after by the State Security Forces, with headquarters and barracks at the entrance to the town. The town has three newspapers, a daily and two weekly in English and Arabic. Gardens have been made around the houses and at selected points in the township. In fact the Company has erected out of the barren desert a self-contained garden city of spacious and attractive appearance of which Kuwait may well be proud.

There is no time to deal with the new projects now being carried out to expand the oil industry. These include the Refinery, which is being much increased, a new pipeline 75 miles long to N. Kuwait, the new field at N. Kuwait, and a new deep-water jetty capable of handling the largest tankers contemplated.

Kuwait Oil Company does all possible to assist local industries by buying their products and assisting their establishment, and also to encourage local entrepreneurship by using Kuwaiti contractors. Otherwise the Company concentrates upon its task of producing oil. Its policy is to maintain its concession by the efficiency of its co-operation and the equity of its agreements with the State.

Before ending, I must stress that much understanding of the new psychology which is spreading in the Middle East is needed to maintain good relations. We must rid ourselves of the idea that we are fighting a rear-guard action against Arab nationalism. We must reshape our thinking to see how we can adapt our methods to co-operate with the evolution which is taking place, not to oppose it. Politically we should be well advised to treat our relations with Kuwait not as with a subject State but as that of a partner based on mutual interest and a long association.

Commercially, I am an optimist, and believe that if handled aright Britain and America have a good long-term position for assisting in the economic development of Kuwait, not only in the oil industry, but also in the fields of air communications, banking, engineering and planning. Competition in these fields is becoming very keen, and the best skills and best relations are essential if British enterprise is to keep its place in Kuwait.

The CHAIRMAN having invited questions in the time remaining,

Group-Captain H. ST. C. SMALLWOOD said: Over forty years ago I was in the area of which Mr. de Candole has been speaking; the change evident from the slides he has shown is really shattering. I ask how, in a small community such as Kuwait, sufficient labour could be found to erect such magnificent buildings as we saw on the screen? I believe there were few there able to do such work. Secondly, is there any hope of seeing any advance in the planting of trees? The villages and towns looked somewhat bare. One feels that if trees could be made to grow in the climate, it would be an advantage for the country.

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Of course, all the new building involves a tremendous number of labourers and skilled supervisors. The latter are found, to some extent, among the Kuwaitis; to the other extent, they are found

among Arabs from Palestine and other areas who are attracted to Kuwait by the tremendous developments taking place. The labourers, attracted by better wages, come from neighbouring Arab countries, Persia and the Gulf of Muscat, etc.

As regards the trees, although the pictures did not show them very clearly, along the wide boulevards and the dual carriageways trees are growing up well. Many species do not take to the type of soil or the climate, but there is a tree in the country, known as the prosopis, which does very well. In the five or six years since tree-planting commenced, a great improvement has taken place; in five years' time the trees will be part of the landscape.

Mrs. ST. J. COOK: Is there any rainfall at all in Kuwait?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: About five to eight inches a year, but the rainfall varies considerably; some years there is a decent rainfall; in other years it is very poor.

Col. ROUTH: What has happened to those excellent little ships so often seen?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: The dhows are famous through the area and down to Africa—there are probably about 100 of them actually trading from Kuwait to India and down the coast of East Africa. The building of the dhows continues. You will be unlucky if you wander down to the old harbour and not find a dhow being built, with the old dhow builders, who run a trade of their own, hard at work; also the dhows are still being built on those fine, spacious lines.

Brigadier S. H. LONGRIGG: Just for future reference and in order that discredit may be given where it is due, could we be told the author of the article which the lecturer read out, and the paper in which it was printed?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: I think it is fair to say that the article was shown to me by a man in Kuwait; it was in *The New Statesman* in July 1958.

Mr. DAVID SCOTT: Can the lecturer tell us if there is sufficient water for market gardening and that sort of activity?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: Not yet. As I pointed out, practically the entire supply comes from sea-water distillation plant, which is a very large one, but the supply at the moment is being used almost entirely for household needs and drinking. A certain amount of irrigation comes from the brackish water station at Suleibiya, about seven miles outside Kuwait, but there is not enough for irrigation on a big scale. It is possible that the project of bringing water from the Shatt-al-Arab at Basra may proceed now. It was held up owing to difficulties with the late Iraq Government. The Kuwaitis are now optimistic that they may be able to revive that project and get water for irrigation from the Shatt-al-Arab.

Mr. HILLYARD: Has labour which has come from other areas been integrated so that the people think of themselves as Kuwaitis, or do they think of themselves as Somalis, etc.?

Mr. DE CANDOLE: I should say integration is taking place, and quite a number of immigrants have acquired Kuwait nationality, which is much sought after, it being such a prosperous place. The process is continuing, but it is a matter of selection to some extent, and it is not everybody who

can attain nationality even if they want it. But many who originally came from Iraq have acquired the nationality and are losing their Iraqi background.

Mrs. COLLARD : What is the attitude of the Ruler towards journalists?

Mr. DE CANDOLE : The attitude of the Ruler has been reasonable; in my view very reasonable; he has broadmindedness towards journalists; there has been no restriction placed on journalists. You may have seen that for a time there was restriction, but it was not imposed by the Ruler. He has said he is only too happy to have people coming to the country. Although he never complains in any way, I think he is slightly pained when they find it necessary to publish scurrilous remarks which do great discredit to the journalists themselves.

Col. ROUTH : Does Palestinian labour consist of Palestine refugees?

Mr. DE CANDOLE : Yes, the authorities deliberately encourage Palestinian refugees to come to Kuwait, and not only give them jobs in the Government but allow them to open shops and take part in trade on equal terms with Kuwaitis. You will find many Palestinians who have become Kuwaitis and are becoming rich in Kuwait.

Mrs. THRUPP : Is there any hero-worship of Nasser?

Mr. DE CANDOLE : He is a great hero among the boys and young people. I think older people are inclined to take some of his sayings with a pinch of salt. The younger boys always like to have a popular leader and Nasser is a popular leader; one cannot deny that.

Asked whether the Army could be regarded as loyal to the Ruler,

Mr. DE CANDOLE replied. The Army is, as far as I know, entirely loyal. Kuwait has a strong Army, well organized, well officered, under the control of the Deputy Ruler, Sheikh Abdullah Mubarak.

The CHAIRMAN : The time has come to close the meeting, and I express on behalf of all present our thanks to Mr. de Candole for coming and giving this lecture today. I know you will wish to express your appreciation in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

# WATER PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By COLONEL K. W. MERRYLEES, O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 8, 1958, Sir Hugh Dow in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN said: This afternoon I have to introduce to you Colonel Merrylees, who is going to talk to us about Water Problems in the Middle East. Colonel Merrylees is a retired officer of the Royal Engineers; but, like many of us, he is still working and finding that one has to work a good deal harder after retirement than one had to work before. He has spent many years in India, but I understand that he is not going to talk about India in particular and instead will talk about many parts of the Middle East.

I RECENTLY opened a copy of the Journal and saw inside the cover the map covering part of the area which this Society now is interested in, and I thought I could not do better than take this area for my talk today. It is, of course, a vast area, so I shall start with Pakistan, and work as far towards the West as I can in the time. Not only is the area large, but in it are some of the biggest low-rainfall areas in the world, which consequently, are the most difficult from the point of view of water development and supply.

No country is free from water shortages, even the British Isles, but there are deserts in Iran and Saudi Arabia on which the rainfall is less than on the driest countries elsewhere. I shall not talk about storage schemes, which nearly always involve the construction of dams, as these are straightforward engineering projects, and do not have the same problems and difficulties as schemes for the development of underground sources, with which I am chiefly concerned. I believe that in every country in this area there are underground reserves of water, safe from evaporation losses, which have so far never been tapped, and it is to indicate some of these sources and the problems of their useful development that I will now start a tour from the most eastern country, Pakistan.

You will doubtless have read of the great storage schemes, in being or proposed, but the main difficulty is rather political than engineering since the boundary with India has been placed between the headworks of the main Punjab canal system, on the Sutlej and Beas rivers, and the distribution system. Unless boundaries are placed on watersheds this problem is almost certain to arise, and I shall show further examples later. Should the supply from the headworks be reduced or even cut off the only possible alternative would be further storage on the rivers wholly in Pakistan, supplemented by the extraction from subsoil water moving in old stream beds buried in the alluvium which makes up most of these plains. This considerable amount of water is lost into the sea bed eventually, as in many places throughout the world, and the only problem really is in the

correct siting of wells to obtain the maximum quantities and stop part of these losses. In the hilly western part, where the rainfall is small, there is, in almost every valley, alluvial deposit in which some water flows and which could be recovered for the use of the inhabitants of the valleys and the plains below, before it is, eventually, lost in the sea.

Afghanistan has few water problems. In the north there is a fair rainfall, and the terraced strips are watered from the surface streams and from the flows in the alluvial fill in the valley bottoms. The Helmand river, which flows across the southern plain, has recently been dammed by an American Company to feed this plain, and consequently there is now no surface flow across the frontier into Iran, as there used to be, and agricultural land has become a desert, and will remain so until the subsoil flows near the old river bed are found and developed.

This brings us to the two countries with the most difficult water development problems—Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran is, for the most part, a salt desert surrounded by mountain ranges, and, unfortunately, most of the rainfall is on the outer side of the mountains, and so only a very small part of the country benefits directly from this, though snow on the higher ranges does provide some water on the central plain. Any of this water not extracted in or near the foothills passes into the salt desert and evaporates from there. Part of this water is extracted by a system of tunnels called "Qanats," some of which are believed to have been built hundreds of years ago, and of which there are said to be some three million miles altogether in the country. These same tunnels are found in both Baluchistan and the Trucial Coast and were probably constructed in all these places by Persians. A large proportion of these qanats have already gone out of action, and the remainder are no longer economical because it is a most expensive process to clean out and repair underground tunnels in modern times. A qanat is constructed as follows: At the point where a valley emerges from the hills and becomes part of an open plain, a well, called the "mother" well, is dug until the water table is met. If this place is then judged to be satisfactory, the well is continued into the aquifer as far as possible. A second well is then dug about fifty yards downhill from the first, and a tunnel made between them. This tunnel has a gradient less than the surface slope, but enough for water from the first well to flow down it, since this tunnel is started a foot or two below the water table. This process is then repeated, the wells or shafts decreasing in depth until the tunnel emerges at the surface of the ground. Only land below this tunnel exit can be irrigated, and, because the mother well can only take a part of the subsoil flow, the whole scheme is both wasteful and expensive. Something must clearly be done to improve the recovery from the subsoil flow because the sizes of the villages and cultivated fields are limited only by the amount of water which can be made available. Some of the tunnels are of very great length, like the one at Yazd, which is said to be fifty-seven miles long, or deep like the qanat feeding the British Embassy garden in Tehran, which has a mother well four hundred feet deep, and under three feet in diameter, up and down which men go using hand and foot holes in the well wall.

The depth of water in the mother well must depend on the amount



of seasonal rain- or snow-fall, though the variation is less than the surface run-off in good or bad years, but even with correct siting of the mother well, only a small percentage of the full flow can with certainty be recovered. One way of improving on this antiquated qanat system is to put in a blind dam where each valley emerges from the hills. Since this type of dam is supported on both faces by the valley fill, it can be a thin waterproof wall of interlocking concrete piles, and the impounded water taken off through a sluice in the top of the dam into an open channel. At this point the channel will "command" a much larger area of cultivable land than any qanat can, and these fields will be further away from the salt land which usually is found close below the present fields. The maintenance on such a dam is very small indeed and compares most favourably with the other modern method, the pumping out of the sub-soil water by diesel- or electric-motor driven pumps in open wells or bore-holes.

The qanat system is costly, uneconomical and expensive in manual effort to maintain, but, worst of all, it wastes so much valuable water in areas where water is of primary importance.

The Zagros Mountains lie between the salt desert of central Iran and the Persian Gulf, and, since the core of this range was forced up through deep limestone beds, many of the valleys run parallel to the axis of the range. Shiraz lies in one of these upper valleys which has a width of about two miles and is over deep alluvial fill, and previously had gone to waste in a salt lake, without an outfall, below Shiraz. Sufficient wells have now been sunk above the town to give Shiraz the first adequate piped supply of any town in Iran. Further north a tunnel has been driven from a similar valley, in which the Karun River flows, so that a large and permanent supply can be passed to the Isfahan district. The large and important new water supply for the city of Tehran is obtained from a valley about twelve miles away, and will eventually be secured by the construction of a dam in the same valley.

The surface flows in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers only requires the age-old canal systems to bring them into use, but hundreds of wells have been sunk away from the rivers, and the problem here has been to site such wells on buried watercourses so that the maximum quantities can be obtained and stationary saline water avoided.

Across the Gulf and Saudi Arabian peninsular is almost entirely desert, with a rainfall seldom exceeding three inches anywhere. The eastern, or rather north-eastern, half of Saudi Arabia is on limestone, which, near to and under the Gulf, is thousands of feet deep, and in which there are fissure flows of good water. I have never accepted the usual explanation that this water comes from the meagre rainfall on the deserts in the interior, and the large quantities which are recovered in the Hofuf Oasis and in the Island of Bahrain seem to bear out my theory. I think it much more probable that this water is from rainfall on the slopes of the Zagros range, and that it passes under the Gulf, some eventually flowing from the Saudi coast under Bahrain. The quality is not very good, but there is plenty of it, and in Bahrain the wells are only about 300 ft. deep. Much further development could be done near the coast of the Gulf north of

Bahrain, but further south, on the Trucial coast, the subsoil is full of brine and it is very difficult to separate the comparatively fresh water in such a loose shell and coral formation.

Further down the Gulf, in Muscat, there is quite a good seasonal rainfall on the hills and on the Jebel Akhdar, but a surface flow only after heavy storms. Along the Batinah coast there are many shallow wells, sited by the local cultivators from observations on the trickles of fresh water which appear on the sandy beach as the tide goes out, wells being sunk inland of the better flows. At Sur, on the extreme east point of Arabia, the beach flows have not been located, and all water has to be carried nearly five miles from wells in a wadi bed inland from the town. The same subsoil flow could, in fact, be developed from a shallow well in the main square of the town. The town of Muscat is sited in a vast volcanic mass of hills, and lives chiefly on roof catchments and unreliable shallow wells. About nine miles inland are hot springs, evidently water which has fallen on the limestone of the Jebel Akhdar and has been heated below ground on the volcanic rocks. The water has to be cooled before it can be used on the gardens, but is free from sulphur and of good quality. (The great difference which the water of these hot springs has made to the cultivation on these slopes was illustrated in some of the slides which were shown later.) Muscat Town could be supplied from the same fissures, quite close to the town.

The western side of Arabia is both under-populated and under-developed, but, as there is a fair rainfall on the coastal hills, there seems no reason why a useful amount of water should not be made available from correctly sited wells near the coast.

Across the Red Sea, North Africa has very similar problems. Except for the Nile Valley and the Oases there are desert conditions almost everywhere, and, except politically, there is no problem close to the Nile. The oases, such as Siwa and Kufra, give an indication of how water problems in certain desert areas might be tackled. Trial wells through the sand to the Nubian Sandstone have shown that this stratum carries water in places far from any rainfall, and, in fact, this water can only go underground from the upper reaches of the Nile, and probably by far the greater part enters the subsoil in the Sudd swamps. This would explain, very reasonably, the tremendous losses in this area which are usually ascribed to transpiration and evaporation.

This vast subsoil movement passes north in a belt several hundred miles wide, and eventually most of it is lost in the bed of the Mediterranean Sea. That the water is of good quality all the way I do know because, in the early part of the last war I had to send a small party of Sappers with the Wadi Halfa-Kufra convoy to a point about half-way between the two places, to renew the wooden steining of one of the wells, so that the convoy could use the water on each journey. Further proof is that the Nile at one point in a limestone gorge in Egypt gets an accretion of several millions of gallons a day from its bed. If ever the Sudd is bypassed by a canal, as has been proposed, the water-table over a very large area of northern Sudan would be very adversely affected.

Further west, along the Mediterranean coast, there are certainly many

subsoil flows which can only have started very long distances to the south, apart from those deriving from the rainfall in Cyrenaica, but the wells often have to be deep, too deep in fact to be sunk during the war, but in them the water would always stand a little above the sea level of the Mediterranean.

I would now like to illustrate some of the points I have made and show slides of some of the areas. (Slides of the Trucial coast, Buraimi Oasis, Muscat and the Libyan coast.)

I have only touched on some of the major problems, as I have seen them, but to take each town or district which is short of water and examine it would take a very long time.

#### DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Merrylees is prepared to try to answer any questions there may be, and there are one or two which I should like to ask. I have had a good deal to do with water problems in the Middle East, particularly in West Pakistan. One thing I should like to know is how the underground water supplies can be located, otherwise than by trial and error, if at all. When these streams have been located, how wide are they or do they vary tremendously in width? I am thinking particularly of experience of Karachi, where I spent many years of my life. When I went there in 1910 it had a population of about 130,000, and it got its water supply by wells and by percolation. Karachi, instead of having a population of 13,000, now has about 1,300,000. Even before I left it was obviously outgrowing its supply, because we found that as we dug a well it simply lessened the supply from another well. We finally had to deal with the situation by bringing water from the Indus. It seems that most of this underground water supply can be tapped only in small quantities at a time. I should like to hear more about it.

Colonel MERRYLEES: There are various methods to be employed, but it rather depends on the country one is in. A riverbed may be as wide as the original watercourse, but usually it is shaped as I have shown. (A roughly triangular section was shown in a diagram, the apex below, and in the original eroded valley bottom, before this was filled with detritus from the weathering of the higher hills.) The main flow may not be near the centre. To get the maximum amount of water out of any underground flow one has to go into it very nearly at the centre. There are many underground flows where very big quantities of water are carried. I know of three big springs. One in Kashmir, one near Kermanshab, which is used for agriculture, and a bigger one at the top of the railway tunnels in the Taurus mountains. There is no certainty that smaller flows do not exist in other places, untapped, which simply disappear out to sea or into the salt beds.

A MEMBER: I should like to ask whether something can be done concerning the planting of trees on a large scale. The French are having considerable success in the Sahara with tree planting.

Colonel MERRYLEES: Tree planting, once it is established, can do with very little water because trees themselves hold a good deal of water, but it is the starting that is the difficulty. There have to be quite considerable

quantities of water for the seedlings and for the first few years of growth. It is no use tree planting in an area where there is not sufficient water of the right quality. In some areas there is water which is sufficiently good for goats, sheep and humans, but not good enough for trees. The Sahara should be capable of development in certain areas because there is a considerable movement of water under it. I believe I am right in quoting the French geologists who say that Lake Chad, being fresh, must have an outlet. It cannot be to the south because of the geological conditions, and therefore it must flow to the north. The only place one can link with it where water of a suitable quality appears in sufficient quantity is Benghazi. It sounds a long trek, but it is not an impossible one. There seems to be nowhere else where that kind of water could go.

Colonel ROUTH: Are there any overall plans to develop this water supply and to make the land usable?

Colonel MERRYLEES: The Persians, under their second seven-year plan, have started quite a lot of development; it is expensive, however, and except for sunken dams there is a need to drill wells and put in pumps. There is a definite limit to the price of water that can be used for agriculture, particularly in poor places. Iran is like so many Middle East countries, having a few very rich people and a great many poor ones. It is a question of the capital cost of the original scheme followed by the cost of pumping water.

Dr. ROLAND BROMLEY: Do eucalyptus trees attract water? When I was in the Middle East recently I saw many of them.

Colonel MERRYLEES: The eucalyptus tree requires less water to grow well than does any other tree. I believe that is the difference. It is not a question of attraction. If water is not there, I do not think any tree can attract it. What trees do to a large catchment area is to hold water about them and prevent it being evaporated by a hot sun, until it is soaked into the ground and can be picked up by underground movement.

General WATERHOUSE: Colonel Merrylees referred to sunken dams. There seems to be a possible snag, and I wonder whether it is met in practice. It involves raising the level of the water-table locally. If the valley is in limestone or something of that sort, it seems that when a sunken dam is put in the water will get round the ends of it.

Colonel MERRYLEES: It depends upon what the dam is fixed to, and limestone is very susceptible to fissures in odd places and losses in that way. Major Jarvis, in one of his books on Sinai, describes how he put a dam across a limestone valley and waited for the rains. When they came there was a lovely reservoir, but the next morning there was no water. Where there is water which can be picked up by a mother well, it is obvious there is a fairly impervious bottom to that particular part of the valley, and therefore if you fix your dam into the rock of the valley it will hold most of the water. The valley may be 200 yards wide and the bottom of the water-table may be only 20 feet down, and so if you drive the piles in and make the dam, the increase in pressure would be very small.

General WATERHOUSE: Provided you are dealing with a local water-table?

Colonel MERRYLEES: Yes. The qanats are usually placed where the valley comes out below the foothills, and this forms a local water-table on the aquifer.

A MEMBER: What is the explanation of hot water at the junction of volcanic rock and limestone?

Colonel MERRYLEES: The rainfall on the 9,000 ft. Jebel sinks through the foothills with enough pressure for it to be forced down into fissures near the volcanic block, which is still quite warm 300 or 400 ft. down, and that water, after passing through the fissures and coming up under pressure, will be hot. It is not steaming; it is about 110°F.

The CHAIRMAN: It only remains for me to thank Colonel Merrylees, on your behalf, for his lecture, which I have certainly found entrancingly interesting, and I hope that that has been the experience of all of you.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation.

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The following back numbers of the Society's Journal are urgently wanted:

- 1914 Part 3.
- 1919 Part 4.
- 1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3.
- 1926 Part 4.
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- 1933 Part 4.
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- 1935 Parts 1 & 3.
- 1936 Part 3.
- 1938 Part 4.
- 1940 Part 3.
- 1942 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
- 1944 Parts 2, 3/4.
- 1945 Part 1.
- 1946 Parts 3/4.
- 1947 Parts 1, 3/4.
- 1950 Part 1.
- 1951 Parts 2/3.
- 1952 Part 2.
- 1957 Part 1.

# SOME NOTES ON RUSSIAN INTRIGUE IN TIBET

BY ALASTAIR LAMB

## I

**I**N a recent article in the *Royal Central Asian Journal*,<sup>1</sup> P. L. Mehra has performed a service of great value to students of the more recent history of Central Asia by examining afresh the evidence behind those reports of Russian intrigue in Tibet which received so much publicity during the period of the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa of 1904. His article is an admirable survey of the published material relating to this fascinating subject. It does not, however, make use of unpublished documents; and it is for this reason that I venture to write these notes.

The Tibetan policy of Lord Curzon has been the subject of considerable discussion ever since Sir Francis Younghusband entered the gates of Lhasa in August 1904. Much has appeared on this subject in past numbers of the *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*. To date, however, no final conclusions would seem to have been reached on two most important questions. What exactly was the Tibetan policy of Lord Curzon, and what were the motives behind it? What foundation was there for the reports of Russian intrigue in Tibet, and what significance had the activities of Dorjief? The second question, requiring research into Russian and Chinese sources, lies outside the scope of this article. On the first question, however, the records of the India Office and Foreign Office throw considerable light, and in several important respects they modify conclusions which might be drawn from the three *Tibet Blue Books*, the main source of published documentary material on this topic.<sup>2</sup> It is hoped that in this respect these notes may prove to be of some value.

## II

In 1886 the extension of British influence into Tibet was a goal which the Indian Government of Lord Dufferin did not consider to be worth the risk of strained Anglo-Chinese relations because, in part, as Mackenzie Wallace noted in 1887 when discussing the reasons behind the abandonment of the projected Colman Macaulay Mission to Lhasa:

“At present we ought to aim at establishing cordial relations with China and allaying her suspicions. Any attempt to resuscitate the defunct mission or to bring pressure of any kind to bear on the Tibetans would have a most prejudicial effect on the negotiations which must sooner or later be undertaken for the delimitation

of the Burma-Chinese frontier. Good relations with China can only be obtained by convincing the Chinese that having taken Burma, we have no aggressive intentions, and we should never forget that, apart from the frontier questions just referred to, China is every day becoming a more important factor in the great Eastern Question."<sup>3</sup>

Nine years later, when the possibility was being considered at the India Office of a British intervention in a dispute between Tibet and Nepal, Lord George Hamilton was able to remark that the attitude of the Chinese was no longer of any importance.<sup>4</sup> In the years between these two statements the disastrous defeat of China by Japan had altered fundamentally the faith of the Powers in the stability of the Chinese Empire. This change, which was destined to have the gravest consequences in China, was also the underlying factor behind the British policy towards Tibet which took definite shape in the opening years of the Twentieth Century. It resulted in a significant intensification of the Tibetan question which had been developing since 1886.

In 1886 the Tibetans occupied a portion of the State of Sikkim which the British had long grown accustomed to look upon as a part of their Empire in India. In 1888, after many delays, the Tibetans were expelled from this area, and as a consequence of this expulsion the Indian Government found itself embarked upon negotiations with the Chinese as to the status of a British protected state. In these negotiations the main objective of the Indian Government was to make it quite clear that China had no claims over British protected territory. Its intention was to eliminate any shadowy claims which "would have remained on record," so Lansdowne wrote in 1889, "as formal evidence of the success of the Chinese whose reputation, already inconveniently great among our ignorant feudatories, we could not have afforded to increase in this way at our own expense. From one end of the Himalayas to the other we should have weakened our influence. In India it is essential for the stability of our rule that we should permit no attempt at interference by Foreign Powers with any portion of the Empire."<sup>5</sup> The Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, and its ancillary Trade Regulations of 1893, asserted beyond dispute the British position in Sikkim; but only at the expense of British commerce in Tibet, and by admitting that the Chinese were the sovereign rulers of Tibet. But, as Lansdowne wrote in 1893:

"There is a good deal to be said for coming to terms with the Chinese and not allowing the negotiations to end in nothing. We shall probably before long be engaged in other and far more important negotiations respecting the Pamirs, in which our interests and those of China will be in many respects identical. We shall also very shortly have to deal with the Burmah Decennial Mission—an exceedingly awkward question. It has, therefore, appeared to us worthwhile, under the circumstances, to stretch a point in regard to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention, and we are disposed to regard the arrangement which has now been arrived at . . . as of importance not so much on account of the commercial interests involved, but

as an outward sign of neighbourly good-will prevailing between the two Empires."<sup>6</sup>

As Riseley, the editor of the *Gazetteer of Sikkim*, put it more forcefully in 1894, "who will deny that it would be a piece of surpassing folly to alienate a possible ally in China by forcing our way into Tibet in the interests of scientific curiosity, doubtfully backed by mercantile speculation."<sup>7</sup>

These arguments could not stand in the face of the possibility that the Chinese Empire might disintegrate, and that the Chinese position in Tibet might be taken over by a European Power. Even in 1893, before the Sino-Japanese War, it could hardly be claimed that the Chinese position in Tibet was very secure. Captain H. Bower reported to Military Intelligence in India in that year that the Chinese were of little significance in Tibetan politics. "A power," he wrote, "which is incapable of protecting anyone or applying the most insignificant rules of police, does not deserve the name of a Government." He added that "a very small armed party will suffice to open the gates of the capital of the Dalai Lama." That such an armed party would be Russian, Bower then thought, was very unlikely since "the Tibetan northern frontier is the strongest in the world."<sup>8</sup>

Tibet was separated from the territory of the nearest European Power, Russia, by Chinese Turkestan. From the Indian point of view the greatest danger that would seem to have arisen as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese War lay in the possibility that this buffer territory would fall into eager Russian hands. In March, 1895, the distinguished Colonial judge, Sir E. Hornby, warned Lords Kimberley and Rosebery that Chinese Turkestan would soon fall to the Russians.<sup>9</sup> In 1896 Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence, had come to the same conclusion.<sup>10</sup>

### III

The possibility that Russia would acquire Chinese Turkestan held immediate dangers for the Indian frontier in the region of the Pamirs and the Karakoram. Here the British frontier had tended to follow the line of the watersheds. Were the Russians to take over Kashgaria they would find themselves in possession of those valleys which led up to the watershed and provided the easy routes by which the British line could be infiltrated. As Ardagh put it:

"For military purposes . . . a frontier following the highest watersheds is defective, and we should aim at keeping our enemy from any possibility of establishing himself in the glacis, occupying those longitudinal valleys, and thus preparing to surprise the passes. We should therefore seek a boundary which shall leave all these longitudinal valleys in our possession, or at least under our influence."

Thus Ardagh argued that the British frontier should lie to the north of the mountains; and, significantly, he added that:

"The same principles and arguments may have to be applied



at some future period to the Upper Basins of the Indus, the Sutlej, and even the Brahmaputra in the event of a prospective absorption of Tibet by Russia. At the present moment, however, we are only concerned in the definition of a frontier between British India and Kashgar Yarkand and Khotan."

On all this Lord Salisbury minuted: "I quite agree with Mr. Curzon that the best plan in this area is to occupy first and negotiate afterwards."<sup>11</sup>

In 1898 Sir John Ardagh was again arguing along these lines, but with greater urgency. The progress of the Siberian railway seemed to promise a great strengthening of the Russian position in North China, and before this could come about it was essential to be prepared. In Kashgaria, also, danger threatened, and—

"before that province is absorbed by Russia, we should endeavour to secure a frontier which will keep her as far away as possible, lest, when the time for actual demarcation arrives, we may find the Russians as inconveniently near us on the Taghdumbash and Karakorum as they now are on the north of Chitral.

The same reasoning applies to Tibet as a buffer region. Unless we secure the reversion of Lhasa, we may find the Russians there before us."<sup>12</sup>

Ardagh, of course, did not envisage that the Russians were going to give serious consideration to the possibility of using Tibet as a vantage point whence to launch an invasion of India. His remarks, just quoted, were made in a letter to the Foreign Office in which he enclosed another report by Bower, now a Major, containing some shrewd observations on the nature of Russian interest in Tibet. Bower wrote that—

"At some future date the Russians may desire to possess themselves of Lhasa. As the Mecca of the Buddhist world its possession would give them great prestige in the eyes of the Mongol world and their presence there even in very small numbers would cause uneasiness in Calcutta and Bengal. From a purely military view their position would be faulty. A large force would starve and a small one could easily be driven out or crushed by a superior force from India. But 200 men and a couple of mountain guns could take Lhasa and that number of Russians there would be sufficient to cause restlessness among the natives in Calcutta.

The Chang or high tableland north of Lhasa with enormous stretches of desert forms incomparably the strongest frontier in the world and it would be well to keep it between us and Russia."<sup>13</sup>

Bower, of course, did not think that the Russians would get Chinese Turkestan for yet a while, and the question of Russia in Tibet was "remote, but not one entirely to be lost sight of."<sup>14</sup> By December 1900, however, one observer of affairs in Chinese Turkestan at least was beginning to be more concerned at the advance of Russian influence in Kashgaria. This was George Macartney, whose long residence in Kashgar had probably made him the most experienced British observer of politics in this region. Macartney was inclined to suggest that Britain should

cease her hopeless struggle to compete with Russian commerce in Chinese Turkestan and to declare that Kashgaria was "outside the sphere of our political interest." He added that

"this need not necessarily imply any direct encouragement to Russia to occupy this province, which is already within her grasp, nor does this preclude us from taking action elsewhere—in Tibet for instance—to readjust the balance of power likely to be disturbed by the occupation."<sup>15</sup>

The conclusion, in short, was that Chinese Turkestan was the buffer between Tibet and Russia and that Tibet was the buffer between Chinese Turkestan and Northern and North-Eastern India. The extension of Russian influence over Chinese Turkestan, which seemed to many observers a most probable eventuality, could only lead to an intensification of British political interest in Tibet. A good case could be made, moreover, that Russia would find Tibet of sufficient value to her in her plans in Mongolia and Manchuria so as to make it reasonably certain that a Russian advance into Chinese Turkestan would give rise to Russian intrigue in Tibet. This, in any case, would seem to follow from the endless nature of Russian advance in Central Asia, to which Prince Gortchakov had given a theoretical description in the 1860s. Curzon, for one, had no doubts concerning the pattern of Russian expansion. With characteristic vigour he wrote in 1901 that:

"As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years, I assert with confidence—what I do not think any of her own statesmen would deny—that her ultimate ambition is the dominion of Asia. She conceives herself to be fitted for it by temperament, by history, and by tradition. It is a proud and not ignoble aim, and it is well worthy of the supreme moral and material efforts of a vigorous nation. But it is not to be satisfied by piecemeal concessions, neither is it capable of being gratified save at our expense. Acquiescence in the aims of Russia at Teheran or Meshed will not save Seistan. Acquiescence in Seistan will not turn her eyes from the Gulf. Acquiescence in the Gulf will not prevent intrigue and trouble in Baluchistan. Acquiescence in Herat and in Afghan Turkestan will not secure Kabul. Acquiescence in the Pamirs will not save Kashgar. Acquiescence at Kashgar will not divert Russian eyes from Tibet. Each morsel but whets her appetite for more, and inflames the passion for a pan-Asiatic dominion. If Russia is entitled to these ambitions, still more is Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that which she won, and to resist the minor encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan."<sup>16</sup>

#### IV

The theoretical reasons why the British should do something about Tibet should the Russians establish themselves in Chinese Turkestan were clear enough. Had the Younghusband Mission taken place with such an event as its background it would have almost certainly aroused far less

controversy at home. But the Mission took place when Tibet was still divided from the nearest Russian territory by a large tract of the Chinese Empire. The extent of Russian influence in Tibet in 1904, if there was any influence at all, could hardly be said to have involved more than the establishment in Lhasa of a few Russian agents, and the signing of a treaty, or treaties, of extremely doubtful political and military value. It was hard to argue that these, alone, constituted a serious threat to the security of India's Northern Frontier. Yet there were many British observers who looked on the establishment at Lhasa of a Russian agent enjoying the confidence of the Dalai Lama as a most untoward event.

At the time when the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1894 was being negotiated the British had been determined, for reasons of prestige, to prevent the Chinese from establishing even a shadow of a claim to sovereignty over British protected territory. As Sir Mortimer Durand then wrote :

“ If we give way in respect to Sikkim, we must be prepared to do so, at some future time, not only with regard to Bhutan and Nepal, but with regard to Kashmir and her feudatories, such as Hunza and Nagar, and with regard to any of the smaller Himalayan States which may have committed themselves. We might even have China claiming suzerain rights over Darjeeling and the Bhutan Doors, which we acquired from her so-called feudatories.”<sup>17</sup>

The Himalayan States, of course, had even closer political ties to Tibet than they ever had to China. A revival of Tibetan claims in this area, with Russian backing, could prove highly embarrassing to British prestige even if it did not give rise to annoying border disturbances.

Nepal was a particularly fruitful field for such activity. It was highly jealous of its independence and, if placed in a delicate position between Britain and Russia, it could possibly become less co-operative in the matter of supplying those highly valued Gurkha soldiers who held such an important place in the structure of the Indian Army. As early as 1887 Ney Elias had remarked that; “ Tibet may have attractions for the Russians affording a road for their intrigues to the back door of Nepal, and they perhaps dream of the day when they may be able to send a Vitkevitch or a Stolietoff to Katmandu.” But in 1887 it was still possible to add that; “ as long as Lhasa remains closed to us, it will also remain closed to Russia, and her only lines of access to Nepal lie through Lhasa territory.”<sup>18</sup>

Following the reports, from October 1900 onwards, of the activities of Dorjief in Lhasa and in Russia, the War Office gave some thought to what effect Russian intrigues with the Dalai Lama might have on Nepal. The conclusion, which Lord Roberts endorsed, was that there was little danger of the Russians at that time, or in the foreseeable future, using Tibet as a base for military operations against India; but that there was a real danger that the Russians could “ acquire at least a nominal protectorate over Tibet,” and that this would be enough to raise political complications in Nepal. Perhaps the Russians might start recruiting Gurkha forces; and anything which would hinder the flow of Gurkha

recruits into the British service would, so Lord Roberts said, "be a real misfortune."<sup>19</sup>

Curzon certainly thought along these lines. As he wrote privately to Hamilton on 11 June, 1901 :

"If we do nothing in Tibet we shall have Russia trying to establish a protectorate in less than ten years. This might not constitute a military danger, at any rate for some time, but would be a political danger. The effect on Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan would constitute a positive danger. We cannot prevent Russia from taking Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, though we may delay the latter a little. But I think we can, and ought, to stop a Russian protectorate over Tibet, by being in advance ourselves. . . . Unless we know what is going on in Lhasa, we may have a Russian protectorate at no distant date, without having had the slightest inkling of what has been going on. If Russia reaches the Nepal boundary we shall have the latter country transformed into a second Afghanistan. Tibet, not Nepal, must be the buffer between ourselves and Russia."<sup>20</sup>

These remarks, which, it is interesting to note, were made after Dorjjeff's visit to Russia in October 1900, had been widely reported, provide a fruitful basis for an interpretation of Curzon's policy at this time. Russian influence on the Nepalese border was most undesirable, and should be avoided. The establishment of that influence did not seem to be an event of the immediate future, but its very possibility demanded that British intelligence in Tibet should be of the highest quality. Should the time come, it is clearly implied, when a Russian protectorate was imminent, and, at that same time, the British were still unable to extend their intelligence and their political influence into the councils of Lhasa, then the need for a strong British policy to the north of the Himalayas could no longer be ignored. As it is hoped the following pages will show, Curzon's assessment both of the likelihood of a Russian protectorate over Tibet and of the effectiveness of British intelligence and British secret diplomacy in Lhasa was changed during the years 1901 and 1902 under the pressure of steadily accumulating evidence.

## V

It was easy enough to argue from first principles—as Curzon had from at least 1880<sup>21</sup>—that the Russians would like to establish close relations with the Government of the Dalai Lama: it was far more difficult to produce any concrete evidence that they were, in fact, achieving any success in this direction. It has been suggested that the Russians were implementing a Tibetan policy since at least 1893.<sup>22</sup> If so, very little indication of this came to the notice of the Indian Government in the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. In 1894 the Russian press reported the recent visit to Lhasa of two Russian travellers, presumably Asians, named Menkujinov and Ulanov.<sup>23</sup> In 1895 O'Connor, Minister in Peking, sent a report to the Viceroy which, being fairly typical of the information on Tibetan affairs, which the Peking Legation saw fit to provide

from time to time, deserves quotation at length. O'Connor wrote that :

"A medical gentleman who is on intimate terms with several Chinese officials told me this afternoon that he had lately seen the Assistant to the Chinese Amban in Tibet, Kuei Ta-Jen, who had returned to Peking and from whom he had heard the following story.

Some time ago some Russian officers had been in communication with the Tibetan authorities—my informant was unable to state even approximately the date—and impressed upon them the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the Russians who alone were able to protect them against the ambitious designs of the English who evidently coveted possession of Tibet. If difficulties arose between England and Tibet the Russians would come to the assistance of the Tibetans and they handed them two letters, the first to be sent to the nearest Russian official in case of any disagreement and the second in case the British menaced their independence in any way. Upon receipt of the second letter the Tibetans could count upon Russian assistance.

These letters were given to the Dalai Lama from whose hands they passed into the hands of the Chinese Amban.

My informant was so vague as to the time when this occurred that I almost hesitate to report it, but in case it should coincide with other information in Your Lordship's possession, I mention it for what it may be worth."<sup>24</sup>

It was not until late 1898 and early 1899 that more substantial details of Russian activity in Tibet began to come to light. In December 1898 J. C. White, Political Officer for Sikkim, who had since 1894 been in charge of dealings with the Tibetans along the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, stated that : "I believe the time has come now to take up a strong position such as would lead to Great Britain becoming paramount in Lhasa." Amongst other reasons for such a step he argued that : "the Russians are making progress in the north, and have already, I am informed, tried to make their influence felt in Tibet. We should certainly be there before them, and not allow the Tibetan markets to be closed to English goods."<sup>25</sup> In April 1899 Le Mesurier, Officiating Political Officer for Sikkim, talked with the Chinese Resident in Tibet who had come down to Yatung on the Sikkim border. The Resident then remarked that if the Indian Government was too harsh in its terms to the Tibetans, the latter "would fall back on the support of Russia who had already offered them assistance."<sup>26</sup> The somewhat cryptic observations of White and Le Mesurier received a certain degree of amplification in the early summer of 1898 when an article in the *Simla News* by one Paul Möwis, Darjeeling resident and self-styled Tibetan expert, to the effect that in the winter of 1898-1899 Lhasa had been visited by a party of Russians under the leadership of an officer named Baranoff. In May Möwis told the Indian Foreign Office that reports of this visit were circulating in the Darjeeling bazaars. A Lhasa friend of his, moreover, had told him that these Russians did not speak English and their leader, in Tibetan spelling, was called *Sbaranuff*,

whom Möwis identified with a certain Baranoff whom he said had once been secretary to the great Russian explorer Prjevalski.<sup>27</sup>

None of this could be called intelligence of the first order; yet it undoubtedly made a profound impression on the newly arrived Viceroy, Lord Curzon. On May 24, 1899, the day after Möwis made his report, Curzon wrote privately to Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, as follows :

“The Lamas there (Tibet) have found out the weakness of China. At the same time they are being approached by Russia. There seems little doubt that Russian agents, and possibly even someone of Russian origin, have been at Lhasa, and I believe that the Tibetan Government is coming to the conclusion that it will have to make friends with one or other of the two great Powers. That our case should not be stated in these circumstances, and that judgement should go against us by default, would be a great pity. Inasmuch as we have no hostile designs against Tibet; as we are in a position to give them something on the frontier to which they attach great importance and we none; and as the relations that we desire to establish with them are almost exclusively those of trade, I do not think it ought to be impossible, if I could get into communication with the Tibetan Government, to come to terms.”<sup>28</sup>

There can be no doubt that these somewhat nebulous reports of Russian activity did stimulate greatly the policy of opening direct communication with the Dalai Lama which Curzon tried to carry out right up to the end of 1901.

In late 1900 Curzon still had sufficient faith in the happy outcome of this policy to take lightly the first reports of Dorjjeff's visit to Russia in October of that year. As he wrote to Hamilton in November, 1900 :

“We are inclined here to think that the Tibetan Mission to the Czar is a fraud, and does not come from Lhasa at all. That the Russians have for a long time been trying to penetrate that place is quite certain; that a Russian Tibetan, or Mongolian Envoy may conceivably have been there and may have opened negotiations is also possible; but that the Tibetan Lamas have so far overcome their incurable suspicion of all things European as to send an open Mission to Europe seems to me most unlikely. Tibet is, I think, much more likely in reality to look to us for protection than to look to Russia, and I cherish a secret hope that the communication which I am trying to open with the Dalai Lama may inaugurate some sort of relation between us. Anyhow, I am not much disturbed by these rumours, of which I expect you will be able, before long, to get to the bottom.”<sup>29</sup>

## VI

Curzon was to be disappointed in his “secret hope.” All attempts to establish communications with the Government of the Dalai Lama failed dismally. The fault lay not with the want of trying on the part of the

British, but in the extreme difficulty in finding suitable messengers to carry letters between India and Lhasa. Such messengers had to combine in their persons the ability to get into touch with the highest circles in Lhasa with the power to cross freely the Tibetan border. They had to be trustworthy, from a British point of view, and discreet, while at the same time they had to be above suspicion in Tibet of being British spies. There were very few people at the disposal of the British with all these qualities. The average "pundit" of the survey of India could not hope to meet high Tibetan officers; the European stood little chance, even in disguise, of penetrating to Lhasa; the most sophisticated native agent then available, Sarat Chandra Das, had been well known in Tibet as a British agent since the early 1880s. These hard facts became apparent to Curzon as he tried to find means of getting his messages into the hands of the Dalai Lama. By 1900 a number of potential agents had been considered. Taw Sein Ko, Adviser on Chinese Affairs to the Government of Burma, looked promising; but he was ruled out, mainly because "he is very fat, and would probably be unequal to the hardships in a journey to, and residence in, Lhasa."<sup>30</sup> There was a possibility of employing Chirang Palgez, a leading Ladaki from Leh who had headed the traditional Lapchak Mission from Leh to Lhasa on several occasions; but Chirang Palgez had lately taken to "chang" beyond moderation, and could no longer be relied upon.<sup>31</sup> By 1900 the Indian Government had concluded that there were but two methods of any promise whereby a letter from them might find its way to Lhasa. A British official might make his way to Gartok, and there hand over a letter either to the two Governors, or Garpons, of that Western Tibetan market town, or to the leader of the official Tibetan trading missions which passed through that town from time to time.<sup>32</sup> A letter might reach Lhasa in the hands of Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutanese representative in Darjeeling, whom the Bengal Government had been using as an intermediary with the Tibetans since at least 1898.<sup>33</sup>

Neither method proved successful. The Gartok route was tried by Captain Kennion in September, 1900. A letter was placed in the hands of the Garpons, addressed to the Dalai Lama, but was returned with conflicting excuses in the following spring.<sup>34</sup> Ugyen Kazi, who had reported much to indicate that he would soon woo the Dalai Lama, likewise failed to bring home any reply to the Viceroy's letter. He said, on his return from Lhasa in October 1901, that the Dalai Lama had told him that he was bound by tradition not to accept communications from people like the British.<sup>35</sup>

By October 1901, therefore, it had become clear to Curzon that he had failed to discover an effective method of getting into touch with the Dalai Lama. In the months that followed, moreover, it came to seem highly probable that Ugyen Kazi's failure was due as much to that Bhutanese official's treachery as to any other factor. Evidence came to light that not only had Ugyen Kazi lied when he said he had delivered the Viceroy's letter into the hands of the Dalai Lama, but also that he had betrayed the trust placed in him by the British by revealing all he knew about these negotiations to the chief Tibetan ministers—(Shapes or Khalons)—

one of whom, at least, was known to be actively hostile to British policy.<sup>36</sup>

Curzon was somewhat disturbed by this turn of events. As he wrote privately to Hamilton on November 5, 1901 :

“ You will remember my telling you, some time ago, when we were discussing what should be done after getting into communication with the Dalai Lama, that the opening of communications at all, not their prosecution or their sequel, was the crux. This has been borne out by the experience of the Bhutanese Envoy, Ugyen Kazi, whom we sent up, or rather entrusted with that last letter from me. He alleges that he handed it to the Dalai Lama himself, and that the latter refused to take it. Accordingly, he brought it back with the seal intact. I do not believe this story. I do not believe that the man ever saw the Dalai Lama or handed the letter to him. On the contrary, I believe him to be a liar, and, in all probability, a paid Tibetan spy.”<sup>37</sup>

Whether Ugyen Kazi was, in fact, a “ paid Tibetan spy,” or not, is a question which we cannot answer here. The important point is that by the autumn of 1901 Curzon had discovered that there existed no method whereby he could send his letters to the Dalai Lama, let alone open diplomatic conversations with him. This discovery, moreover, was made at a time when Dorjief had made his second much-publicized journey to Russia.

## VII

In 1900, when the first reports of Dorjief's activities emerged, Curzon, we have seen, was inclined to dismiss the affair as “ a fraud.” The second Dorjief mission of the summer of 1901 was not dismissed so lightly. As Curzon wrote privately to Hamilton on September 11, 1901 :

“ I am afraid it cannot be said that the Tibetan Mission to Russia only represents Monasteries in the North of Tibet. On the contrary, the head of the Mission though originally a Russian Mongolian subject has been resident in Lhasa for many years, and is no doubt familiar with the priestly Junta who rule in that place. I do not myself believe that he is upon a mission, or that he conveys a formal message from the Dalai Lama to the Tsar, but that he will go back with such a mission and such a message, I have not the slightest doubt whatever, nor that, whether the traditional attitude of the Tibetan Government is thereby affected or not, the result must in any case be unfavourable to ourselves.”<sup>38</sup>

This change of attitude was largely based on disquieting reports on the movements of Dorjief and his followers which did not reflect much credit on the efficiency of British intelligence in Tibet. When the stories of Dorjief's visit to Russia in October 1900 first emerged, Curzon naturally sought further information from Darjeeling, the centre for the conduct of Anglo-Tibetan relations, and the home of S. C. Das, the leading expert in India on Tibetan politics at that time. The reply, telegraphic, to this query, dated November 14, 1900, was as follows :



"Sarat Candra (Das) has no knowledge of Dorjien (Dorjjeff). He feels sure that, if any mission had been sent from Lhasa, he would have heard regarding it, and thinks it probable mission went from Urga in Mongolia."<sup>39</sup>

This opinion, Curzon was to discover a few months later, was a false one, and probably deliberately so. Dorjjeff, on his way to Russia in 1900, passed through Darjeeling and British India, leaving by sea from a British port. While in Darjeeling he stayed at a Buddhist monastery whose Abbott was subsidized by the Bengal Government in return for information on transients from Tibet: and there Dorjjeff was met by S. C. Das. This was in May or June 1900, but no word of it reached Curzon until January 1901.<sup>40</sup>

In April 1901 Dorjjeff and three companions once more passed through British India from Tibet via Nepal, and embarked at Bombay on a ship bound for Singapore, whence Dorjjeff made his way to Odessa by way of Peking, Chita, the Trans-Siberian and the Trans-Caspian. While in Peking Dorjjeff stayed with the Russian postmaster, another Buriat named Gomboieff. No news of all these proceedings reached Simla until after the world had learnt through the Russian press that Dorjjeff had arrived in Russia on another mission from the Dalai Lama to the Tsar.<sup>41</sup>

The fact that Dorjjeff had twice travelled in secret through British India—and the shifty behaviour of some of his associates, one of whom, in March to August, 1900, travelled from Calcutta to Darjeeling under a variety of aliases and told a number of conflicting stories about himself<sup>42</sup>—did not prove that Dorjjeff was actually negotiating between the Tsar and the Dalai Lama. It did prove, however, that British intelligence on what was going on in Tibet was quite inadequate for that period when Anglo-Russian competition had reached a new intensity within the borders of the Chinese Empire following the Boxer troubles.

One consequence of these developments was that Curzon resolved to take the conduct of Anglo-Tibetan relations under his direct control, an event which could only intensify British pressure on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.<sup>43</sup> Another consequence was that Curzon, now that he had discovered that he could neither get into touch with the Dalai Lama himself, nor keep a close watch on what the other side was doing in the Tibetan capital—it no longer seemed that if the British could not make friends with the Dalai Lama, then nor could the Russians—began to give serious thoughts to solutions of the Tibetan problem by means other than diplomatic. His letter to Hamilton of July 10, 1901, after his discovery of the second journey of Dorjjeff through British India, would lead to this conclusion. He then wrote that:

"I am very much exercised over the question of Tibet. An incidental consequence of the policy of leaving political relations with smaller States in the hands of Local Governments, which I did not mention to you last year because I was unaware of its existence, has recently come to light in connection with the Tibetan frontier. Bengal has charge of Sikkim, and, as a consequence, of the political

relations with Tibet and the whole Tibetan frontier. So utterly have they failed in the discharge of this particular duty, that we now learn that two Tibetan Missions that visited the Tsar at Livadia last year, and again in this, left Lhasa, crossed the British border, passed in one case through Darjeeling, and in the other through Segowlie, traversed India by rail, and took ship from Indian ports, without the slightest inkling on the part of the Bengal Government or its agents that any such persons had been in their midst. Who would have believed it possible that negotiations could have passed between Lhasa and St. Petersburg, not through Siberia, or Mongolia, or China, but through British India itself? I spoke to Woodburn about this matter before I left Calcutta, and he admitted that the conduct of this sort of political business by his officers was so inadequate that he should not feel at all hurt if I would take over the political control of Sikkim and that frontier myself. I am not certain that a little later on, when the Dalai Lama rejects or returns my last letter, as he probably will, and assumes a position of confirmed hostility (probably under the influence of Russia), I shall not require to adopt some such policy towards Tibet as Tibet adopts towards ourselves; in other words, we might have to prevent any Tibetan subject or caravan from crossing our frontier. We could do this, I think, without much difficulty. It would be giving the Tibetans tit for their tat, and it would, I expect, bring them more promptly to their knees than any other proposal. I do not know, and I have never really discussed it with you, what attitude His Majesty's Government is likely to assume about a Russian protectorate over Tibet. It seems to me that we should have just as much reason to protest against any such consummation as Russia would have to object to a British protectorate over Manchuria. Tibet is not necessary to Russia; it has no relations, commercial or otherwise, with Russia; its independent existence implies no menace to Russia. On the other hand, a Russian protectorate there would be a distinct menace and a positive source of danger to ourselves. I hope that no Government at home would acquiesce in such a surrender."<sup>44</sup>

At about this time Curzon was also beginning to think about some sort of mission to Lhasa, but only in very general and hypothetical terms, as he hastened to assure Hamilton in July 1901. These were "ideas which have hardly yet taken shape in my mind, and which are certainly by many stages removed from action."<sup>45</sup>

## VIII

By the end of 1902 the idea of a mission to Lhasa had become to Curzon a matter of more than theoretical interest. He had become convinced that it was the only solution to the Tibetan problem and he was urging its adoption with all the eloquence at his disposal. The reasons behind this lay not so much in events in Tibet as in events in China. By the end of 1902 there had emerged a considerable body of evidence,

very little of which has been published in the Blue Books, that the Chinese had given to Russia by secret treaty some sort of protectorate over Tibet.

Hints and rumours that Russia and China might be acting jointly in respect to Tibet seem to have first emerged from Nepal in January and February 1902.<sup>46</sup> In May 1902 the Chinese reformer Kang Yu-wei, then living in Darjeeling, told the Bengal Government that the Chinese—by which he meant Jung Lu—had just signed a treaty with Russia which gave that Power a protectorate over Tibet.<sup>47</sup> By August Sir Ernest Satow in Peking was telling of similar rumours, which he said had been reported in the Chinese press. He gave details of the alleged treaty, of 12 articles; and a version of the same treaty was reported on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.<sup>48</sup> Satow did not have any reason to believe that such a treaty had been signed, but he did think that—

“it is reasonable to suppose that some sort of pourparlers of an unofficial kind have taken place between the Russian Legation and a member of the Grand Council on the international position of Tibet.”<sup>49</sup>

By October 1902 these rumours had been reinforced by much information, perhaps of a doubtful nature, but impressive in its quantity and its detail. Satow, for instance, was told of a draft of a treaty between Jung Lu and the Russians, complete with Jung Lu's seal, in which the Russians guaranteed Jung Lu's immunity from any punishment by the Powers for his somewhat ambiguous rôle during the Boxer rising in return for the granting to Russia of a special status in China, Tibet, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.<sup>50</sup>

The Dalai Lama, so the rumours had it, was aware of these agreements, which, presumably, met with his approval. Hardinge, for instance, reported from St. Petersburg that an anonymous, but usually reliable, informant had told him of a treaty with the Dalai Lama which gave Russia the right to station an agent in Lhasa.<sup>51</sup> In the same month Satow, in Peking, was shown an intercepted telegram from the Chinese Resident in Lhasa to Jung Lu announcing that, with the approval of the Dalai Lama a Russian officer accompanied by a mining engineer and an escort was on his way to Tibet.<sup>52</sup> The reference to mining—and the treaty which Satow and others reported in August also contained references to Russian interest in Tibetan minerals—must have lent an air of truth to these rumours. In 1899 the India Office was convinced that the Russians had plans to exploit Tibet's alleged wealth in gold, a wealth which, it seemed, had also aroused the interest of the Rothschilds.<sup>53</sup>

Curzon seems to have had little doubt, by the end of 1902, that the Sino-Russian agreement concerning Tibet was real enough. He can hardly be blamed for this attitude when a cautious diplomat like Satow was describing the rumours concerning this agreement as representing “the current belief among the Chinese as to the secret engagements of Russia with the Manchu party”;<sup>54</sup> and when Lord Lansdowne was able to minute in October 1902 that “the story of the Russo-Chinese agreement as to Tibet is supported by a good deal of evidence.”<sup>55</sup> Telegrams,

such as the following to Hamilton of November 9, 1902, showed this conviction :

“News has been received from Yatung by Political Officer in Sikkim . . . that the Junklo (sic) Chinese Grand Secretary has sent information by despatch to Amban that he should at all costs prevent negotiations between Tibet and India till the spring of 1903, when an expedition, for which preparations are secretly and rapidly progressing, will have enabled Manchurian-Russian troops to occupy Lhasa.”<sup>36</sup>

And a few days later, on November 14, 1902 :

“Captain Parr (Chinese Customs Officer at Yatung) has no doubt that Russian treaty relating Tibet is an accomplished fact. He derives this information from several quarters, but chiefly from Kang Yu-wei, whose informant in China is stated to be the present Viceroy of Chili, Yuan Shih-kai.”<sup>37</sup>

On November 13, 1902, Curzon wrote privately to Hamilton about these rumours and his reactions to them. He said that :

“I am myself a firm believer in the existence of a secret understanding, if not a secret treaty, between Russia and China about Tibet : and as I have before said, I regard it as a duty to frustrate this little game while there is yet time. Our recent action on the Sikkim border greatly flustered the authorities both at Lhasa and Peking, and for a time there was great talks of envoys and negotiations. Suddenly, under orders from Peking, all this was suspended, and for weeks we have heard nothing. My impression is that the Russians have told the Chinese on no account to negotiate with us, or to allow us to come to close quarters with the Tibetans, for the result of such proceedings must be greater intercourse between India and Tibet, if not an improved treaty. My idea, therefore, is that we should let the Chinese and Tibetans play the game of procrastination for some little time longer, and should then say—as it is clear that they do not mean business—that we propose to send a Mission up to Lhasa to negotiate a new treaty in the spring. . . . I would inform China and Tibet that it was going, and go it should. It would be a pacific mission intended to conclude a treaty of friendship and trade with the Tibetan Government. But it would be accompanied by a sufficient force to ensure its safety. We might even get the Nepalese to join by providing the escort. They would be delighted, for they are itching to have a go at Tibet themselves. These ideas are only thrown out in the rough. I will mature them as time proceeds.”<sup>38</sup>

The idea of the “pacific mission” to Lhasa, as is well known, did not meet with the approval of many members of the Home Government. The Tibet Blue Books labour this point. But few who then thought about the Tibetan problem would have denied that something had to be done. Lansdowne advocated diplomatic notes to China and Russia,

which, of course, met with emphatic denials that anything was afoot in Tibet. The India Office was inclined to set the Nepalese on to the Tibetans, with covert British support. "Might not Nipal," Sir. W. Lee-Warner wrote in September 1902, "be urged to send a force to Lhasa and demand from Tibet an assurance that it would permit no Russian troops to enter its country?"<sup>59</sup> The India Office welcomed a scheme of this sort,<sup>60</sup> and even Lansdowne was impressed by Lee-Warner's suggestion. As he commented on Lee-Warner's "Note on Tibet" in which this scheme was outlined: "I think he is right. It is impossible to depend on the Chinese in cases of this kind. The Nipalese are friendly and would fight."<sup>61</sup>

Curzon was convinced that a mission to Lhasa was the only possible solution, and he argued this so convincingly in his great despatch of January 1903 that the India Office could but agree with him in principle.<sup>62</sup> The problem, so Hamilton put it, was to find a good international case to justify such a mission. As he wrote to Curzon on January 28, 1903:

"Your Tibetan despatch requires considerable examination before we can definitely give you an answer to the propositions you advance. But there are certain points which are self evident. We cannot ignore the cumulative evidence that there is a secret treaty or understanding between Russia and the authorities at Lhasa. If we sit still and do nothing, and the rumours of such a treaty be confirmed by its publicity, then we shall in any movement we may make against Tibet, have Russia behind them. If we assume that these two propositions are unanswerable, then arises the further question: Can we establish a good international case for the course of action you suggest? I do not think it likely that a Mission formed on the lines you suggest would arrive at Lhasa without fighting and I assume that you would be compelled to send an escort of very considerable dimensions, as its communications must to some extent be guarded. As far as I can judge from looking at the map, there is such a vast distance, such impossible country, between . . . the Russian frontier . . . and Lhasa . . . that no material interference on the part of the Tibetans is for the time being possible by Russia. These considerations commend your proposals to me, but I have been unable to discuss it with Lansdowne, who has not, as you know, been well, and whose time has been greatly taken up recently with the Venezuelan negotiations."<sup>63</sup>

On February 13, 1903, Hamilton again wrote on Tibet that—

"if we are not prepared to take action now with these elements in our favour, it seems to me perfectly hopeless for Great Britain to attempt to arrest Russia's progress in any part of Asia. But there are obvious difficulties which will have to be faced, if a mission you suggest is to force its way into Lhasa; and unless some satisfactory explanation can be given on these points, the Cabinet will probably hesitate and delay until it may be too late to send an expedition this year."<sup>64</sup>

How a "good international case" for a mission to Lhasa was established must lie beyond our present scope. That much of the British diplomacy on the Tibetan frontier throughout 1903 was designed to bring this about can hardly be doubted by any who have read the Curzon-Hamilton correspondence. Curzon argued throughout 1903 that the only solution to the Tibetan problem lay in a mission to Lhasa. He refused to believe Russian denials that they had any ambitions in Tibet.<sup>65</sup> He refused to agree that it would be better to wait until the Russians had further shown their hand. Preventative action was called for. As he said to Hamilton on March 12, 1902:

"If we are not to defend our frontiers, to ward off gratuitous menace, to maintain our influence in regions where no hostile influence has ever yet appeared, until the national honour has been grossly affronted, the practical result will be that you will not be able to keep a step upon your frontiers until they have actually been crossed by the forces of the enemy."<sup>66</sup>

This is about what Sir John Ardagh had been suggesting in 1896 and 1898. Tibetan policy, as Curzon saw it, was but one manifestation of the forward policy which advocated vigilance on the frontiers. It was inspired, as had been British policy towards Tibet since 1888, by much the same considerations. Present policy, in the language of games, was to play one's own correct move now so as to make it impossible for the enemy, whoever he might be, Chinese or Russian, to play his correct move at some later date.

## IX

Tibetan policy, in these notes, has been considered solely as an aspect of the "Great Game." This is not to deny that there did exist arguments between the British and the Tibetans about trade, the frontier, and the observance of treaties. But Curzon's outline of his views on Tibet, as he made it privately to Hamilton, shows how small a part these matters played in his thinking. Where these other matters did prove of importance was in the making of "a good international case" for the Younghusband Mission, and for this reason they figure very largely in the Blue Books.

Democracies, perhaps fortunately, do not often embark upon preventative wars; and when they do so embark, only do so in the face of considerable popular protest at home. Such was the nature of the Younghusband Mission, which bears many striking similarities to recent events in the Middle East. Such preventative actions are extremely hard to justify in public, especially when they are designed to forestall the policy of a great power, a policy which has not yet reached maturity and which the power in question claims does not exist. Their success is even harder to assess: it is all too easy to say that if the danger which the preventative action was designed to obviate never materialises, then that danger has never existed.

The dangers which Curzon tried to prevent in Tibet must be viewed, if any assessment of his policy is to be arrived at, in the light of the

political climate of, say, 1902 or 1903. At this time Curzon thought that Russian intrigue in and over Tibet might be dangerous to British interests. He had at his disposal much evidence to suggest that this intrigue was, indeed, afoot. Could he afford to ignore that evidence? Curzon thought not. In that period following the Boxer rising when the Russians were busy establishing themselves in Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia, it would be hard to say that Curzon did not have much reason on his side. The mission to Tibet was the British counter to the reported Sino-Russian treaty over Tibet of 1902, and its outlines were laid down in that year. It was certainly not, as has sometimes been argued, a device to take advantage of Russia when she was involved in a war with Japan.

Was it successful? From the point of view of Curzon's own career and reputation the Younghusband Mission was unfortunate. But it was not followed by a strengthening of the Russian position in Tibet. The Chinese gained from it for a while, it is true, but then China was a preferable neighbour to Russia. And in the long run it cannot be denied that the British Mission to Lhasa of 1904 did pave the way for the emergence of an independent Tibet under the rule of the 13th Dalai Lama, to the great benefit of the peace of the northern frontiers of India during the closing decades of British rule in the Indian subcontinent.

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- <sup>51</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Hardinge, No. 349 of November 10, 1902.
- <sup>52</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Sir E. Satow, Tel. No. 361 of November 20, 1902.
- <sup>53</sup> The fascinating story of Tibetan gold and attempts to exploit it must be told



elsewhere. See Home Correspondence, India, Vol. 182, No. 1021, Gold Mines in Tibet.

<sup>54</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Sir E. Satow, No. 289 Confidential of October 8, 1902.

<sup>55</sup> F.O. 17, 1554, Minute by Lansdowne on I.O. to F.O., October 1, 1902.

<sup>56</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, I.O. to F.O., November 11, 1902.

<sup>57</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, I.O. to F.O., November 14, 1902.

<sup>58</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Extract from private letter from Lord Curzon of November 13, 1902, with minute by Lord Lansdowne.

<sup>59</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, I.O. to F.O., September 17, 1902.

<sup>60</sup> Letters from India, Vol. 149, No. 1456a.

<sup>61</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Minute on I.O. to F.O., September 17, 1902.

<sup>62</sup> F.O. 17, 1745, Note on Tibet by Sir S. Bayley, February 11, 1903.

<sup>63</sup> Private Correspondence, India, Pt. I, Vol. VIII. Hamilton to Curzon, January 28, 1903.

<sup>64</sup> Private Correspondence, India, Pt. I, Vol. VIII. Hamilton to Curzon, February 13, 1903.

<sup>65</sup> Private Correspondence, India, Pt. II, Vol. XXIV. Curzon to Hamilton, April 13, 1903.

<sup>66</sup> Private Correspondence, India, Pt. II, Vol. XXV. Curzon to Hamilton, March 12, 1903.

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**Hong Kong Annual Report, 1957.** Hong Kong, Government Printer. March 1958. Pp. 409. Many maps, photographs, etc. HK\$7-50 (10s.).

The Annual Reports of the Hong Kong Government are excellently—even beautifully—produced. There is nothing about them of the dryness of a “blue book.”

The 1957 issue, like its predecessors, contains very comprehensive information on all aspects of the life and activity of this brilliant and active community, vividly presented.

## REVIEWS

**History of the Second World War: The War against Japan.** Vol. II. H.M. Stationery Office. Pp. 519. Maps and Index. 55s.

The period of fighting covered by this volume is from the first invasion of Burma in December, 1941, to the late summer of 1943—the preliminary planning of the Japanese offensive which led to their defeat at Imphal. The authors have compiled a fluent, clear and well-arranged account of the Burma operations within the framework of the South-East Asian and Middle Eastern theatres of war. The summaries of operations outside Burma are quite excellent.

The Burma story is heartbreaking: it is of disaster after disaster, each to the same pattern as the one before. Did it require all these to show our soldiers that their methods were wrong? Before me, as I write, are the G.H.Q. India Training Memorandum 6 of April, 1941, and the related pamphlet on forest fighting: that is, of many months before the Malayan and Burman hostilities. Here is an extract:

“Mobility is relative. That is, whereas infantry on foot is comparatively immobile in country where M.T. can move freely, it is the most mobile arm in mountainous and forest country. . . . We will establish well-defended, well-sited, well-provided bases at strategic points over a wide area. From these our mobile infantry columns can move and strike rapidly in any direction, and the consequent scope of offensive action will paralyse the enemy’s mobility. Infantry mobility can best be maintained . . . by the use of highly trained porters and air supply.” These quotations contain the correct operational technique for fighting in Malaya and Burma.

India was the home of mule transport for war, Assam-Burma of porters from the martial clans who could be trained and armed.

In these few sentences lie the basic cause of our defeats. How, one asks, could troops have been sent to fight in Burma, in the forests where defence spells defeat, without the transport to render them mobile and aggressive? Every theatre of war has its own operational technique, to be modified from time to time, to be neglected at your peril.

For these defeats one may blame the commanders on the spot for not knowing better, or blame the over-rapid expansion of the Indian Army and the scraping of the barrel that sent raw recruits into the field, but the fact remains that even the best-trained troops cannot fight successfully on a faulty operational technique; yet second-class troops will make a very good showing on a correct one. If sackings were to be made they should have started at the War Office, who were responsible for the land defence of both Malaya and Burma and so for the method of fighting when they were attacked. In August, 1941, I was sent to Jhansi to raise the then youngest division, the 34th: in December I left it for the Western Desert. With proper transport and directed on the right operational technique, even this young formation would have given a good account of itself, especially in the forests, where high technical skill is not as necessary as adequate patrol training.

As for training, it will, I hope, be at some time emphasized (have I overlooked it in the narrative?) that for nine months after the outbreak of war India was told by H.M.G. that the Indian Army would not be needed in that war, and was not therefore given the resources to prepare for it. While cadet officers and recruits should have been pouring into our training establishments during those months, virtually nothing was being done in this vital respect. From December, 1941, until 1943 this grievous loss of training time almost wrecked the Indian Army. Early on we had pressed for a twelve-month course of training for recruits because, in war, the opportunities would not exist for them to be trained on with their units. This was not conceded and later events, notably Dunkirk and Malaya, overtook us and we had no trained resources available from those lost months.

It was only thanks to Auchinleck that by 1939 the Indian Army had even started to modernize itself.

With the reservations above, the authors' phased commentaries are most enlightening. Some of "the lessons learnt" need never have been learnt this hard way. One ounce of imagination and foresight is worth a ton of experience, since, for us, experience is always bitter—Mons, Gallipoli, Dunkirk, Malaya, Burma. How much disaster is needed to impress an old lesson? Why, therefore, should the High Command be talking of holding lines right up to the end of this book? Were mines employed for defence and delay? It is all very dismaying.

The assessment of Wingate's operation is just, though it might have been mentioned that Auchinleck's opinion on p. 404 was a correct one and that had Wingate, therefore, been compelled to co-operate with Lloyd in the Arakan, instead of working independently hundreds of miles away, the pooled cross-country and air supply resources would have brought success to both of them. All the lessons taught by Wingate could have been learnt at leisure in a peace area before he launched out on his wasteful operation. Most of them, indeed, were already known. His force was too large for stealth and too small for battle.

Production, photographs and maps are of the usual high quality expected in this series.

SIR FRANCIS TUKER, LT.-GEN.

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**The Pathans.** By Olaf Caroe. Macmillan. 1958. Pp. 521 and xii. Maps; illustrations; appendix; index. 60s.

This his third book will greatly enhance Sir Olaf Caroe's already considerable reputation as a historian, a scholar and man of letters. The fact that he now brings to his subject the knowledge and experience derived from over twenty-five years' service among the people whose history and character he describes makes the appearance of *The Pathans* a notable literary event. As that shrewd critic and man of affairs, Walter Bagehot, once remarked, very few people who know how to write know, or have experienced, anything worth writing about. His latest book places Sir Olaf Caroe quite definitely in this small category; it is literature as well as history; and the author's evident liking and respect for the Pathans infuse into his writing a sympathy and zest—a gusto almost—which make it entralling reading.

The Pathans have so far had something of a raw deal from Western literature. For this their martial prowess has been in great measure responsible: their present contribution to the arts of peace may be considerable, but it must be admitted that so far as the outside world is concerned they have hitherto mainly attracted attention as redoubtable and not unchivalrous fighters. This has meant that their Western chroniclers have for the most part been of those many British Army officers who served on the North-West Frontier of India before 1947. The resulting literature has mostly been of the "Tales from the Outposts" variety—good, stirring stuff very often, but taking little account of the origins and ethnography of the Pathans and sometimes giving vent to narrow and highly controversial political views. There are, of course, exceptions, and Sir Olaf draws particular attention to two of them written at an interval of over a hundred years—Mountstuart Elphinstone's *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (1815) and Evelyn Howell's *Mizh* (1931). Than these, the author claims, and gives ample proof of his assertion, there is nothing better. It is good to be reminded on p. 279 of Elphinstone's saying on the duration of British rule in Asia that "for it the desirable death to die would be that the peoples themselves should reach such a standard that retention of the government by foreigners would become impossible." But it has been left to Sir Olaf to navigate the uncharted seas of research into the origins of the Pathans and to place the part which they played in the history of the Mogul Empire and of Afghanistan into proper perspective. This is not to say that his book is lacking in romance and colour. Both are present in every chapter.

The Pathans who read this book, and it is to be hoped they will be many, will not find it inappropriate that the first comprehensive history of their people should be written by an Englishman. The author has avoided over-stressing the British period of association with the Pathans, and barely a fifth of the book is devoted to it. Yet it was a period of great importance for the Pathans. As Sir Olaf does not hesitate to

point out, British policy was often mistaken; but it was during the British association that the Pathan renaissance took place. In other hands such an association might have resulted, not in the renaissance of the Pathans, but in their emasculation, if not in their extinction. This notion of "the lesser evil" is one much favoured by the Russians in addressing the subject races of Central Asia. The difference is that whereas the British have left the Indian sub-continent for good and all, the Russians are still in Central Asia and show no signs of leaving it.

Those familiar with the history of the Russian conquests of and rule over Central Asia will not fail to notice the great difference between British and Russian treatment of frontier tribal problems. Both the close-border and the forward policies make nonsense to the Russians. Their aim was always to reach the frontiers of "properly constituted" states, and anyone who got in the way was hammered into permanent submission. "In Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy," said Skobelev, the victor of the battle of Gök Tepe. "The harder you hit them the longer they will be quiet afterwards." Yet, in spite of this, the Russians never cease talking of the great love which the peoples of Central Asia have always borne them. The British, and Sir Olaf among them, do not care to indulge in such palpable insincerities. "British rule," said a Pakistani woman to the present reviewer, "is rather like school. When we are in it we think the masters are monstrous oppressors. But when we leave we find they were not so bad after all." Such faint praise is as much as most of us expect.

It is difficult to exaggerate the merits of this important work: it fills a big gap in Oriental scholarship; it is a fitting tribute to a people who have proved both redoubtable enemies and loyal friends of Britain; and it is a piece of enduring history and literature. Last but not least, it describes fairly and dispassionately an association of which Britain has no reason to be ashamed, nor the Pathans to regret.

The arrangement of the notes and the selection of illustrations and maps are excellent. The author has done well to follow the practice advocated by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names of using a broad system of transliteration in the text and a narrow one in the index. There are occasional lapses: if we are to have Kandahār (Qandhār), why not Meshed (Mashhad)? The publishers are to be congratulated on the production, which is uniformly good and appropriate.

G. E. WHEELER.

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**A Person from England; and Other Travellers to Turkestan.** By Sir Fitzroy Maclean. Jonathan Cape. 1958. Pp. 384. Illustrations; map; bibliography. 21s.

*A Person from England and Other Travellers to Turkestan* records the exploits, experiences and endurances of some of those early adventurers into the lands beyond the Caspian, when they first began to emerge from their Dark Ages and to appear on the world's stage. "For a space, a short fifty years or so, the attention of the Western world was focussed on Central Asia. Men risked their lives to get there. Not many succeeded and not all of them returned to tell the tale. But between them, both figuratively and literally, they put Central Asia on the map." In Georgian times the name was scarcely known, the Victorians knew it only too well, the Edwardians had forgotten it.

The reason for all this was the expansion of Russia out of Europe into Asia—towards India and the futile attempts of Great Britain to counter it. However, the first Afghan War did allow the first British to penetrate the independent Khanates—Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand. This so-called "heroic period" was short-lived, but it supplied Sir Fitzroy Maclean with the best material for his book. And what a strange lot they were! Wolff, an eccentric but very gallant missionary intent on distributing tracts and Bibles to Jews, Turks and infidels. Vambéry, an Austrian orientalist intent on gathering knowledge. Two war correspondents, American and Irish, out to get hot news of the latest Russian advance—towards India. And the notorious Skobelev, avenger of Gök Tepe.

There follows the less "heroic period" as tension on the frontier was reduced, and we have the impressions gained by no less a person than a future Viceroy of India, George Nathaniel Curzon, the result of whose researches ended in a book,

considered by the Russians themselves to be a standard work on the subject—*Russia in Central Asia*.

His next traveller was a member of a certain abortive mission to Turkestan when under early revolutionary domination: Colonel F. M. Bailey was left behind when the other members of the Mission departed whence they had come. After a year in hiding he escaped alive and well into Persia. This account by Sir Fitzroy is even more absorbing than Bailey's own factual and modest story; for his risks were perhaps even greater from Bolshevik fanatics than were his forerunners' from fanatical Oriental potentates.

There follows another ill-advised attempt to stem the Bolshevik flood by a Turkish patriot, Enver Pasha—a little-known story ending in tragedy.

Traveller No. 9 is the author himself, and he tells us briefly of his attempts to reach Bokhara and of his final success to walk its bazaars.

All nine chapters are fascinating and informative, and the personalities are well chosen. Prior place and space is given to Joseph Wolff, and rightly so, for no greater paradox ever existed. A German Jew pervert, who, failing to find solace in Rome, became an Anglican clergyman, and between his duties as a country parson in this country made the most audacious journeys all over the Middle East and Central Asia. The most notorious of his travels was his journey, of his own free will, to Bokhara, where he bearded the bloodthirsty tyrant Nasrulli in order to investigate the murder of the British officers Stoddart and Conolly. He came back alive.

Vambery undoubtedly deserves a niche in the hall of fame, for he succeeded in carrying out his intention to penetrate to Khiva, Bokhara, Samarkand and Afghanistan, disguised as a Dervish, at a most dangerous moment. On his return to civilization he was honoured by scientific societies and lionized by London ladies, which shows how high popular feeling ran in those days about the Russian bogey. But Vambery had been *there*, the last to see the antique Khanates before they fell under foreign "protection"; a year later the Russians stormed Tashkent, two years later Bokhara fell.

The "White General" Skobelev comes on the stage as the vanquisher of the Turcomen. The right man in the right place, with a mania for danger and a glutton for blood when the chance occurred, exactly what St. Petersburg required to clean up the mess. But a war correspondent from the West was present to witness the end of the Turcomans. Edmund O'Donovan, an Irish Fenian agitator, was despatched by the London *Daily News* to "cover" the Russian campaign against the Turcomen. Of course, the Russians would not allow such a thing. O'Donovan therefore crossed the frontier into Persia and did his best to watch events. He failed to get in at the finish, but since the Turcoman stronghold is only a few miles across the frontier, he was able to see through his glasses the vanquished Turcomen streaming out of their last fortress in panic, and the Russians streaming in. That was the end of the campaign which he was sent out to report upon. But being an Irishman, and looking for trouble, he made for the last refuge of feudal Central Asia—namely Merv—which still had hopes of avoiding the fate of the Turcomen on the west, Khiva in the North and Bokhara in the east. They looked hopefully southwards where the British were re-establishing an exiled Amir on his throne. With this in mind the Mervli made O'Donovan their Khan—surely as strange an honour as any European has had thrust upon him.

Merv, once styled "Queen of the World," was not much of a place in 1881, for it had never recovered from the Mongols, who had paid it a visit 650 years ago. But its geographical position made it a vital strategic and political point, being as it was so close to the Afghan frontier. O'Donovan soon became tired of being the Khan of such inert, unstable orientals and was only too ready to abdicate when a chance occurred.

The other war correspondent was the American MacGahan, detailed by the *New York Herald* to accompany the Russian campaign against Khiva. MacGahan wrote a wonderful book, and Sir Fitzroy gives a brilliant résumé of its essentials. As an anticlimax, we find that Burnaby, two years later, found the intractable, warlike Khivans docile enough and Russian wives already established in the military cantonment outside the city walls. Two hundred years to subdue, two years to tame.

The next "traveller to Turkestan" was of a very different type. The Russian

conquest and able administration of the wide lands beyond the Caspian were brought into jeopardy by the 1915 Revolution. Chaos reigned where order had ruled, and out of it emerged the old idea of Turkey for the Turks, not for the Turkey that we know of, but for the whole Turkish race—the Turanians—and they spread across our Turkestan to innermost Asia. Enver Pasha, a "Young Turk" of great parts, but a visionary, conceived the idea of a Turanian empire. Mustapha Kemal aimed at less, and succeeded. Enver visualized himself as liberator of all the Turks under Russian rule; he proposed to form an independent Moslem Central Asia, to re-establish the Caliphate and to crown himself "Amir of Turkestan." He made himself "Commander-in-Chief of all the armies of Islam," and was to raise a holy war. He had a short run for his money, and created so much trouble that the Bolsheviks had to hunt Enver out of his retreat in Eastern Bokhara and put an end to him. This may sound ludicrous to us now, but the Turanian illusion was far from funny in 1918, when we considered it vital enough to compile a "Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism."

The epilogue describes the author's own attempts to get into Bokhara. Twice he failed, the third time he succeeded, and I think he found rather what I myself found, that "*Bokhara the Noble*" was really a rabbit-warren of a place of no great enchantment. There were no monuments of any architectural merit, no magnificent vaulted bazaars like those of Aleppo or Damascus, no basalt walls like those of Diarbekir, but only of mud. How anyone could see Bokhara as "the most interesting city in the world" (Curzon) surprises me; there is a Pekin, a Stambul, a Cairo and a Baghdad. Except for a certain romance attached to its name, Bokhara has little to show for itself. It is, we know, immensely old, but we know little about its early history; it is the Mecca of Moslem Central Asia, and as fanatic as the birthplace of the Prophet himself. Perhaps that is why it has attracted attention; for wherever there are forbidden places, whether they be Lhasa, Mecca, the summit of Everest or the other side of the moon, they create in man a desire to see them!

The book has some charming sketches incorporated in the text, and well-chosen illustrations of all the actors who appeared on this Turkestan stage.

DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS.

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**The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia.** By Laurence Lockhart. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1958. 8vo, cloth. Pp. xiii + 584. 10 plates; 6 maps and plans. 70s.

Dr. Lockhart's book is at once a detailed study and a brilliant synthesis of a complex theme: the crisis of the Safavid state. This prolonged crisis, which extended in time over more than fifty years, was a major preoccupation of European chancelleries and involved the armies of the Russian and Ottoman empires during the third decade of the eighteenth century.

It is hardly possible to do justice to the author's great industry and wide range of research in the course of a brief review. In the first six chapters he analyses the processes, political rather than economic (for Persia was prosperous during the second half of the seventeenth century), which led to the deterioration of affairs under the weak rule of the well-meaning and not unsympathetic Shah Sultan Husain. Dr. Lockhart shows that a significant contributory cause was the revival of Shi'a mysticism in an intolerant (and political) form. This revival, sponsored by fanatical clerics and intellectuals, destroyed the balance which existed between the Shi'as, who constituted the majority of the Persian population, and the powerful tribal minorities which included the Turcomans on the peripheries of the Iranian plateau and the unruly subjects of the Shah in Dagistan and Afghanistan. The Georgians, who played an important part in the administration and army of the Safavids, and the rich Armenian community who were engaged in the foreign trade of the country, were also antagonized or frightened. On this interesting theme Dr. Lockhart might, perhaps, have done more to explain to the layman the differences between the Shi'a and Sunni approaches to the spiritual and mundane aspects of life.

The heart of the book (chapters vii to xiv) is devoted to the dramatic and tragic events of the Afghan revolt and the invasion which resulted in the siege and final

capitulation of Isfahan and the downfall of the Safavi dynasty (October, 1722). Dr. Lockhart has a terse, economical style which is peculiarly suited to the description of these extraordinary events, when Georgian security troops were defending the Persian monarchy against wild tribesmen in the eastern deserts, and the fatuous court of Shah Husain was wasting fatal months in mean intrigues and flippant diversions. The author has a masterly touch in the delineation of character. He uses skilfully his numerous sources, allowing contemporary witnesses, Armenian interpreters, Jesuit missionaries, Persian literati, English traders and French soldiers of fortune, to describe the events which they experienced, and he illuminates his text with fascinating footnotes.

Chapters xv to xxii constitute a valuable and original study of the course of the Russian and Turkish interventions in Persia and of the various plans for the partition of the country which followed the establishment of the Afghan régime in Isfahan. Dr. Lockhart demonstrates that the initiative in aggression came from Peter the Great, who for many years had been planning the expansion of Russia round the shores of the Caspian. Incidentally, the author under-estimates Russian interest in Caucasia and Persia and Persian mistrust of Russia before the time of Peter the Great. More than a century earlier, Russian interventions in the Persian zone of influence in Dagistan and Georgia had disturbed the Persians and had provoked, in the end, the devastation of Kakheti and Kartli by Shah Abbas (1614) and the liquidation of the ruling families who had sought alliance with Muscovy. On this phase of Russo-Persian relations N. I. Veselovsky published three volumes of documents in *Trudy Vost. Ot Imp. Russkago Archaologicheskago Obschestva*, Vols. XX-XXII; other documents touching the Russian missions to the Georgian kings were edited by S. A. Belokurov.

In 1723, Turkish intervention was reluctant and intended to limit the scope of Russian expansion. Dr. Lockhart gives a stimulating account of diplomatic manœuvres in Istanbul during the critical months which preceded the Turkish decision, and he shows that it was popular opinion, roused by the Sunni divines, which forced the hand of the pacific Sultan Ahmet, of "Tulip Time," and his cautious Grand Vizier, Damat Ibrahim.

Chapters xxiii to xxviii describe the remarkable recovery of the Persians under the leadership of Nadir Kuli Khan, who was able to restore the Safavi monarchy as a prelude to his own usurpation of power.

The final chapters, xxix to xxxvi—almost a quarter of the book—are a study of the relations of the English and Dutch East India Companies, and of the French, with the Persian Court, and of their trading activities in Persia during the period covered by the book. These chapters in themselves are valuable, but to the reader they come as an anti-climax after the main theme.

In lengthy Appendices, which include genealogical material, Dr. Lockhart gives a topographical study of the city of Isfahan in the first quarter of the eighteenth century and an essay on art and literature in the late Safavid period. Here he is rather inclined to summarize recent European and American critical studies; he might better have given us an appreciation of Sir John Chardin's acute observations on carpet weaving and miniature painting in Isfahan—which seem to have been little used by the art historians. The author is happier in his lengthy bibliographical notes on maps and sources (over fifty pages) which will remain of great use to both bibliophiles and students of the period.

The production of the book is up to the usual high standard of the Cambridge University Press, but it is a pity that they did not encourage the author to reproduce more of his excellent photographs.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

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**Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist.** By Philip Magnus. John Murray. 1958. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 410. Index; maps; illustrations. 30s.

This biography is a model of its kind. The author has the master's touch, as his excellent lives of Gladstone and Burke go to prove. K. of K. will always be a controversial man, but here we have an uncompromising and unbiased summary, both

penetrating and sympathetic. This volume, containing new evidence from private letters and many other sources recently available, gives a truer and more authoritative picture than anything so far published about Lord Kitchener.

Those who remember the magic of that name in the early years of the century will realize that whatever happened at the War Office, Kitchener was the most important soldier who ever commanded the confidence of the British public, Wellington not excepted. Whatever the criticisms of soldiers and statesmen in 1916, it was his name, and his name only, which produced the new armies essential to survival. And the politicians knew it. It must be remembered that our war organization in 1914 was immeasurably inferior to that available to Churchill in 1940.

Kitchener clearly ranks with the great commanders of history. They all made mistakes, but they all seemed to possess some similar vital germ of success which produced results, including in every case a certain indefinable personal magnetism. Nelson, Napoleon, Wellington, Cromwell, Marlborough, and now Montgomery, expressed it in different ways. Each was the product of his age. So, up to 1914, was "K." Had the atmosphere of Victorian Imperialism continued, he would now be regarded by many as the ideal soldier. But he was unlucky enough to have overlapped into another age for which he was not so fitted. The individual commander, with the only plan in his own brain, could no longer compete with the complexities of modern war. Smuts tried it in East Africa in 1915 and we all rebelled. Maude did it in Mesopotamia in 1916 and got away with it. "Staff" did not interest them, except to clear up the mess. Omdurman was very nearly too big for "K.'s" methods, but by much galloping he got there. At Magersfontein, a bit later, galloping did not do it, and he suffered a serious reverse, although Lord Roberts saw him through.

This volume is well arranged and very readable, especially for those whose early life was dominated by this Colossus riding the sky. Even now it revives memories with a tingling effect. Yet "K." did not spring from the head of Zeus fully armed. He was an efficient if rather insubordinate sapper subaltern with early responsibilities in Palestine and Cyprus, 1874 to 1884. Sir Garnet Wolseley, and later Lord Cromer, must have found him what Monty calls "tiresome." Yet both, with a strange clairvoyance, backed him decisively and bore with his intrigues and uncontrolled ambitions. Two very different names come to mind in scanning the first and most striking portion of this book—Sir Richard Burton and Montgomery—each of whom had certain of "K.'s" assets in full measure, Burton the understanding of Oriental mentality and Monty the detailed controls of the immediate battle. Till 1898 these assets were decisive, but less valuable on the larger stage of world war.

Kitchener spent seven years in India, during which he reorganized the British Army on a territorial and divisional basis, on the principle of selective recruiting for the changed problem. It was a rewarding achievement, carried out in spite of Curzon and the India Office. No one else could have done it. A few more pages on this subject might well have replaced some of those on the trial of strength of these two giants.

It was not surprising that Lord Haldane and others tried to tempt Lord Kitchener to do like things in London. But "K." knew instinctively that the War Office was not his métier. He was the personal commander, not the director of an efficient staff, although he had seen Lord Roberts, the man who above all others had brought the General Staff into being, use it successfully in Africa. Kitchener, unlike Lord Alanbrooke, could not convince his hearers and sway committees. At times even his powers of decision failed him, as at Atbara and, far more important, Gallipoli. Better collusion with Churchill on finding troops in 1915 might well have shortened that war.

Two personal memories seem relevant. An unhappy subaltern on the platform of a small Indian station in 1907, awaiting a surprise inspection by the C.-in-C. The subaltern had a month before been detailed "Station Staff Officer and Cantonment Magistrate" without experience, assistance or emoluments. The only baboo had just died of plague, and the fumigated files were piled in the garden. As the train slowed down, Lt.-Colonel Birdwood got out and shouted for the S.S.O. He took his arm and promised to see him through. He did. But it was a terrible day for that S.S.O. He well knew Kitchener's views on failures, whatever the cause.

The other memory is H.Q. Nairobi in 1915. At 3 p.m. daily we got a sheaf of



clear, crisp telegrams from W.O., which did much to boost our morale after a series of defeats. "K" knew all our problems first hand. He was in his element and gave us his best. In those days von Lettow's askaris were a very real threat to our settlers and the Uganda Railway.

The War Office post in 1914 was a tragedy Kitchener had for many years tried to avoid. At first his words and influence were unchallenged. The recruiting poster (p. 291). The war for "three years." We all felt the right hand was on the tiller. But gradually, as the limitations became obvious, confidence waned, especially among Ministers who expected reasonable discussions as well as ultimatums. The General Staff was there, but he failed to use it, and everything centred in the one man, an impossible burden in the world upheaval. He was lost, and took refuge in silence and secretiveness. He lost sight of official papers with serious results. Munitions alone eventually involved a whole Ministry with Lloyd George in charge.

And so at last came the visit to Russia and the mining of the *Hampshire* in June, 1916. This was in some ways the ideal solution of what had become an insoluble problem. Kitchener was still a legend. Still the name that stirred the people. But Ministers had found they could no longer work with him, although by then most of that impossible burden on one man's shoulders had been passed on to others. There is little doubt that, had he returned to Whitehall, he would have had to face a public exposure of failure. A fallen idol and a legend shattered. It is well he was spared that. Now there remains the picture of that Eastern Colossus who achieved victories on a shoestring and possessed probably the most commanding personality of his age.

Other biographies will appear as other records come to light. But there is little doubt that this fair and convincing presentation of the relevant facts will remain for many years the most complete and authoritative documentary evidence available.

The Sudan map on pages 44-5 is not easy to follow. An extendible single page, even on a smaller scale, would seem worth while and more in keeping with the general standard of the whole publication.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Egypt.** By Tom Little. Ernest Benn, 1958. Pp. 321. Map. 30s.

Mr. Little's disclaimer that his book is a history of Egypt is perhaps literally true—in the sense, that is, that history is a meticulous record of events. It is fortunate indeed that his wide reading did not tempt him to produce anything so indigestible. What he has done in fact is to draw for everyone, from the earnest and well-read student to the uninformed but honest seeker after truth, a wonderfully well-balanced picture.

Unlike so many others who have written about Egypt, Mr. Little has no axes to grind, no policies to defend and no complexes to parade. He is British to the core and a staunch patriot. He knows the Egyptians well and it is clear that he likes them. But he has allowed neither his patriotism nor his sympathy to affect his dispassionate approach to the matter.

Few observers have brought out so clearly how deep in the subjection and suffering of the past are the roots of contemporary Egypt, or have shown so convincingly the strength and pliancy given to the Egyptian people by this fact. The conviction that they were always the victims imbued them with a pessimistic realism and conditioned their attitude towards their Western "deliverers" despite the obvious benefits these brought to the country. What has seemed to so many honest souls in Britain who have, like their predecessors, given of their best to help Egypt, the base ingratitude of the Egyptian people was the natural result of the passage of time. As Mr. Little puts it: "... material benefits do not for ever satisfy the people ruled, if only because the younger generation does not know the evils of the past and the older soon forgets them." So that while the Egyptians may, as he says, be pro-British by temperament, they are by political conviction deeply against Britain. Their belief that the secularization of Turkey has made them the heirs to the Caliphate is one of the main factors in their pan-Arab approach to the problems of the Middle East and North Africa. These and other aspects of Egypt's evolution are discussed by Mr. Little with a clarity and a lack of emotionalism which are most refreshing.

But it is when he comes to the Revolution of 1952 and all that followed from it that Mr. Little is at his best. His picture of Colonel Nasser is wholly admirable. Some critics might think that the importance of the rôle he played at Faluja in the Palestine war, where he was a comparatively junior officer, is exaggerated. But as showing that physical courage is one facet of his character the picture would have been incomplete without some mention of it. I fully share Mr. Little's doubt whether Nasser has ever been influenced by any foreign political ideology. He is certainly not attracted in any way by Communism, for he has dealt as harshly and decisively with the Communists in Egypt as he did with the Moslem Brotherhood. And though he pays lip-service, and perhaps something more, to parliamentary democracy, he has no longer any illusions about the readiness of the Egyptian people as a whole to shoulder the responsibility entailed by it. I think also that the parallel drawn between him and Arabi is correct, and that it is true to say that Nasser made the Arabi rebellion all over again in more appropriate conditions and that it was not rooted in any relatively modern theory of government.

So far as international affairs were concerned, Nasser naturally gave priority to an agreement with Britain, first over the Sudan and then on defence. The Sudan Agreement proved disappointing because instead of flying into the arms of the Egyptians, as was confidently expected, the Sudanese showed a disconcerting independence. On defence it must not be forgotten that Nasser did what no previous Egyptian statesman had dared to do since 1936, and that was to mortgage Egypt's future by agreeing to the re-activation of the Canal Zone base in the event of an attack on Turkey. Egypt was thus brought into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the back door, as it were. Within a fortnight of signing the treaty an attempt was made to assassinate him. Contemporary accounts of this occurrence gave it, perhaps naturally, a rather more serious character than does Mr. Little. But whether or not his version of it is more accurate, the timing of the attempt was undoubtedly significant.

It is also noteworthy that up to the time of the Suez attack the Defence Agreement was being scrupulously observed despite the deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations consequent on the conclusion of the Bagdad Pact, the refusal of what Nasser considered adequate supplies of arms by Britain and Egypt's anti-British activities and propaganda throughout Africa and the Middle East.

Neutrality as a political theory is understandably attractive to the small countries of the Middle East, and in particular to Egypt, which has been throughout its history such a good example of stubborn passive resistance. Mr. Little is surely right in attributing to Nasser the mental picture of Egypt following the example of India, neutral but remaining in the Commonwealth, and of Yugoslavia, neutral within Communism.

There is no doubt whatever that Egypt's connection with the Soviet bloc is economic and not ideological, but there is none the less grave danger in it, for debts must be paid sooner or later in one way or another. Men of goodwill everywhere, and Egypt's well-wishers in particular, can only hope that her rulers and the Western Powers will see the wisdom of an adjustment of policy on both sides. A successful Middle Eastern policy cannot be found by the Western Powers except in association of some kind with Egypt. Here lies the great importance of this book with its lucid exposition of the aims and aspirations of the Egyptian Revolution.

RALPH STEVENSON.

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**Alexander's Path.** By Freya Stark. John Murray. 1958. Pp. 283. Ind.; app.; maps; ill. 30s.

This is the third of Freya Stark's books on Asia Minor. The first was her "quest" for that Ionia where took place "the early blossoming of Greece on the easy peninsula loved by the Mycenaean oarsmen." The second took her pleasantly by sea paths along the surprisingly lovely (surprisingly because so little known even now) Lycian shore. This third volume of a series which, let us hope, will grow into a pentalogy or even something more, was the one most uncomfortably made—by horse and jeep into Pamphylia and the inland parts of Lycia and beyond. It, too, is a

quest—a quest for the short Lycian section, so cursorily referred to in history, of Alexander the Great's route along the path of fabulous destiny that led him in the end into Afghanistan and the Punjab. In increasing measure as the book proceeds the young superman becomes its central figure.

Alexander—Iskandar of the Two Horns to the Arabs, national hero to the modern Albanians, who claim him as their compatriot—is a man after the authoress's heart. She sees him as the geographer and the explorer rather than as the empire-builder, still less as the shedder of blood; as the godlike youth who long before his time dreamed dreams of the brotherhood of man and offered prayers for its fulfilment. So she decides to devote this particular journey to a laborious tracking of his march through an obscure region of western Asia, readily accepting its inevitably attendant fatigues, discomforts and even hardships. No long ride in wet clothes, no tiring reconnaissance on foot, no certainty of hard lying, deters her from her self-imposed task; and the result is a fascinating piece of historical reconstruction in a setting of great natural attraction. "No part of the world," she remarks at the outset of her narrative, "can be more beautiful than the western and southern coasts of Turkey."

Freya Stark does not embark lightly on her travel books: her self-preparation is conscientious, intensive and detailed, which is one of the reasons why her books are so superlatively good in matter. That they are as superlatively good in manner is because they are written in her inimitable blend of philosophy, humanity (which means understanding sympathy with the inhabitants of the country) and that wealth of imagery which never fails her. From her seeing eye and comprehending spirit she fashions her commentaries, her interpretations of scenes and people, in a beauty of writing which is her own special gift. She can draw that beauty even from topography.

Dedicated traveller that she is, she explored her hero's route alone, her only companions the Turks who drove her and those who sheltered her in the villages where she rested and slept, entertaining her with that hospitality which the Turkish countryman proffers as a matter of course, indeed, but not perfunctorily, since it comes not only from good manners but from the heart. And while she never takes her eye for long off Alexander and his Macedonians, she does occasionally permit herself a digression to consider, for example, accomplishments of Byzantines and Seljuq Turks and the little-known Crusader Kingdom of Lesser Armenia. She goes to that loveliest of all castles by the sea, Anamur, the Bamborough of the Latin East; to Alanya, summer resort of the Sultans of Rûm, which is the charmingly named Candelore of the mediaeval chroniclers and the Alaia of the Seljuqs Ottomans. But Alanya has its annoyances to offset its delights: this reviewer, too, has been exasperated by the paradoxical enthusiasm of its Director of Tourism for its threatened modernization. He positively looks forward to the rude awakening of the Sleeping Beauty in his charge; he really seems to believe that the tourists who come to visit her will prefer reinforced concrete to Byzantine brick and Turkish tile.

It is pleasant to find familiar words looming among the strange place-names: there is a chapter on Mount Climax; we go to a Gordium (although not the one of the Knot); an appearance is made by Mausolus of Halicarnassus, whose sepulchre is the first and original mausoleum. The volume is embellished with the author's photographs and amusing little sketches in the text. She knows so well not only how but what to photograph.

HARRY LUKE.

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**Avicenna: His Life and Works.** By Soheil M. Afnan. George Allen and Unwin. 1958. Pp. 298. 30s.

This is not a bedside book. Avicenna spent a variegated life ranging from prison to palace, but the tale is dull; only a novelist could make it interesting by telling us why the army objected to Avicenna as vizier yet not long after demanded his appointment, but such explanations would almost certainly be wrong. Avicenna was a man of tremendous energy, burning the candle at both ends, dominating the world of medicine for centuries, and an outstanding philosopher, though his excursions into politics were failures. Dr. Afnan has a few pages on the physician, only a doctor

can write on medicine, and concentrates on the philosopher. The book begins with a vivid description of the world in which Avicenna lived and the progress of ordered thinking among Muslims. It is a familiar tale, but here it is well told. Avicenna was a big man who did not swear in the words of any master but went his own way, borrowing anything which he found useful and incorporating it into his own system, though the foundation was the work of Aristotle. The last two chapters of the book treat of the influence of Avicenna among Muslims and in Christian Europe. It is noteworthy that Bar Habraeus translated one of his philosophical works into Syriac. In Europe his influence was widespread though not so concentrated as that of Averroes; he did not found a school, but what has been called *augustinisme avicennisant* can be found in wellnigh every department of scholasticism.

His universe is a dualism of creator and matter. (Matter did not mean to him what it means to a modern scientist, and substance may be "neither a body nor a power in a body.") The transcendence of the creator is guarded by the emanations of Neo-Platonism, through which the divine will is imposed on amorphous matter, the souls of men being joined to that matter which is in harmony with them. Distinctive features of the system are the distinction between essence and existence, for in God alone are these identified, while in all else existence is an accident added by God to the essence or nature of the thing which is to be; that from one only one could proceed, so the derivation of the multiplicity of the universe from the unity of God was a difficulty. The first emanation from God is the Primal Reason; this has two aspects, one towards itself and one towards God, so from it two can proceed! Avicenna was a believing Muslim, so his teaching on God's providence is at odds with the determinism of his system, and he could never banish the fears of the orthodox that he taught the eternity of the world. Afnan reports some arguments at length and some of them seem to rest on baseless assumptions. It is hard to screw up enthusiasm for theories which have long since been exploded, so Avicenna's psychology and his arguments for it and on it are wearisome. Dr. Afnan can see no defects in his hero; Avicenna followed Aristotle in thinking that the soul was the form which made the body into a man, yet he affirmed that it is a substance which continues alive after the death of the body. No attention is paid here to this inconsistency. The translations from Avicenna are reliable though occasionally rather free. The English is sometimes ugly; two words meaning "eternal without beginning" and "eternal without end" are translated "pre-eternal" and "post-eternal," which are meaningless. The index is almost worthless. The book is a sound introduction to its subject.

A. S. T.

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**A History of Modern Burma.** By John F. Cady. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press. 1958. Pp. 682. Bibliography and index.

Professor Cady is well known as an authority on the history of South-East Asia in the modern period, and students of the history and affairs of that part of the world have been awaiting his *History of Modern Burma* with eager anticipation. They will find in this book no cause for disappointment. Professor Cady begins with a most valuable analysis of the structure of society and government prior to the British period, rightly judging that the problems which arose under British rule, and which have in some instances continued into the period of regained independence, cannot be understood unless the radical changes which the British effected are appreciated. This section of the book bears evidence of the thoroughness with which the author has examined and collated evidence drawn from all available sources, and it has also the great merit of being readable, a feature of which some other historians might take note.

The body of the book is devoted to the rise of nationalism and the attainment of independence; roughly two-thirds of the space are given to this difficult period. The author observes in his preface that no definitive history of this period can be written until the official archives in the India Office Library, still closed for the years since 1902, are made available to the public. He is perhaps unduly modest on this point: the wide variety of sources which he has consulted has enabled him to build up a

detailed account of the course of events, and even though access to unpublished documents might here and there have elaborated or modified a point, it is doubtful whether any resultant alterations in the text would have been significant.

The author's judicious impartiality is impressive. Readers who were themselves involved in the political troubles of the pre-war and post-war years are not likely to find themselves in agreement with the book on all points: but this applies to both parties, Burman nationalists and British officials and businessmen alike. Sympathetic to the nationalist cause, Professor Cady is also aware of the complex difficulties which the British régime had to face, and though critical where criticism is due, he also gives credit where it was earned. This is probably a case where the onlooker sees most of the game, and the views of a wise and scholarly observer may have a greater value than those of participants in the struggle.

One or two minor points call for amendment when a new edition is issued. Professor Cady's proof-reader failed him here and there—e.g., p. 285, "J. Clague" is given instead of "J. Clague," an error which appears also in the index. Alexander Hamilton, whose *New Account of the East Indies* was published in 1727, was not Duke of Hamilton as stated in the bibliography and index. The collapse of the defence in the Shan States in 1941 is stated (p. 439) to have been due to Japanese penetration from Northern Siam, but Lord Alexander's despatch and the official history of the campaign both indicate that the enemy advance came from Toungoo through Karenni. Such minor slips are, however, almost unavoidable in so massive a work and do not detract from the value of the whole.

The only part of the book which arouses any uneasiness is the account of the new Constitution introduced into Burma in 1937. This section (pp. 451-355) very properly draws attention to the extensive reserve powers entrusted to the Governor, but the casual reader might not perceive that such powers were essentially of an emergency character, to be employed only as a last resort. The task of the Governor was to make the Constitution work, and the exercise of his special powers except in circumstances where such action was manifestly justified would have produced a constitutional crisis and frustrated the whole object of the new system of government. This misapprehension is likely to be confirmed by the footnote on p. 353 stating that "Only the Governor's council could initiate financial measures"; no reader unacquainted with the circumstances could realize that in this sense the term "Governor's council" means the Ministers responsible to the elected House of Representatives.

But apart from such minor points, anyone who wants to know what happened in Burma in the British period and what has happened since will find the information in this book; and those already familiar with the story will find their memories refreshed and corrected and their judgment clarified by the details which the writer gives and the comments which he makes. Professor Cady has performed a valuable service by compiling this work, which must stand as the authoritative history of modern Burma for many years to come.

B. R. P.

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**Mazdur: Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India.** By Charles A. Myers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. 297.

My heart sank when I began this book and read the opening sentence: "India is in the midst of an ambitious and critically important effort to raise the living standards of her people by an integrated economic development program." I looked forward to another painstaking specimen of heavily financed fact-grubbing interlarded with the familiar materialist-missionary clichés about raising the standards of living in the under-developed areas.

Instead, as I read on, I enjoyed a fascinating account, supported by about the right stiffening of statistics, of the industrialization of India, first under a British-dominated capitalism and latterly in a "Socialist pattern of society" woven by the independent régime of the Indian National Congress. This system is shrewdly defined in a quotation from *Capital of Calcutta* which Professor Myers does well to include: "'Nehruism' would seem to be Capitalism without the confidence of inalienable property rights, Socialism with a private sector, and Communism without revolution or ruth-

lessness." Part of the social philosophy of the Nehru Government is shown to derive from a suspicion of the Indian businessman's integrity, part from a Gandhian antipathy to machinery and mass methods, part again from the British legacy of liberty and law. The enlightened labour relations enjoined by Indian nationalism today are often seen at their best in British and American firms. Hidebound management and political trade unionism, all the uncertainties and bureaucracy of a mixed economy—these are experiences not limited to India. In India, as Professor Myers shows, are added the complications of a labour force still influenced by the village and caste basis of society and a desire for paternalism not on one side of industry alone.

The Professor's appraisal is interesting and temperate, and his conclusion can be studied with advantage by the Union and State Governments of India, the pundits of the Plan, managers and trade union leaders and all who are concerned, like the author, for the future of a country with a decisive part to play in the Commonwealth and in Asia.

Among a number of most useful appendices is reproduced the Labour Section of the First Five-Year Plan.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**India Changes.** By Taya Zinkin. Chatto and Windus. Pp. 234. 28s.

**The Time of the Mango Flowers.** By Roderick Cameron. Heinemann. Pp. 308. Index; illustrations. 30s.

It has never been possible to judge India by Western standards and it would not be right to do so. When India has a revolution we may therefore assume that it will set about it in its own way. A country that has traditions so deeply embedded in the past must move slowly and take time to decide what must be discarded and what can effectively be grafted on to the new system. Mrs. Zinkin, who has many years of experience in India and clearly has a great love for the country and understanding of its people, gives in a short space an excellent introduction to India's peaceful revolution.

India is changing more rapidly than many ever expected possible and Mrs. Zinkin has described changes in personal status, social organization and the political system. Her chapter on the position of women, marriage and the family and family planning are excellent. They are based on personal knowledge and observations, so that the reader can get a very clear picture of the problems which exist and how far they are being overcome.

On social changes Mrs. Zinkin covers such problems as caste, untouchability and hygiene, showing that centuries of tradition cannot be ignored or overridden by legislation. Only time and example can bring about the changes required, and it may well take longer than Mrs. Zinkin and others think to achieve the final object. She emphasizes the importance of the village and shows what effect newspapers, wireless, cinema and improved communications are likely to have. She stresses throughout the book the great part which the village plays in India and how strong its influence is upon all strata of society.

In the chapter on minorities Mrs. Zinkin has overlooked an extremely important group—namely, the Aboriginal tribes—although she has briefly mentioned earlier the admission of Aborigines into the Hindu fold. It is difficult to accept her view of Hinduism as a non-proselytizing religion when one remembers the very great efforts which have been made over the years to bring in Aborigines for political reasons and thus increase the population figures for Hindus as opposed to other religions. A book such as the present would be improved by a chapter dealing with these important groups, varying from Nagas to Todas, who are a special responsibility of the Indian Government and who have their own entirely separate problems to solve.

The final chapters include a very interesting review of Gandhi and the work of Vinoba Bhave, but those sections dealing with political developments are so compressed as to be of less value than the rest of the book. In addition, they do not for obvious reasons have the same personal touch as the earlier chapters. To make a really successful book these chapters should be expanded considerably.

The book is of great interest and will stimulate thought, even if we do not agree

with all the author says. Mrs. Zinkin is, after all, speaking as a supporter of the present régime in India, and some readers may think that her spectacles have unduly rosy lenses. Further, it must be remembered that the book was written for the United States of America and was first published there. It is, therefore, written to suit that market, including the spelling.

*Time of the Mango Flowers* is quite a different type of work and is light reading for those who wish to visit or revisit many places of interest in India. Mr. Cameron obviously read widely before he set out on his travels, and it is a pity that the book is marred by a remarkable number of careless mistakes. Some of them are spelling mistakes repeated more than once, and others are errors of fact. All or most could have been remedied by anyone with a knowledge of India, if the text had been shown to him before publication. Such mistakes shake the reader's confidence in the author and detract from what is a very enjoyable account of a journey through the length and breadth of India. The illustrations are good and the book can be recommended to those who are willing to read it in an uncritical frame of mind. The observations of the author are supported by extracts from authoritative work and memoirs which bring life to the many places visited.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

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**An Economic Geography of East Pakistan.** By Nafis Ahmad. Oxford University Press. Pp. 325. 50s.

There are many within and without her coasts who confuse "Pakistan" with her Western wing. The people of East Pakistan knew Islam later than those in the west; the European and indigenous emporium of Calcutta sucked life from, or denied vitality to, the fertile plains of East Bengal; and the growth of population during the first half of the present century outdid the slight increase of cultivation in what Sir John Woodhead about fifty years ago described as "a prosperous land, judged by Indian standards," so that there is today very heavy human pressure on the soil. "Geography," in Mr. Nafis Ahmad's words, "seemed to relegate (East Pakistan) to the backwaters of isolation." But Lord Curzon's partition of 1905 was made final in 1947: Calcutta is parted from East Bengal; and there is now no excuse for ignoring the geopolitical significance and economic possibilities of a territory of 54,141 square miles containing 42 million souls against nearly 34 million in West Pakistan. It is a territory which in terms of agriculture is one of the richest in the world.

Mr. Nafis Ahmad has used the techniques of economic geography to describe the physical complexion and natural and productive resources of the country and to show how climate and physical conditions and drastic political changes have influenced the evolution of its economy. The author writes a clear and vigorous English. He is never dry, nor does he shirk such contentious questions as the conflict between rice and jute, between the main food crop and the great cash crop. He concludes with an appeal for urgent measures to care for the millions of Pakistanis "living in an atmosphere of subsistence economy," any further lowering of whose living standards would, in his opinion, prove disastrous.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

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**Frontier Doctor.** By Sir Henry Holland. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 256. Index; ill.; maps. 25s.

Sir Henry Holland was born into a north-country family that had strong clerical traditions. His father and both his grandfathers were clergymen, and since he himself had early determined to lead a practical Christian life and to be of use in his generation, it was only natural that powerful influences should be brought to bear on him to follow the example of his elder brother and become a parson. But his own strong predilections were for a military career and for a life of sport and adventure, and he must have felt that he was giving up all of this when, as the only seemly way of resisting family pressure to go into the Church, he decided to become a doctor. Almost inevitably this led him into the foreign field as a medical missionary, and he joined the Church Missionary Society at Quetta in 1910.

"Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things

shall be added unto you." There can be no better illustration of the truth of this text than Sir Henry's autobiography, written now when he is well into his eighties. For it is a record not only of a life of dedicated service to his fellow-men that none can ever have surpassed, but of sport and adventure that he would perhaps never have enjoyed but for his early willingness to abandon the hope of them. In the course of more than fifty years' service on the frontiers of what is now Pakistan, he has become famous as a surgeon specializing in eye diseases, and the hospital at Quetta with its subsidiary clinic at Shikarpur in Sind has been placed on the world map. He might have become a wealthy man, for his skill soon attracted the attention of the rich and generous as well as of the destitute poor to whom most of his time was devoted, but everything that he received above a bare subsistence allowance has gone into maintaining and furthering the work of his hospital.

One who has known and admired Sir Henry and his work for more than forty years is tempted to paint a far more glowing picture of his life than he himself has done. But he would not wish for this, and it is better to let a few facts speak for themselves. The clinic at Shikarpur only functions for two months each year in the cold weather, and its patients come from far and near. Sir Henry has often had to see from 200 to 300 out-patients in a day. The clinic is now one of the largest eye clinics in the world, and can deal with 600 patients at a time; during the last fifty years over 150,000 eye operations have been performed, including over 80,000 for the removal of cataract. During one period of only two months there were 3,000 operations, of which over 1,400 were for cataract. All this was the work of Sir Henry and of the devoted staff which he has trained, and in the course of it he has had the great happiness of having both his sons join him in the work, and Dr. Ronnie Holland is now carrying on his father's work. And here one must mention Ronnie's heroic wife Joan, who was early in her married life smitten down by polio and has, in spite of grievous disability for nearly twenty years, not only continued to carry on purely administrative work, but has become an expert anæsthetist, working from an invalid chair, using modern anæsthetic apparatus in the operating theatre.

Two world wars gave Sir Henry his opportunity for military service, and his work has taken him to America, Arabia, China, Japan, Kashmir, Tibet and Afghanistan; of all these countries he has engaging things to say. There are many amusing anecdotes, and there is not an unkind word about anyone. But in one matter he is mistaken. His modesty leads him to think that his knighthood and official decoration were bestowed "not so much with the idea of honouring the individual as to show appreciation of the service rendered by the institution which he represented." This is often enough true of official honours, and there is no doubt about Government's appreciation of the work of the Quetta and Shikarpur hospitals. But equally there is no doubt that Sir Henry's honours were earned many times over, and were granted for personal service.

HUGH DOW.

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**Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains.** By Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Moseley and Benjamin Schwarz. Foreword by Arthur H. Dean. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers. New York. 1957. Pp. 231.

The nature, complexities and obscurities of the Moscow-Peking Alliance are closely examined in this impressive symposium by five distinguished American experts. The political expediency of the Alliance in the present international conjuncture is obvious. It is a more difficult task to discover beneath the façade of a common allegiance to Marxism, "proletarian internationalism," fraternal Party unity . . . what the permanent basis and the real nature and temper of the Alliance is. Occasional stresses and strains would seem inevitable between these two Communist giants, but they are carefully concealed from prying eyes by the tight security guards of Peking and Moscow. The subject bristles with open questions and with political-ideological conundrums. What, for example, was the respective share of responsibility of the Chinese and Russians for the Korean War? Why did Stalin plunder Manchuria if he believed in a Chinese Communist victory? What is the Soviet attitude to the Chinese claim to provide the revolutionary model for the under-developed countries



of Asia and Africa? All these questions are examined in this book, though the answers are far from conclusive. In this reviewer's opinion, insufficient attention has been given to the complex question of stresses and strains in the Alliance. Indeed, Professor Mosely's conclusion that "the Soviet leadership wishes to see China achieve its far-ranging ambitions" (p. 203), seems extraordinarily unrealistic in the light of the recent history of the domestic border lands and the large areas of possible conflict between Soviet Russia and China in South-East Asia.

The Alliance is compounded of ideological, power-political and economic factors, any of which may fluctuate in importance according to the respective domestic policies and needs of the two partners, thus introducing an element of instability into the Alliance. The significance of the economic factor, for example, at the present time illustrates this point very clearly. While economic supplies from the Soviet Union are essential to China's industrialization policy, the China trade is rather a drag on the Soviet Union, which needs the capital goods exported to China for her own industry and the satellites, and has only a marginal interest in Chinese imports. The precise basis of this Sino-Soviet trade is not known, but as it is motivated by political rather than economic considerations from the Soviet side it would be surprising if it were not the source of serious if hidden strains and frictions.

The common Marx-Leninist image of the world and its future shared by Russia and China no doubt lends strength to their opposition to the West, but ideology and the struggle for ideological leadership of the "Communist camp" is none the less a hypothetical source of conflict between them. Which of the two powers, for example, is to provide Communist leadership for South-East Asia, guidance for revolutionary parties in Indonesia, etc. Does Moscow positively accept China's claim to provide the more relevant revolutionary model for the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa? These and similar questions could become hotbeds of trouble—enormously dwarfing the present Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in scope and intensity—if Soviet Russia and Communist China ever fell apart.

Perhaps the greatest merit of this admirably honest and business-like survey is to alert the reader to the large gaps in our knowledge of Sino-Soviet relations and to discourage glib or facile prognostications about the future of the Moscow-Peking Axis.

C. J.

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**The Soviet Far East.** By Erich Thiel. Translated by A. and R. M. Rookwood. Methuen. Pp. 388. Bibliography; index; 38 maps. 30s.

In the past hundred years the Far East has come to play an increasingly important role in Russia's economy and her relations with other states. Although it does not correspond with Soviet administrative divisions, the Far East, defined for the purposes of this study as the area east of Lake Baikal, was explored in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but only colonized as a result of Russian Government policy in the nineteenth. Then the activity of Muraviev, resulting in the foundation of Vladivostok, made the economic development of the Maritime and Amur Provinces necessary to support the political position attained by Russian diplomacy and arms. This sequence was later observed in Manchuria and Korea. In consequence, compulsory settlement of the area was begun—the first settlers being convicts and deported prostitutes. These were followed by the foundation of self-supporting military settlements among the Amur and Ussuri Cossacks. Subsequently, when the deficiencies of this policy were revealed, the Government reverted to a policy of migration from other parts of Russia based on the incentives of financial assistance and low land prices. The significant increase in population took place in consequence of the Trans-Siberian and Amur railways, which gave a fillip to the economic and, in particular, industrial development of the region. Labour on these projects was restricted to Russians, who were encouraged to settle and thus help colonize the area, and the improved communications promoted the exploitation of its considerable natural resources.

This policy has been continued and intensified under the Soviet régime. Again, development has turned on the problem of communications, which itself has depended on strategic as well as economic considerations. It is the supreme merit of Professor Thiel's study that it makes perfectly clear the over-all size of the problem confronting

the Soviet planners, together with the geographical and economic circumstances they have to take into account.

The book is divided into two parts: the first deals with such basic geographical factors as the physical background, population, economic pursuits and communications of the region as a whole. The second is concerned with detailed studies of individual areas, of which Professor Thiel identifies eighteen, mainly on the basis of their relief. Both parts are illustrated with clear maps and diagrams and are firmly based on statistical information, though the author recognizes that in part this information is, for obvious reasons, neither as complete nor as up to date as could be wished.

Clearly, the Soviet Far East has all the natural resources for future development, even within the limits imposed by the climate. The principal hindrance is the vast area of permanently frozen subsoil. As only the surface thaws, the covering of soil to support organic life is restricted. Precipitation runs away on or near the surface, and when it freezes in winter causes upheavals in the surface level and disrupts communications. The permanent frost also adversely affects building construction and mining operations. Evidence that such difficulties are being successfully tackled is furnished by the results of Soviet research institutes and by the recent change in the ratio of pastoral to urban population in favour of the latter. As in other empty areas, air transport has reduced the problem of distance. Professor Thiel's account emphasizes, however, that the economy of the area is, compared with its potentialities, still only at the beginnings of development.

The book is part of a comprehensive geography of the Soviet Union and is based on personal observation and wide reading of sources which are indicated in an excellent bibliography. It is to be hoped that the author's study on Mongolia, recently published in Germany, will also be translated.

MAURICE PEARTON.

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**Syria and the Lebanon Under French Mandate.** By S. H. Longrigg. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. xii × 404. Index; 3 maps. 42s.

The tragic story of Syria under French rule runs here through prologue and progressive development to its inevitable climax. It is an impressive performance and those who "knew from the beginning what would happen" will find in this book convincing justification for their beliefs. Brigadier Longrigg's treatment of his subject is superbly thorough, objective, analytical, dispassionate.

After the scene has been set, "one of the most interesting countries in the world," probably the most beautiful of the Arab world and with natural resources rather better than most of it, the prologue, chapters II and III, tells the story of the preliminaries to the French taking of the Mandate.

A great deal of heat has been generated in past over the question of the promises to the Arabs and this is perhaps the best and most judicial summing-up of the matter there has been. Though the whole story must in point of time still rank as recent history, the period of the Mandates is completed history and we are now well into a new period of the relationship of the Western world with the Arabs. It does not seem likely that this account, prologue and all, can be easily superseded and from this aspect the author's cautions as to his disadvantages seem unduly modest and unjustified.

The main body of the book, covering the Mandate period itself is very detailed and though invaluable for reference purposes, (the index is good, though it might perhaps have had more sub-headings), reading through it is far from tedious and indeed rewarding in that it brings home, incident by incident, how inevitable it all was.

The summing-up is very satisfying in its impartiality and entirely convincing. Without straining to find something to say in French favour, Brigadier Longrigg gives them full credit for all they achieved in the social, cultural and economic fields: the sad thing is that had French pride and obstinate belief that their *mission civilatrice* could make all those under French rule anxious to become Frenchmen not led them to desire the political power, they could probably have achieved much more in their cultural, social and economic activities. So, too, if the British had not

been convinced that to maintain the interests they had so hardly preserved in the war they had to have extended political power, it might well have been the case that there would have been a happier issue in Iraq and Palestine.

Close association with French as well as Arabs has long made me feel that though we and they have had much to dispute about, we have much to give each other and a great deal which should make for solid friendship. Apart from the tragedy of Western-Arab relations at present, reason for which is apparent enough in this book, it is also sad to see how persistent French distrust of the British attitude to their presence in Syria was, despite the fact that there was not the slightest ground for it. The French and British attitudes to the emergence of dependent peoples to self-government are very different and the French have far more feeling about that than the British, but it is strange indeed that they should ever have thought the British wanted to substitute themselves for the *Presence Française*.

It seems fair enough to say that Arab dissensions and disunity would have had their way in Mandated parts of the Arab world even if they had had their independence from the beginning. The only political legacy that matters is therefore the strength of anti-Western feeling there is in Arab Nationalism today. We could have done more for the Arabs and better for ourselves without taking political control, especially in face of the promises to the Arabs. This theme can also be supported by evidence to be found in this very excellent book.

HAROLD INGRAMS.

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**Iraq.** By Brigadier Stephen Longrigg and Frank Stoakes. Ernest Benn Ltd. Pp. 256. Appendices; map; index. 27s.

Before the world was suddenly awakened by the *coup d'état* in Bagdad last July, the British public seemed to take strangely little interest in Iraq. It knew vaguely that there was an elder statesman named Nuri-es-Said, a lot of oil and a big programme of development. It might also have heard of the Bagdad Pact, but it never succeeded in distinguishing between Iraq and Iran. For this ignorance the press was largely to blame, for Middle East correspondents, if they visited Iraq at all, stayed only a day or so before rushing back to the spicier atmosphere of Cairo. No doubt their editors were always demanding drama, and Iraq was not at the time providing it. She has made up for it since.

The present volume, published by Ernest Benn in the "Nations of the Modern World" series, is therefore exceedingly welcome. The two authors, Brigadier Longrigg and Mr. Frank Stoakes, are both masters of their subject and have succeeded in compressing an astonishing amount of information into 250 pages. It is precisely what is needed for an introduction to the country. Brimful of data and description—of the land, the people, the economy and the social background, not to mention an historical survey ranging from the earliest times up to the present day—the volume will encourage the reader to delve further into the history and problems of a country fascinating in itself and of outstanding importance to the Western world. He will learn, if he does not know already, what gives it its fascination and its importance and will crave for more.

In reading the story of Iraq, what the reader may miss is a feeling of drama. Where so much has had to be included in so short a space it has been impossible to do full justice to the tenseness of much of the recent history. The cold facts are all recorded, but at the time they were far from cold; for though in the last few years, up to last July, Iraq had been comparatively free of the turmoil that was surging in most of the Arab world, it has had its full quota of dramatic incident since it started on the road to independence forty years ago.

Right at the end of the book there is a reference to the Iraqi army as the ultimate arbiter. One might perhaps have wished that the authors could have devoted a little more of their limited space to the army. Much is told us of civilian discontents, but these could always be handled so long as the army remained loyal. One would like to know more of the reasons that led to its disaffection and why it was that when the moment of decision came hardly a single officer felt able or willing to defend the old order.

J. M. T.

**Tensions in the Middle East.** Edited by Philip W. Thayer. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. London: Oxford University Press. Pp. 332. Index; map. 35s.

*Tensions in the Middle East* is made up of thirteen essays, each accompanied by a commentary, which were presented by different authorities (all clearly of considerable eminence) to a conference sponsored by the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in August 1957. There is an introduction by Charles Malik and a concluding comment by Ernest K. Lindley.

A criticism of the book could be that it has no central theme or pattern. The papers range from high politics and strategy to philosophy, economics and social problems, while some are devoted to particular issues such as the Suez crisis, Cyprus, Israel and the problems of technical assistance. Yet it is perhaps unfair to complain that a book fails to achieve what it never sets out to do. The conference, as explained in the foreword, was designed to "provide a forum for expressions of opinion on recent developments." Those developments were the Suez operation, the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine, the threat of a Communist success in Syria and the deadlock in Cyprus. These are the questions with which the more political of the contributors are chiefly concerned, and very ably are they discussed. Views, of course, are expressed on which argument is possible. Not all will agree, for example, that the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine and the deployment of United States forces in the wake of the Jordan crisis really had the effect even at the time of reassuring the West's Asian allies and sobering some of Asia's "mischievous neutralists." But no opinion about matters in the Middle East will ever receive universal acclaim. Indeed, what makes the volume alive is the divergence of view among its contributors. The action of Israel and of Britain and France in November 1956 is defended in one paper and assailed in another. One paper denounces the organization of the United Nations as it emerged from the Suez debates, while another defends it. One authority holds that the West should take as little action as possible in the present Middle Eastern situation; another believes that this would expose the Middle East to further penetration and domination by the Soviet Union. The arguments will no doubt go on for as long as the Middle East retains its interest for the Western Powers. But they are unlikely to be better put than in the present essays.

The volume, however, is not all politics. Some readers will find greater satisfaction in the more philosophical papers discussing such matters as the basic reasons for the present discontents in the Middle East, the peculiarities of the Arab approach to politics, and the structural changes in Middle Eastern Society. They will also be entranced by Walter Laqueur's reflections on the prospects of Communism. Its attraction to under-developed countries, he thinks, is often underrated in the West, for "Communism has everything Nasserism possesses plus a practical social and economic programme."

All in all, the volume not only presents an invaluable exposition of American and other Western thinking on the Middle East. It also sets out and argues many of the basic problems that confront the Western world in that region.

J. M. T.

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**British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.** Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by the Oxford University Press. Pp. 123. 12s. 6d.

This is the work of a Chatham House Study Group under the chairmanship of Sir Knox Helm. The names of the members and the fact that they approached their subject with individual views is an appetizer conditioning the reader to enjoy the ensuing meal.

It starts with an historic and economic background lucidly written. Although the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth are but touched on compared with later times, yet the comment on those early days contains some of the most thought-provoking sentences of the section. "In the nineteenth century the main significance of the Middle East to outside Powers lay in its geographical situation. Apart from this it had little inherent interest in itself"—an attitude taken for granted

at the time. Yet it is relevant today to look at a sentence in a very little known manifesto issued by Arabi and the emergent Egyptian National Party exactly seventy years ago: "The country . . . does not always want ministers representing this or the other European influence," they wrote. "Egypt does not want to become nothing but a geographical expression."\* This attitude was not taken for granted by them, even in 1879.

The authors of this book face squarely some unpalatable truths: "Within Egypt the benefits of occupation were counter-balanced by other ill-effects. To Egyptian nationalists one overlord seemed merely to have been exchanged for another. . . . Contact between British policy and Egyptians took place only at the top, where Britain alienated the current Egyptian leaders without either winning over their successors or doing sufficient to keep the allegiance of the vast mass of the people from whom their successors would rise." The point in expressing such truths is not to be negative about the past but for the light thrown on how to be effectually positive about the present. "The aspiration for a united Arab state was thwarted at the Peace Conference." There is value in pondering that sentence too.

The next section deals with Britain's economic and politico-strategic interests. They are viewed with a welcome clarity. "We may still need bases, but our means of retaining them must include winning the friendship and loyalty of their inhabitants, assets less tangible and more easily thrown away than military installations." This is followed by a section on the interests of other parties—American, Soviet, European and Asian. Arab nationalism is then discussed realistically with an insight into past experiences and present trends of thought.

The Iraqi events of July 1958 can often act as a tuning fork held up to Middle Eastern books written prior to that month. This tuning fork can help to show whether the note struck in the work is flat (as in an unsuccessful dive), sharp (as in a Slick Alec), or whether it proved, in the event, to be a true note. This is what the group wrote months before July 1958: "Intellectuals everywhere from Baghdad eastwards and southwards are being held in check by censorship, banishment or arrest, but they cannot be suppressed entirely. They have an envious eye on Egypt, think President Nasser a hero, and have a mob at their disposal everywhere except where the urban population is truly prosperous. Time is on their side. They gain ground as the educated class mounts in number. Whether they will take over the reins without violent upset, and an interlude of dictatorship by the young officer class depends more upon the capacity of the present ruling class to alter its ways than upon any other factor. Possibly the biggest chance of peaceful social change lies in Iraq, the Lebanon and perhaps Kuwait." The background thinking is all true.

Two distilled paragraphs on the Baghdad Pact give food for thought. Later on a question is asked: "What in the Arab view is 'colonialism'?" The answer is worth inwardly digesting; it includes the British invasion of Egypt in 1882—an important point.

The report then deals with an analysis of the dangers which may threaten in the area, and a review of the assets at Britain's disposal to meet them. Some readers may not agree with all propounded here, but it is stimulating reading. No one save an ostrich could disagree with such basic statements as: "Change of one sort or another there is bound to be in the long run, and it would be folly not to prepare ourselves for this in advance."

The two last sections are called respectively Assets and Drawbacks for Britain and Conclusions on Policy. The final paragraph of the former section gives some content to the crucial word "change," inasmuch as it gives a clue where to begin on the necessary move from diagnosis to cure: "Britain suffers greatly from the existence, especially among educated Arabs, of a stereotyped conception of herself as 'machievellian,' 'colonialist,' hostile and contemptuous of the Arabs at one moment, avuncularly condescending to arrange their destinies for them at another, but always determined to prevent the Arabs from achieving full control of their own affairs and full equality in international affairs with the established members of the community of nations. In so far as this conception is based on facts, it is essential that such facts

\* According to the Egyptian historian M. Sabry, there is but one copy extant of this document. It is in French, at the Bibliothèque Nationale.

be changed or repudiated. In so far as it is false, it is essential that its falsity be made as evident to Arab opinion as possible."

In the last section well-known difficulties are honestly reviewed—Cyprus, Israel, the Nile Waters, Egypt's development. No surface cure-all is offered, thank goodness, but fundamental truths are stated, to wit: "Habits of thought still sometimes persist which were formed when Britain was politically unchallenged. Even a benevolent avuncularism may now be almost as much disliked as selfish imperialist intervention." "The value of education in Britain can be very much reduced if the student's experience in Britain is unhappy." "What is most needed is a change in attitude. . . . Moreover, Britain's past does not support the view that Britain needs to be powerful to be great."

A re-thinking of what the "Great" in Great Britain could mean in an ideological age would indeed do much for the state of the world.

This book has no index. Perhaps its shortness and the number of its sub-headings is an excuse, but an index is missed all the same. As for errors or misprints, their absence reduces the wretched reviewer to but one critical remark of negligible importance. "The end of the eighteenth century," write the authors, "saw . . . Napoleon's descent into Egypt, and his subsequent isolation and defeat." But Napoleon himself left Egypt after winning a battle against a Turkish force, and the final French defeat overlapped into the nineteenth century. Kleber recovered Cairo in March 1800 and French influence was strong till his murder on June 14. General Hely-Hutchinson received the surrender of Cairo in July 1801 and of Alexandria in the following month.

There are many useful books on the Middle East which present facts, but a book like this one which honestly interprets facts is rarer and of a more significant use.

M. E. ROWLATT.

**Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today.** By Emile Bustani. Published by Allan Wingate. Pp. 159. Map. 18s.

"Any book about the Middle East," says Mr. Bustani, with pardonable emphasis, "has to be written at almost breakneck speed . . . if its content is not to be overtaken, and conceivably made ludicrous, by events." Even as he was writing his chapter on Syria, so he tells us, came the announcement of the formation of the United Arab Republic, and he had to go back and virtually re-write the book. Today, the best part of a year since publication, with the Iraqi and Sudan *coups* intervening, he would no doubt like the chance to re-write it again; for some of its principal characters have vanished for ever from the scene, and others, then unheard of, now hold the centre of the stage. And one hopes that he will re-write it, again and again if necessary, for these flashlight photographs, as it were, of the Middle Eastern scene, illuminated by Mr. Bustani's wit and robust eloquence, bring its turbulent and uncertain politics vividly to life.

It would really be unfair at this late date to review a book such as this, meant to be read as it was written—at the gallop—were it not that it contains much of permanent value. Indeed, it is not too much to say that its introduction and early chapters on Arab Nationalism, Colonialism and the Arabs should be made required reading for all who have to live and work with the people for whom Mr. Bustani speaks. For here, even though some of his compatriots might occasionally question his good humour and moderation, is the authentic voice of the Arab nationalist. It comes to us, moreover, not from the shuttered seclusion of some academic ivory tower, but rising above the hubbub of the market-place.

In attempting to quote from the book, there is an *embarras de richesse*, so many and pertinent are the good things said in it. The Arab world, says Mr. Bustani, "no longer wants to be controlled, coerced and manipulated by Powers who think they have an inherent right to shape its destinies. It no longer wants to be taken in hand by even the friendliest nation and shown the way to fulfilment. It knows its own way." Sometimes one may wish that the truth of this last statement were as obvious to outside observers as it is to Mr. Bustani, but it would be foolish to doubt that, as he insists, "Arab nationalism is a symptom of vigour, not one of sickness. The Arabs do not want political leaders to minister to them and recommend courses of

treatment. . . . The hard but inescapable truth of the matter is that Middle East oil will sooner or later cease to flow into Western markets if Britain and the United States do not cease to patronize the Arab nations, and start to respect them."

Unlike that of some of his fellow-Arabs, Mr. Bustani's clarity of vision is by no means impaired when he looks north instead of west. If anything, it becomes sharper. His forthright and courageous condemnation of Soviet policy towards the Middle East appears throughout the book. "The simple truth is that Russia is a friend of nobody on earth save the Soviet Union"; and again, "She represents, in fact, by far the most dangerous brand of imperialism which the Arab world has ever come up against." He is not deceived by false values. Although it may be true that, as he says, the Middle East "brings out the worst" in the Western Powers, yet he fairly observes that they are "far more genuinely concerned with securing peace and stability in the Middle East than is Russia."

Little wonder that, seeing his nation in danger of being crushed between the outside pressures to which it is inevitably subjected by history, geography and economics, he should have put forward his plan—the "Bustani Plan"—for an Arab Development Bank, to be owned and financed jointly by the producing countries and the oil companies, each of whom would contribute five per cent. (or perhaps less) of their revenues from oil. Working through National Development Corporations in the transit States and with its investments protected by a network of international guarantees, the Bank "would simultaneously enhance prosperity and stability in the Middle East and confound the designs of the Communist bloc to wreak ruin there."

Although Mr. Bustani might not claim complete originality for the idea behind his plan, he was the first to give it significant shape, and he might well claim it as the inspiration of the three parallel proposals subsequently put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations and the Arab League. No details of these appear to be available, but it seems hardly likely that the Bustani concept of oil company ownership and board membership—though reasonable enough if they are to make a contribution—can survive. And perhaps this is just as well. For quite apart from the difficulty all oil companies have in meeting existing calls on their capital resources for investment, such a proposal for intimate association with what is properly the exclusive prerogative of the Arab governments would surely draw them deeply into Arab politics. They already have that "concrete and visible stake in the Arab world's development" that Mr. Bustani offers them, and it may be that the best contribution they can make to it is conscientiously to mind their own business. After all, as Dr. Johnson said, "there are few ways in which a man may be more innocently employed than in getting money," and the oil companies would surely be loath to see their innocence compromised.

P. E. L. FELLOWES.

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**The Middle East.** A Political and Economic Survey. Edited by Sir Reader Bullard. Oxford University Press. Pp. 569. Appendices; maps; index. 45s.

This is the third edition of the Chatham House survey of the Middle East, the last having appeared in 1954. Sir Reader Bullard has here succeeded, with the aid of many notable contributors, in maintaining the high standard of the earlier editions. In some 500 pages are recorded the main facts about the Middle East countries which it is essential to know.

The volume opens with a seventy-page introduction of outstanding merit surveying the whole area, which includes Turkey, Cyprus and Sudan. There follow chapters on each individual country, with sections dealing with its geography, population, history, politics, constitution, religions and social and economic conditions. All the relevant information is set down, though, as explained in the preface, severe compression was necessary, as well as some sacrifice of the early history, in order to make room for the important events of the previous four years.

The purpose of the survey is, of course, to provide information rather than express opinions. Yet there are occasional touches of colour. One can enjoy the dry comment on the Persian Gulf that "there are various candidates for the succession to Britain, but none to the British policy of non-interference in the internal affairs and the oil revenues of the oil-producing states." It is salutary to be reminded that the

popular division of the Middle East countries into "haves" and "have-nots" needs some qualification and that in view of their own needs the oil-producing states may not be too enthusiastic about contributing to the economic betterment of their neighbours. The chapter on Syria again contains an interesting reflection on the effect upon Syrian opinion of the 1919 settlement. These are some examples of the lighter side of a volume which by its very nature was not designed for light reading.

Events in the Middle East are moving with such rapidity that Chatham House is no doubt already considering when the fourth edition should be put in hand. The present survey, apart from a postscript dated February 26, 1958, takes one only up to 1957. Much has already happened since.

J. M. T.

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**Muhammad and the Islamic Tradition.** By E. Dermenghem. Longmans (Men of Wisdom). 191 pp. Ill. 1958. 6s.

The life of Muhammad, an outline of religious duties and of trends of thought, with some account of the mental state of the Muslim world today, are all included in this book. There follow extracts from the Koran, from the traditions of the prophet and from writers who show the religion at its best, who show that a complete life is possible only if it is based on faith in what is right, honourable and good. A table of dates, a short bibliography and a list of persons and places from whom the illustrations have been obtained complete the book. The illustrations are many and well chosen, but several are too small to be effective, some are badly reproduced and one is upside down. In the miniatures the faces are often only white blobs—no features can be distinguished. The author has picked out the salient points for emphasis and not wasted space on unessentials; his book is a trustworthy guide in all important matters. A few details may be criticized. Few believe that the pre-Islamic poet Imru ul-qais was a Christian; in the early days Christians fought in the Muslim armies and in the fourth century one was even a commander, and it was only in the Ottoman empire that the poll-tax was made a substitute for service in the army; most amazing is the statement that the Koran teaches the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

A. S. T.

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**Islam—The Straight Path.** (Islam interpreted by Muslims.) Edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. The Ronald Press, New York. 1958. Pp. 453. End-paper map. \$6.

This book is divided into general chapters dealing with the religion as a whole and special chapters treating of separate areas. The first set are on Muhammad and the Koran, history, laws and customs, theology in the widest sense, and a conclusion summarizing the divergences as opposed to the essential unity. The second set are on the Shi'a (mainly Persia), the Arabic area with Africa, the Turkish-speaking area, the Indian sub-continent, China and Indonesia. Each special chapter begins with a section on local history. Each chapter is by a different hand, so it is not surprising that they vary in value. There is some overlapping; nearly every author has to say something about the nature of Islam, which means repetition of ideas even if the words differ. The chapter on the Shi'a repeats much of what occurs elsewhere on the early history, does not mention what is usually regarded as a distinctive mark of the sect, that the imam is the final authority in all spheres of life, and judges the character of 'Ali more highly than any historian would do. The first chapter states the orthodox view of Muhammad and the Koran, even knowing the exact date of his birth. If the chapter is to be regarded as propaganda, it is a failure, for none but a convinced Muslim would accept the statements in it. The second chapter is a masterly summary of Muslim history; the historical paragraphs in the special chapters fill in details in this outline. The third chapter on beliefs and codes of laws is a description of the religion as it ought to be, not as it is. To take one example: Divorce, it says, is allowed but only as a last resort, but King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud with his more than a hundred wives evidently did not agree. All the writers stress the high moral value of Islam and claim that it is the only foundation for a world commonwealth of nations, but they show great skill in turning a blind eye to the darker aspects of Muslim life. An attempt is made to prove that Islam is not a form of fatalism, yet the writer does not emphasize as he might that the Koran can be



quoted in support of both determinism and free-will, nor does he admit that in practice Muslims have often been fatalists, believing that this was their duty. The chapter on systematic thought is a masterpiece; it includes theology, philosophy and mysticism, tracing the collisions between the three and their interactions. Perhaps the writer under-estimates the importance of Christianity as an irritant in hurrying the development of Muslim thought. He does not try to show that everything in the garden is lovely; awkward facts like the intolerance of the rationalists, the narrowness of the orthodox and the occasional anti-nomianism of the mystics are not glossed over. It was not till the sixth century of Islam that a mystic preached the unity of all being, a thorough monism. The chapter on the Turkish areas is disappointing, even though one could not expect to learn much about those in the U.S.S.R. It is written in superlatives; Abu Muslim, who is usually called a Persian, and Saladin, a Kurd, were both Turks; the Ottomans are descended from the noblest branch of their race. Present conditions are described in vague generalities with few details. We read of "Turks with their philosophic interests" in the past; one is tempted to make the familiar challenge, "Name three." The Turks in Greece suffer under "systematic and fiendish oppression." The chapter on India and Pakistan describes the various movements for the revival of religion during the last three hundred years and ends with an estimate of the present situation. It is a competent piece of work. The same may be said of the chapters on China and Indonesia; they tell of what has happened and is happening without frills. The chapter on the Arabs makes some interesting points. The earlier Arab nationalism was separate from Islam; it sought to unite the inhabitants of a land without regard to their religion in one purpose. Now in Egypt nationalism goes hand in hand with Islam. Also there is a movement calling for the re-valuation of religion, a new study of the canon law is being made to clarify its relation to civil legislation, the Sufi orders are in process of dissolution and reconciliation of the sects is in progress. There is an odd misprint on p. 250, "liberal" appearing for "literal"; it is not the only one. The editing has been rather careless; on one page there are about four hundred million Muslims and on another five hundred million; the Berbers are not relics of the Romans and Vandals, and not all of them speak Arabic, even as a second language. That the inhabitants of Syria and Iraq are pure Arabs is questionable. There is a glossary, three pages of bibliography and an index.

A. S. T.

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**A Short Account of Early Muslim Architecture.** By K. A. C. Creswell. Penguin Books. Pp. xvi + 330, with 72 plates and 64 text figures. 7½" x 4½" 8s. 6d.

Though based upon Professor Creswell's two monumental folios published by the Clarendon Press in 1932-40, this is no mere condensation but incorporates much recent research and constitutes a thorough revision of the larger work. The author has for many years deservedly enjoyed an international reputation as the foremost authority upon Islamic art, but it is only now that a wider public can appreciate his position as one of the greatest scholars of his generation. In the field of architectural history Professor Creswell has made a bigger single-handed contribution to knowledge than any man living, and his output rivals that of such past workers as Viollet-le-Duc and Fergusson, whose standards were far less meticulous.

Within a masterpiece of compression and lucidity it is invidious to single out particular passages, but the masterly reconstruction of the *temenos* of the Great Mosque at Damascus in the period A.D. 633-705 (p. 71), the discussions of dating of Mshatā and Qasr-at-Tūba (pp. 137-44) and of Ukha'idir and 'Atshān (pp. 200-3), and the demonstration (pp. 184, 230) that the pointed arch is not Persian in origin, are notable instances of Professor Creswell's powers of reasoning and expression.

The appearance of this book in this form is of immense importance, for it must do much to correct the unbalanced views hitherto held on the exclusive importance of the "historical" styles and the squint-eyed concentration of standard works upon the Romano-Christian tradition. Here for all to see, displayed with a wealth of interesting detail and illuminating anecdote, is another complete world of human achievement equally valid with that within which we live.

There is a simple honesty in Muslim pronouncements which puts to shame the

sophistication and pontifical mumbo-jumbo of Western æsthetic thought. Ziyād ibn Abihī, appointed Governor in A.D. 665, gathered non-Muslims to build at Kūfa a mosque that should be without equal. When it was finished Ziyād candidly gave the credit to the master mason, saying: "That is what I desired, but I could not express it" (p. 13). How refreshing to read this frank counterblast to the cherished theory that distinguished art patrons are their own "architects," entitled to regard the building master as a menial technician. Not even St. Bernard stated the case against art as succinctly as Muhammad, recorded by Ibn Sa'd to have said: "The most unprofitable thing that eateth up the wealth of a believer is building" (p. 4). But the early anti-æsthetic outlook of the new religion soon vanished and the portrayal of living beings, including human figures, was not merely permitted but normal until late in the eighth century A.D., when (p. 98) the singular tradition grew up that "he who paints anything living will be compelled on the Day of Resurrection to breathe into it a soul."

The book abounds in valuable information on many aspects of history and art: the first pointed arches (pp. 102-4) and coloured glass windows (p. 22), the use of geometrical diagrams and proportions in design (pp. 19-21, 75-79), the origin of the bent entrance in fortification (pp. 174-9), optical corrections (p. 270), the use of artificial stone in the ninth century (p. 288), and the earliest dated lustre tiles, brought from Iraq to Qairawān in Tunisia in A.D. 862 (p. 298). In connection with such widespread geographical links, important owing to the conscription of craftsmen from the whole Muslim Empire (pp. 156-7), it would have been helpful had the publishers added a map of the Islamic world to the illustrations, which are both numerous and well produced.

The accuracy and careful detail with which the book is written leave little room for criticism. Among the few points where Professor Creswell's comments may be less than definitive are his description of the iron screens inserted in the Dome of the Rock as made "at the end of the twelfth century" (p. 36): they belong so manifestly to the same Western school of craftsmanship as the Winchester Cathedral grille and the later examples scattered through France and Northern Spain that they must be regarded as Crusader insertions between 1099 and 1187, probably of c. 1150; the dictum (pp. 74-5, 226) that the (structural) horse-shoe arch is Syrian might have added that as a *decorative* motive it is first demonstrable in Roman Spain. In discussing the minaret of the Great Mosque, Qairawān, Professor Creswell finds a discrepancy between the recorded dates of 724-7 and c. 836, but does not mention the possibility that the seven courses of large stones at the base may belong to the first work, and the rest to that of a century later, a solution strongly indicated by the marked change in the work (pp. 109-10, plates 25, 47a).

One strictly irrelevant matter should be put on record: during much of the time when this book was produced its author was (following the Suez incident) the only Briton permitted to remain in Egypt—an outstanding tribute in an age of chauvinism to a personality transcending politics.

JOHN H. HARVEY.

**Malay.** By Norton Ginsbury and Chester F. Roberts, Jr. University of Washington Press, Seattle. 1958. Appendices; maps; plans; bibliography; index.

Described as being the result of an interdisciplinary research project by a staff of social scientists at the University of Chicago, the book is published under the auspices of the American Ethnological Society. Geographers, historians, anthropologists and other specialists have contributed to it, and the authors acknowledge the help and counsel received from Sir Sydney Caine, a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya, Mr. P. T. Bauer of Cambridge University and Professor Raymond Firth of the London School of Economics.

At a critical juncture in the history of Malaya, where "the process of self-determination which has been transforming South-Eastern Asia . . . has about run its course," the appearance of the book now is deemed timely by its authors. But it depends for its facts so largely upon the out-of-date Census Report of 1947 that publication might well have been delayed until the 1957 Census Report has appeared and been digested. For instance, the population of Singapore is given without

qualification as 680,000, and that of Kuala Lumpur at between 150,000 and 200,000—wide of the mark today by a factor of two.

Written before and during the time the British were handing over control, a delay in publication would have given this radical change its full emphasis and a better perspective.

The book attempts a detailed picture of the Malayan polity, with sections on its physical, historical, demographic and political facets, the existent Plural Society and its Ethnic Groups. It is packed with statistics, many of which could with benefit to the reader be relegated to appendices. One gets the impression of a hurried attempt to compress a vast number of facts into the compass of 500 pages. There are many mistakes in detail, some of which will be pointed out below, and some doubtful deductions drawn. Here and there the American authors cannot resist a mild dig at British "colonialism," and this is especially evident from the remarks in chapter 9 on the Indian National Army.

In the historical section, when speaking of the Dindings, the authors state that it had "neither a valuable harbour nor . . . hinterland." In point of fact, Lumut is one of the best natural harbours on the Malayan coastline, but it has never been developed. This small district, moreover, was occupied by the British because it had become a nest of pirates and not because of its economic value. On the Japanese invasion the authors say "it was discovered that despite the change the lot of the Malayan masses was little better, if not a great deal worse, than that under the British. . . ." This surely is under-statement with a vengeance! It is an exaggeration of the effect of the "Emergency" upon post-war reconstruction to say that the Communist guerillas by their raids on tin mines and rubber estates made serious inroads into the productive efficiency of the country. Apart from the loss of valuable lives, and the waste of money, it is probably correct to say that the most lasting *economic* effect of the Emergency has been the halting of prospection for new tin-bearing lands.

The chapter on Demographic Patterns could in particular have awaited publication of the 1957 Census Report. When it says of a possibly explosive increase in the birth-rate that the Malayan economy is better prepared to face this than most in Asia, it makes a risky assumption in the case of a country which has to import half its staple food.

In the chapter on Transportation and Telecommunications, the great significance of the development of Port Swettenham is not appreciated. The comparative lack of long-distance land-line telecommunications—commented on on page 128—can be accounted for by the fact that to run land-lines through forest country invites constant interruption from falling trees.

In chapter 6 we read that Malayan schools generally use local dialects (page 158). The dialectical variations of the Malay language in the peninsula are not great, and are not reflected in vernacular education. The *Majlis* is named as the leading Malay paper, but it has disappeared and its place has been taken by the *Utusan Malayu*.

In the chapter on the Malays, the authors tend to over-emphasize affiliations with Indonesia. One should remember that this word is a loose post-war descriptive label, and that many of the different peoples of Indonesia have little affinities with each other except in the most general way.

The book rightly states that the Malay is no longer only a poor *padi* farmer, but that the percentage of Malays employed as estate labourers has increased from seven in 1938 to twenty-two in 1948 should be emphasized. What the Malay lacks is "working capital," and when he has to go to the Chinese or the Indians for it a frustrated feeling of economic dependence is apt to arise in his mind. The Malays also make much of the fact that they are the sons of the soil, and that as such they had an inalienable claim to be protected by the British both physically and economically.

In the chapter on the Chinese, it should be emphasized (page 266) that the Malayan Chinese Association did not *merge* with the United Malaya National Organization. The two bodies are merely close allies.

The book tends to over-emphasize the effectiveness of the Malayan Communist Party as an anti-Japanese force. Its members were not trained as guerillas before the war started, nor did the guerilla units constantly harass the occupying power. Many

of them merely became bandits or sat in the jungle learning Communist dogma. Speaking of trades unions, the authors fail to realize that these had hardly come into their own before the Emergency started, and that they have not been deliberately boycotted since then except by the Communists when they retreated into the jungle.

In the chapter on the Indians in Malaya, much is made of the Indian National Army during the war. This force was visible during the war, but many Indians refused to join Bose and there was very little left to see of this "army" on the collapse of the Japanese. When the authors quote an Indian source on the doings of the Indian National Army on page 360, this should be compared with what Field-Marshal Slim has to say about the I.N.A. in his book on the Burma campaign.\*

The authors have seriously misdirected themselves about the policy for the alienation of land. On page 332 it is stated that no land suitable for subsistence cultivation was available for Indians; on page 364 that there is legislation forbidding non-Malay ownership of land; on page 419 that there are vast amounts of land which the Government will not alienate for the production of rubber; on page 311 the Chinese are stated to have been prevented from acquiring land for many years by the non-alienation enactments of the early twentieth century. There is also a rather deprecatory reference to the policy of establishing Malay Reservations where land is strictly "entailed" to Malay owners only.

Outside Malay Reservations there is no legal prohibition on the alienation of land to any particular type of persons and when an application for a title to State land is received from an individual or a company, the following considerations *inter alia* are weighed up:

- (1) Will the opening up of the particular area be of benefit to the neighbourhood and the State?
- (2) Is the prospective alienee a suitable person of substance and will he work the land?
- (3) Is mining or agriculture to be given preference in any particular area?
- (4) Should any particular crop be encouraged or discouraged?

In the light of the answers to the above the State Government makes its decision.

The Malay Reservation has protected the rather thriftless Malay peasantry from some of their own weaknesses. Without it much of the land within these reserves would have fallen into the hands of foreign moneylenders and the Malay yeoman stock would have become a pauperized urban proletariat.

There are a number of solecisms in the book. The Malay Moslem does not drink toddy (page 206); the word "Islamized" on page 316; the strange word "ecumene" on page 324; the fantastic sum of £65 million mentioned as loaned or granted to the Federation under the Colombo Plan. On page 427 we read of a British *Governor of the Malay States* in the nineteenth century. . . . There has only been one such Governor, the late Sir Edward Gent, for two years (1946-1948); on page 464 the "abolishment" of high taxation; on page 493 the "entrepot for archipelagic" South-East Asia; on page 490 Sir Patrick McKerron, who was once Colonial Secretary in Singapore, is described as Secretary of State for the Colonies; the total transmission time of the Singapore radio is given on page 184 as 224 hours per week! It is also difficult to see to what "other food production" on page 389 refers. A crop which covers about half as much area as rice and is more valuable, yet from the context cannot be fruits, vegetables, coconuts, pineapples, tea, coffee, or pepper. What is it?

W. C. S. CORRY.

**Temiar Jungle.** By John Slimming. Published by John Murray. Pp. 176. Ill. 18s.

This short and unpretentious book admirably captures the atmosphere of the hilly jungle country stretching down the central spine of Malaya and which is particularly high and rugged in the North where it divides Perak from Kelantan. This poorly explored area is inhabited by Temiar tribes who were almost unknown to the outside world until the advent of Anthropologist Pat Noone barely one generation ago.

\* Reviewed page 138, *R.C.A.S. Journal*, April, 1956. *Defeat Into Victory*.

The author does not attempt a scientific treatise: he describes with becoming modesty his own work which was the strenuous and at times dangerous job of investigating how far these Temiar tribes on the Kelantan or Eastern side of the Divide were helping the Communist Terrorists by supplying food; and if any such help was being given whether it was given voluntarily or under duress.

His book has the freshness of a simple adventure story, but it gets the atmosphere of these remote areas and their simple primitive inhabitants just right. The author evidently liked the Temiar and he stresses their good qualities—truthfulness, gentleness and a naive sense of humour.

Perhaps he rather overstresses the bad relations which he says exist between Malays and the Aborigines. No doubt the former as "People of the Book" and followers of Islam tend almost naturally to look down upon primitive heathen animists, and the less educated your Malay the more he exhibits this. It is like the slight feeling of superiority that the Third form has over the First. But it is normally relieved by the Malays' cheerful sense of humour, which nearly always saves him from being a prig in these matters, and your educated Malay knows where his duty to these primitives lies.

This is a book to be recommended to all between sixteen and sixty; it shows one of the many facets of the long struggle in Malaya against Communist-inspired terrorism, and how the campaign has had to be waged in so many different ways.

It is indeed a great pity that these primitive people should have had to be dragged into the murderous political struggle between the Free and the Communist Worlds in the mid twentieth century. If all their contacts with the Free World are as happy as those established by John Slimming they will indeed be lucky.

The illustrations are significant and good.

C. CORRY.

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**The Opium War through Chinese Eyes.** By Arthur Waley. George Allen and Unwin. 21s. Pp. 257. Index.

Mr. Arthur Waley's usual preoccupation is with the more æsthetic aspect of Chinese life, thought and ancient matters. In his latest work he presents us with a study of the remarkable clash between the two extremely incompatible and mutually incomprehensible political entities which culminated in the Opium War of 1839-42. To many of his readers the course of this war is already familiar, but they are not as a rule privileged to watch the contest, as it were, from a vantage-point situated behind the enemies' lines. In the development of the story, as usual, neither side seemed quite to realize the degree of provocation which it exercised on the other.

The greater part of the account is taken up with the struggle between the classical figures of Commissioner Lin and Admiral Elliott, which led to the recall of both men in somewhat ignominious circumstances, and the course of events described up to the fall of Chinkingang on July 21, 1842.

It is particularly useful today to have someone to go through the Chinese source material covering the interplay of political and military designs and moves of those times and present us with the less familiar side of a rather sordid tale.

This is because the springs of Chinese action, so little understood, could always bear closer examination. Their proverbial distrust of foreigners which still persists, and the form of their prejudices and phobias, can thus the better be understood when linked with events such as this book describes.

One is left after reading it with a degree of admiration for the luckless Commissioner Lin, whose rôle at Canton has become well known through other accounts. This brave and resolute official has never appeared in a better light than in his uncompromising attempt here described to defend the interests of his Manchu masters against yet another irruption of "barbarians," and in his own communications with his Emperor, in which he took grave personal risks. Sea-power and his understandable lack of ability to understand or assess the degree of the threat which it constituted to a land power such as China brought about his inevitable personal failure. One cannot help but sympathize with this cultured enemy who in his more desperate moments spent his time copying poems and practising calligraphy.

He could, however, be extremely direct when he chose. "You Americans are not

subject to the English. Why should you take on so at the mere mention of the English not allowing ships to pass. However, if when June comes you dare not trade just because the English tell you not to, our officials will be only too pleased; it will save them a lot of trouble.

The contest was really an extremely unequal one, and it is all the more interesting to be made aware of the numerous instances of very gallant behaviour on the part of the Chinese and Manchu officers and men who had so little hope of success, an example being the death in action of the elderly Admiral Kuan at the Bogue Fort, as witnessed by our own accounts.

Another outstanding if somewhat insalubrious figure who suddenly emerges as if brought again to life by the inimitable satiric gift of the Chinese is the rather sinister "cloak-and-dagger" missionary Gutzlaff, known to the Chinese by his adopted name of Kuo Shi-li.

On his high dais Daddy Kuo comes.  
 If you are in trouble  
 He'll get things straight.  
 If you have been wronged  
 He'll come to the rescue.  
 If you have got into difficulties  
 He'll manage things for you.  
 He's a master at speaking the Chinese language.  
 There's not an ideogram he cannot read.  
 Daddy Kuo is nothing short of a genius.

Quite possibly this inspiring song written at Ningpo by the local poet Hsu Shih-tung was meant for presentation to the subject during his rather improbable magistracy there, which was so startlingly unconventional to the Chinese.

But he is remembered more for his skill in organizing treachery among the Chinese than for his administrative qualities. He was certainly the least prepossessing of all missionaries who ever went to China, and his combination of the profession of the Christian faith with active political aggression of this sort is only to be deplored. Unfortunately there have been other instances.

The literary sources which Mr. Waley has used are mainly those within the texts in twenty-four volumes published in Shanghai in 1953 under the title *Ya p'ien Chan-cheng Tzu liao Ts'ung-kan* (*Corpus of material about the Opium War*).

This publication itself owes much to the *Ch'ou-pan I-wu Shih-mo* and the *Shih Lu* (*Veritable Records*) of Tao-kuang's reign, which he has also consulted.

We are much in Mr. Waley's debt for his outstanding work and for his objectivity in the presentation of little-known facts which should be better comprehended as they become increasingly important and relevant as the policies of the so-called New China become day by day of more concern to all.

A. H. S. C.

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**Catalogue of Translation from the Chinese Dynastic Histories for the Period A.D. 220-960.** Compiled by Hans Frankel. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. Pp. 295. \$4.50.

The University of California Press has notably added to its list of "East Asia Studies" promoted by its Institute of International Studies by publishing this first supplement to its China Dynastic Histories Translations series.

The series itself is edited by a panel of specialists well known in this field—namely, H. S. Chen, Woodbridge Bingham, Wolfram Eberhard, H. H. Frankel, Elizabeth Huff and O. J. Maencken—but the work under review was produced by Hans Frankel. It is a useful guide to students of Chinese history and literature who need help in their reference to translations of source material belonging to the period extending from the Three Kingdoms to the Five Dynasties A.D. 220-960. There is indeed scope for much more expository listing of Chinese texts on these lines, since it is most unfortunate that China's great wealth of historical writing is, even at this late date, hardly known to Western readers and relatively little translation has been done.

In his interesting introduction the author points out that the period with which he is dealing was one which was politically complex and culturally flourishing, and which has been particularly neglected by students, although there are a good many translations available from authoritative sources.

In order to try and remedy this state of affairs he has assembled a catalogue of more than two thousand translations of varying length which he has conceived as a guide in the pursuit of further material of a similar kind from Chinese texts. He has only listed translations in English, French and German, although there are many available in other languages.

Entries in this catalogue are listed in sixteen groups, each headed by a letter in the series A-P. Of these, each letter corresponds to the standard Dynastic History of a period, and all these are arranged in their traditional order.

The works are as follows :

- A. The "San-Kuo chih" (History of the Three Kingdoms) (233-297).  
Ch'en Shou 289.
- B. Chin shu (History of the Chin Dynasty) (266-402).  
Fang Hsuan-ling 646.
- C. Sung shu (History of the Liu Sung Dynasty) (420-479).  
Shen Yueh 488.
- D. Nan-Ch'i shu (History of the Southern Ch'i Dynasty) (479-502).  
Hsiao Tzu-hsien 530.
- E. Liang shu (History of the Liang Dynasty) (502-557).  
Yao Ssu-lien 636.
- F. Ch'en shu (History of the Ch'en Dynasty) (557-589).  
Yao Ssu-liang 636.
- G. Wei shu (History of the Northern and Eastern T'o-pa or Yuan Wei Dynasty) (386-550).  
Wei Shou 554.
- H. Pei-Ch'i shu (History of the Northern Ch'i Dynasty) (550-577).  
Li Po-yoo 636.
- I. Chou shu (History of the Northern Chou Dynasty) (557-581).  
Ling-hu Te-fen 636.
- J. Sui shu (History of the Sui Dynasty) (581-618).  
Wei Cheng 636.
- K. Nan Shih (History of the Southern Dynasties): Sung (420-479), Ch'i (479-502),  
Liang (502-557), Ch'en (557-589).  
Li Yen-shou 659.
- L. Pei shih (History of the Northern Dynasties): Wei (386-556), Ch'i (550-577),  
Chou (557-581), Sui (581-618).  
Li Yen-shou 659.
- M. Chiu T'ang-shu (Old History of the T'ang Dynasty) (618-907).  
Liu Hsu 945.
- N. Hsin T'ang-Shu (New History of the T'ang Dynasty) (618-907).  
On-yang Hsiu }  
Sung Ch'i } 1060
- O. Chiu wu-tai shih (Old History of the Five Dynasties): Later Liang (907-923),  
Later T'ang (923-937), Later Han (947-951), Later Chou (951-960).
- P. Hsin wu-tai Shih (New History of the Five Dynasties): Later Liang (907-923),  
Later T'ang (923-937), Later Chin (936-947), Later Han (947-951),  
Later Chou (951-960).  
Ou-Yang Hsiu 1007-72.

Besides the captions pertaining to each translation there is an index of translators and a subject index. If any criticism of this work can be justified, it is that the subject index is regrettably limited in scope and that this could appreciably handicap a historical research worker. The author has, however, expressed his awareness of this deficiency.

Students of the early history of the Turks and of comparative religion no less than Chinese philosophy will find the work a useful and stimulating companion.

A. H. S. C.

**Hazor I.** An Account of the First Season of Excavations, 1955 (The James A. de Rothschild Expedition at Hazor). By Yigael Yadin and others. The Magnes Press of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1958. Distributed in Great Britain by the Oxford University Press, London. Pp. xxiv-160. Plates clxxxiv including 13 plans). 8 guineas.

The outstanding archæological-historical problem connected with the Syro-Palestinian Middle Bronze Age (first half of the second millennium B.C.) is that of the people generally referred to as the Hyksos. Who were they? Whence did they come? Even the meaning of the term Hyksos is uncertain; the explanations commonly given ("Shepherd Kings" or "Foreign Kings" or "Rulers of Foreign Countries") are not satisfactory. According to Egyptian annals they were conquering nomads from the East who ruled Egypt as the fifteenth and sixteenth dynasties (from about 1730 to about 1575 B.C.). Their "empire" extended from Egypt to Mesopotamia, but in what sense can we speak of a Hyksos Empire? Apparently this was a loose confederation of West Asian desert peoples, organized in a kind of feudal state with an aristocracy of chariot-warriors, corresponding roughly to the equestrian knights of the Middle Ages. Some scholars have associated the Descent of Jacob and his sons into Egypt with the Hyksos Conquest, and have assumed that the Israelites formed a conspicuous part of the conquering host. This, however, is hardly more than a suggestion. The precise ethnic composition of the Hyksos is, indeed, hard to determine. It is very probable that they were of mixed race; but that they contained a Semitic element is indicated by some of the earlier Hyksos royal proper names, which seem to be North-West Semitic.

The fortifications of the Syro-Palestinian Middle Bronze cities are undoubtedly the most elaborate and the most powerful found in any period of their history. A new type of fortification appears, known as *terre pisée* or "beaten earth"; it consists of great rectangular fortified camps surrounded by massive sloping ramparts of packed earth. In the opinion of leading scholars—is this opinion correct?—these camps were used to shelter the chariots, wagons and horses which are known to have been introduced into Syria, Palestine and Egypt by the Hyksos conquerors. One of the best examples of such a fortification in Syria and Palestine is at Tell el Qedah, a large mound situated nearly nine miles north of the Sea of Galilee and five miles southwest of Lake Huleh. It has been identified by the late Professor John Garstang as the ancient city of Hazor. Very few Syrian and Palestinian fortified camps are comparable in size: indeed, according to Garstang the Tell el Qedah "camp enclosure was large enough to accommodate in emergency 30,000 men with a corresponding number of horses and chariots."

Hazor was one of the most important cities of ancient Israel; it is mentioned numerous times in the Bible (in the books of Joshua, Judges, and Kings 1 and 2); it is mentioned in Egyptian sources (from the nineteenth century B.C. onwards) and also cuneiform (from the eighteenth century onwards). The city, situated at the foot of the eastern ridge of the Upper Galilee mountain range, occupied one of the most strategic areas of ancient Syria and Palestine, dominating the main highway from Egypt to Mesopotamia. In Joshua's time the king of Hazor was the head of the northern Canaanite confederation which fought against him (Josh. xi. 10). Joshua "burnt Hazor with fire" (*ibid.* 11), but it continued to be the leading city of the Canaanites. Deborah and Barak fought successfully against its king Jabin (Judges iv-v). It was rebuilt by Solomon (1 Kings ix. 15).

Son of a leading archæologist (the late Professor Sukenik), Dr. Yadin, himself an excellent archæologist and a first-class military strategist, knew the paramount importance of the site when he selected it for excavation. With his great enthusiasm, knowledge and charm he succeeded in obtaining the necessary means; as a great organizer he succeeded in bringing together an unrivalled team of archæologists and other experts, who assisted him valiantly in the excavations as well as in the production of this stately work: Y. Aharoni, Ruth Amiran, Trude Dothan, I. Dunayevsky, J. Perrot and others.

The present volume "is primarily a factual report, devoted to description of the results of the first season only" (August 1 to November 1, 1955). It is proposed "to publish in the future several additional volumes, each devoted to the results of one season." (The fourth season has just terminated.) "A final volume will contain the



synthesis of the results of all seasons, with detailed comparative studies of the architectural remains, the pottery and the small finds. It will also contain a detailed discussion of the history of Hazor in the light of excavation results, as compared with data to be drawn from the Bible and written documents" (p. xix). We may expect at least a partial solution of some of the problems concerning the Hyksos.

The work, sumptuously produced, contains the introductory matter (including the organization of the expedition, distribution of duties, and so on); a chapter (chapter one) describing the site and the excavations (pp. 1-8), with which we may connect the "Tentative Synchronization Table of Strata in Lower Canaanite City," on p. 160; and five chapters (chapters two to six), each one describing the excavations conducted in a particular area; chapter two, Area A (pp. 9-28); chapter three, Area B (pp. 29-70); chapter four, Area C (pp. 71-98); chapter five, Area D (pp. 99-144); and chapter six, Area E (pp. 145-159). Each chapter gives a general description of the area in question, a description of the structures and stratification, of the pottery and other finds, the chronological conclusions, and the index of "loci." The plates present views of the excavations, photographs and drawings of pottery and small objects, and the plans of the excavation of the whole area and of the single areas. Fig. 2, on p. xxiv, is a schematic map of the district.

The following main conclusions reached in these chapters are of great importance for archaeologists and historians of the ancient Near East. The general picture presented by the areas C, D, E is that the camp enclosure was a built-up area from the eighteenth century B.C. onwards; the earliest city was established in the second half of the Middle Bronze II (c. seventeenth century B.C.), Stratum 3. The latest city in the enclosure came to its end in the last phase of the Late Bronze II (c. thirteenth century B.C.), Stratum 1.

Area A shows Strata IV (Assyrian rule, from mid-seventh century B.C. to the late eighth) to X (Solomon, tenth century B.C.). Area B: the citadel of Stratum V was destroyed by Tiglath Pileser III (732 B.C.); the citadel of Stratum IV probably belongs to the late eighth or early seventh century B.C.; the citadel of Stratum III is probably of the seventh century; the citadel of Stratum II of the late fifth and early fourth century; and the citadel of Stratum I belongs to the Hellenistic period. Space does not allow to go into further details.

The arrangement of the material is excellent, and this fine publication reflects the greatest credit on the scholars who collaborated in producing it, and on its publisher.  
D. D.

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**The Mahdist State in the Sudan.** By P. M. Holt. Oxford. 1958. Pp. vii + 247. Index; bibliography; maps. 35s.

Dr. Holt has written a scholarly account of the background, rise and fall of the theocratic state which the Mahdi and his successor established and maintained in the Sudan, after the overthrow of the Egyptian administration, from 1881 to 1898. As a member of the Sudan education service, Dr. Holt gained access to the archives of the Mahdist state preserved in Khartoum. The first fruits of his interest in the archives was the publication of two papers on the subject. The present work is a welcome addition—a substantial addition—to these preliminary contributions.

An introductory chapter gives a concise survey of the conditions of the Sudan and the life of its people in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This is followed by another on the antecedents of the rise of the Mahdi and his movement. Subsequent chapters trace chronologically and very minutely the military success of the Mahdi down to the fall of Khartoum. But more significant than the chapters on the military history is the one on the system of administration of the Mahdist state (pp. 98-116), which throws more light on a subject that is little known and often obscured by the currency of unexamined assumptions. Then in the following chapters the military history is resumed. The Khalifa's fortunes, the eventual reconquest of the Sudan and the extinction of the Mahdist state are also treated in great detail. The book is admirably concluded with a chapter on the Khalifa's administration (pp. 225-247), which is as valuable as its counterpart on the Mahdi's.

These two chapters alone are a strong recommendation of the book. They deserve

further development based on all the available documents. The wars of conquest and reconquest are more or less adequately covered by published literature. Dr. Holt has recast the story in a masterly survey, corrected many of the mistakes of his predecessors, and cleared many obscure phases, but substantially the story is still much as we knew it. Dr. Holt's main service to scholarship seems to lie in demonstrating, with abundant evidence, that the Mahdist state was not the barbarous monster we were led to believe it was. Thanks to his work, we know now that it possessed a coherent system following well-defined principles, that it was by the standards of its time efficient and on the whole popular.

Five years of unrestricted access to the Mahdist archives left Dr. Holt's historical sense still unsatisfied. Very modestly he says that he could not "exploit them to the full," and that his work "is essentially a preliminary historical study, susceptible of much amplification in the light of further research on the material in Khartoum." Let us hope that he himself will be able to act on his own suggestion, so that we can read from his pen an equally authoritative work.

T. L. TIBAWI.

**A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush.** By Eric Newby. Secker and Warburg. London. 1958. Pp. 247. Illustrations; maps. 25s.

Eric Newby's *A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush* is a delightfully written account of a journey made in company with Hugh Carless of the Foreign Service through Nuristan in North-East Afghanistan—one of the least-known parts of the world—and of their gallant and almost successful attempt to climb Mir Samir (19,880 feet).

The author conjures up a vivid and accurate picture of this remote area, and his description is supported by excellent photographs, good maps and a brief account of local history. One cannot but admire the determination shown by Eric Newby and Hugh Carless in embarking upon and carrying out such an arduous journey and such a strenuous and dangerous climb—conscious as they were of their own deficiencies in training and equipment.

In brief, this book will make eminently worthwhile reading both for those interested in the region and for those more interested in an able and light-hearted account of a strenuous journey in little known parts.

JOHN GARDENER

**Adventurer's Eye.** By Tom Stobart. Published by Odhams Press, Ltd. Pp. 256. Ill. Index. 21s.

The author of this attractive book is the direct descendant of Drake and the merchant adventurers. Members well remember his illustrated lecture in 1956.

He takes the reader through an early love affair in Roumania to Turkey, to the Himalayas and the Antarctic. From there to South Africa and East Africa, where he worked with that well-known couple Armand and Michaela Denis, whose broadcasts are a delight to many television viewers.

His filming in Africa took him to Dassen Island, a penguin breeding-ground, surprisingly enough only half a day's journey from Table Bay.

Further travels to Borneo and to Queensland lead one on inevitably to the great and successful attempt on Everest.

Stobart does not pretend to any great skill in mountaineering, but sheer guts enabled him to go on, in spite of some ill-health, if not to the very apex, quite near enough to satisfy the ambitions of most men.

The book is copiously illustrated with many photographs, some of which are magnificent. A word of criticism about these, however, is the lack of chronological sequence and order. Photographs of Ladakh adorns the Roumanian pages, and one of the Hadramaut is found amongst the Everest matter. Apart from this, *Adventurer's Eye* is a book to read—and better to own.

H. ST. C. S.

## NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

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## NOMINATION FORM

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(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL  
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(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 10s. for country and overseas members.  
£2 for residents in the London area.)

## NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to all members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask that those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

### DEED OF COVENANT

I .....  
of .....  
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date of this Deed or during my life (whichever shall be the shorter period) I will pay to the said Society from my general fund of taxed income such an amount annually as after deduction of income tax at the Standard Rate yields the net sum of .....  
The first payment is to be made on the .....  
Dated this ..... day of ..... 19.....  
Signed, sealed and delivered by the said .....  
In the presence of : .....  
Address of Witness to your signature .....  
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(NOTE—The Deed must be signed by the subscriber on a date prior to the date of the first yearly payment, as shown in the body of the deed.)



# JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XLVI

APRIL, 1959

PART II

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## IN MEMORIAM

MR. AKAKI TCHENKELI

**M**R. AKAKI TCHENKELI who died in Paris on January 3 at the age of 85 was almost the last survivor of the Social Democrat Government of Georgia which was overthrown by the intervention of the Red Army in March, 1921.

Tchenkeli was born at Okum in Abkhazia on May 6, 1874. Three years later the village became the centre of military operations when in the summer of 1877 the Turks landed troops at Sukhum to support an Abkhazian insurrection against the Russians.

In his last year as a student at the Kutaisi Seminary, Tchenkeli was sent down for "political activity." In 1905, a year of revolutionary and nationalist ferment throughout the Caucasus, he was arrested. He evaded a sentence of forced residence in Russia and left the country for western Europe. Tchenkeli did not return to Georgia until 1910. He was soon accused of illegal political work and spent three months in Rostov gaol. He managed to escape on the eve of the elections to the Fourth Duma and returned to Georgia where he secured election as a deputy. He subsequently participated in the stormy sessions of the Fourth Duma in which the Georgian Social Democrat group played no mean rôle. After the Bolshevik coup in October, 1917, Tchenkeli was elected a member of the Transcaucasian Seym which soon proclaimed an independent Transcaucasian Republic. Tchenkeli was named Minister for Foreign Affairs and headed the delegation which went to Trebizond to discuss peace with the Turks. After the disintegration of the Transcaucasian Republic in May, 1918 and the proclamation of an independent Georgian Republic, Tchenkeli became Georgian ambassador in Paris and one of the Georgian delegation which attended the Versailles Conference. The Georgian Government received *de jure* recognition from the Soviet Government and from the Western Powers only a short time before the sudden attack by the Red Army, without warning or declaration of war, put an end to free institutions in that country. The members of the exiled Government of Georgia took refuge in Paris. Tchenkeli retained for some years the status of ambassador until the Herriot Government finally accepted the *fait accompli* in Transcaucasia and withdrew recognition.

One of the founders of Georgian socialism, and a respected member of the Second International, Akaki Tchenkeli really belonged to the generation of Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden and Albert Thomas. Bred in the liberal atmosphere of a generation of reasoned optimism, he survived the adventures of the Revolution to live on into an age of ruthless rationalism where the rights of the smaller nations of the European community have become of no account. There was always something of

the cheerful peasant farmer about Akaki Tchenkeli, with his burly figure, his small shrewd eyes and his quick friendliness. As an old man, he still remained alert and vigorous, with an intelligent comprehension of the way of the world, and an enduring faith in the destiny of his own people.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

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The following back numbers of the Society's Journal are urgently wanted:

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- 1950 Part 1.
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- 1952 Part 2.
- 1957 Part 1.



## NOTICES

### ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting of the Society will be held on Wednesday, June 10 in the Rooms of the Royal Society at 4 p.m., and will be followed by the Anniversary lecture.

### ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner will be held on Wednesday, July 8, 1959, at Claridges, London, W.1. Notices will be sent to every member. The charge will be 37s. 6d. exclusive of wine.

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following :

*The Arabs of Modern Libya*, by Louis Depree. Reprint from *The Muslim World*. Hartford Seminary Foundation, Vol. XLVIII, April 2, 1958.

*The Story of Chanak Kale*, by a Captain of the Turkish General Staff. In Turkish, dated 1337 A.H.

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# THE TRASCASPIAN EPISODE

## Operations in Central Asia (1918-1919)

By COLONEL C. H. ELLIS, C.M.G., C.B.E., T.D.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 4, 1959, Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,—My first duty is to apologize for the absence of the Chairman of Council, Sir Hugh Dow; unfortunately also our Vice-Chairman, Mr. Southwell, is leaving London tomorrow morning and is unable to be with us. However, it is a great pleasure to me to introduce Colonel Ellis, who was many years ago a member of the Society until having to go to distant countries he dropped out for a while. He has, however, rejoined and we are in the happy position of having our meeting addressed by a member of the Society.

As you all know, the Australian continent is responsible for sending a great many men to our wars, and Colonel Ellis was among all those from down under who came to the rescue of the Old Country in both World Wars. During the First World War he saw service in France and India, and was a member of the Malleson Mission to Meshed and Central Asia in 1918-19. While that may seem a long time ago, it is really a matter of great current interest because the Russians have never ceased to attach significance to it and are always referring to it as an instance of British Imperialism. I now leave Colonel Ellis to speak of the Transcaspiian Episode.

I HAVE been asked to speak this afternoon about the Transcaspiian Episode—the operations in Transcaspiia in 1918-19. This episode, regarded as a military operation, was a comparatively minor affair. Not more than a few hundred officers and men were involved, and the scale of operations was little more than that of the sort of “side-show” that used to take place on the N.W. Frontier of India.

It attracted little attention at the time—in this country—and little has been heard of it since then, except in the Soviet Union where the memory of the affair has been kept alive.

It may be asked, then, what purpose there is in reviving the memory of a small military side-show which took place some 40 years ago? There are, I think, several reasons why it is worth re-telling. First of all, the episode took place in a part of the world that is of great strategic importance. In the past, when we were responsible for the defence of India, Central Asia or rather Russian Turkestan, was the area whence the threat to the security of India seemed likely to come. Russian advances towards Afghanistan were regarded as a threat to our interests in India and the Middle East area generally. Now that we are no longer responsible for the defence of the Indian peninsula, in a military sense, the names of places like Merv, Tedjend, Kushkh, no longer figure in press reports and House of Commons debates, but the area has not lost its special significance as a strategic area of great importance in the light of the growing nationalism and industrial development of Asia. Secondly, during the course of the operations along the Central Asian railway in 1918 and 1919, several incidents occurred, one in particular—I refer to the case of the 26 Com-

missars—which have given rise to much controversy, and in the Soviet Union are still the subject of much misrepresentation and hostile comment, as well as propaganda.

During the past few years a number of books have appeared in the Soviet Union in which this episode, as well as others, have been treated as examples of British "imperialism," and have been distorted and embellished for propaganda purposes. These books are sometimes quoted in publications overseas as sources of information about the events of that time. For that reason alone, it is I think useful to have the facts restated by someone who has personal knowledge and experience of the episode.

At the end of 1917, the war situation for the Allies had entered upon a critical stage. In the West, the heavy losses in manpower incurred during the fighting on the Somme in the autumn of 1916, and in Flanders during the summer of 1917, had placed a severe strain on Allied resources. The Italian setback at Caporetto, and the defeat of Roumania after a short campaign, gave hope and encouragement to the Central Powers. On the Russian front, little progress had been made after the February revolution. Many weary months were to elapse before the entry of the United States into the war began to make itself felt on the fighting fronts.

The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October, 1917, was quickly followed by the disintegration of the Russian Army, and Russian withdrawal from the war. The Russian collapse not only freed German manpower for transfer to the West, but also opened the way for both German and Turkish penetration of the Caucasus and an advance into Persia and Central Asia. Such an advance constituted a threat, not only to British forces operating against Turkey in Mesopotamia, but also to India. A hostile, if not actively belligerent Afghanistan (already subjected to Turkish and German propaganda), would pin down large numbers of British and Indian troops, which could be more usefully employed elsewhere.

The armistice on the Russo-Turkish front was almost immediately followed by the withdrawal in disorder of the Russian Army, its arms and equipment being abandoned to the enemy or falling into the hands of revolutionary groups in Transcaucasia. Two Russian columns in Persia, one operating in the N.W. in co-operation with the British Army in Mesopotamia, and the other in East Persia, were also withdrawn, leaving the Mesopotamian right flank exposed and removing the barrier to the penetration of enemy agents into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

With the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Germans entered into a separate agreement with Ukranian Rada, occupying the Ukraine and the Crimea and thus gaining a mastery of the Black Sea and the Caucasian coastal littoral. A German column entered the Caucasus at Poti, and having reached an agreement with the Georgians who had declared their independence of Russia, occupied Tiflis. Turkish forces occupied Kars and Batum and began their advance through Armenia into Azerbaijan and N. Persia.

The aim of the German command was mainly to secure Baku oil and the vast store of Turkestan cotton, both urgently needed for war purposes.

while threatening the vulnerable British flank in Persia and, via Afghanistan, India. Turkish aims seemed to be mainly directed towards the fulfilment of pan-Turanian plans for uniting the Turkish-speaking and Moslem peoples of Azerbaijan and Turkestan under the flags of Turkey and the Caliphate.

Despite some conflict of aims between Germans and Turks, there was sufficient unity and co-ordination of effort between them to enable them to continue their advance unless some effective resistance could be organized among those elements in Transcaucasia and (as was hoped, at that time) in Turkestan, who might be willing and able to impede their passage.

The existence of some 35,000 Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners of war in Turkestan, the remnant of a far greater number, now freed from restraint, constituted an additional threat to India in the event of an enemy advance along the Central Asian railway from Krasnovodsk.

In Turkestan a confused situation had developed about which little was accurately known. A Soviet, mainly Bolshevik in character but supported by Menshevik and Social Revolutionary groups, consisting of railway workers and returned soldiers and entirely Russian in its composition, had seized power in Tashkent and other local centres of Russian population, including the Transcaspien town of Merv, Ashkhabad and Krasnovodsk. The Tashkent Soviet, proclaiming its authority over the whole region, arrested or shot representatives and ex-officials of the Tsarist and Provisional Government régimes, and established an impoverished administration in those centres where there was a substantial Russian population. Ignoring a declaration made in Petrograd in November, 1917, which invited the Moslem population of Russia to organize their own affairs and establish, if they so desired, autonomous administrations, the Tashkent Soviet excluded representatives of the native population (which comprised more than 90 per cent. of the total population of Turkestan) from any part in the administration and public services. Cut off from central Russia by a Cossack force under the anti-Bolshevik Ataman General Dutov, which had occupied Orenburg, the Tashkent Soviet government acting independently and often without reference to policies proclaimed in Petrograd, adopted a chauvinistic Russian policy towards the native population. An attempt by Moslem native leaders to set up an autonomous régime at Kokand was crushed with great severity by Tashkent Red guards, the city being destroyed and many thousands of the unfortunate inhabitants being massacred. The survivors took refuge in the independent Khanate of Bokhara, or joined the so-called Basmachi bands which were already in revolt against Russian authority in Southern and Eastern Turkestan.

Faced with a revolt of the native population, and threatened by Dutov and other anti-Bolshevik centres of resistance in the North and North-east, the Tashkent Soviet organized a Red Army, consisting partly of railway workers and troops recently withdrawn from Persia or former garrison forces, but mainly of Hungarian prisoners of war who were given the alternative of enlistment or starvation. Although firmly entrenched in Tashkent, where there was a large Russian population and

concentration of troops, the authority of the Soviet was not unquestioned in other centres, particularly in Transcaspia where the rumblings of revolt had already begun to be heard in the spring of 1918. The Turkmen population smarting under what they considered to be the high-handed attitude of the Soviet administration, waited an opportunity to revolt. A deteriorating economic situation caused much dissatisfaction, and the local railway men, mainly S.R. in outlook, and perhaps more concerned than the Tashkent workers with the impending threat from the other side of the Caspian, began to display a resistance to Tashkent policies which culminated in their revolt in June and July.

The failure of the Tashkent Soviet Government to recognize the threat to which they were exposed by the Turkish and German advance can only be explained by the character and inexperience of the men who comprised it. Mostly ex-railway workers, ex-soldiers and petty officials, their ignorance of the outside world was only exceeded by their revolutionary fervour. Ignoring the Turkish threat, already manifesting itself in pan-Islamic propaganda and intrigue, they embarked on a violent "anti-imperialist" and anti-British campaign, taking their cue from declarations made by Soviet spokesmen in Petrograd and Moscow, but also expressing the latent anti-British feeling common to all classes of Russians in Turkestan, the outcome of suspicion and distrust fostered by propaganda in Tzarist times. This atmosphere had been most effectively exploited by German and Turkish agents, and indeed it was largely due to their efforts that the Soviet Russian propensity to attribute all disorder, revolt and deviation from the "official line" in Turkestan to British influence, was reinforced.

It was in the light of these circumstances that the British military authorities, in consultation with London and Simla, decided to send Missions to key points in the Caspian and N. Persia to keep a watch on the rapidly developing situation, and in the event of the Turkish and German forces reaching the Caspian coast, to organize such local resistance to their further advance as was possible. In addition to these Missions, a further Mission was planned to proceed via Kashgar to Tashkent to establish contact with the local Soviet government and ascertain what steps, if any, could be taken to deny the use of the Central Asian railway and cotton supplies to the enemy.

The first of these missions was "Dunsterforce," a small group of officers and men under the command of Major General Dunsterville, with a convoy of armoured cars, which left Bagdad for Enzeli via Hamadan early in January, 1918. The column followed closely in the wake of the retreating Russians, part of which force, a group of several hundred Cossacks under General Bicharakov, had remained behind, having refused to obey the order to withdraw to Transcaspia.

The aim of the Dunsterville Mission was to secure the road to Enzeli, and report on Turkish moves in the direction of Tabriz and developments in the situation in Baku, while at the same time to establish contact with friendly elements in Transcaucasia who were willing and able to resist the Turkish advance towards the Caspian.

At this stage there was uncertainty regarding the situation in Trans-

caucasia. It was known that the Turks had formed a new "Army of Islam" under General Nuri Pasha, and that this army, which had already established contact with Moslem leaders in Azerbaijan and Daghestan, was advancing towards Baku while another Turkish column was proceeding towards Tabriz. German and Turkish forces were in command of the railways leading eastwards from Erzerum and Batum. In the Persian province of Gilan, a revolutionary band known as the Jangalis, officered by Turks and Austrians, blocked the road to Enzeli, acting as a "Fifth column" for the Turkish Army marching eastward.

At Baku, where there was a large Russian and Armenian population consisting largely of oil and railway workers, a Soviet government had assumed power, but had little authority outside the city area, where the Azerbaijan "Tatar" population, although somewhat divided in its loyalties, were largely under Turkish influence. Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian, and the terminus of the Central Asian railway was in Tashkent Soviet hands. The merchant fleet, or that portion of it that was in southern Caspian harbours, wavered in its loyalties, but on the whole, seemed to favour resistance to the Turks.

In Baku and in the railway towns of Transcaspia, opposition to Bolshevik control was, however, developing. Conflicts between the various national groups—in Baku, Armenian Dashnaks and Azerbaijan Mussavists, S.R.s and Bolsheviks—and in Transcaspia, Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, railwaymen and Tashkent bureaucrats, as well as Turkmen and Russians, absorbed the attention of the local population more than the threat of Turko-German invasion. The Armenians of Baku were perhaps more apprehensive than others, being fully aware of the fate in store for them should the Turks occupy Baku.

This confused situation resolved itself in Baku early in July, when the non-Bolshevik groups succeeded in removing the Communists from office, and set up a new government under the title of the "Centro-Caspian Directorate." This government, in which Dashnaks and S.R.s predominated, finally becoming fully alive to the implications of the Turkish advance, established contact with General Dunsterville, whose little force had at last reached Enzeli, after defeating the Jangalis and reaching a provisional agreement with a locally formed Russian Soviet in Resht and Enzeli.

The Centro-Caspian Directorate sought the assistance of General Dunsterville in men and equipment for the training and organizing of a defence force, and undertook in return to co-operate with him in steps to prevent the oil and cotton resources falling into enemy hands. The force at General Dunsterville's disposal, although reinforced by several companies of infantry, some artillery and sapper units, was quite inadequate to undertake alone a full-scale defence of Baku. By agreement between the Baku authorities and General Dunsterville, General Bicharakov's Cossacks had been shipped to Baku to part of the line of defence, and in early August a small reconnaissance party of officers visited Baku.

After some hesitation on the part of his military chiefs in Bagdad, General Dunsterville was authorized to take part of his force to Baku, which he proceeded to do after taking steps to secure possession of several



ships of the Caspian merchant fleet as a precautionary measure. An agreement was reached with the C.C.D. whereby Dunsterville undertook, for the period of hostilities, to support the C.C.D. with equipment, with training units, and a limited number of men and guns, the Baku authorities undertaking in return to establish a unified command, and to mobilize all available resources for the defence of the city. At the same time, the British Commander, by agreement with the crews, secured control of the Caspian fleet, consisting of a number of small armed vessels, for which purpose a naval officer, Capt. D. Norris, and a few naval ratings were sent from naval units in the Persian Gulf.

Hopes of being able to organize an effective defence of the city, however, were to be disappointed. Although sufficient troops and military equipment were available, it was found impossible to achieve unity of command or adequate supply services. Lack of discipline and unwillingness to fight were displayed by both Russian and Armenian troops; cohesion was absent and treachery and cowardice in the face of the enemy facilitated the advance of the Turks who pressed their attack resolutely. In the defence, most of the fighting fell to the handful of British troops, whose casualties were heavy.

The advance of the Turkish force, assisted by about 10,000 Azerbaijan volunteers, had been held up on account of differences between the Turkish and German commands. Following discussions between the Soviet and German governments, held in Berlin, the Germans had undertaken to stop the Turkish advance on Baku in return for deliveries of Baku oil. When this became known in Constantinople, Enver Pasha ordered an immediate attack on the city.

By mid-September, it was clear that Baku could not be held; the British Commander therefore decided to withdraw his forces. Amid scenes of chaos and confusion, he re-embarked the remnant of the British force and retired to Enzeli.

While these events were in progress, a considerable change in the situation had taken place in Transcaspia. Conflicts between the different political groups in Transcaspia, to which reference has already been made, came to a head in June, when an order for the registration of all males, for mobilization purposes, was issued by the Tashkent Soviet. Railway workers at Kizyl Arvat and Ashkhabad, supported by other anti-Communist elements, organized meetings of protests, and disorderly scenes took place in these and other towns. A visit to the area by the chief Commissar in Tashkent, Kolesov, failed to pacify the railwaymen. Kolesov's visit was followed by the arrival of another Commissar, Frolov, together with a Red Guard bodyguard. Frolov instituted a reign of terror, shooting a number of people, including several railway workers. Under the impression that he had suppressed the threatened revolt in Ashkhabad, he proceeded to Kizyl Arvat, where he shot a deputation of railway workers out of hand. Overpowered by the railwaymen, he was himself shot, and those of his bodyguard who escaped a similar fate, went over to the railwaymen.

Frolov's death was followed by a revolt against the Bolsheviks in Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad and Merv, the chief Transcaspian centres. A

Transcaspians Provincial Government, consisting of S.R.s, some Mensheviks, representatives of the railwaymen, and several local officials, with the support of the local Turkmen, took over the administration in Merv and Krasnovodsk. A number of Bolshevik Commissars and officials were shot in these and other centres, followed by the usual atrocities which at that time were common practice on both sides.

Having burnt their boats by their action against the Bolsheviks, the Transcaspians Government proceeded to organize a line of defence on the Central Asian railway, in the vicinity of Chardjui, where the railway crosses the Amu Darya (Oxus) river. This military force consisted, at this stage, of a few ex-officers and men formerly belonging to the garrison or to units withdrawn from Persia, some Armenian volunteers, and a few hundred Russian volunteers from Ashkhabad and Kizyl Arvat. The local Turkmen, who had been disarmed by the Bolsheviks, were rearmed, with some trepidation, by the Provisional Government, and were induced by promises of recognition of their rights to support the government and provide a cavalry force at the front. The command of the army was entrusted to Colonel Oraz Sirdar, a Tekke Turkman who had served with distinction in the Tzarist Army, thus ensuring the loyalty of the Turkmen horsemen.

The Tashkent Soviet was not slow to respond to the challenge. Early in August, a force of Red Guards, mainly Hungarians, attacked the Transcaspians force, compelling its retirement some 100 miles to Bairam Ali, a small town 30 miles east of Merv. While both sides brought up reinforcements mainly in the form of armoured trains, the Transcaspians Government, faced with the realities of the situation, cast about for support.

Several weeks after the shooting of Frolov, and the establishment of the Transcaspians Provisional Government, a British Mission under the command of Major-General W. Malleon arrived at Meshed in Persian Khorosan from India. After the withdrawal of Russian troops from the northern section of the East Persian Cordon, as the Anglo-Russian screening force was known, British-Indian cavalry took over the Russian section, and a line of communications from the Baluchistan railhead at Nushki to Birjand was established. The objectives of the Mission (known as Malmiss) were mainly of an exploratory character. With no troops at his disposal other than a bodyguard and units of L—C troops of the Cordon force, the Malmiss Mission was precariously located in the event of a Turkish advance into Persia or across the Caspian. Apart from exploratory duties, General Malleon was authorized, at his discretion, to establish contact with groups and individuals in Transcaspians who were likely to be co-operative in denying the Central Asian railway and Krasnovodsk to the Turks in the event of the latter seizing Baku. He was given a free hand to undertake such sabotage operations along the railway as were feasible in this event, operations which were obviously unlikely to be successfully undertaken without local collaboration.

Events in Baku and Ashkhabad now provided grounds for hope that such co-operation might be achieved. When, therefore, the Transcaspians Government approached him in mid-August with a request for assistance,

General Malleon was placed in a position to bargain for their undertaking to co-operate in the mining of Krasnovodsk harbour, and to take steps to ensure that the railway would not be available for a Turkish advance, should this threat materialize. The Transcaspians required military equipment, medical and other stores, and some officers for training purposes, and put in a plea for the provision of troops, which Malleon, at that stage, was unable to satisfy. An agreement, along these lines, was reached on August 19, more than a month after the Ashkhabad revolt had taken place. The agreement, which was of a provisional character, was confirmed by Malleon's military chiefs in Simla, who, however, appeared to have little knowledge or understanding of the real state of affairs in the area. (N.B. Simla was at this time more concerned with the state of affairs in Afghanistan and the N.E. Frontier, and appeared to be more interested in reports reaching its Headquarters from Kashgar and Kabul than from N. Persia and the Caspian.)

Following the signing of the agreement with the British Mission, the Ashkhabad Government took steps to strengthen its military command, while reorganizing its own functions. Funtikov, the Chairman of the Provisional Government (an ex-railwayman), reduced the numbers of the "Cabinet," which now consisted of Zimen, a Merv schoolmaster, one Count Dorrer, a S.R. who had escaped from Tashkent, two other railwaymen, Belov and Kurilov, and Obez Baev, a Turkman.

None of these, with the possible exception of Dorrer, had any administrative experience. Although regarding themselves as revolutionaries, they were compelled by circumstances to abjure many ideas they shared with the Bolsheviks. They had no clear pattern of thought on political and economic issues, and were basically suspicious of each other. Faced with the problems of government and defence, they were forced to rely to a considerable extent on the advice and experience of ex-officials and ex-officers of the Tsarist and Kerensky régimes, who at least had some organizing ability and capacity for translating theory into action. The need to concede some liberty of action to the Turkmen, some of the leaders of whom were vaguely pro-Turk, and practically all imbued with anti-Russian sentiment, was a further source of embarrassment.

A small party of Indian troops belonging to the 19th Punjabi Regiment, with several machine guns, joined the Transcaspians force at Dushakh, a station west of Bairam Ali, to which it had been compelled to retreat by a further Red Army attack. Following a sharp but inconclusive engagement at Dushakh, a further retirement took place at Kaakha, a few miles further west, where the Transcaspians, in response to an urgent appeal from Ashkhabad to General Malleon, were reinforced by additional units of the 19th Punjabis. In the fierce battle that ensued, heavy casualties were incurred on both sides, but the Transcaspians and Indian troops held their ground, and after further fighting in September, in which armoured trains played a large part, the Red Army was forced to withdraw to Dushakh. Some British infantry belonging to the Hampshire Regiment and a Battery of Field Artillery arrived about this time from Dunsterville's field column at Enzeli. The addition of field artillery, in which arm the Transcaspians were very weak, to some extent counter-balanced the poor

quality of the Transcaspien troops. The Turkmen cavalry was undisciplined and unreliable, and the infantry showed a strong tendency to keep to the shelter of the armoured trains. In September, three squadrons of the 28th Indian Cavalry arrived from Meshed in time for the heavy fighting which took place during the latter part of September and in October, following which a general retirement of the Red forces beyond the Merv Oasis took place.

The temporary loss of Merv and the rich agricultural land of the oasis, the principal source of food supply to Transcaspien, had caused great hardship to the population, and was the chief underlying cause of the unrest and agitation against the government which followed in the late autumn. The reoccupation of the Oasis in October and November eased the situation, but financial difficulties and political conflicts between the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary elements in the governments and Trades Unions precipitated a crisis towards the end of the year, which was only resolved by the provision of financial assistance by the British Mission, a reorganization of the government, henceforth known as the "Committee of Public Safety," and the arrest by the Ashkhabad authorities of a number of agitators who were suspected of sympathy with the Bolsheviks.

At the time of the fighting at Kaakha and in subsequent operations in the Merv area, the total Transcaspien strength, including Turkmen, was less than 2,000. British and Indian troops, in addition, numbered about 900, a third of which number were on lines of communication. Both sides used armoured trains, mounted with guns of various calibres and vintages, and protected by bales of cotton. The Red trains, at the beginning of military operations, had the advantage of possessing guns of heavier calibre and longer range; an adequate supply of ammunition was obtained from the large store of military equipment at the frontier fortress of Kushkh, which remained in Bolshevik hands throughout the fighting.

With the onset of winter, one of great severity with temperatures below zero, a period of stalemate developed, punctuated by sporadic armoured train duels and occasional raiding attacks by the Red forces, which were invariably driven off.

Despite the disparity in numbers and equipment, the Transcaspiens had gained the initiative by the autumn, but largely owing to the economic and political difficulties with which the Ashkhabad government were faced, the tendency to intrigue and talk rather than act with resolution, and the lack of any clear policy other than to play for time while depending on British support, the military command was unable to use it to advantage.

The fighting qualities of the Indian troops were fully appreciated by the Tashkent Soviet. Their own troops were of unequal quality, the Hungarian ex-prisoners, buoyed up by hopes of fighting their way through to the Caspian, displaying great courage and fortitude. It was only after the removal of the "plug" at Orenburg, where Dutov's Cossacks, with varying success had blocked the road to Moscow, that the Tashkent Soviet Army, reinforced by Red Army units and military equipment from Central Russia, was able to take the offensive with any hope of success.

It was during this period of fluctuating fortune and domestic unrest that the episode of the 26 Commissars took place. This incident, which became an international *cause célèbre*, stemmed from actions taken by the Centro-Caspian Directorate during the evacuation from Baku in September. Bolshevik members of the previous Baku Soviet Government, and a number of Bolshevik officials had been arrested by the C.C.D. in July, and were awaiting trial on charges of treachery and misappropriation of State property when the Turkish attack on Baku took place on September 14.

Released from prison by the government, or what seems more likely, by friendly hands, the Commissars, 26 in number, took ship to proceed to Astrakhan, which was in Soviet Government hands.

On the pretext of having insufficient fuel, or possibly because of some uncertainty in their minds as to what fate awaited them in Astrakhan, the crew took the ship to Krasnovodsk, where it arrived early on the following morning. The Ashkhabad Government official in charge of the Krasnovodsk administration, one Kuhn, arrested the party of Commissars, and telegraphed to Ashkhabad for instructions. The Transcaspian Government, disturbed by developments in Baku as well as local unrest, notified General Malleon in Meshed through their liaison officer, Dokhov, of the arrival of the Commissars and sought his views. General Malleon informed Dokhov that he considered it most undesirable that the Commissars should be allowed to proceed along the railway, or be brought to Ashkhabad, and suggested that the most prudent course would be to hand them over to the British Mission at some convenient point, whence they could be sent to India and held as hostages for a number of British citizens then being detained by the Bolshevik Government in Moscow and elsewhere. Dokhov undertook to convey General Malleon's suggestions to his chiefs in Ashkhabad, but expressed some personal doubt as to its feasibility.

General Malleon, having little confidence in Dokhov, then telegraphed to his own liaison officer in Ashkhabad, Captain Teague Jones, instructing him to convey the same message to the government through Zimen, the L.O.'s contact with that body.

The government, consisting of Funtikov, Zimen, Kurilov and Dorrer, spent the following night discussing the question without reaching a unanimous decision. In the meanwhile, Kuhn, evidently fearing an attempt on the part of local sympathisers to release the Commissars from custody, telegraphed Funtikov, asking for an immediate decision. While it is uncertain whether the final decision was left to Funtikov by the other members of the government (their subsequent efforts to dissociate themselves from the action taken having little value as evidence), instructions were in fact given by him to Kuhn to shoot the unfortunate prisoners.

On the night of September 19, the 26 Commissars were taken by train to a point in the desert about 200 kilometres east of Krasnovodsk and there shot in circumstances of great brutality.

The Ashkhabad Government took steps to prevent the news of this action reaching the public, and it was only after repeated requests for information that General Malleon's liaison officer was able to elicit from

the government information on what had happened. On being informed, General Malleon, who in the meanwhile had obtained the approval of his chiefs in India to his suggestion to hold the Commissars as hostages, expressed his strong disapproval and horror at the action taken by the Ashkhabad Government.

News of the fate of the Commissars does not appear to have become known in Moscow until February or March in the new year, but in the meanwhile, late in September, there was some correspondence through neutral channels, between M. Chicherin and H.M. Government, regarding their whereabouts. At that time, however, H.M. Government had not yet received news of the fate of the Commissars, as Malleon's direct communications were with Simla, and delays in the transmission of all but urgent telegrams were not uncommon.

The fate of the Commissars, however, became the subject of articles in a Baku newspaper, early in March, 1919, and subsequently the theme of a book by one Vadim Chaikin, a Social Revolutionary journalist who had visited Transcaspia. In these publications, Chaikin charged the British with the execution of the 26 Commissars, placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of officers of the British Mission. The fact that no representative of the Mission was in Krasnovodsk, and that Kuhn took his orders from the Ashkhabad Government, was ignored.

Chaikin's charges were repeated in a Soviet wireless broadcast in April, the Soviet Government bluntly accusing the British of being responsible for the transportation of the Commissars to Krasnovodsk, their arrest and subsequent execution. The statements contained in Chaikin's book were quoted in evidence, and the charge has been repeated many times in numerous publications, and in internal and external propaganda since that date.

The fate of the 26 Commissars, by no means an isolated incident of callous brutality committed by both " Reds " and " Whites " during those years of internal struggle and confusion, has become part of the Soviet revolutionary epic, and it now seems unlikely that an objective and unprejudiced restatement of the facts will be included in Soviet historical accounts of events in Turkestan in the foreseeable future.

The collapse of the Central Powers in October and November inevitably brought about a change in the political and military situation throughout the whole Caspian area. The reoccupation of Baku by British forces after a short period of Turkish occupation, following the Turkish attack on the city in mid-September, removed the danger of aggression from that quarter, so that British involvement in operations in Transcaspia could no longer be justified by reasons of military expediency. Early in the New Year, British troops in the area came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Black Sea Forces, General Milne, who was also responsible for troops in occupation of the Transcaucasian railway between Batum and Baku. German troops had withdrawn through the Ukraine, and Turkish units, scattered throughout the area, were with difficulty being extricated from their various locations. The sudden collapse of the Central Powers, however, left in its train an extremely complicated and confused situation in Transcaucasia and the Caspian area

generally, delaying the disengagement of British forces for some months.

Following a visit to the Transcaspien front by General Milne in January, 1919, and consultations with London and Simla, the decision was taken to withdraw the British-Indian forces from Transcaspia. The danger of too sudden a withdrawal was, however, recognized, and in fairness to the Ashkhabad Government, and above all to the Turkmen who looked to the British for support, it was felt that they should be given the opportunity to obtain alternative support from the Caucasus, where General Denikin's troops had established themselves in the northern area.

Preparations for withdrawal were put in train and the Ashkhabad Government was informed in confidence of the intended move. Meanwhile, rumours of an impending encircling movement by a reinforced British force were put into circulation to forestall an early attack by the Tashkent Army; military stores and equipment were made available to the Transcaspians, and some rifles and ammunition sent, at his urgent request, to the Emir of Bokhara, whose forces, woefully inadequate, at least constituted a threat to the Red Army flank. (N.B. Contrary to subsequent Soviet charges, no British officers were sent to Bokhara, nor was any political or military agreement entered into with the ruler of that unruly State.)

By the beginning of March, all British and Indian troops were withdrawn, either to Meshed or via Ashkhabad, to Baku. Meanwhile, officers and men, mainly Daghestan cavalry, had arrived from Petrovsk, and the military command became subordinate to General Denikin.

No move was made by Tashkent until May, by which time news of the British withdrawal had become definitely known, or the danger of a flank attack was discovered to be a stratagem. Although heavily reinforced from the Caucasus, the Transcaspien Army was unable to withstand the Red Army attack, and fell back on Merv, which after a short respite was abandoned, the Transcaspians retiring in disorder in the direction of Ashkhabad. Ashkhabad fell in July; Kizyl Arvat a few weeks later, and a general retirement then took place to Krasnovodsk, which held out until the end of the year when the remnant of the defending force surrendered or was evacuated to the Caucasus. Few of the Ashkhabad Government leaders escaped. Oraz Sirdar, with several other Turkmen leaders, took refuge in Persia; others joined the Khivan irregular forces and continued the struggle until the whole of Turkestan was in Bolshevik hands after Frunze's campaign in the following year.

Thus ended the Transcaspien episode. On the British side, begun as an improvisation, on characteristic British Army lines, to deal with a local situation as it arose, it has passed into military history as one of many such episodes, a forgotten campaign.

In Soviet accounts, dealing with the history of the period in Turkestan, the British rôle is presented as part of a vast plan to subjugate Turkestan, to make that vast area a British "colony," and gain possession of its resources of oil, cotton and manpower. Many of these accounts speak of a "Pact" alleged to have been entered into with some mysterious and unspecified "White" organization, with that end in view. No such "Pact"

ever existed, except in the imagination of some fanciful journalist, or as a piece of propaganda which aimed, for internal purposes, at providing a convenient explanation for the situation brought about by the excesses and mistakes of the Tashkent Soviet and its alienation of the Moslem population from the Bolshevik régime.

Most Soviet historical accounts of the campaign in Transcaspia, and Dunsterville's participation in the defence of Baku, show a disposition to ignore or to minimize the fact that war with the Central powers was still in progress, and that it was Allied victory in the West that brought about the collapse of Germany and Turkey, thus removing at one stroke the threat of Turko-German occupation of the Moslem countries of the Middle East, and at the same time lifting the heavy burden of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is up, but I am happy to say that the paper will be reproduced in full in the Society's Journal so that any omission which has had to be made for lack of time will later be available to all members. I know you will wish to support me in thanking Colonel Ellis very much indeed for his masterly and intensely interesting exposition.



# HONG KONG

By SIR ALEXANDER GRANTHAM, G.C.M.G.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, November 19, 1958, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Sir Hugh Dow, much to his regret, cannot be with us, and so it has fallen to my lot to have the pleasant task of introducing Sir Alexander Grantham, who has kindly come to tell us about "Hong Kong."

Sir Alexander spent his early years with the Colonial Service in Hong Kong, afterwards serving in Bermuda, Jamaica, Nigeria and as Governor of Fiji. Then, in 1947, he returned to Hong Kong. Shortly after that, Hong Kong began to go through the tremendous upheaval of which the two principal facts were the great influx of refugees from China and the complete loss of the Colony's trade. Sir Alexander steered the Colony through those troublesome waters with such skill that he completely won the confidence and affection of every nationality in all walks of life, with the result that his term of office was renewed and again renewed, so that he eventually spent ten and a half years as Governor of Hong Kong, which I believe to be the longest term of governorship of the Colony. I now ask Sir Alexander Grantham to kindly give his lecture.

**Y**OUR Royal Highnesses, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I propose to divide my talk into five main headings: (1) Basic facts about Hong Kong, some of which may be elementary to those who have visited Hong Kong; (2) The history of the Colony of Hong Kong up to the time the Communists took over in China; (3) The effect on Hong Kong of the Communist take-over in China; (4) Major internal problems of today; and (5) The future of Hong Kong.

(1) *Basic facts about Hong Kong.* Geographically, Hong Kong is situated on and just off the south-eastern coast of China. It is an area of a little under 400 square miles. The island of Hong Kong is 32 square miles in extent; the urban area of the Kowloon peninsula is four square miles, and altogether out of the total area of 391 square miles, 11 square miles are urban. There is a land frontier with Communist China of 23 miles, 18 of which are now wired; the remainder is swampy land and therefore does not require wiring.

The island was acquired by Great Britain in 1842, not as in the case of Gibraltar for military reasons, but as a trading centre, a place where merchant ships could refit and be careened. In 1860 another six square miles were ceded by China, again in perpetuity. Those six square miles constituted the tip of the Kowloon peninsula on the mainland, and an island known as Stonecutters' Island in the harbour of Hong Kong. In 1898 there was leased by the Government of China to Great Britain for a period of ninety-nine years the area of 355 square miles, mostly countryside and islands very sparsely inhabited. An important point to bear in mind today is that part of the Colony is ceded and part is only leased. The lease expires in 1997.

The population at the time Hong Kong became British was about 1,500,

and the inhabitants were occupied in the dual trades of fishing and piracy. One hundred years later the population had risen to a little over one and a half million; that was just before the Japanese entered the Colony. At the end of the war, when the British returned, the one and a half million had dropped to half a million. Three years later, in 1948, the half-million had risen to two million, a fourfold increase, and you will note that that big increase took place before the Communists had completed the over-running of China. Today the population is probably between two and three-quarters and three million. In the urban areas the density of population is tremendous, about 50,000 to the square mile, and in some cases 2,500 to the acre. The natural growth of the population is 3.8 per cent. per annum, which is probably as high as anywhere in the world. Ninety-nine per cent. of the people are Chinese by race; and 80 per cent. of them are Chinese by nationality. The non-Chinese population, excluding the Services, is about 25,000.

Still on basic facts concerning Hong Kong, what of the economy? How does Hong Kong tick? It has no natural resources; it cannot feed itself; it grows enough rice, which is the staple diet of the Chinese, for about three weeks supply in the year; overall, roughly 50 per cent. of Hong Kong's foodstuffs have to be imported, and most of the food comes from the mainland; that is, Communist China. The mineral resources are negligible, but nature has made of Hong Kong an entrepôt because it is situated adjacent to the vast and populous hinterland of south China and it has a magnificent harbour, the best natural harbour on the whole of the China coast. Therefore, Hong Kong is an entrepôt; that is to say, goods are brought from all corners of the earth in big ships to Hong Kong where they are put on to little ships and sent by coastal steamer, junks or rail to various parts of China, and the reverse process happens. Trade is therefore vital to the people of Hong Kong and any obstacles put in the way of such trade are regarded as bad. By being free trade, Hong Kong has become one of the great commercial centres of the world.

Following on the desire for free trade in goods, there was also a desire for free movement of peoples—I am now talking about basic facts and not of the period after the Communist take-over of China—and there was no restriction on the movement of people between Hong Kong and China. In pre-Communist days about 10,000 people a day would come into Hong Kong and 10,000 a day would go out. Admittedly some were the same people moving backwards and forwards. Hong Kong being free trade by instinct, is also opposed to any Government or other restrictions. The Government interferes in business to the bare minimum. There is also, even on the part of Government, an abhorrence of taxation, for the reason that if taxation were to be high, prices would rise and Hong Kong as a harbour and port would lose its competitive position.

I am not sure whether this is the proper place to put this, but I cannot think of anywhere else, so I mention now the internal constitution of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is not a democracy; it does not pretend to be that; but it does provide individual liberty and freedom. That there is freedom and individual liberty is, I think, shown by the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of people leaving their own country of China to

come and live under a benevolent autocracy. That is the form of Government there. It is also an impossibility for Hong Kong to become an independent state or dominion, because when Hong Kong ceases to be a British colony it will simply be merged into the adjacent Chinese province of Kwangtung. Nor is there any general demand for internal self-government. For this there are two reasons: first, the Chinese, generally speaking, are politically apathetic; that is to say the cry of "No taxation without representation" means little or nothing to them. Provided that the Government maintains law and order, does not tax the people too much and that they can obtain justice in the courts, they are satisfied and well content to devote their time to making more money in one way or another. Secondly, people in Hong Kong are against a popularly elected Legislature because they are afraid, and there is justification for this fear, that the politics of China would be played in such a Legislature. Some of the members would be stooges of the Communists and others would be stooges of the Nationalists, that is Chiang Kai-shek's régime in Formosa. So Hong Kong has to be, and is, content with a benevolent autocracy. At a lower level in the municipal council or, as it is called there, the urban council, there are elected members, but in the elections held during the last few years there has been consistently little interest. It is estimated that never more than 17 per cent. of the potential electorate have ever troubled to vote. So much for the basic facts concerning Hong Kong and its internal constitution.

(2) *The history of the Colony of Hong Kong.* In a few words I will run through the history of Hong Kong up to the advent of the Communists in China. The first stage was the founding of the Colony in 1842 up to Christmas Day, 1941, when the Japanese came in. Suffice to say, that the Colony prospered and grew in size and wealth. There were from time to time minor conflicts with China, but in those days China was weak. During the occupation by the Japanese of the Colony, the population dropped from just over one and a half million to half a million, and when the British returned, 70 per cent. of the European style buildings—I do not mean buildings occupied by Europeans but the upper middle-class buildings—70 per cent. were either destroyed or unfit for human habitation and 20 per cent. of the tenements were in a similar state. The Colony made a remarkably rapid recovery after the war in rehabilitation, for which there were four main reasons, the first being that private enterprise was given its head. Those concerned could go ahead (provided they got on with the job) and make as much money as they could. There was an adequate supply of labour and plenty of food with which to feed that labour and, finally, the Colony was able to buy materials from dollar countries such as the United States of America and Canada. So much for the history of Hong Kong up to the end of 1949, when the Communists completed their over-running of China and became the Colony's neighbours.

(3) *The effect on Hong Kong of the Communist take-over of China.* It was on January 6, 1950, that His Majesty's Government recognized the Central People's Government as the *de jure* Government of China. From the Hong Kong point of view—not the United Kingdom point of view—

the great thing was not so much that the new régime in China was a Communist régime but that it was a comparatively strong régime. It was strong. That is the overriding effect that the change has had on Hong Kong.

What has been the attitude of this new régime to the British Colony of Hong Kong? Here I would like to remark that the Chinese Government has no diplomatic representative in the Colony. Before the war there was no such representative. After the war there was the Nationalist Government—the then lawful Government of China—which had what was termed a Special Commissioner in Hong Kong. He was a graduate of Harvard and of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

The attitude of this new régime to the Colony has gone through various phases. The first phase was one of negative hostility and positive unpleasantness. As an example of the positive unpleasantness I will give an example. There are two bridges joining Hong Kong and Chinese territory. On their side of the bridge the Communists erected loudspeakers which were pointed towards Hong Kong, and from these loudspeakers there poured forth a stream of abuse of Britain and the British in general, and the Hong Kong authorities in particular. After a time the new régime, or at any rate our neighbours, in the province of Kwangtung, mellowed a little. They still continued their negative hostility, but not positive unpleasantness. At the end of 1955, whilst the negative hostility still continued, there was added to it what we in Hong Kong then termed "the Campaign of Sweetness and Light," a campaign to woo the Chinese of Hong Kong, especially the leading Chinese, to love Mother China, and they played down the Communist side of the new China. That had only a limited success. That phase continued up to the present year, by which time I had left Hong Kong. Then again, whilst the negative hostility still continued, there was an era, or some weeks at any rate, of positive unpleasantness. All this is the usual Communist technique. First of all, there is a period of tension, then there is relaxation, then tension again, and so it goes on, and so it will go on. The primary targets in Hong Kong are trade unions and the schools, just as those were the targets in the days of the Kuomintang régime in China.

Turning from the attitude of the Government of China towards Hong Kong, what about the attitude of the people of Hong Kong, 99 per cent. being Chinese, towards the new régime in China? At first they welcomed it, as so many did in China, because they were fed to the teeth with the corruption and inefficiency of the Nationalist régime. Disillusion, however, soon spread throughout the masses; in fact, through all classes of the people of Hong Kong except those who were convinced Communists. I do not, however, want it to be thought that the bulk of the people in Hong Kong, because they are against the new régime in China, are in favour of the régime in Formosa, or Taiwan. They are not. The bulk wish to remain in Hong Kong and to be left alone to lead their own lives.

In all this, what should be or what has been the policy of the Hong Kong Government? On the one hand, they must not provoke unnecessarily their vast neighbour, China, if for no other reason than that Whitehall would not welcome the Hong Kong authorities doing something

stupid which would start a little local war on the borders of Hong Kong, between Hong Kong and China. But just as the Hong Kong authorities must not provoke China, so they must not appease China or even seem to appease China, because if so they might lose the confidence of the population of the Colony. The population might then think that the Hong Kong authorities, but more especially Her Majesty's Government, were afraid of the Central People's Government, that is the Chinese Government based on Peking.

(4) *Major internal problems.* I now pass to major internal problems in Hong Kong today. The biggest of these is overcrowding. That there should be overcrowding follows from the fact that there are between three-quarters and one million refugees in the Colony. There have always been refugees coming into Hong Kong from over the border from time immemorial. Whenever there has been local disturbance or local civil war in the neighbouring provinces of China the Chinese have come flocking into Hong Kong to stay with their relatives and friends; then, when things have settled down in China, they have returned there. For that reason the Hong Kong Government never did anything about providing amenities for those temporary refugees. Had they done so the Colony would have been flooded out with hundreds of thousands and more coming in.

Since the advent of the new régime in China there has been a change in that the refugees will not return to China. As I have already said, the frontier in the old days was always open, and remained open until 1951, nearly two years after the Communists came on the border. Then the frontier had to be closed. We closed it not for political reasons, not because we thought that somebody with a big "C" for Communist written on his shirt would come in, but we closed the frontier because we could not cope with the vast influx of people.

The Chinese on their side also closed the frontier; they would not allow, except in unusual circumstances, Chinese to leave China for Hong Kong, nor would they normally allow Chinese from Hong Kong to go into China. But in 1956, in response to urgent requests from the Chinese people of Hong Kong and agreement with the Chinese authorities over the border, the frontier was opened. It was worked in this way: the Hong Kong authorities would allow in from China any Chinese provided he was in possession of a re-entry permit issued by the authorities in Canton. The Chinese authorities in Canton would do the same with Chinese coming from Hong Kong. At the end of six months we found that 80 per cent. of those coming into Hong Kong from China had not gone, and would not go, back. We had a net gain of population of 70,000. On the other hand, the fraction of Hong Kong Chinese who went into China and did not come back was infinitesimal. So that the frontier was closed again; it is still closed today. Illegal emigrants are, however, still coming into Hong Kong. Since they are illegal it is impossible to say what their number is. About a year ago the number was variously estimated at anything between 5,000 and 15,000 a month.

This problem of overcrowding means, of course, a housing problem. At the height of the influx there were probably 600,000 squatters; that is to say, people living in the most squalid little shacks made out of beaten

kerosene tins, or whatever else they could find. In addition, there were 300,000 people living in slums and needing to be re-housed. Altogether, therefore there were 900,000 out of a then population of about two and a half million who needed re-housing. Today about 250,000 of the squatters have been re-housed, in multi-storey tenement buildings, blocks of tenements seven storeys high; by no means luxury but far better than the places in which the people were previously living. In a room 12 by 10 feet (120 square feet), five adults live, and for that they pay 17s. 6d. a month. They are very happy indeed with that accommodation. The programme is by no means complete and it will probably be some years before it is, because all the finance comes out of the pockets of the Hong Kong taxpayers. The re-housing of the 300,000 slum dwellers is also proceeding, but since they have a better standard of accommodation, its provision is taking a little longer.

Again as a result of overcrowding there is the educational problem. At the end of the war most of the school buildings had been destroyed or severely damaged. Today about 80,000 children of school age are receiving no education whatever, and 40,000 are getting inadequate schooling. That is not a problem that can be solved in a short time, because even if it were possible to erect the necessary school buildings in a matter of weeks or months, there would not be sufficient teachers, in that these have all to be trained.

Still on the problem of overcrowding, there are the medical and sanitary facilities which have to be provided. That is a tremendous problem; but there is in process of erection what will be the largest hospital in the British Commonwealth. That again is being paid for entirely out of the pockets of the Hong Kong taxpayers.

The economic effect of the new régime in China on Hong Kong arises more out of China's venture into the Korean War than anything else. Hong Kong's natural trading partner, by reason of its geographical position, must be China. In the old days, 75 per cent. of Hong Kong's trade was with China, but after China entered the Korean War the United Nations imposed an embargo on the sale to that country of strategic and semi-strategic materials, while the United States of America imposed a complete embargo on imports and exports of anything Chinese. Hong Kong, being an entrepôt, suffered from these two embargoes more than any place in the world. Unfortunately that happened at a time when Hong Kong was flooded out with refugees, all of whom were looking for jobs. Today, instead of 75 per cent. of Hong Kong's trade being with China, the figure has dropped to 15 per cent. The United Nation's embargo was recently eased, but that is only having a limited beneficial effect on the Colony for two reasons: (1) China has already got her economy geared to the U.S.S.R. and the satellites; (2) China does not yet have sufficient foreign exchange for a great deal of foreign trade. It is only by the ingenuity and industry of her industrious people that Hong Kong has been able economically to survive; it is from industries and factories that the greatest salvation has come. Industries are not natural to Hong Kong because all the raw materials have to be imported, but today more than one-third of Hong Kong's total exports are made up of the products

of her factories, most of which are Chinese owned; the capital was refugee capital from Shanghai. There are now about 170,000 factory workers. Nonetheless, unemployment and under-employment are very serious. Of the manufactured products, textiles are the most important, making up about two-thirds of the total. That has created a mild flutter in Lancashire, which objects very strongly to the more efficient Hong Kong textile industry being allowed free access to the United Kingdom market. I say no more as to that vexed question, because I trust it is going to be solved to Lancashire's satisfaction, if not to Hong Kong's.

Another major problem is that of getting rid of the deportees. Eighty per cent. of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese subjects. Every country has the right to deport the nationals of another country, and in the past all convicted of crime were automatically sent back to China at the end of their sentences. That cannot now be done. But, more serious, there are now secret societies which go in for protection rackets, and it is difficult to get evidence against the members in a court case because they intimidate would-be witnesses. They, too, used to be deported. That cannot now be done. Therefore a new regulation has been brought into force whereby such people can be detained.

The next major problem, and the last I shall deal with, has nothing to do with China being Communist. It is the drug traffic; drug addiction. Hong Kong, by no fault of its own, but because of a sovereign State not very far off, is one of the big markets, one of the big drug distributing centres. Therefore a good deal of heroin passes through and is consumed by the people of Hong Kong. It was a difficult problem to know what to do with these people. Recently Hong Kong Government has decided to erect a prison or institution whereby these addicts, whilst undergoing prison sentences, can be cured, it is hoped, of their addiction.

(5) *The future of Hong Kong.* One day Hong Kong will go back to China, but in my opinion it is very low on the Chinese priority list. Why do I say that? You will recollect that I told you at the beginning of this talk that in 1997 part, but only part, of the Colony goes back to China when the lease of that part expires. In that leased part there are the main reservoirs. The boundary, the dividing line between the leased part, that is the part that goes back to China, and the conceded part runs right through the middle of a city street. It is extremely doubtful if the rest of the Colony can continue as a viable entity when the leased part goes back to China. I may be wrong. After all, it is nearly forty years off, and a good deal may happen between now and 1997. If I am right, that indicates that the Chinese Government has to wait less than forty years before they get the whole of the Colony back on a plate, as it were. Meanwhile, it is of considerable use to them. Great Britain having recognized the new régime, the Communists come into the Colony and get all the banking, shipping and insurance facilities and all the advantages of the port. Also by feeding the population of Hong Kong they get a good deal of foreign exchange, that is sterling, which they would not do if Hong Kong ceased to be British. It is a peep-hole for the Communists; in fact, it is really their only direct contact with the free world.

Those are the advantages as I see them from the Communists' point of

view. If they were to attack Hong Kong and if they were to take it—and here I would remark that Hong Kong is defensible—but supposing the Communists were to take it, then before the British withdrew they would, no doubt, destroy all the power houses and so on, so that the Chinese would get an empty shell. And Hong Kong is only of use in time of peace. Furthermore, by attacking Hong Kong the Chinese might well be starting, not necessarily a Third World War, but they might well be starting another Korean War, and in Korea they certainly burnt their fingers. Again, the Government in China has on its hands today a very full programme of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture and any military foreign adventure would distract the Communists from these objects.

Let us look at the matter from the British and the free world aspect. First of all, there is trade. Great Britain sells to Hong Kong £40 million worth of goods a year. That is visible trade. I imagine the invisible benefits from banking, shipping and insurance business are even greater. Then as a listening-post Hong Kong is the best, not excepting Formosa; it is the best listening-post into Communist China. By its contiguity with Communist China, Hong Kong provides a contrast between the dictator State of the Communist world with the free States of the free world. It has proved a sanctuary to nearly one million people. In short, Hong Kong is a symbol of the free world not only of the British world but of the free world in the Far East. It has been said with some justification that Hong Kong is really the Berlin of the East.

I would like to conclude by saying that Hong Kong, for those of you who have not visited the Colony, is a fascinating place. Its beauty is outstanding. It hums with activity. You will also, I am sure, be impressed by the confidence which exists; the amount of building that is going on. Admittedly some of that building may be speculative, but when I tell you that a Bank, which has its headquarters in London and only a comparatively small branch in Hong Kong, is building what is going to be the tallest building in the whole Colony, about 18 storeys high, you will realize that I am not talking nonsense when I say that there is confidence in the future of Hong Kong. And, last of all, the visitor to Hong Kong will, I hope, pay credit to what the British and the Chinese together have done to make Hong Kong one of the show places of the free world.

#### DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Alexander Grantham has kindly said he will answer questions.

Sir NEVILLE BUTLER: Can Sir Alexander say where the one million people went to at the time of the Japanese occupation?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: They were driven back into China; that is what accounted for the drop in population from one and a half million to half a million at the time of the Japanese occupation.

Asked if any effort was being made to end the lease of part of Hong Kong.

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM replied: No; I doubt whether this would be a propitious moment at which to open up such a problem.



Col. FOX HOLMES : Is there any sign of the emerging of a Third Force, that is non-Chiang Kai-Shek and non-Communist in Hong Kong?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : There is nominally a Third Force, but it has no leader. As a matter of fact, I do not think the Third Force has any future whatever.

Mr. JOHN HILL : Can Sir Alexander say what the future of the fishing industry of Hong Kong is likely to be in view of the squeeze being put on by the Chinese Communists in claiming a 12-mile limit?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Hong Kong is, as I have said, on the south China coast, and recently the Chinese Government declared a 12-mile limit. That is going to be serious for the Hong Kong fishing fleet. Quite what H.M. Government will do about it, I do not know. Maybe H.M. Government will hesitate to do to China what they are doing to Iceland.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT : I would like to query that, because in 1927 the Russians set a 12-mile limit off the north coast of Norway. At that time we sent up ships and defended our fishing rights.

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Any similar action would certainly be welcomed by the British in Hong Kong.

Mr. W. WHITE : What is the position in regard to language in the schools from the point of view of teaching Chinese and English?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : There are two types of schools : those in which Chinese is the language of instruction, and English is taught as a foreign language. And there are other schools in which English is the language of instruction. The Chinese students are very good students indeed; one has almost to keep them away from their books; their eagerness to learn English is remarkable.

Lord KILLEARN : What has happened in regard to the University of Hong Kong?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Hong Kong has a University, it is comparatively small, with a student body of just under 1,000. The Vice-Chancellor is an Australian; some of the professors are Chinese; some are British. I think the University is doing very well indeed.

Lord KILLEARN : Do the undergraduates come from China or elsewhere?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : I do not think there are any undergraduates who come straight in from China. Admittedly, some of the undergraduates are refugees who may a few years earlier have been in China. Most come from Hong Kong which, with a population of its size, can support a University. That is apart from the financial angle.

Sir ESLER DENING : Do graduates return to China?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Some do.

Mr. MATTHEW : Do many of them go to Taiwan?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Some go back to the mainland of China and some to Taiwan. We did keep statistics in Hong Kong of the number of secondary schoolboys who went to China or to Formosa, and the numbers were about equal. The reason why they went to China or Formosa was not necessarily, or hardly at all, that they were either of Communist or of Nationalist persuasion, but only because they wanted to get education which they could not get in Hong Kong.

Mlle. ELLA MALLART: How much money is allowed for the counter-acting of Chinese propaganda which is pouring out all the time from China?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: That is an interesting question. It had been suggested at one time that the Radio Station at Hong Kong should be used as a British propaganda centre against China. Fortunately, from the Hong Kong point of view, that suggestion was turned down. There is no counter radio propaganda, or rather no direct radio propaganda from Hong Kong back into China. Perhaps I might explain that. Hong Kong is very small and is in a very forward position. If Hong Kong were to adopt an aggressively anti-Chinese policy against what is the legitimate Government of China, it would suffer for it. Hong Kong is really like a glass-house right out in front, and they do not want great big stones thrown through their glass. I believe there is a powerful transmitter station in Singapore, but Singapore is not in the front line.

Lord KILLEARN: Could I ask what is the position in regard to Kai Tak aerodrome?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: The new runway which cost £6 million sterling has just been completed and is ready for occupation. The terminal buildings of the new aerodrome will not be ready for about two years.

Lord KILLEARN: Has the idea of an aerodrome on the frontier been dropped?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: Before the new aerodrome was built in Hong Kong it was necessary to find a site for it, and the site in a place like Hong Kong, which is largely mountains and hills, was not easy to find. A provisional site had been chosen quite near the frontier with China, but it was wisely decided that since the aeroplanes in taking off or landing would have to go over Chinese territory, they would undoubtedly be shot at by the Communist guards, and that might have had rather a discouraging effect on tourists wanting to fly there, so that site was abandoned.

Sir ESLER DENING: Will the new aerodrome take the B.O.A.C. Comet IV and the American Boeing 707,

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: It will take all types of aircraft in the foreseeable future.

H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE: What is the proportion of Chinese in the Police Force in Hong Kong?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM: The Police Force in Hong Kong is almost entirely Chinese; most of the officers, but not all, are British. They have proved extremely reliable and perhaps I might give an instance of that. In the first phase of the Communist attitude to Hong Kong, at the bridge joining Hong Kong and Chinese territory, there was a barbed-wire barrier. On the Chinese side were their armed soldiers with their tommy-guns and sub-machine guns. On the Hong Kong side, about ten feet away, was a Chinese-British policeman. The Communists would take this man's photograph and would say: "We know who you are. We have got your picture and we know where your family live. We are going to take Hong Kong in about three months and you will be for it." This

sort of thing went on for several weeks, but those policemen did not bat an eyelid; they just remained at their post.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOK : What are the formalities if British want to settle in Hong Kong?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : There are no formalities.

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK : Are the secret societies political or criminal?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : The secret societies are today criminal; they started about one hundred years ago as political.

Lord KILLEARN : It is a form of blackmail?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : Yes.

Mr. ACLAND : Might I ask about the other side of the propaganda coin? Do the Chinese Communists use Hong Kong as a centre for disseminating propaganda into other territory?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : That I think is a loaded question. Some neighbouring British territories have complained that they receive from Hong Kong Communist propaganda that has come from China. It is a difficult problem to deal with because if leaflets and so on are put into the mail-bag in China under the International Postal Convention, which is adhered to by the present Government of China, the Hong Kong authorities cannot do anything about it.

Mr. EGERTON : Is there any Communist unrest in the schools similar to that in Singapore?

Sir ALEXANDER GRANTHAM : There are some schools which are almost completely Communist dominated; there are others which are infiltrated to a greater or lesser extent. On the whole, the proportion is not high; nothing like the problem in Singapore.

Lord KILLEARN : Would the lecturer agree that Hong Kong is a perfect example of a Crown Colony well run? (*Applause.*)

The CHAIRMAN : I do not wish to discourage further questions, but as our time is up it remains for me to thank Sir Alexander for coming and taking the trouble to give the Society such a wonderfully clear and complete picture of Hong Kong; what it has been; what it is and what it stands for in the future. We are very grateful to you, Sir Alexander. Thank you very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

# MY VISIT TO CENTRAL ASIA, 1958

By SIR FITZROY MACLEAN, BART., M.P.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, November 5, 1958, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my very pleasant task to introduce our speaker, Sir Fitzroy Maclean, M.P. I do not think I need say much about his career to date; it is familiar, no doubt, to all of you. After leaving Cambridge, he joined the Foreign Office and was well embarked on a career there when the war broke out after he had been at the Foreign Office for six years. He resigned, joined the Cameron Highlanders as a private, and in four years' time he was a brigadier in charge of the British Military Mission in Yugoslavia. For a long time he has been Member of Parliament for Lancaster division, and from 1954 to 1957 he was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War and Financial Secretary to the War Office.

Sir Fitzroy Maclean has made frequent journeys into Central Asia and also all round the Middle East. I am glad that he has agreed to speak to us today about Central Asia. We call ourselves "The Royal Central Asian Society," but we have extended our boundary a great deal and for a long time we have heard lectures about countries on the periphery. Now I ask Sir Fitzroy Maclean to give his lecture and tell us something about Central Asia itself.

I FIND myself in rather a dilemma. I have it in my favour, as your Chairman has just said, that this is the Central Asian Society and that my talk is about the very centre of Central Asia. But it is not too easy a subject to talk about, especially to an audience like this. I do not feel that I should be justified in giving you a travelogue, because the trip I have made this summer was nothing but a tourist expedition. I equally would not feel qualified to lecture to this audience on the subject of Central Asian history, art, architecture, literature, ethnology or anything of that kind.

Therefore, the best thing I can do is to make a few general observations and then ask the Chairman to throw the meeting open to questions and discussion; and if any of you want to ask me any questions, I will do my best to answer them. I also have some colour slides and a short movie film, which will probably be more interesting to me than to you because it is the first film I have ever taken and I have not yet seen it myself. It is of Bokhara, a place where I do not think many people have taken photographs or films.

The reason why these remarks are bound to be general is that Russian Central Asia—I am talking about what used to be called Russian Turkestan—like all the other non-Russian and, for that matter, Russian parts of the Soviet Union, has over the last 40 years become increasingly Sovietized. In this respect I noticed a big difference from my visit 20 years before, for Sovietization is progressing rapidly. Therefore, most of the remarks that I make today are equally applicable to the Soviet Union as a whole. It is becoming harder and harder to distinguish between one part of the Soviet Union and another.

I was lucky in having a standard of comparison. The Soviet Union.

particularly the remoter parts of it, is so completely different from the rest of the world, and especially from the Western democratic world in which we live, that unless one has some standard of comparison, one's first visit is apt to be bewildering. It is quite different from anything else. One tries to compare the place with what one is accustomed to at home, but that is not a proper comparison. It bears no relation to it. I was fortunate, because I had been there before. I could compare the Soviet Union of 1938 with the Soviet Union of 1958.

I had spent a couple of years in the Soviet Union at our Embassy in Moscow from 1937 to 1939, just 20 years ago, and during that time it was, naturally, my job to take an interest in the country and find out what I could about it, to speak the language, and so on. I was also very lucky in travelling about more, on the whole, than most people to places like Transcaucasia and particularly Siberia and Russian Central Asia, which at that time was normally closed to foreigners and to which I therefore had to go without the permission of the authorities.

At that time, the Soviet Union was at the height of what is now called Stalinism. Stalinism reached its peak, I should say, in about 1937 or 1938. With the exaggerated attention to detail of a homicidal maniac, Stalin was then wiping out not only anybody who had got in his way, but anybody who might conceivably get in his way in any respect at all. The atmosphere was one of terror. As far as day to day life was concerned, everything was sacrificed to the industrialization of what until then had been basically an agricultural community. Agriculture itself had been collectivized by the most brutal methods and the standard of living was just about as low as it could be. No interest was taken in the consumer. The consumer came last. Everything was put into building up heavy industry, the armament industry and the manufacture of machine tools.

Apart from that, apart from the terribly low standard of living and shops with practically nothing in them, there was the most appalling reign of terror. One felt this atmosphere of terror wherever one went, whether in Moscow or in the provinces, but perhaps worst of all in Moscow. Everybody was suspicious of everybody else. Everybody was afraid of being denounced by his nearest neighbour or by his children. One was always reading in the newspapers that little Ivan had been awarded a medal for denouncing his father as a saboteur or Japanese spy, or whatever it might be. That made for a very nasty atmosphere indeed.

The suspicion that Soviet citizens in general, whether Russians or non-Russians, felt for each other, was as nothing compared with the suspicion which they felt for foreigners. The one thing that really was the kiss of death was for any Russian to have anything whatever to do with a foreigner. It was bad enough for the unfortunate officials in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who were obliged to have relations with us in the course of their official duties. They showed the greatest reluctance to speak to us or to have anything to do with us. Everybody else, of course, was in an even worse position. As a foreigner, therefore, one lived in a complete ghetto. One was completely cut off from all contact with Soviet citizens.

In the whole of the two years I was there, I never once saw a Soviet citizen come to the British Embassy for a meal or any purpose except perhaps to deliver a letter and then get out as quickly as he could. That was not for want of trying on the part of the Ambassador or the members of the staff. It simply was too dangerous for it to be worth people's while to accept invitations. In a way, that was tragic, because, when left to themselves, the Russian people—and, indeed, all the peoples of the Soviet Union—are immensely friendly, hospitable, gregarious, and there is nothing they like better than to see foreigners.

That is the background of my sojourn in the Soviet Union 20 years ago. There was the reign of terror, the low standard of living, no freedom, nothing like freedom of any kind to do anything, and, in particular, a complete ban on contacts with foreigners. As far as Central Asia was concerned, there was an absolute ban for foreigners to set foot in it at all. When I went, I went by devious routes and with various attendant adventures.

On the occasion of my recent visit, the first surprise was that when I went to the Soviet Embassy in London and said "I understand you are giving visas for tourists to go to Russia" and gave my name—which was no recommendation—they said "All right. We will look into it." Back came the visa. Then I said, "I would also like to go to Turkestan." They replied, "As long as you go as a tourist de luxe"—meaning, in other words, as long as I paid enough—"you can certainly go to Turkestan." That was a promising start.

When I got to Moscow—I spent a week or so in Moscow and two or three weeks in Turkestan and other parts of the Soviet Union—I was struck by a number of things. First, I was struck by the fact that when one went out into the street, the people no longer looked absolutely terror stricken. They were walking about and chatting to each other. The boys and girls were giggling and flirting, as they do anywhere else. It was a much more natural atmosphere. Every now and then, of course, one saw an older person who showed from his face what he had been through during the last 40 or 50 years. But there was no longer the same atmosphere of terror.

I also found that there was no longer the same difficulty about speaking to foreigners. On the contrary, wherever I went in the Soviet Union one had only to sit down on a bench in a park or at a table in a restaurant for half a dozen Soviet citizens to come and talk. Some of the things they said were not at all complimentary to the régime; others were.

I said at the beginning that it was very useful to have a standard of comparison. When I say that it is now possible to talk to people in Russia and that people there no longer look terror stricken, I am comparing what I saw with what I saw 20 years ago. I am not comparing what I saw in the Soviet Union this summer with what one sees in the street in London today. By those standards, of course, there is no doubt whatever that Russia is still a tyranny, a police state. It could not be much exaggeration to say—we have seen examples of it during the last few days—that the people do not have what we call freedom of speech,

freedom of expression or freedom of anything else. But, compared with 20 years ago, however, there is a big improvement.

I will give you an illustration. I was discussing this problem with some foreigners—diplomats, journalists, and so on—who lived in Moscow, and they said that it was very difficult to see Russians. I asked what they meant. They said, "After you have seen any individual Russian ten or twelve times, somebody turns up and gives him a warning and says 'It is not really a very good idea for you to see these foreigners so constantly.' If, after that, he does not pay any attention to the warning and goes on seeing the foreigners, somebody comes to him and says 'This is not doing you any good,' and it is possible that he may lose his job, and so on."

Now compare that with what happened when I was there before. During the whole of the time I was there before, I had what would really be called friendly contacts with only a very few Russians. In almost every case, generally on the second or third occasion that one saw any particular Russian, he or she disappeared within a few hours of one's seeing him, apparently for good. That happened to me several times. Therefore, by those standards, there has been a certain advance now, when it is possible for Russians to see a foreigner a dozen times and then get more or less only a friendly warning.

The other thing I noticed in Russia, and in Central Asia as well, was a considerable advance and improvement in the standard of living. There is much more in the shops. There is more to eat. People live better and, on the whole, life is easier and gayer. There is less straight Communist propaganda. The films that one sees in the cinema deal with ordinary themes, such as boy meets girl, and do not always hammer home the same dreary political message.

That also applies in the Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union, where there always was a lower standard of living, a difference which to some extent still remains. Obviously, people in the outlying parts still live very much as they have lived for the past thousand years or so. On the other hand, in some ways there has been a greater advance in Central Asia than in European Russia, for the reason that the people there started from a much lower level. Here again, there has been a marked improvement, an improvement, that is, by comparison with the Soviet Union of 20 years ago.

Twenty years ago any foreigner in the Soviet Union, even a shabbily dressed foreigner, stood out a mile. He could be noticed at once. Now, the people whom one sees in the streets of Moscow and in the bigger towns, even though they do not look like the people one finds in Bond Street, in the Rue de la Paix or on Fifth Avenue, do not look so very different from the people to be found in the less prosperous quarters of large provincial towns, even in this country and certainly in the Continent of Europe. That, again, is an advance. What one does not have there is anything to compare with shops such as Marks and Spencer or C. and A. Modes, where, I am told by female relations, it is possible to get pretty clothes remarkably cheap. The prices in the shops in Russia are simply terrific.

There is, of course, tremendous rationing by price, and there is also—

this applies just as much in Central Asia as anywhere else—a tremendous differentiation in wage rates. They vary from what is in practice a starvation wage at the bottom of the scale to wages running into the equivalent of tens of thousands of pounds.

That brings me to the third big change which I noticed: that is, the emergence of a new ruling class, a new aristocracy. This is not a new development, but when I was there before everybody stood a good chance of getting shot, and, on the whole, the ruling class stood a bigger chance of getting shot than anybody else. That did not make for social stability. Now, everybody stands a considerably smaller chance of getting shot or of being pushed off to Siberia. Therefore, the stratification of the society is becoming crystallized and much more permanent. There are not only the people who do the actual job of ruling the country, running the factories, commanding the Army and Navy, being Ministers and the rest of it, but there are their sons, who are also being brought up in luxury, and there will soon be their grandchildren, another generation. That is one development.

The other development is that there are far more educated people. In order to run a technical society, which is what the Soviet Union is becoming more and more, in order to make sputniks and things like that, it is necessary to have a large number of people with technical and advanced education. I have seen the present number of Soviet citizens with advanced or technical education put at about six million. That is a very important change, because those people, the people who are able to cope with these abstruse scientific, technical and other problems, will use their trained minds for working out a lot of other problems too which have nothing to do with science and are not technical. They will turn their minds to the question of how their country ought to be run and whether the propaganda which is pushed out at them really makes sense. They will be much more difficult to bamboozle.

Like almost everything in the Soviet Union, there are two sides to that. Whilst those are the people who are bound to ask themselves questions, and to ask the Government questions, they are also the people who have, in a sense, a vested interest in the continuance of the régime. They are the people who stand most to gain from its continued existence, and as long as life is made sufficiently agreeable for them, they can probably be counted upon not to foul their own nests.

The proviso that life must be made sufficiently agreeable for them is a very important one and something which Mr. Khrushchev has continually to bear in mind. That is one of the reasons for the improvement in the general standard of living, for the fact that more building is being done, that the housing problem is to some extent being faced up to, and that there are more things to buy in the shops and that standards all round are going up a little. There is not enough for everybody—that is perhaps not necessary for their purposes—but there is definitely less stick and more carrot. In fact, there is enough carrot for quite a lot of people to get a chance of a nibble at it and for a lot of other people to hope that if they work and push on hard enough, they may get a nibble too. These are all general considerations which apply to the whole of the Soviet Union.



I would like now to say a word or two about Russian Turkestan and about Central Asia specifically. At the beginning, I referred to all the republics of the Soviet Union. As you know, it is composed of a number of federated republics, all nominally with the right to secede from the Union should they wish (which, obviously, does not mean very much), and all, in theory, self-governing. I have spoken of Sovietization and not Russification, for this reason. It is not a question of their having Russian customs or a Russian way of life forced upon them. There are, of course, examples of purely Russian institutions being spread about. One thing which has happened since I was last there is that instead of using Latin script into which to transliterate their languages, they now use Cyrillic nearly everywhere, at least in all the Central Asian Turki-speaking republics. But, in the main, what is happening is Sovietization and that is producing an effect upon everybody, in all the republics. Everywhere, people listen to the same radio, read what are in effect the same newspapers, see the same films and use the same jargon. There is a regular Soviet "officialese" jargon which is getting not only into Russian but into all the other languages which are spoken in the Soviet Union, to such an extent that one sees the possibility that in 40 or 50 years' time there will be practically a new "Soviet" language.

The policy of the Soviet Government and the central government in Moscow is to encourage, up to a point, manifestations of nationalism such as national dances, and to some extent national art and literature, but, again, provided always that it fits the party line and provided there is nothing that smells of real nationalism about it.

When I was in Central Asia before, most of the population wore the *khalat*, the long, brightly-coloured, striped type of dressing-gown which is their national dress. I have always found these garments very useful as dressing-gowns, so I decided to buy myself one, as I had done before. I asked where I could buy one and we went all over the bazaar and elsewhere. There are still quite a lot of people who are wearing old ones, but in Bokhara and other places there was apparently no such thing as a new *khalat*. "We have left all that behind," they said. To some extent, therefore, even the national dress is disappearing and its place is being taken by ready-made European suits from Moscow. That is not the case everywhere, however. In many places, one still finds the national dress, but habits such as women wearing veils, although they still exist, are strongly discouraged by the Party propagandists.

A typical example of the extent to which these national trends are encouraged or allowed in art and other directions is the sort of architecture now to be seen in the new buildings which are going up everywhere in places like Tashkent and Central Asia generally. In Tashkent, for example, an opera house has been built in an official sort of "Regent street" nondescript classical style. But, looking at it carefully, one sees that it has little Oriental motifs worked in. Anybody who asks what it was would be told that it reflects the national architecture of Turkestan.

When going to the opera, as I did in Tashkent, one sees what is called an opera dealing with an historical theme out of the history of Turkestan. The singing is in Uzbek, the actors are all natives of the country and they

all wear magnificent dresses. But, although the scenery is all accurately copied, one has the feeling that it is no more genuinely Uzbek in spirit than *Madame Butterfly* is expressive of Japanese culture or *Chu Chin Chow* of Chinese. It was very much a sort of Christmas pantomime performance.

As for the government of all these countries, the members of the government are nearly all natives of the country. In Uzbekistan, the country of which Tashkent is the capital and which includes Bokhara and Samarkand, all the ministers are Uzbeks, or perhaps there are one or two Russians to represent the Russian minority. On enquiring further, however, one discovers two things. One finds, first, that the man who commands the troops is not an Uzbek but a Russian, while a lot of the troops themselves are either Russian or troops from other parts of the Soviet Union, so that if any trouble arose they would be loyal to Moscow. The other feature is that control is exercised from Moscow very largely through the Communist Party. To some extent, therefore, it is only a façade of national independence. It is, however, an interesting pattern and one which, I think, in the long run will successfully steamroller out any remaining traces of what in the earlier days used to be called bourgeois nationalism in these subject republics.

One has to remember, of course, that many of these people had a fairly miserable time before the Revolution. They had low standards of living, and so on. In some cases, their standard of living has materially improved. Of course, it might well have done so if Russia had continued as an empire. But the fact is that the younger people do not remember much about that and the people of, say, my own age remember what I remembered from before the war, that life was much nastier then than it is now. Therefore, on the whole, there is not very much in the way of discontent on this score. Nor does one find any very obvious hatred of Russians as such. It does not occur to anyone to call them colonial oppressors, although that, of course, in a sense is what they are.

That is a point that might be made occasionally in answer to some of the charges that are always being levelled against Her Majesty's Government. People are always talking about British Imperialism. But people forget that a large part of the Soviet Union is inhabited by races who are not Russians at all or anything like them. They are no more Russians than the inhabitants of Birmingham are Chinese. For the most part, they were bludgeoned into submission by force of arms sometime or other over the last 100-150 years, some as recently as 1880 or 1890. That is something that we might well say in our own defence occasionally when we are accused of being colonial oppressors and imperialists.

One place where I went and where tremendous development is taking place is the Soviet Socialist republic of Kazakhstan. I do not know how many of you have given it any thought as a place, but an interesting fact about it is that it is the size of the whole of Western Europe put together; in fact, a big country. It has a population of about eight million, so there is plenty of room for expansion. Its capital, Alma Ata, has increased enormously and has only become a great city in the last thirty years or so from a very small Russian settlement. Now, it is the scene of Khrushchev's

great experiments of bringing under cultivation enormous areas of country in a desperate struggle to make Soviet agriculture pay.

The surviving Kazaks, who used to be vague nomads, wandering about looking after their herds and flocks, now come into this great new city of 300,000 or 400,000 inhabitants. They see all the cinemas, television sets, trains, trams and the rest, and a lot of them are greatly impressed. That is what one must remember.

Twenty years ago, and much more so thirty or forty years ago, the biggest problem of all in Central Asia for the Soviet Government was the problem of the Mohammedan religion. That was where they met the strongest opposition to Communism, and that was their target No. 1. At that time, the Mohammedan religion, like all other religions in the Soviet Union, was being savagely persecuted. This time, I found that that was no longer the case. I talked to various Orthodox churchmen in European Russia and I talked to more of them in Georgia. I went to the Orthodox Cathedral and also to the Armenian Cathedral in Tiflis and talked to people there. Finally, when I was in Tashkent, I had dinner with the Grand Mufti of Central Asia.

What the Grand Mufti said to me corresponded roughly with what the Christian Church leaders said to me too. They both said that during the war, the Soviet Government had found that believers, whether Christian or Moslem, were not necessarily unpatriotic and that the Orthodox Church in particular was prepared to throw its weight behind the war effort against Germany. From then onwards, the Church was treated much better. That process has, I think, gone on, and now all the churches—in return, it must be said, for a certain amount of compromise with the secular authorities—enjoy a certain freedom from persecution.

They are not subsidized by the State. The Mufti told me that he got no money at all from the State. He depends entirely on voluntary contributions from his own flock, as do the others, but he gets plenty of that. There has also been a change since before the war, when the authorities used to deal with mosques or churches by suddenly imposing violent discriminatory taxation. A church would suddenly be taxed out of existence, or the town planning would be arranged so that a church either, in Moscow or elsewhere, invariably came in the way of a big new boulevard. That is no longer the case. The authorities even help to rebuild churches and mosques and to keep the existing ones in a good state of repair. The Mufti told me that there were far more people now going to the mosques and worshipping than ever before. He had also been given new facilities, for instance, to print the Koran for the first time since the Revolution.

Of course, there are two sides to this too. Some experts assure me that the reason why the Soviet authorities give Christians and Mohammedans a greater degree of freedom, a greater degree, not of encouragement, but of tolerance, is that they have come to the conclusion that they have nothing whatever to fear from them and that, if left to themselves they will, in the ordinary course of events, simply die a natural death. On the other hand, other experts point to the increasing numbers of people in the mosques and in the churches and say that the Government have involun-

tarily let loose something like a religious revival. I went to a mosque in Samarkand, and certainly there was an enormous and obviously devout congregation; and one finds the same thing in the Christian churches in European Russia.

As far as Central Asia, and even as far as the Soviet Union as a whole, is concerned, I would draw a general conclusion that, as long as things go on as they are, as long as there is not a world war, the process will continue and the Soviet Union will be welded more and more into a more or less homogeneous whole. Of course, if there were to be another war, it is useless to speculate, but it is worth remembering that in the last war very large numbers of these subject nationalities in the Soviet Union came into open revolt against Moscow and joined the Germans. It is possible that if the Germans had played their cards less clumsily, they might have had more success with all that than they did. That is, no doubt, a consideration which the Soviet Government bear in mind.

I do not myself think that the Soviet Government, let alone any of the peoples of the Soviet Union, want a hot war. The people do not want it because they suffered too much from the last war. That is something one notices clearly when visiting the Soviet Union. Everywhere can be seen people without arms or legs. People to whom one talks have very often lost, not one, but three or four relations killed in the war. They certainly do not want another war.

I do not think the Soviet Government want a hot war either, for two obvious reasons: one reason is that nobody in his senses wants it, that we have the deterrent and so do they, thus cancelling each other out. Another reason, which is, perhaps, more important, is that they feel they are winning the cold war. They are certainly doing very well in the cold war. I saw signs of that the whole time. Wherever one goes in Central Asia or anywhere else, one finds delegations of people from every country in the world, from Asia and Africa particularly, being taken round, given a splendid time, with plenty to eat and drink, shown the glorious new jet airliners, motor cars and the rest, and going away thinking what a powerful new country the Soviet Union is. That is only one manifestation of the cold war, but an important one.

Talking to my friend the Great Mufti of Middle Asia, as he calls himself, I asked whether he ever sees any Moslems from outside. "Yes," he said, "Colonel Nasser was here the week before last. He came to the mosque, and everybody liked that." That is another reason why the Soviet authorities find it convenient not to persecute Islam. The Moslems act to some extent as a link with communities outside, and in that way, too, the cold war is being carried on.

That, you may say, is a gloomy prospect, and, of course, it is, but most prospects are gloomy nowadays. It has one possible ray of hope. There have been very big changes wrought in the Soviet Union, partly involuntarily, I think, and partly voluntarily, during the last five or six years. They have let in, into what was a hermetically sealed vacuum, a little fresh air from outside. They are allowing a very small degree of freedom to talk and to discuss things. They are letting people see a few foreign visitors, and they are letting a few Russians come out.

The question is, once that process has been started, how easily can it be stopped? How easy is it to go back to the total terror that I remember twenty years ago? My view is that it is not all that easy, that it is not easy to turn back the clock. Whether they like it or not, especially with the new, better educated ruling class that is gradually growing up, there is quite a chance that the character of the régime may gradually change. Certainly, the more say the people of the Soviet Union have in the affairs of their own country, the smaller will be the likelihood of war.

That is simply a hypothesis. It is simply a guess. I give it to you for what it is worth, but I think that a change of that sort is our only hope for the future. My hope is that the Soviet régime may in the foreseeable future—and it may take 20 or 30 or 40 years—evolve into something a little easier to live with than what confronts us at present. If in the meantime we can hold our own in the cold war, hold our own militarily, politically and economically, although none of these things will be easy, then I think there is some hope that the worst of our troubles will be over.

#### DISCUSSION

A MEMBER: Where did the lecturer stay in Bokhara?

Sir FITZROY MACLEAN: I stayed in one of the two hotels. One is about 50 or 100 years old, and the other 500 years old. Bokhara is not one of the places where tourists are allowed to go. I had considerable difficulty in getting there. I had to fly back to Moscow and approach Mr. Khrushchev personally. He very kindly let me go there. His last words were, "Do not blame me if it is very uncomfortable." The place is not yet finished. The authorities are driving great boulevards through the middle of the old city and cementing everything in sight. The water supply, which used to be the dirtiest in Central Asia, is now more or less satisfactory, but there is no form of drainage of any kind, which might upset susceptible tourists. The room at the hotel was perfectly clean, as were the beds. The food was rather good and I thoroughly enjoyed myself there. I think that once they have got the place tidied up, they will let everybody go there.

A MEMBER: Is the carpet industry still being carried on?

Sir FITZROY MACLEAN: Yes, in Bokhara. The carpets are now being made with aniline dyes and machines are used to a great extent.

A MEMBER: Is the Karakul business still going on?

Sir FITZROY MACLEAN: Yes, the Persian lamb trade is going on very much indeed.

A MEMBER: Does the black skull cap, as shown in your pictures, have any significance?

Sir FITZROY MACLEAN: I am sure that there are many in this audience who know much more about it than I do. It is, in fact, a turban base. Although quite a lot of people have given up wearing turbans, they continue to wear the little skull cap. These caps are mostly black with the traditional white squiggle pattern, which, I expect, has a meaning, which I have never discovered.

A MEMBER: The caps do not signify that those who wear them are Jews?

Sir FITZROY MACLEAN: No. The Bokharan Jews have been there for hundreds, if not thousands, of years, but they wear little round fur caps, rather like pill-box hats.

*(Two films were shown between various questions and answers.)*

The CHAIRMAN: All I can do now is to thank Sir Fitzroy Maclean on your behalf and ask you to show, in the usual manner, your appreciation of his lecture.

*The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation and the meeting then ended.*

# CLIMBING IN THE CAUCASUS

By SIR JOHN HUNT, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, January 14th, 1959, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—You would have just cause for complaint if I were to waste your time in introducing our speaker. The word “historic” is perhaps rather overworked nowadays by journalists, but certainly we can justly apply the word “historic” to the conquest of Everest, and Sir John Hunt’s name and fame will be known to our remote descendants when most of us have been entirely forgotten. Sir John is now going to talk to us, not about the Himalayas, but about “Climbing in the Caucasus.”

I SHOULD like, first, to say what a great pleasure it is to have the second opportunity to address this Society. I well remember the last occasion and enjoyed it very much. In all sincerity, however, I am doubtful of the relevance of this subject to your learned Society. When I was in Russia, there were many occasions when we met groups of Russians and discussed Everest and mountaineering with them. At the first meeting I addressed, one of the first questions they put to me was to ask which mountain I considered to be highest in Europe. It was on the tip of my tongue to say Mont Blanc, but I remembered the need for diplomacy and I replied “Elbruz.” That caused great satisfaction to the Russians, who undoubtedly think of the Caucasus as being in Europe. However, in talking to this Society, I will treat it as being part of Asia.

This talk is not really one of true exploration, because most of the exploration which was done in the range of the Caucasus had been done in the last quarter of the last century and it was done very largely by British explorers and mountaineers, pre-eminently and in the first instance by the great Douglas Freshfield, who went there in 1868 and who first climbed Elbruz and Kazbek at the extreme ends of the central massif in the Caucasus range. A great many other climbs were done and explorations were completed before the turn of the century.

I shall not take you through the whole history but will say a word about why we went, as it was not virgin soil that we were treading. We went primarily to climb mountains. There is great satisfaction to be had from, if not treading virgin soil, at least climbing again, reaching the tops of peaks or covering country which was first pioneered by one’s own compatriots. That undoubtedly was a source of great satisfaction to us, because we were the first group of British mountaineers to go there for over twenty years and to reach some of these high and difficult mountains, which had first been climbed by British climbers, was very satisfying.

Secondly, and much more important, we went there quite simply to make friends with the Soviet mountaineers. I well remember, about four

years ago, when I first went to Moscow to talk about Everest, being surrounded by a crowd of eager, fit, friendly and very sincere Russian climbers. It struck me then what a wonderful link we could have if we really got together on the mountains and got to know each other better. The outcome of that first meeting was undoubtedly our trip of last summer.

I will now show some slides.

The following is Sir John's commentary while showing slides.

Elbruz is the highest mountain in the Caucasus, with a height of 18,550 ft. It is not really a climbing proposition. For that reason, we did not set out to climb Elbruz. The mountains that interested us more were, first and foremost, the great Ushba, which is the Caucasian Matterhorn but higher; it has a double summit.

The party were nine in number. They included George Band, a member of the Everest expedition, who first set foot on the third highest mountain in the world, the Kangchenjunga, two years after Everest. There was also Christopher Brasher, who brought back a gold medal after winning the 3,000 metres steeplechase at Melbourne in 1956. The person we have to thank for bringing the expedition into being at all was a young man, Eugene Gippenreiter, whom I first met in 1954. Eugene and some of the other Russians whom we met were splendid throughout.

We started our journey from London. Rather than fly to Moscow, we thought it would be more interesting to take cars and motor across. There were in the party three well-known rally drivers. This enabled us to get three nice motor cars free of charge. We followed the usual route to the Polish/Russian frontier at Brest and we hoped to motor on to Moscow and then get an aeroplane, but it did not work out as we had hoped.

We found ourselves in the great city of Düsseldorf, having caused a traffic jam, when one of our motor cars collided with a tram. We camped the first night, after driving 600 or 700 miles across Germany, at the little frontier town of Helmstedt. Next day we set off for Warsaw, another journey of 600-700 miles. There is nothing much to tell about the drive, particularly across East Germany, the great empty road being devoid of any motor transport and having only a few carts.

When we got into Poland, however, it was a great relief after the frigid and unfriendly attitude accorded to us by the East German officials to discover that we were among people who were able to show what they felt under the Gomulka regime. All the people, the children and even the geese by the roadside seemed equally pleased to see us and pleased that we were coming through their country, even though it was only a brief stay.

When we got to Brest, our troubles started. We were travelling at an unfavourable time from the political point of view, just after the murder of Nagy, and we were warned that there might be difficulties in driving through Russia.

At the frontier, we were given the alternative of going back as we had come or of going on by train. Despite many appeals, we failed to change



the situation and decided that we must go on in the Russian train. Somehow, our baggage had to be crammed into two and a half railway compartments.

For those of you who have not travelled by rail in Russia, it is a very comfortable and quite efficient system. It is not democratic to have first and second class, but one can travel "hard" or "soft"! One pays more to travel soft. We travelled hard on the all-sleeper train which moves between Brest and the Russian capital. The train has a very nice kind of sugar-puff engine which goes along at a steady speed not exceeding 30 m.p.h. for the whole distance between Brest and Moscow. On the journey, the compartment is visited by the coach attendant, who uses a vacuum cleaner on it twice a day and serves refreshment. The hazards of the journey, however, were provided by the drunks. One is liable to be visited in one's compartment by somebody who is very much the worse for wear. The country, however, is very dull, mostly forest.

On arrival at Moscow, the first object one sees is the university. We crossed the river, entered the capital and found ourselves in very friendly hands as soon as we got out at the station. We were greeted by representatives of the Mountaineering Section of the U.S.S.R. and taken to a very comfortable hotel. Some of the buildings are of skyscraper type, all very much to pattern. It is curious to see the extraordinary contrast in the city in the style and ages between the very modern buildings and the old, wooden chalet type of buildings of the old Moscow.

In Gorki Street, we noticed the 7-ft. wide lane marked by dots through the centre of the street. It is an interesting device for enabling the Khrushchev level of people to travel without hindrance right up the street and across the crossings without being stopped. If any other transport uses these lanes, it is an offence for which the driver is whistled up and fined. We were there after the second Sputnik had gone into outer space and drawings of it were displayed in the streets.

We did our shopping in the department stores. In Red Square, some of us went in the huge crowds which assemble as the hour of midday approaches to enter the mausoleum containing the remains of "Uncle Joe" Stalin and Lenin. At the head of the queue are usually school-children or foreign delegations. I was very interested, after an absence of four years from Moscow, to see what difference there might be in the appearance and dress style of the citizens of the capital. There were rather interesting differences. We noticed a number of women who now dress themselves up attractively, using nail varnish and lipstick, and carrying a handbag.

Most of the churches in Moscow and elsewhere are not existing now as churches. Some of them, in the capital at least, are on display as museums. Something like 40 churches are actually used for services. St. Basil's is a museum standing at one end of the Red Square. From the roof of the British Embassy, there is a stupendous view of the Kremlin, with its churches and the big Palace of the Tsars, which is now the Parliament of the Supreme Soviet. The churches are very nicely kept up. A good many of the people passing through, most of them Soviet citizens, show reverence as they go round the churches.

We were kindly entertained by the British Ambassador. Although we were an entirely private party, unsponsored by any society, we were very kindly helped by the Embassy. We went on to a reception given by the Mountaineering Section and the Ministry of Physical Culture and Sport. There we met some of the outstanding people in mountaineering circles in Russia. It was a delightful occasion.

We had a very rushed two days sorting out our kit. We sent some down by Russian friends to the Caucasus and we took the rest with us. We travelled by air but did not go in one of the fine Tu. 104 aircraft. Flying down over the green fields and rich black earth of the Ukraine was a very pleasant experience until we got to Rostov-on-Don, where we ran into a storm. Because the internal airlines fly low without air control, it was decided that we must make a stop for the night and continue next day.

A rough mountain track led us up to our camp where we were to spend our first fortnight. It was a rough journey up the valley of the Baksan River, flowing from the foot of Elbruz at the western end of the Caucasus. We had a short halt on the way at the little mining town of Tirnaus. On our way, we met a crowd of Russian climbers on their way down from the mountains and we had a good time making friends.

It was a wet afternoon when we got out of the bus and we found ourselves received in a most genuine and delightful way by the camp at which we were to stay for the first half of our stay. Mostly, the accommodation was hutted or tented. This camp is run by the Union of Co-operative Workers; it exists to provide training courses in basic mountaineering for young men and women during their summer holidays. It is rather like an Outward Bound school, with a definite training programme which leads up to recognized standards of achievement. That, I believe, is the only way in which one can enjoy this particular sport in Russia. Anyone who wants to be interested in climbing or mountain walking must first attend a course.

At seven o'clock every morning at the camp there is a call on the loudspeaker system wishing everybody good morning. That is followed by music to wake everybody up. Ten minutes after the call, the whole of the camp is turned out in P.T. clothes to do physical jerks—that is to say, all except us "decadent" Westerners, who got up sleepily in pyjamas and stayed taking pictures of what was going on. It is not only physical culture that is taught in these places. There was a sketching class, at which I joined two charming lasses who were doing some sketching.

During the first day before we went out to climb, we were interested to see something of the system of training. A large group of students came back during that morning from a three-day outing which was the last but one of their training items during the programme they were carrying out. They march back all in step and draw up on the basket-ball pitch. Everybody turns out to welcome them. The Chief of the camp then calls on the leader of the party to give an account of what they have achieved, followed by the camp Chiefs call for three cheers for the conqueror of this or that mountain. The party is then garlanded and em-

braced by the other inmates of the camp. One member of a group of typical Russian mountaineers was the son of the former Russian Ambassador, Litvinov.

Our first need was to get fit and accustomed to the rather greater altitude of the Caucasus, so we chose a comparatively easy mountain of about 13,000 ft. There are no huts or amenities and we had to carry our kit and have one bivouac on the way. On the journey, we passed a group of 40 or 50 Czech climbers under Russian supervision. With us were three Russians, our own Eugene Gippenreiter and two Georgians.

Next morning the weather was perfect. It was the only fine day in the first ten or eleven days of our stay and we were lucky that it came during this training trip, because we were able for the first time to get an idea of the country and of the mountains.

When we got on to steeper ground, climbing became more difficult. The climb does not call for much comment except that the rock was abominably loose and it was probably a mistake to attempt the mountain in question with such a large party. At the end of the day there were three casualties, with three people having been hit by rocks on their arms or chest. Brasher had a nasty cut on his head.

At the top, we were all somewhat out of breath and unfit, but we had a wonderful opportunity to look around. Forty or fifty miles to the east we could see the main peaks in the Caucasus. Much closer was a great rock and its face some 3,000 ft. high, up which the Soviet climbers have made a number of routes. This indicates the standard of climbing now achieved by the Russians. Climbing was in its infancy in the pre-war years and it has made great strides since.

Ushba was our next objective. We intended to camp up on the shoulder of Ushba at 14,000 ft.; some of us would then traverse the peak from north to south while others would go round the mountain and traverse it in the opposite direction.

On the way down, I rejoiced in the flowers. At that time of year, the Caucasus flowers are beautiful. The azaleas were still in bloom. Down in the meadows was a wonderful array of sub-Alpine plants.

Back in the camp, we started to get ready for the expedition to climb Ushba. It was a big undertaking because it meant being away from civilization for about eight days, carrying everything we needed for that period. So, heavily laden, each with about 70 lb. on our backs, we set off.

Before actually climbing the mountain, we wanted to make one or two lesser climbs to get ourselves completely in trim. The first peak was Peak Sehherovski, about 14,500 ft. On the second day, we had to make our way up a very steep ice-fall. Unfortunately, at that stage, the weather started to get bad. We went up into the mist and falling snow, groping our way up the ice-fall. When we were only about 1,500 ft. from the top of the mountain, there could be no question of going any higher because we were completely surrounded by thick cloud and falling snow, but we had reached the plateau, so we set up our camp on Ushba according to plan. There we were besieged on the mountain for another three days and nights while snow fell incessantly. Apart from ourselves, some eight Russians came up to join us to do some climbs from the plateau and

we got to know each other well. In fact, we reckon that the "summit" discussions we held on Ushba were a great deal better than any others which have taken place to date!

During this enforced stop high up on the mountain, we dug down beneath the surface of the snow and produced a big cavern beneath the glacier in which about twelve of us could get. By the end of the third evening, we had to consider what to do in the continuing bad weather. We met there on the evening of the third day with the Russians for a conference, the outcome of which was that we should all go down again. On the fourth morning, we groped our way down through dense mist and snow, with avalanches thundering all around us. It was a relief to descend the icefall without mishap.

We moved back to our camp before preparing to set off for our main objective, the mountain group surrounding the Bazingi glacier. In a little farewell ceremony, I handed over a pair of British mountaineering boots. The Russians had not seen rubber-soled boots before and were very intrigued to have them. The Russian system is that they do not own their equipment. They draw it from the quarter-master's store and have to hand it back afterwards.

We had arranged to meet another group of Russians on the way up to the glacier, who had carried part of our provisions. We got to the higher regions and reached the village of Bezingi, the chief settlement of the tribe of the Balkharis. It has remained a ruin for the last fourteen years since the time when the Balkhari and other tribes were evicted from the Caucasus by Stalin, who had them transported to Kazakstan. It was particularly interesting to see the return of these people, who had been given permission to return by Khrushchev, he had referred to their brutal eviction in his famous anti-Stalin speech of two years ago. These people are Muslims, they speak a quite different language from the Russians and are a very independent-minded people.

We awoke to a lovely morning at the end of our journey. Donkeys were fetched to carry our loads up to the glacier. We went up the valley. It was one of the most pleasant mountain walks I can remember, through meadows which were a riot of flowers. For fourteen years there has been no grazing in the valley and very few of the flocks have come back. We were making for the great barrier of mountains at the head of the Bezingi Glacier. We reached the glacier snout and had to cross the torrent by wire ropes suspended from either side and duly reached the place where the Russians were already camped.

One of the people we were particularly glad to see again was Alex Baldin, we met in this country last year when he was an exchange student in Birmingham. He is a physicist and we took him climbing in North Wales. We were impressed by his standard of climbing on some of our British rocks. The Russians explained to us details of the local mountains and the routes to them and generally put us in the picture. We had no maps, because none are available of this part of the world in Russia.

Next morning we made our own plans, intending to divide into three parties, in order to make as many climbs as possible in the remaining fortnight. We wanted to make three separate ascent attempts on the 7,000-ft.

Bezingi Wall. But before setting off we had to show our Russian friends our equipment. We held a kit inspection and they all crowded round to look at the special packed food and the climbing clothes and equipment we had brought with us. Their clothing is more simple and quite rudimentary, but effective. We admired in particular their ice-axe hammer.

The great Bezingi Wall is about four miles long, and exceptionally steep. The group of which I was a member chose a particularly spectacular line up the centre of this Wall, leading by a narrow rib of rock and ice to the summit of Jangi Tau (17,000 ft.). It had been climbed only once previously, by a German group in 1935, and is known as the Schwarzgruber Rib. The other two groups were attempting routes on the left and the right of ours, leading to the summit of Shkara. We surprised ourselves by climbing 6,000 ft. up this difficult route. On the third day we set out for the summit, only 1,000 ft. above. It should have been straightforward, but we discovered as a result of all the heavy snow which had fallen in the Ushba area that there was a lot of unstable snow ready to peel off in avalanches. Within 600 ft. of the top, we deemed the conditions too dangerous to continue, and after I had had a lucky escape when falling into a big crevasse, we reluctantly decided to descend. On the fourth day, we again ran into bad weather. Growing exhaustion on this critical terrain added to our difficulties. With tremendous precipices below us, it was difficult to find the way and the snow was in a rotting state on the ice, so we had to take very great care as we came down. We got down on to the glacier at about half-past ten at night on the evening of the fourth day.

The Russians like to do things more thoroughly and more slowly. On return we were delighted to meet the other members of our party, who had succeeded in climbing both Shkara and Bestola by the North Face.

We came down and had a pleasant two days in the valley. On our way down we had looked over to the great peak of Dych Tau, which is the third highest mountain, first ascended by Mummery in 1888, and decided to make this our next objective. Some of us wanted to repeat the Mummery route: moreover, the Russians had told us of an unclimbed buttress on the south face of this peak. During the severe climbing of the past week we had a number of minor casualties, and only two groups, one of four climbers which included myself, the other of two climbers, set off at the end of the rest period. Band and Harris, our best climbers, were to attempt the unclimbed South Buttress. When my group had reached a point some 1,500 ft. below the top of Dych Tau, on the second day of our climb, Brasher unfortunately fell sick. We had to leave him in a little hollow scraped out in the snow while we went on to the summit. But it proved impossible to get there and to get back to him again in the day, so we had to turn round and get off the mountain as quickly as possible.

But Band and Harris continued. During the next five days they climbed their extremely difficult route, descending by the north ridge.

As we flew back to Moscow, I thought over the trip and wondered whether it had been worth while. It was not very original exploration, apart from the 3,000 ft. of virgin rock on Dych Tau. Apart from the

Russian sketch maps, there was not much of interest to this Society. We did, however, succeed in making a good many real friends from among the Russian climbers.

While we were away, the Americans entered the Lebanon and British troops entered Jordan. In Moscow, posters were put up, pillorying the American Sixth and Seventh Fleet, and about the British and American invading forces, in front of Western Embassies. Demonstrations were organized among workers coming off shift. Down in the Caucasus, however, we remained friends. It was not at that time our quarrel. We were just enjoying each other's company and the experience of being in the mountains together. Far from having the situation altered when we heard the news on the radio, our Russian friends assured us that they would see us safely through the mountains into Turkey or, if we could not do that, that we would enjoy some very good climbing for the next 25 years in Siberia!

That brings me to the end of a rapid talk about this very pleasant six weeks we spent in the Caucasus.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is up. I can only, speaking for myself at least, say how very much indebted I feel to Sir John Hunt for his fascinating lecture and some of the loveliest and most impressive pictures I have ever seen. I know you will show your appreciation in the usual way.

# THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

The following is the second of a series of articles describing recent works published in the U.S.S.R. on the subject of the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics (Azerbaijdzhan, Uzbekistan, Tazdzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizia, and Kazakhstan) and their borderlands (Persia, Afghanistan, Sinkiang, and Tibet). The series is being contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford.

The present article deals with books received in November and December, 1958. As these include none on Azerbaijdzhan or the borderland countries, the present article deals only with the Muslim Republics of Soviet Central Asia.

## I. THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS TODAY

### *New tourist guide-books*

**T**OURIST guide-books are a recent phenomenon in the Soviet Union. Until very recently there was no post-war guide or even street-map to Moscow. Now, however, tourism is encouraged and guide-books to various regions of the Union are being published. On the Muslim republics there are now two such works: *Uzbekistan—A Handbook* (Uzbekistan. Spravochnik. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1958. 279 pp.) and a *A Trip with you through Kirgizia* by Viktor Vitkovich (S vami po Kirgizii. "Molodaya Gvardiya," Moscow, 1958. 335 pp.). The handbook to Uzbekistan gives a brief history of the Republic from the earliest times and then proceeds to a description of Tashkent and each oblast of the Republic. Care is taken to point out new buildings, canals and factories, but full descriptions are also given of historical monuments such as the Registan Square in Samarkand and other tourist attractions such as spas and nature reserves. There are interesting photographs on nearly every page, but the standard of reproduction is unfortunately extremely low. When the book appeared it was subjected to scathing criticism in the official Russian-language newspaper of Uzbekistan *Pravda Vostoĳa* on account of its numerous typographical and stylistic errors, repetitions, and factual inaccuracies. In spite of some imperfections, however, the book can be recommended as useful and rewarding to anyone visiting the Republic.

Vitkovich's guide to Kirgizia is more in the nature of a travelogue. The author takes his readers through the Chu Valley, round the Lake Issyk-Kul, to the south of Kirgizia, and through the central Tien-Shan mountains. Colourful descriptions of nature and of local inhabitants are interwoven with factual information. The book contains several good full-page marginless photographs. Both these guide-books have maps. Neither gave any information on hotel accommodation or travel facilities.

### *An anthropological study of the Central Asian peoples*

In the last article in this series some account was given of L. V. Oshanin's *The Anthropological Composition of the Population of Soviet Central Asia and the Ethnogenesis of its Peoples*. The second part of this work has now appeared. (*Antropologicheskiiy sostav naseleniya Sredney Azii i etnogenez yeye narodov*. Part 2. Yerevan University: Trudy XCVII, Yerevan, 1958. 148 pp.). Chapter I considers the ethnogenesis of the Kirgiz and Kazakhs, Chapter II that of the Kara-Kalpakhs, and Chapter III that of the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks of Uzbekistan. The author bases his findings on a detailed study of the physical types to be found in Soviet Central Asia, together with a consideration of archæological, historical, and linguistic materials. The book includes sixty pages of tables showing physical details of the peoples studied such as colour of eyes, growth of beard, head measurements. There is a bibliography of 108 titles and twenty-five pages of photographs of racial types. Oshanin is an established authority on the anthropology of Soviet Central Asia and has been working in the field for over thirty years. His book is very fully documented.

### *The eradication of traditional customs among the Uzbeks*

Another pamphlet has appeared on the subject of the persistence of traditional customs among the Central Asian peoples. (The last article in this series reviews one on "harmful survivals" among the Kazakhs). T. T. Inoyatov's *The Courts of Soviet Uzbekistan in the Struggle against Feudal-Bay Survivals* (*Sudy sovetskogo Uzbekistana v bor'be s feodal'no-bayskimi perzhitkami*. Central Asian State University: Trudy 124, SAGU, Tashkent, 1958. 42 pp.) is a brief, poorly produced propaganda pamphlet. It considers the laws under which customs such as polygamy, bride-purchase, and forced marriages are now punishable in Uzbekistan and gives some examples of cases. There is no indication to what extent these customs are still prevalent, but the very publication of the work may suggest that they are still not entirely outmoded.

### *The Central Asian State University*

Evidence of the remarkable activity of the Central Asian State University at Tashkent is the *Index to Publications of the Central Asian State University (1922-1956)* (*Sistematicheskiiy ukazatel' k izdaniyam sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. V. I. Leninas 1922-1956 gg.* 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. SAGU, Tashkent, 1958. 192 pp.). The index includes all articles and books published by the University between 1922 and 1956 and comprises 2,036 titles. Of these 239 are concerned with the history of the University, 344 with Arts subjects (philosophy, history, archæology, ethnography, law, economy, linguistics, literature, art, and pedagogy), 1,361 with natural sciences (mathematics, astronomy, physics, meteorology, chemistry, mineralogy, geology, hydrology, geography, soil cultivation, biology, botany, zoology), seven with technology, 38 with medicine, 37 with bibliography. Only six of the 344 Arts titles are written in Uzbek, the remainder being in Russian; it may be assumed that all the



scientific works are also in Russian. There is an overwhelming preponderance of Russian or Slav names among the authors, and the majority of those with Islamic names write in Russian. The list of authors includes many famous orientalists: Barthold, Bertels, Masson, and A. A. Semenov. A brief history of the University, together with accounts of its principal serial publications is given in the introduction. There is no doubt that the quality of work produced by the University is extremely variable; its output includes propaganda such as the pamphlet described above by Inoyatov and scholarly works such as those by Pugachenkova whose latest book is reviewed below.

### *The teaching of Russian to Tadzhiks*

While much effort is made to develop local languages and literatures in Soviet Central Asia, it is still essential for anyone of ambition to have a thorough knowledge of Russian which is the language of higher education and higher administration. An inter-republican conference was held recently to consider methods to improve the teaching of Russian in Tadzhik schools and its proceedings have now been published: *Papers of the Inter-Republican Conference on Improving the Teaching of Russian in Tadzhik Schools* (Materialy mezhpublikanskoy nauchnoy konferentsii po voprosam uluchsheniya prepodavaniya russkogo yazyka v tadzhikskikh shkolakh. Tadzhik Ministry of Education, Stalinabad, 1958. 131 pp.). The opening paper was read by T. P. Pulatov, Tadzhik Minister of Education, who spoke of the importance of knowing Russian and gave examples of the low standard of results in many Tadzhik schools. He ascribed this to the difficulty of Russian pronunciation for Tadzhik schoolchildren, to shortages of textbooks and of qualified teachers, and to the overloading of the syllabus with too much theoretical instruction. He pointed out that many pupils had little knowledge of Russian and yet were not thoroughly grounded in their own language, and called for a change in the syllabus that would give more time to language instruction. Following speakers gave practical examples of how to conduct classes in Russian for Tadzhik pupils of various age-groups.

### *Kazakh and Kirgiz literature*

An important new book on Kazakh Soviet literature is the symposium *An Outline History of Kazakh Soviet Literature* edited by M. O. Auevov and others (Ocherki istorii Kazakhskoy sovetskoy literatury. Academy of Sciences of Kazakh SSR, Alma-Ata, 1958. 485 pp.). The work contains sections on Kazakh literature in the early days of Soviet rule, during the pre-war Five-Year Plans, during the war, and since the war. The latter section is divided into prose, poetry, drama, and criticism. Then follows full accounts of the life and works of thirteen leading Kazakh writers including the popular bard Dzhambul, novelists such as Sabit Mukanov and Gabit Musrepov, and the great novelist and authority on Kazakh literature, Auevov. Since the war many Kazakh writers have had their works severely criticized (See for example *Central Asian Review*, Vol. III, No. 2

for an account of the Central Asian writers' congresses held in 1954); Auezov himself was attacked during the Zhdanov period (but emerged unscathed without having recanted) for his great novel *Abay* on the life of the nineteenth-century Kazakh enlightener Abay Kunanbayev (for the controversies that raged over this much-disputed figure, see *Central Asian Review*, Vol. II, No. 4). In the present volume, however, there seems to be no echo of these past criticisms. There is a full and eulogistic description of *Abay* in the section on Auezov and the novel is rightly judged as one of the finest examples of modern Kazakh literature. The works of other writers receive some criticism from a literary viewpoint, but none for their ideological content. Socialist realism is still, of course, unchallenged, but the narrow interpretation of the genre that stifled literary activity in the post-war years seems to have been dropped.

A useful guide to the writers of Kirgizia is *Writers of Soviet Kirgizia* (Pisatteli sovetskogo Kirgizstana. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1958. 273 pp.). This book, like that on Kazakh writers, was issued for the festivals of national art held in Moscow last year. It is in fact a "Who's Who" to the Kirgiz literary world, containing photographs, biographies and lists of works of leading writers. It is divided into sections on "Popular singers and story-tellers," "Kirgiz Soviet writers," critics, translators into Kirgiz, and finally "Moscow translators and critics." This last section consists mostly of Russians who have either co-operated with Kirgiz writers or who are professional translators into Russian.

One of the Kirgiz writers decried is K. Dzhanatoshev, a prolific novelist and playwright. A Russian translation of the first volume of his long novel *Kanybek* has just appeared (Kanybek. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1958. 405 pp.). The four volumes of this novel appeared in Kirgiz in 1939, 1941, 1949, and 1958. At the Kirgiz Writers' Congress held in September 1954 the novel was condemned as a distortion of history, but nonetheless Dzhanatoshev was elected Vice-President of the Kirgiz Writers' Union. *Kanybek* is a colourful, picaresque novel telling the adventures and misfortunes that befall Kanybek, a poor Kirgiz shepherd. His strength, daring, and musical talent win him wide renown and his exploits give him the reputation of a Robin Hood. His adventures include being sold into slavery, running away with the wife of a rich Kashgari merchant (whom he marries bigamously), stealing the finest horse of his task-master, imprisonment in Kashgar goal, and finally capture by the police in Russian territory, when his revolver fails him. The volume ends with Kanybek condemned to Siberia. Interwoven in the text are snatches of the songs that made Kanybek famous among his people and the whole book is full of local colour.

Another new Kirgiz novel is *Dawn over the Steppes* by S. B. Dzhan-tuarov (Zarya nad step'yu. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1958. 275 pp.). As there is no mention of a translator it may be assumed that the novel was written directly in Russian. The novel describes life in a Kazakh village during the Civil War period and the exploits of the partisans. The style is unoriginal but direct and the tale is told as a straight adventure story. When the counter-revolutionaries are defeated at the end of the story one of the villains, Alabugin, turns out to be none other than

the English spy Sir Oliver Camby who "for ten years had been active in the Kazakh steppes."

Finally there is the Russian translation of a Kirgiz epic *The Tale of the Hunter Kodzhodzhash* as told by the bard Alymkul Usenbayev. (Skazaniye ob okhotnike Kodzhodzhashe. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1958. 182 pp.). The poem has been well rendered into Russian tetrameters.

## II. HISTORY

### *The historical monuments of Turkmenistan*

The Soviet authorities pay much attention to archæology. In Turkmenistan, for instance, two large-scale organizations are at work studying the rich sites of the Republic. Since 1938 Professor Tolstov's expedition has been at work in Khorezm, and since 1946 the South Turkmenistan Complex Archæological Expedition (YuTAKE), under Professor Masson, has been studying the southern part of the Republic, an area which includes such sites as Merv and the great Parthian city of Nisa. The leader of the architectural team of YuTAKE, G. A. Pugachenkova, has now published a comprehensive study of the architectural remains of southern Turkmenistan. *Steps in the Development of Architecture of southern Turkmenistan* (Puti razvitiya arkhitektury yuzhnogo Turkmenistana pory rabovladieniya i feodalizma. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 492 pp.) is a splendidly produced work containing many line drawings, photographs, plans, sketches of reconstructions, and some full-page colour plates. It suffers from lack of an index or map. It is a work of careful scholarship; the author is widely read and has used the findings of Western and other Soviet scholars to draw comparisons and parallels between the architecture of her own area and that of adjacent lands. Two ideas underline the work: firstly, the historical background is given in Marxist terms. Periods are defined not by the dominant dynasty or victorious invaders, but by the social order that is assumed to have existed. For instance, the new style of architecture that developed after the Arab conquest in the seventh century is ascribed as much to the change from a "slave-owning" society to a "feudal" one as to the influence of the invaders. Secondly, the author is at pains to stress the continuity of architectural style in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen Republic is, of course, a most recent creation, and before the Russian conquest in 1882 the area was at different periods of history parcelled up among different states or ruled by various invading peoples; but the author pays particular attention to building materials and decorative details and throughout tends to stress the native contribution as a counter-balance to the more obvious influences of successive invading peoples.

The introduction gives an account of previous archæological expeditions to southern Turkmenistan, including pre-revolutionary studies. The first chapter describes prehistoric sites and archæological remains up to the time of Alexander the Great's conquest. Excavations have shown that at the time of the great civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Indus Valley the tribes of southern Turkmenistan were already sufficiently de-

veloped to have an extensive irrigation system. Between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. the area came under the sway of the Achæmenians; the cities of Erk-kala (Merv) and Sultan-desht (near Koshout) can be ascribed to this period and remained later to be obstacles in the path of Alexander's armies.

Parthian architecture (third century B.C. to third century A.D.) is dealt with in the second chapter. The author makes a spirited attack on those scholars who consider Parthian art to be merely barbarized Hellenism. Western scholars, she argues, have only studied the Parthian monuments of Mesopotamia which was on the fringe of the classical world and thus under stronger classical influence. Parthian art can only be truly judged by a consideration of the monuments of southern Turkmenistan, an area which was the heart of the Parthian empire. Since 1948 YuTAKE has paid special attention to Parthian remains and in particular to the great city of Nisa. The author gives a full and detailed account of the remarkable finds made on this site. There are numerous illustrations including full-page sketches of conjectured reconstructions of the Temple at Old Nisa, the Square Chamber, and the Round Temple.

The following chapter covers the period of "early feudalism," *i.e.* the sixth to tenth centuries, from just before the Arab conquest to the fall of the Samanids. One of the most interesting sites of the fifth or sixth century is a church, evidently Christian, at Kharoba-koshuk (near Merv). The ruins, studied by YuTAKE in 1951, are the only remains yet to be found of the many Christian churches that are known to have flourished in the area between the fourth and seventh centuries. Few buildings of the early Arab period are still standing, an exception being the Mazar Shir-Kabir mosque (near Mestorian) dating from the ninth or tenth century, and several mausoleums. Already by the tenth century, the author argues, a definite style can be noticed in the architecture of Khorasan—the province of which southern Turkmenistan was then a part.

The fourth and longest chapter is on the architecture of "developed feudalism," or the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. This was the heyday of the great mediæval cities of Merv, Dakhistan, and Abiverd. The chapter is divided into three parts: the pre-Mongol, Mongol, and Timurid periods. Notable ruins of the pre-Mongol period are the palaces and public buildings of Merv, the great trade-route caravanserais such as Akcha-kala (between Merv and Chardzhou) and Daya-Khatyn (between Chardzhou and Khorezm), and mosques such as that of Talkhatababa near Merv. The most numerous relics of the period are mausoleums such as those of Alamberdar (near Kerki), Abu-Said (at Mekhna), and Muhammad ibn-Zeid (at Merv); that of Khuday-Nazar-ovliya (near Bayram-Ali) with its ornate brickwork had never previously been studied. The most renowned mausoleum of the period is, however, that of Sultan Sanjar at Merv, a masterpiece of composition and decorative detail. Sultan Sanjar is not, in the author's view, an isolated masterpiece but the logical culmination of south Turkmenistan or Khorasani architecture of the pre-Mongol period.

The second part of the chapter deals with architecture of the Mongol period. Few monuments date from this period of invasion and destruc-

tion. An exception, however, is a remarkable Buddhist temple at Merv. The ruins were studied by YuTAKE in 1950-51 and the temple can now be dated to 1250 (which can be corroborated by Juvaini). It was destroyed in 1295 when the Mongol ruler, Gazan Khan, became converted to Islam. Among many fragments of sculpture and decorations is a fine majolica panel which is reproduced in colour.

The third part of the chapter describes "one of the most brilliant pages in the history of Central Asian architecture," the Timurid period in the fifteenth century. Under the Timurids many new buildings appeared at Merv and other cities. One of the finest buildings of this period was the great mosque of Anau, a superb composition with its twin minarets, great entrance arch, and richly decorated façade. An original feature is the use of dragon motifs set in the decorated panel over the entrance. The mosque was thoroughly studied by YuTAKE in 1947, a year before it was almost totally destroyed in the Ashkhabad earthquake.

#### *Trade between nomads and settled peoples*

An example of how a Marxist approach by its emphasis on economics can shed new light on the more obscure periods of history is to be seen in V. S. Batrakov's *Economic Links between Nomadic Peoples and Russia, Central Asia and China* (From the fifteenth to middle eighteenth centuries) (Khozyaystvennyye svyazy kochevykh narodov s Rossiyei, Sredney Aziyey i Kitayem. Central Asian State University: Trudy CXXVI. SAGU, Tashkent, 1958. 104 pp.). The author sets out to prove that "contrary to the widely held view inherited from bourgeois scholarship" the relations between nomads and their settled neighbours were not confined to raids and wars but were founded on peaceful economic intercourse. Batrakov considers firstly, economic relations between the Nogays and Kazakhs on the one hand, and Russia and the Central Asian oases on the other in the sixteenth century; secondly, relations between Eastern Mongolia (Khalkha) and China from the fifteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century; and thirdly, relations between Western Mongolia (Dzhungaria), on the one hand, and China, Russia, and the Central Asian oases, on the other, in the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century. Batrakov argues that nomadic peoples, such as the Nogays, Kazakhs, and Mongols, being primarily cattle-breeders, were to a greater or less extent dependent on their settled neighbours for agricultural produce and manufactured goods; thus, if for any reason these trade relations were broken, it was the nomads who took the initiative to re-establish them, or failing this, compensated for their loss by plunder and raids.

#### *The economy of the emirate of Bukhara*

A thorough study of the economy of eastern Bukhara after it had come under Russian suzerainty is provided by B. I. Iskandarov's *Some Changes in the Economy of Eastern Bukhara in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (O nekotorykh izmeneniyakh v ekonomike vostochnoy Bukhary na rubezhe XIX-XX vv. Tadzhik Academy of Sciences: Trudy LXXXIII. Stalinabad, 1958. 140 pp.). The first chapter gives a

general picture of the economy of the emirate with particular emphasis on the position of the peasant. Subsequent chapters consider the gold-mining industry, which was developed largely through Russian private enterprise, trade, and "the growth of revolutionary conditions." The book contains a mass of detailed information drawn mostly from Tsarist sources, both Government papers and published books, and is a valuable and thorough account of a little-known subject. Certain passages such as those describing the fortunes and misfortunes of the first Russian gold-prospectors are vividly written.

*A new look at the history of Central Asia in the Soviet period*

In May, 1957 a conference of historians was held in Alma-Ata to consider the history of the peoples of Soviet Central Asia since the October Revolution of 1917. The conference considered methods of improving historical writing and research in the light of criticisms made at the XX Party Congress when Soviet historians were accused of "dogmatism" and "bookishness" and of having failed to produce ideologically acceptable general histories of the Soviet period. The conference received little publicity at the time although a few reports appeared in learned journals later in 1957. Now the full stenographic report of the papers and discussions have been published: *Papers of the joint learned Session on the History of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the period of Socialism* (Materialy ob'yedinennoy nauchnoy sessii, posvyashchennoy istorii Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana epokhi sotsializma. Edited by S. B. Baishev and others. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1958. 506 pp.). Within the rigid ideological framework discussions seem to have been remarkably free; but the arguments were over details of fact or questions of emphasis, and general premises such as that the revolution was inevitable and predetermined and that the strategy of the Communist Party infallible were not questioned (it is, however, now allowed that the tactics or the members of the Party may have been mistaken). As the latest and most authoritative statement of the Soviet interpretation of Soviet policy in Central Asia the book is extremely important.

The conference was divided into two parts: the history of the Revolution and the establishment of Soviet authority, and the history of the "building of Socialism" in the years that followed. After a brief panegyric to the Party by Baishev (Vice-President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences) who also welcomed the delegates, the first paper was read by G. N. Golikov (of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences) on the state of historical writing on the Revolution. He deplored the fact that there was as yet no acceptable history of the Revolution and passed judgment on past writers, including M. N. Pokrovskiy (who until very recently has been unmentionable since his disgrace under Stalin; Golikov rather contradictorily characterized him as "a great Soviet historian" and his work as "anti-Marxist"). He then gave certain points that writers on the Soviet period should bear in mind: the predetermined nature of the Revolution, the alliance between the workers and peasantry, and the leadership of the Communist Party. He gave no special consideration to the problems of Central Asian historians beyond advising them to take account

of the "specific characteristics . . . of the national regions." Golikov's paper aroused no comments other than approval and many subsequent speakers followed his example of giving brief consideration to questions of historiography.

Following speakers read papers on the Revolution in Russian Turkestan, in Kazakhstan, in the emirate of Bukhara, in Turkmenistan, Kirgizia, and Kara-Kalpakia. The first was K. Ye. Zhitov (Uzbek Academy of Sciences) on "The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Turkestan"; his paper was in fact a history of the events of 1917 and 1918 in Tashkent and of the Bolshevik Government that seized power there. This period is one of the least reputable in Soviet history: the Tashkent Bolsheviks in alliance with the left-wing Social Revolutionaries carried on a policy of extreme national oppression. In February, 1918 they sacked and looted the city of Kokand, then seat of the short-lived Muslim autonomous government of Turkestan. When in 1919, at the end of the Civil War, contact was re-established with Central Russia, Lenin had to send a special Turkestan Commission to re-establish order, win the support of the native population, and indeed reverse the policies of the previous administration. Zhitov, however, far from showing the tyranny and oppression of the Tashkent Bolsheviks describes them as the executors of a wise and deliberate policy and as the bearers of a revolution that was to bring a new and better life to the peoples of Central Asia. Their errors are barely mentioned and then are glossed over or ascribed to anti-Party infiltrators into the Bolshevik ranks. All Muslim opposition is said to have been inspired by the reactionary clergy and careful attempts are made to show the support of the poorer natives for the Bolsheviks. The paper consists largely of accounts of Soviet and Party meetings.

Various speakers commented on this paper, mostly favourably, and some added to the information Zhitov gave. Of particular interest are the comments on the Kokand autonomous government. G. K. Rashidov (from the Uzbek Academy's Museum of History) elaborated on the theme that the Muslim depressed classes stood throughout firmly for the Tashkent Bolsheviks and that they "unmasked" the Kokand government as "counter-revolutionary." B. Yakubov (Andizhan Pedagogic Institute) gave a brief history of the Fergana Valley in 1917-18 in which he attempted to prove that the Bolsheviks had widespread support in the area and that the capture of Kokand was but the final step in winning Fergana to the Soviets. M. U. Aminov (Uzbek State University, Samarkand) dealt more fully with the political programme of the Kokand autonomists and suggested that the question should be dealt with more fully.

By far the most interesting comment on Zhitov's paper came, however, from A. V. Pyaskovskiy (U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences). He began: "It is no secret that the history of the Soviet State and the history of our Party are usually described as if there have been no serious obstacles in our path, no serious failings or mistakes, and as if the whole history of Soviet society was a continuous triumphal advance 'from victory to victory'." He then gave examples of the "serious mistakes" made by the Tashkent Bolsheviks and ascribed them to the "infiltration of colonial, chauvinistic, and nationalistic elements" and to "the old colonial tradi-

tion, according to which the native population was looked on as people of 'second rank,' incapable of Party or administrative work." To prove this he quoted from the resolutions of the V Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party, held in 1920 after the arrival of the Turkestan Commission. Turning to Zhitov's paper he said: "I personally was active at that time in the struggle against colonial, chauvinistic elements in Turkestan. And when I remember what in fact happened and compare it with K. E. Zhitov's paper, it is clear that his paper shows only the 'façade' of the October victory in Turkestan; the sharp corners are rounded off, the negative aspects are toned down, historical reality is embellished . . . In the 46 pages of the text of K. E. Zhitov's paper, only 20 lines are allotted to the serious mistakes made in the national question and then only in general form. Nothing is said of the struggle with chauvinistic . . . elements, nor of the anti-Party activity of the 'Old Communists' group which fevored the Turkestan Party during the whole of the second half of 1918. Tobolin (leader of this group) and Kolesov (head of the Tashkent Government) are shown as restrained Bolsheviks . . . and there is no word of their most serious errors. Nothing is said even about the Basmachi movement, although, as is well known, it became widespread immediately after the liquidation of 'Kokand autonomy' early in 1918." Pyaskovskiy concluded: "We shall only be able to reveal the true greatness of the October victory if we show how this victory was in fact won . . . Some people think: will not the truthful account . . . harm the friendship between the peoples of our country? I think not. On the contrary, friendship won in the fire of battle is the best guarantee that no force in the world can now shatter it."

Zhitov in reply brushed aside Pyaskovskiy's criticisms: "On many problems we think alike although we have disagreed more than once. In the past I noted embellishment of events in his work on the 1905 Revolution in Turkestan, and now he says the same to me about my paper. But his criticism is not fully objective. He gives a one-sided picture of the state of the Party organization in Turkestan and shows everything in a dark and gloomy tone."

The second part of the conference was devoted to "the victory of socialism in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan" and included papers on the nature of socialism, on the development of the Tadzhik state, on the national demarcation of the present republics in 1924, on the emancipation of women in Turkmenistan, on the industrialization of Kazakhstan, on collectivization in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, on the development of Kirgizia, and the cultural revolution in Turkmenistan. The discussion that followed was not as lively as that following the first part and in the main speakers were more concerned with the correct Marxist-Leninist interpretation of events than with events themselves. Thus considerable time was devoted to a discussion about whether the land and water reforms of 1921-22 and the distribution of arable and meadow land in 1925-28 were "socialist" or only "revolutionary-democratic." Many speakers were perplexed to resolve the dicta that socialism was predetermined and yet that the way to socialism differed from country to country. Golikov and Baishev, for instance, had urged historians to



see the specific characteristics of different areas in this respect. Sh. Ya. Shafiro, however, commented: "At this conference considerable time . . . has been devoted to the question of the characteristics of the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the national republics . . . Frequently, these characteristics were shown only as backwardness and difficulties . . . But this is only one side of the picture . . . To take an example from Kazakhstan: it cannot be denied that one of the greatest difficulties in collectivization . . . was the preservation of a nomadic form of life by the great mass of the Kazakh peasantry. But to mention only this reduces the characteristic features of collectivization to the difficulties of collectivization and does not explain why the kolkhoz system was victorious . . ."

M. Kh. Nazarov (Central Asian State University) returned to the question of the Tashkent Bolsheviks. He urged historians to make a fuller study of events and personalities and not merely to ascribe to them "serious mistakes." He then went on to discuss what have evidently up to now been forbidden subjects: the local Muslim Communist Bureau which existed in Turkestan from early 1919 to the arrival of the Turkestan Commission; the position of the left Social-Revolutionaries with whom the Bolsheviks for a time co-operated; and finally the Turkestan Commission itself, some of whose members were not opposed to the idea of Turkestan becoming a Turkic republic with its own Turkic Communist Party. (The conception of a Turkic nation in Central Asia is of course now anathema in the Soviet Union. Care is taken to show the national characteristics of each of the peoples inhabiting the area. Pan-Islam and pan-Turkism are heinous sins). It is not clear why Nazarov raised these subjects unless to indicate to other historians that they were now permissible subjects—permissible for criticism if not for evaluation. This appears to have been confirmed by the closing speech to the conference delivered by A. L. Sidorov of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences who said: "The national question is one of the most complex and neglected in historical literature. Moreover, recently the idea has been current that there no need and that it is even harmful to study the history of bourgeois parties, reactionary nationalist movements, and ideas hostile to us. But in order to combat our enemies we must study them. Otherwise people abroad can read only what is written by White emigres and bourgeois historians on these questions. We must ensure that the works of Soviet historians are circulated both in the Soviet Union and abroad."

It may well be that Central Asian historians are now on the horns of several dilemmas. On the one hand they are urged to throw off the "dogmatism" and "personality cult" of Stalinist times, and to avoid an "illustrative" approach. They are encouraged to make full use of archive material and to pay attention to historiography. They may now probe deeper into subjects which previously were barely mentioned, if at all. They are to indicate national differences in the road to socialism. On the other hand, they are to remember that they are "Marxist historians," that their function is to justify the history of the Soviet Union according to criteria laid down by the Communist Party, that their duty is to attack and discredit bourgeois writers. Two schools of thought were apparent

at the conference: one which included writers such as Zhitov and most of the non-Russian historians seemed loth to penetrate deeper into inflammatory episodes and ideas; the other which included Pyaskovskiy and to a lesser extent Nazarov and Sidorov held the point of view that as the Soviet Union in its present form was a success and had achieved what it set out to do there could be no harm in examining controversial subjects in past history. It will be interesting to see which school will predominate and how Central Asian historians will resolve the conflicting demands placed upon them.

As a postscript, it is interesting to note that *The October Revolution in Uzbekistan* by Kh. Sh. Inoyatov (Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya v Uzbekistane. Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1958. 319 pp.) which was written after the conference devotes nearly 50 pages to a consideration of the Kokand government and other forms of opposition to the Tashkent Bolsheviks. The few sources that are quoted are contemporary newspapers or Uzbek State Archives, but the picture that emerges from the book is not new: the Tashkent Bolsheviks are heroes who were supported by the native population; all opposition was inspired by reactionary circles or the British interventionists. The true story of the October Revolution in Tashkent has in fact yet to be told.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### RUSSIAN INTRIGUE IN TIBET

SIR,

In the Journal for January 1958 Mr. P. L. Mehra examines the nature and scope of Russian intrigue in Tibet at the end of last century and the beginning of this; and, while leaving it to the reader to judge for himself on the old argument whether the Lhasa Expedition of 1903-1904 was necessary, he gives his own conclusion—which I do not find acceptable—that Lord Curzon fell into a Russian trap.

Curzon's policy in Tibet was part of the general forward policy by which, perhaps with insufficient regard for the difficulties facing the British Government in other parts of the world, he sought to fortify the position of India. His consideration of the Tibetan problem began as early as 1899, before he was aware of the activities of Russian agents at Lhasa, when he made his first attempt to establish direct communication with the Dalai Lama. Some Chinese historians, indeed, take a very different view from Mr. Mehra and suggest that Curzon was looking for an excuse to extend the influence of the Government of India into Tibet and that he found it in the alleged Russian intrigues at Lhasa.

There is a circumstance, not mentioned by Mr. Mehra, which suggests that the intrigues may not, in fact, have been so great a potential danger as was feared. The majority of the Dalai Lama's officials disapproved of his flirtation with Russia; but this was not known to Curzon at the time.

At all events, the evidence cited by Mr. Mehra shows that Dorjief's activities were a reality and it draws attention too to the violently anti-British feeling of the Czar and his ministers. It is not surprising, therefore, that Curzon, already irritated by Tibetan intransigence and disregard of the agreements of 1890 and 1893, should fear that a link between Russia and Tibet might lead the Tibetans into further unfriendly acts.

Mr. Mehra suggests that Curzon was blinded by his many obsessions to the "extremely fantastic nature" of the idea of a "real or fake Muscovite invasion of India through the barren wastes of Tibet." This seems to look at only one part of the picture. It is true that in 1902 Curzon wrote—as quoted by Mr. Mehra—that, if there were a Russian move towards Tibet, he would "put a British army into Lhasa." That should be compared with his presentation of the Government of India's case in 1903 when he made it clear that "Tibet was the one corner of Asia in which we were at an overwhelming political and strategical advantage as compared with Russia" and that the Russian Government were "prohibited, both by the extent and nature of the country which separated Lhasa from their nearest military bases, from meeting with an equivalent

display of force any demonstration which we might find it necessary to make for the purpose of safeguarding our legitimate interests in the country." (See *The Life of Lord Curzon* by the Earl of Ronaldshay, Vol. II p. 274 to which I refer for want of access to the relevant Parliamentary Papers.)

Even if it be accepted that Russian interest in Tibet was of a peculiar and "exotic" nature, designed simply to "create a situation" for the Government of India it does not follow that their activities at Lhasa could safely have been ignored. It seems that the emphasis on the very special nature of Russian interest and the story that Curzon fell into a trap are the sort of excuses that Russian politicians might have put about to explain their eviction from Tibet. For what, one may ask, did Russia gain from setting the trap and what did Curzon lose from falling into it?

The opinion has been expressed that only the Chinese profited by the Expedition of 1904 and, on a strictly short term view, there is something to be said for that, although the fault was not Curzon's. It was of timidity or indifference at Whitehall that the Chinese were able to take advantage. But on a longer view it can be seen that the Expedition placed relations between India and Tibet on an entirely new footing as a result of which, in due course, a friendly understanding developed which for some forty years prevented all thought of serious trouble—or of heavy expenditure on defence and administration—on the long common frontier. In August 1947 the new Government of India fell heir to the position and goodwill established by their predecessor and mainly because of that, although the old relationship was changed after a few years by the Chinese occupation of Tibet, they have been able to maintain official representation at Lhasa.

H. E. RICHARDSON.

## REVIEWS

**The Mizan Newsletter.** Issued monthly by the Central Asian Research Centre and St. Antony's College, Oxford. Price 10s. per month, or £6 per annum post free.

This is a new and vital venture in the field of review of contemporary Soviet attitudes to the countries of the Middle East, inaugurated on January 1 of this year.

Until the other day, when the tide of Soviet influence sweeping into the Arab world compelled the attention of the West, it had been usual for Middle-Eastern reporting to the British press to be written as if the whole region were in some sort of vacuum, unaffected by the influences and ambitions of adjacent Russia. And even now, when the establishment of the U.A.R. and the revolution in Iraq have opened the way to Soviet penetration, it is remarkable how little space is given by our national dailies and weeklies to the Soviet treatment of Middle East affairs, whether Arab, Persian, Kurdish, Israeli or Turkish. For example, the past three months have seen an intense effort by the Kremlin to blackmail Persia into an unequal agreement with Russia which would have removed the keystone of what we must now call the "Ankara" Pact. Every Soviet organ, up to Mr. Krushchev in person, has been engaged in an all-out verbal assault on the Shah and his government; yet the echoes have hardly been heard in the London papers.

*Mizan* means in Arabic the constellation Libra, or a pair of scales. Those journals in this country which discover the uses of this compendious and admirably compiled new source will be furnished with the very material they need to set the balance even. No longer will they or their public be able with justice to complain that nothing comes out of the U.S.S.R. to indicate the present direction or the probable future trends of Soviet policy in Middle Eastern affairs. The perspective can now be corrected. The great value of this newsletter is that it is compiled wholly from Soviet sources. These include the speeches of Soviet leaders, extracts from the Central and Republican Soviet press, and citations from periodicals, academic bulletins and reference books such as the 2nd Edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopædia (1949-58). It is in fact the equivalent of a monitoring service directed at Soviet speech and writing on the Middle East. A careful selection of such material gives a real insight both into Russian strength and Russian weaknesses, and may even on occasion provide a preview of Russian policies.

This is a new vision which we cannot afford to overlook, especially at a time when Russia's true designs may be masked behind a seeming concentration on the affairs of Western Europe. What more likely to bemuse the West than a feint at Berlin to cover perhaps the use of Russian influence in Iraq, and through the Kurds, to acquire control of Iraqi oil by means of Abdal Karim Qasim, cast in the rôle of an Arab Mosaddeq?

And Russian weaknesses? Lord Wavell used to encourage himself when faced by apparently insupportable odds and difficulties by remembering that the problems facing the enemy were almost certainly equally baffling. It is not necessary to read far in *Mizan* to grasp that the situation emerging today in Baghdad is no less puzzling to the Kremlin than to London or Washington, and that the key may lie in a correct appreciation of the Kurdish dilemma. For it is the Kurds who make of Iraq a state not wholly Arab, and who reinforce the historical antipathy of Mesopotamian for Levantine Arabism. Even on a short view Arab unity and Kurdish nationalism are irreconcilable; which shall the Kremlin support and how far? *Mizan* shows up the Soviet embarrassment, issuing in almost pathetic clichés addressed alternately to Nasir and to Qasim to be good boys.

It is revealing too to read of the dismay with which the Soviets greeted the Cyprus settlement, and of the importance they attribute to the affairs of Talib and Ghalib in Oman!

A further valuable lesson taught by this new appraisal is one of the immense and growing effort of Soviet academies in the field of serious orientalia. This is a field in which the R.C.A.S. has done, is doing, and will continue to do great work. But the resources of one Society are limited. If Britain is to recover its nineteenth-century place and reputation in this field, the State must step in more decisively. And in so doing those who guide our effort will do well to remember that British repute in Asia will be enhanced not so much by a well-worn projection of our own way of life as by our understanding, in book, periodical and broadcast, of the great Asian civilizations of which we should, and in fact do, know so much. As in all marriages success attends the partner who dwells on the quality of the other rather than on his own.

Two criticisms could be levelled at *Mizan*. One is that the field should in due course cover Turkey and Afghanistan, as well as the Arab world and Persia. The other concerns that terrible sense of *ennui* which attacks the mind of any normal western reader of more than a few pages of the devastating jargon of Soviet thought and writing. It is as if words were being thrown into a scrambling machine; such is the gabble that it is not in human nature to listen. This withering blast might at times be balanced—cf. *Mizan!*—by a pithy commentary, or at least by some offset. Take, for example, the immensely refreshing tone of the Persian response to the wearisome Soviet memorandum of December 28, 1958. This ran as follows:

The Persian Government considers the Soviet note totally unjustifiable and irrelevant. While the Persian Government intends to continue to observe the provisions of the treaty of 1927, Soviet breaches of the same obligations are too embarrassingly numerous and flagrant to mention. The Persian Government preserves the right to enter into any defensive agreements, and will not tolerate Soviet or any other foreign interference in Persian affairs; nor does the Persian Government consider the Soviet Government competent to express views on whether or not Persia needs defence pacts. . . .

In these few stiff words we hear again the accents of Khusran Anushirvan addressed to the Byzantine envoys of Justinian.

The suggestion is that merely to quote Soviet writings and speeches is not enough; like all liturgies they became a bore. A little spice needs to be put in one tray of the scales to balance the stodge of the double-talk in the other.

But, even as it stands, *Mizan* supplies just the ingredient wanting in a co-existent world. Those who use it will be helped to strike a more convincing balance between complacency and hysteria. The editors deserve well of their public.

OLAF CAROE.

### Official Histories of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939-45.

*Historical Section, India and Pakistan. Distributors, Orient Longmans.*

**Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organization.** Pp. 397. 15 charts and graphs; appendices and index. 45s.

This volume has an extensive sweep, dealing briefly but adequately with the constitutional development from 1909 up to 1939, the outbreak of war: then with the situation of the Armed Forces in 1939: with expansion during the war: with the defence organization as it developed and with which the war was fought. The whole survey is of great value to those who may be planning for a possible—not, one hopes, probable—expansion of the defence organizations in the sub-continent, provided that it is fully realized that future war will bear little relation to the war that has gone, that it will allow not one minute for organization and expansion after the first rocket is launched and that, while the mountain frontiers must be held in force, defence depends on the ability to throw back the airborne invasion. For India, herself, the vital change is that she belongs to no regional defensive organization, so her peacetime defence costs are high and she stands on her own in war.

On p. 81 a point of much importance in organization is made for the first time—that the creation of the Wingate Special Force diluted and broke up formations and

set back expansion. This is yet another objection among those that history is building up against the Wingate operations.

In the introduction and in passages on recruiting, it is inferred that the recruitment of the majority of Indian soldiers from the martial classes was to a great extent for political reasons. The authors should be reminded that in 1815 General Ochterlony reported officially to the Governor-General that the "Hindustani" sepoy was no match for the hillmen of Nepal: that Kitchener, after personally investigating the state of efficiency of the Indian Army in 1903-4, disbanded 14 southern regiments: that more of these battalions were disbanded as a result of experience in the field in the First World War and that a battalion of Bengali Infantry raised at that time was also disbanded because of indiscipline and gross lack of soldierly spirit. These were military decisions. Even in a future war good infantry will be more difficult to obtain than technicians, and infantry will be needed.

Students of Parkinson's Law will be interested in the proliferation of directorates, etc., at G.H.Q. and the regular swelling of staff therefrom. A 1941 Training Directorate of a dozen officers under a brigadier must have swelled by 1945 into many dozens under a major-general. One wonders whether a greater volume of progressive work was produced, and rather doubts it.

On p. 379 it is stated that a combined training centre at Khadakvasla was sanctioned in 1942. Sanctioned or not, it was in full blast in 1941.

More information about industrial expansion for war would have been appreciated. There is a story yet to be told here. One recalls *The Statesman's* leading articles of the spring of 1940 and the subsequent invasion of Simla by hordes of enthusiastic industrialists.

This book is a valuable contribution to the history of the war. It will be closely examined by all those who took a leading part in India's expansion.

**Campaign in Western Asia.** Pp. 461. 37 maps; plates, appendices and index. 45s.

This starts with a summary of India's pre-war relations with the Middle East and continues with a geographical note on those regions. There follows an interesting account of the planning and counter-planning that went on between the British Cabinet, Middle East Command and India to meet the changing situations in the Middle East, influenced as they were by the hostile attitude of Russia and then by Germany's sudden attack on that country. The operations covered are those against the Vichy French in Syria in the spring of 1941, those to oust the German-sponsored Iraqi Government, and those against the pro-German forces in Persia. The story then passes on to the instalment and development of the vast base in Iraq and the construction of communications up into Persia.

Particulars are given of the various plans of area defence of Iraq against Axis attack from east and west. The authors should not regard this system of defence as an invention of any commander at this time. The Crusaders used it and so did Marshal Saxe. Nor, as they indicate in the North African volume, was what they call a "box" defence anything more than Wellington's squares, or any tactical squares from time immemorial.

The operations are described in great detail, right down to companies—5 Indian Brigade in Syria, 10 Indian Division in Syria and Persia, 8 Indian Division in Persia and the small force which held Habbaniya airfield and drove off the Iraqi army. Perhaps one interesting fact is insufficiently stressed, and it is that Linlithgow and Auchinleck by prompt and decisive action in 1941 saved Iraq for the Allied cause. I well recollect the G.H.Q. conference at Delhi in early 1941, at which we discussed how we could find and fly the force to Shaiba and Habbaniya. To illustrate our extremity, I recall that we decided to send with it the only anti-tank equipment we had in all India—two wretched little Boyes rifles, with which we were training the whole army.

Perhaps this volume gives us too much detail of what were minor engagements, but that is not a fault to be cavilled at, as the operations are easily followed. It is a close and conscientious account. It would have helped our understanding if the actions of an Australian Division on the Mediterranean coastal flank of 5 Indian Brigade during the Damascus fighting could have been given more fully.

**Reconquest of Burma.** Vol. I. Pp. 403. 36 maps and charts; appendices and index. 50s.

In this volume and that on the North African campaign there is a deal of fighting to recount. In this Burma account the story is taken right down to companies and platoons. It is conscientiously told, but the detail clutters up an operation so much that one is often at pains to discover what it is all about. It would have helped if the chapters had started with references to the maps concerned and a broad summary of the operations to be described. As it is, a young officer is liable to be scared away by the toil required to master the battles fought.

There is an ample description of the physical and strategic scene against which the operations are to be staged. The period covered is from the summer of 1942, after the disastrous retreat from Burma; through the decisive operations about Imphal in 1944 and those of Wingate's contemporary Chindit expedition, to August, 1944, by when Wingate's Chindits had withdrawn, the Japanese attack on Imphal was petering out and that place had been relieved.

A prime reason for compiling military histories is that students of war shall learn from them how best to conduct operations. I believe that the most difficult of all achievements is to fight a successful land battle against a formidable enemy. The most successful battle is the one that results in complete victory with little or no loss to one's own forces; yet the historian is too often attracted to write of the most bloody contests and to neglect the others. He prefers conflict to manœuvre, just as some commanders are inevitably attracted to head-on attacks on the strongest places. The army encourages this outlook by awarding battle honours for the bloody fights and ignoring the more skilful actions. Any army can provide competent administrative officers by the thousand: the able commander is indeed a rare bird.

This volume describes many a sternly fought action; yet from the autumn of 1942 it was apparent that in mobile patrol operations Indian and Gurkha were more than a match for the Japanese. One cannot help concluding that if the air supply lavished on the Chindits had been there for 14th Army to use, there would have been less bloody fighting and success would have come earlier. That brings one to the controversial General Wingate. On p. 86 he is described as "a genius": p. 315 describes his 1943 operations as a "debacle": p. 402 tells us that in 1944 the Chindit "Force paid only a five per cent. dividend." Wingate was a somewhat extravagant eccentric: his 1943 expedition was a debacle: the assessment of five per cent. for 1944 is about right. The authors continue: "Its real usefulness (*Long-Range Penetration*) will probably be in conjunction with a strategic, swift-moving offensive rather than as an isolated delaying operation." That is true. Wingate was only employing a method laid down for normal forest and mountain warfare by the General Staff of G.H.Q. India in its *Jungle Warfare* pamphlet of 1940, applicable to *all* forces fighting a modern enemy in the hills and forests. One is left to wonder why the method was not generally employed earlier in fully planned operations and why, since Wingate had to jettison his mules, porters were not in common use.

There is much more to be culled from this careful account. We would, however, have liked to be told more fully why the Higher Command, learning in good time of the coming Japanese offensive against Imphal and Kohima, had not streamlined its formations and concentrated its outlying detachments. There must have been good reasons why so many thousands of what are here termed "useless mouths" were maintained for so long in forward areas and why some considerable detachments had to fight their way back. It is the approach to battle which counts. A cogent approach ensures an easy road to success. It looks as though the Higher Command made the task of its corps a great deal more difficult than it need have been.

**The North African Campaign. 1940-43.** Pp. 515. 43 maps; plates, appendices and index. 50s.

Here again is provided an adequate background, political, strategic and geographical. This account starts at Sidi Barrani, 1940, and ends in Tunisia in May, 1943. In the Introduction we are told that Mareth was the last battle. Not so. There were three more battles, in each of which at least 4 Infantry and 1 Armoured



Divisions were employed—Akarit, Enfidaville and Medjz el Bab. All three could be object-lessons to students if they were at all fully described. They are not. Medjz is virtually ignored, while the few words on Akarit are mostly wrong.

The weakness of this account is due to the loss of a sense of proportion. For instance, twelve pages are devoted to the brave stand of 3rd Indian Motor Brigade at Mekili in 1941, a minor engagement. On p. 163 we are told that that action "finally turned the tide of war in the direction of Allied victory," by an "inexorable chain of sequences" leading to the conquest of Sicily and the defeat of Italy! For one reader, at any rate, it was difficult after this to take the rest of the volume seriously.

Many pages are devoted to the regrettable armoured defeat at Antelat in January, 1942, and to the consequent retreat from Benghazi. The changing moods of 8th Army H.Q., and its contradictory orders, are well brought out. It would have been useful to stress that in these days of mechanical movement one must, when one decides to go, retreat far and fast, "firm up" in good time and strike back quickly. By delaying, 8th Army turned its fighting troops into a mere escort for a hundred miles of transport, losing completely all initiative.

There follows a careful account of the Gazala and Tobruk disasters of that summer. Is it not true, though, that, in Tobruk, the 2/7th Gurkhas were fighting on when all others had ceased?

For the phase from Alamein of October, 1942, to the end in Tunisia in May, 1943, the historians have been allowed a bare 80 pages out of 515. There is, therefore, no examination of 8th Army's failure to counter-attack Rommel at Alam Halfa in August, when it could have destroyed him before he "hardened up" by encasing his army thickly in mines and wire on the Alamein position. 8th Army's plan of attack at Alamein is all too readily accepted. Its "cover plan" failed to deceive the enemy and, in any case, was it reasonable to expect thereby to entice any appreciable forces away from the supremely vital north? In this very preoccupation lay the Axis' fatal weakness: one would expect that that weakness would have been exploited. It was not. From the Ruweisat Ridge two days before the battle one could see—and so could the enemy—the impressive accumulation of British forces piling up against that decisive flank. So 8th Army launched itself at the toughest part of the enemy's position, to endure twelve days of head-on combat. It was 1917 over again, with minefields added: a battle of attrition won by a much stronger army.

What 8th Army had needed for its all-powerful armoured force was a quick break-through at the easiest possible spot, so that it could debouch at once on to the wide desert and compel the Axis armour to attack and be destroyed. Thereafter, the enemy infantry would be helpless.

The "pursuit" from Alamein, though accepted as proper in this account, will yet go down in other histories as a melancholy classic—a plodding, short-hooking affair which misfired on each hook, and did not reach Sollum until November 10-11. Any infantry or light formation, under the cover of our air supremacy, could have been sent wide on the firm inland going, to cut in at Conference Cairn, Sollum and Halfaya by nightfall on November 5, 1942. Thereafter, there would have been no more war to write about in North Africa. "Victory," said Napoleon, "is nothing: one must exploit success." One has to recognize that, after Auchinleck's departure, 8th Army and its corps were steered by commanders fresh from the restricted spaces of England. The legend that rain foiled the pursuit is repeated in this book. The rain did not fall until the afternoon of November 6 and only aggravated the faulty planning and laggard execution. The risks of an enveloping pursuit to a distant point of interception were at this time minimal compared with those that, in February, 1941, Caunter faced in his brilliant desert pursuit when he led his armour wide from Mekili to Beda Fomm, where he intercepted and finally destroyed Graziani's army.

At Mareth, a student will want to know why 8th Army did not at the outset seize the Hallouf Pass, the possession of which would have allowed scope for manoeuvre and deception. By Hallouf, using manoeuvre, an Indian formation, when at length let loose, cut through the Axis centre with no more than 100 casualties.

According to this history, the battle of Akarit opened at 0400 hours on April 6,

1943. In fact, it opened at 2100 hours on April 5, when two Indian brigades destroyed the enemy's right flank from front to rear in a silent attack on a moonless night, on a front of 5 miles. Thereby, at 0900 hours on April 6, the Axis army lay at 8th Army's mercy. The ponderous 8th Army did not move in to exploit and pursue with its X Corps until close on 24 hours later, when the Axis had escaped—only to be fought again at Enfidaville. History will hold this as a second melancholy classic of "pursuit." P. 509 repeats another fairy tale—that X Corps was held back by "very fierce fighting." There was none whatsoever: the way forward was clear early on April 6 and the enemy paralysed by the dire calamity which had so suddenly eliminated his whole flank, crumbled his centre and menaced his rear.

And so on. I have written enough to show that this volume needs re-examination.

F. S. T.

**The Origins of Russia.** By George Vernadsky. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1959. 8vo, cloth, pp. xi, 354, 3 figs.

Professor George Vernadsky is a survivor of the generation of Russian scholars who graduated in the universities of the Imperial regime. Together with the imaginative writers of the same vintage, they were the flower of a mature culture which it is now fashionable to denigrate. A few managed to work under the Soviet dispensation. One recalls Bartold, Kratchkovsky and Grabar (who is still alive). Some like Marr and Pokrovsky, were pursued with ignominy after their deaths. Others found welcome and a happier lot in the west. The liberal tradition of the American universities inspired support for the work of Rostovtsev and Vasilyev and, in England, Professor Minorsky has attained a unique position as the dean of contemporary oriental studies.

For many years, George Vernadsky, together with his colleague, Michael Karpovich, have been working on the history of Russia planned in ten volumes by Yale University Press. Vernadsky's first volume, *Ancient Russia*, was published in 1943; the second, *Kievan Russia*, in 1948; and the third, *The Mongols and Russia*, in 1953. The present volume, issued by the Clarendon Press, represents in some respects a summary and a revision of Volume 1 and the first part of Volume 2 of Vernadsky's great history. Yet it is an original work in itself and introduces much new—and fascinating—material on the religious beliefs, social habits and arts of the western as well as of the eastern Slavs. Thus, the book contains what is undoubtedly the best account of Slavonic paganism and follows the transition through a near-Mithraism to Orthodox Christianity.

Vernadsky is a bold and speculative explorer of the past and he has an erudition which ranges over European and oriental sources; he is familiar too with the intricacies of contemporary research in the field of periodical literature.

As is well known, Vernadsky attributes great importance to the Alans as a factor in the history of the Eurasian world. He holds that "the Alanic language survives in the Ossetian" and he accepts the view that Ossetian (now only spoken by some tens of thousands of people in the central Caucasus) belongs to the north Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Vernadsky's knowledge of modern Ossetian enables him to reconstruct an Alanic *Ursprache* and to interpret many names and words current in the Scythic and Sarmatic phrases of South Russian history. For instance, he finds that *Sarmat* is not an ethnic term but in Alanic can be interpreted as *saer maet*—"a member of the council" (a noble or *boyar*, referring to the chieftains who were encountered by the Greeks and Romans), p. 57. This interpretation may, indeed, be compared with "soviet" (= "council" in Russian) which has become practically a "national" term designating modern Russians. Again, in *Sauromatae* (a people often confused with the Sarmatae) Vernadsky detects *sau rom*, "black hair." (In my own opinion, *sau rom* may have been a name given by the fair or rufous Alans to a darker "Asiatic" element which had survived in the northern Caucasus.) In effect, Vernadsky's Alans are identical with the "Sar-

matians" to whom Rostovstev attributed the leading role in south Russia. (Cf. his *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*.)

Vernadsky's general view may be summarized as follows:

"The heartland of Eurasia—that area between the Altai mountains and the Caucasus—was controlled by Indo-European peoples from time immemorial. After the migration of the Aryans to Iran and India and of most of the western branches of the Indo-Europeans to Europe, there still remained in the central Eurasian area two large groups of Indo-Europeans—the Alanic and the Tokharian" (p. 48).

"The vast area controlled by the Alans and the Tokhars may be conveniently called the Alanic-Tokharian sphere. During the first millenium B.C. this area played a role of paramount importance as the base for both eastward and westward migrations as well as for the radiation of artistic and mythological notions and patterns all over the world" (p. 51).

Vernadsky attributes to the Ros, Rus, or Russes (as he prefers to call them) an origin round the north-east shore of the Black Sea and he believes them to have been a part of the Alanic confederation. He distinguishes them clearly from the Scandinavian Varangians (identified by some scholars as Rus) who penetrated Russia as groups of mercenaries and traders during the ninth century A.D. The Slavs (originally *Slovene*, "people of the word," i.e. speaking the same language, as opposed to *Nemtsi*, "dumb" Germans) are named first in historical sources of the fourth century A.D. There are reasons for assuming affinities between the prehistoric Slavs and some peoples of the Thracio-Phrygian milieu and Vernadsky finds a "Slav" undertone to the nomad invasions of Asia Minor "around" 800 B.C. (p. 7).

Recent archæological discoveries in the Aral basin (Tolstov's Khorezm expeditions) have underlined the extent to which the cultures of the Aralo-Caspian region have coloured the background of Russian history. There is a type-branch in the cultures of Khorezm, of the Scythians and Alano-Sarmatians, of the Khazars and of the Golden Horde and, indeed, of the early Muscovite state before "westernization" began in the sixteenth century. But in his present work Vernadsky has perhaps weighted the evidence a little too much in favour of "the Alano-Tokharian cultural sphere" and indeed of Eurasian and nomadic influences. In the symbiosis which produced the Russian world pressures from south and west were also significant. In the prehistoric world there were influences on the north Pontic lands from Asia Minor and, ultimately, from Mesopotamia (as Vernadsky noted in *Ancient Russia*, p. 29). In the ethnogenetic background, Marr was right in detecting a "Japhetic" (i.e. pre-Indo-European) element even among the Ossetians. This element was present too in early Khorezm, as Tolstov has indicated. It was represented in south Russia, down to the classical period, by the Maeotians, Agathyrians and other groups. (Vernadsky allows for this Japhetic substratum in Ukraine, *Ancient Russia*, p. 49.) There is evidence for the penetration of the European hinterland from the southern shores of the Black Sea and the Ægean in the pre-history of Ukraine and the Danube basin (cf. Gordon Childe, *The Danube in Prehistory*). In my own view, elements of Ponto-Anatolian origin moved along the European river network as far as the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea, as indicated by fossils of Asianic—and notably "Circassian"—toponymy and cults in the north. Movement by river and slash-and-burn agriculture preceded the spread of pastoral nomadism which followed after the forests were cleared.

Again, I would venture to suggest that the Russian historian does not allow sufficient weight to the expansive tendencies of integrated societies in western Europe before the beginning of the first millenium B.C. (cf. Christopher Hawkes, *The Prehistoric Foundations of Europe*). The expansion of the Celts to the shores of the Black Sea in the third century B.C. is an historical fact. In the preceding century the rapid swell of the Macedonians (with their Thracian allies) over the Middle East and into central Asia had been a comparable and far more important phenomenon. It is possible that the presence of the Cimmerians in the Pontic area during the eighth century B.C. represented an earlier phase of a European *Drang nach Osten*. Heine-Geldern would take such a movement even farther east. He postulates a migration from the west in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. which brought elements of the European and Caucasian cultures to Inner Mongolia, China and Upper India (*Sacculum*, 11/2, 225 ff., "Das Tokharer Problem und die Pontische

Wanderung"). In an article in *Südöst Forschungen*, XIII, 1954, 277 ff., Vernadsky examined Heine-Geldern's thesis, but found that "it is much more likely that most of the ancient migrations of both peoples and cultures did not go the whole way from Occident to Orient or *vice versa* but started in a central area from which they expanded in various directions. That central area stretched from the Azov-North Caucasian region eastward to the Altai mountains and east Turkestan. Its hub was in Khorezm." There the controversy stands; but it may be submitted that movements of peoples can start in different places from different causes. (We know from Roman records that bad storms and coastal erosion moved the Teutons and Ambrones to migrate from Jutland into Gaul; and fear of the Germans impelled a westward trek of the Helvetii from the Alps. Pressure from the Chinese, or a few drought years (or merely the destiny of one man, Chingiz) could set the eastern nomads in motion.)

We have discussed here only a difference of emphasis in presentation. Vernadsky's book is an adventure in itself: argued with immense learning and a charming zest for the curious detail; vital and vigorous as the spirit of its author. It is a "thriller" in its range and originality and it should be read by everyone interested in Russia and in history.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

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### **Bibliography of Recent Soviet Source Material on Soviet Central Asia and the Borderlands.**

This bibliography, designated "No. 1, 1958," is issued by the Central Asian Research Centre and covers material from Soviet sources issued in the second half of 1957 and relating to the areas of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The material is sub-divided into the following sections: Agriculture and Forestry, Architecture, the Borderlands (including general works and studies on Afghanistan, India and Iran), Economics, Education, History, Industry, Irrigation, Literature and Fine Arts, Natural Science, Politics, Transport and Travel. Each title mentioned is accompanied by full reference details, with an indication of its length and a brief comment on its scope and relevance.

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### **Die Mongolei.** Land, Volk und Wirtschaft der Mongolischen Volksrepublik. By Erich Thiel. Isar Verlag Munchen (German). Pp. 495. Ill., maps.

Mongolia was for a long time generally regarded as an essentially marginal area, in both geographical and political senses, and one that accordingly merited consideration only as an adjunct to the study of Russia or China. This view was reflected in British official opinion, according to which Mongolia was of no special interest other than in the context of Anglo-Russian relations.

Recent publications and articles in this journal have established quite clearly that developments in Mongolia, particularly since 1911, have an intrinsic interest and importance. In that year, nationalists in Outer Mongolia took advantage of the weakening of China as a state to declare their independence. Subsequently, rebellion quickened into revolution, from which emerged, in July, 1921, a "People's Revolutionary Government" and, three years later, a "Republic of Labouring People." These developments were, however, Mongolian rather than specifically Russian: the successful destruction of both Chinese garrisons and "white" forces was accomplished by Mongolian detachments as well as by Soviet troops, whose presence was dictated as much by strategic necessity as ideological sympathy. Relations between the new Mongolia and the Soviet Union were put on a basis of formal equality and, throughout the vicissitudes of Soviet policy, the Republic has remained an associate of the Soviet Union and not an integral part of its structure.

Mongolian national feeling has continued to be sufficiently strong to evoke concessions from the Soviet Union as regards the basis in Communist theory of Mongolia's development and working relations with the Republic. This is particularly the case in the persistence of nomadism and resistance to the collectivization of agriculture. Nevertheless, official thinking in Ulan-Bator and Moscow proceeds from the same premises, and in consequence both State and economy have been organized on Marxist lines under the aegis of the Soviet Union. The process of industrialization showed features similar to those which were later evident in Eastern Europe—viz., the assumption by the State of a monopoly of industry and trade, the extrusion of foreign capital and the setting up of joint Soviet-national concerns, which were eventually transferred to the satellite State when it had become reliably Communist. In Mongolia, however, this policy evoked less resistance, primarily because the predominantly nomadic and pastoral character of existing Mongol society ensured that there was no rigid state apparatus or organized industry which had to be forcibly transformed.

Professor Thiel shows in detail the geographical and economic factors which the rulers of the Mongolian People's Republic have had and still have to take into account in the development of the area. As in the case of his other studies in Central Asia and the Far East, his conclusions are based on personal observation on the ground and on the critical use of statistics and other published data.

The sub-title indicates the scope of the book, which is divided into four major sections, dealing respectively with general geographical considerations, population and the organization of the Republic, the economy of the area and an examination of the individual regions. There is also a valuable appendix containing the Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic and an extensive bibliography, devoted for the most part to Russian sources, not readily available elsewhere.

The future political possibilities of the Mongolian People's Republic were canvassed by Mr. R. A. Rupen in the issue of this journal for July-October, 1958. In the book under review, Professor Thiel presents the indispensable factual basis for such discussion and sets out clearly the potentialities of the area and the further organization which will be necessary before they can be realized.

*Die Mongolei* is eminently readable and well illustrated with maps, diagrams and some photographs.

MAURICE PEARTON.

**My Golden Road from Samarkand.** By Jascha Golowanjuk. Translated by Frances Hogarth-Gaute. Published by Geo. G. Harrap and Co., Ltd. Pp. 215. 18s.

In the Preface the author admits to having a special liking for his book, and I must say I rather like it too, for it is a lively book. "Little boy," said the Tsarist officer, popping out of the train lavatory, "have you any buttons?" and, on learning that he had, without further ado took his penknife and cut off all his buttons "in a twinkling," neatly sewing his own uniform buttons in their place. After which he kissed him on the brow, handed him a silver rouble and pushed him back into the corridor, to emerge shortly afterwards disguised as a civilian.

This was in 1917, when Mr. Golowanjuk was twelve. The Revolution had begun. His adopted father was manager of the Russia-Asiatic Bank in Samarkand, and two years later, in April, 1919, set off into the mountains with his family to try to reach Bokhara, at that time still an independent kingdom. Though clearly charming, they were neither experienced travellers nor endowed with very strong nerves.

"My knees," writes Mr. Golowanjuk, "were knocking and my hands were like ice, my throat was dry and I had a violent desire to weep." As for his mother, who weighed 16 stone, she was clearly not built for Central Asian travel. "My mother," he writes, "could not manage it at all, she kept on slipping off her mount's back and rolling down the slope. We helped her to remount several times, but it was no use." Their guide, meanwhile, "never ceased to stamp and storm and pour out a

stream of oaths at us." He was, in fact, so furious with them that he foamed at the mouth.

The characters they encountered on their journey were colourful in the extreme. My favourite is a certain Karamatilla, "tall, elegant, absolutely superb with his flashing eyes smiling at us and his white teeth gleaming between his black beard and moustache," a "fabulously rich" "social lion" who was also a double agent. He wore "a white turban and under his sky-blue caftan a belt sparkling with gold and precious stones." His horse "reared impatiently, foaming at the mouth and champing at its bit." He had "a lovely melodious voice" and was a brilliant rider. "His rich laugh rang out as he spurred his horse and came into the stream to meet us." "Good-bye for the present!" he said on terminating the interview. Whereupon "he dug his spurs into the flanks of his magnificent horse and plunged into the current in a flurry of spray which sparkled in the sunshine." Mr. Golowan-juk's father tried to persuade Karamatilla to dress a little less flamboyantly, but it was no good. Arriving clad in a dinner jacket with huge diamonds for studs, he would proudly turn up the bottoms of his trousers to show that they were lined with silk. And, on being told that a dinner jacket was not the right thing to wear in the morning, he would merely "smile with ironic incredulity." The "radiant blonde beauty from Moscow," who "acted as hostess at his parties," was "tall and thin and blazing with magnificent diamonds from ten o'clock in the morning onwards." Her "blue eyes would rest with passionate devotion on the superb young Oriental who was her accepted lover," while "her beauty was enhanced by the presence of the young Aladdin, whose eyes shone with pride at having aroused such passion in a European woman." But Karamatilla was unfortunately "as dangerous as he was handsome," and there was "a lump in all our throats and our hearts were full, for we just could not understand how a human being so handsome and fascinating could be so coldly cruel and so devoid of feeling." Karamatilla, for his part, "just laughed his low melodious laugh, watching our horrified expressions at his behaviour with a kind of proud satisfaction." But in the end retribution overtook him, and when, later, they asked what had happened to him, the Mullah to whom they addressed their enquiry simply drew his finger across his throat as though he was slitting it with a knife.

On reaching Bokhara, the bank manager's party found that it was about to fall to the Bolsheviks, and therefore decided to set out across the desert for Persia. "Already," writes the author, "I could see my poor bare bones bleaching." He was very nearly right. The air was stifling, the temperature reached 140 degrees, the sweat poured down their faces, their heads ached. "My mother had put on an enormous panama hat, but the sun perished it so quickly that it crumbled to dust when she touched it." My mouth and throat were so parched that they seemed to be stuck together, and red spots danced before my eyes." A little further on the spots turned blue and green.

But soon they found that their proposed escape route to Persia had been cut by the Reds, and so were obliged to return to Bokhara, now only defended against the surrounding Bolsheviks by four rusty cannon. Under the Tower of Death sat a soothsayer, whose face "would have been frightening even to a brave man, for it was a yellowish green with deep lines and green shadows, his pale-green deep-set eyes, phosphorescent and very piercing, the only living things in that dead visage. He had no hair on his head, though a few wisps hung down from his chin, and his long brown teeth protruded, resting on his lower lip. . . . I could not get out of my mind the fearful glow in those green eyes; even when I fell asleep at last they still seemed to stare at me. What had he read in the pages of Destiny?"

We are not told. But shortly afterwards the author and his family were off on their travels again. "My parents' camel began to behave in a most peculiar manner, leaping about, roaring, and throwing my parents up into the air. They landed heavily and were badly bruised, but luckily not otherwise injured." But, we were told, "even camels cannot be happy for too long," and soon they were far out on the steppe amongst pretty Mongolian girls with bright slanting eyes, whose husbands treated them like dogs.

In the end, after further adventures, they reached the Caspian and the Caucasus and took ship for Constantinople. Their sufferings had had a steadying effect on

their nerves and they were by now experienced Central Asian travellers. They had also brought out a large number of diamonds hidden in a pot of dripping and several million badly devalued roubles. As for the author's mother, she had, he tells us, lost two and a half stone and "become slim and elegant."

FITZROY MACLEAN.

**Egypt in Transition.** By Jean and Simonne Lacouture. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 532 pp. Illustrated, index. 35s.

In the welter of tendentious journalism and nationalist propaganda, which has bedevilled all information about happenings in the Middle East, this book must be welcomed as a sympathetic but not uncritical survey of the Officers' Revolution in Egypt, its causes, its personalities, its development, and the reasons for its apparent success. And the need for an independent survey is urgent, not least for the enlightenment of the foreign chancelleries. The internal and external relations of the United Arab Republic are in a state of flux, and have undergone new strains and modifications even since this book was written less than a year ago.

But *Egypt in Transition* is far more than an intelligent and impartial survey. The nationality of its gifted authors is apparent in the clear and logical analysis of events and personalities. We are told that M. and Mme. Lacouture are journalists working on the spot; but their book is more than journalism. It is history. While it has great value as a record of contemporary events, its interest also lies in "the thread of historical continuity" which the authors trace from the landing of Buonaparte (which flung Egypt into the whirlpool of international politics and was to bring a listless old country into the cycle of modern life) to the dictatorship of Colonel-Nasser.

In Part I (The Awakening of Egypt) this theme is followed out with logical skill; and whatever view may be taken of the authors' judgment on such events as "the Revolution of 1919," the leadership and deportation of Sa'ad Zaghlul, and the rise of the Wafd party, their analysis of the tendencies, strains and antagonisms which emerged in the Officers' Republic of 1952 is reasonable and convincing. It may be that scant justice is done to the rehabilitation of Egypt's finances under the British régime of the eighties and nineties, and to the resulting betterment of conditions for peasants and townfolk alike. Those of us who knew the Egypt of Cromer and Kitchener will trace in this an echo of the not unnatural prejudice with which our French friends have always regarded the success of a régime which, at its inception, their own government refused to share. Be that as it may, it is not a bad thing for British readers to be reminded that the achievements justly claimed by Lord Milner and others in the service of Egypt weighed but little as against the sense of inferiority and humiliation in the subject people. We have been all too slow to realize the hard truth that "the native," whether in Egypt or Arabia or India, unreasonably prefers to be administered badly by his own people rather than efficiently governed by us.

This underlying current of resentment was brought to the surface from time to time, particularly by such events as the introduction of parliamentary institutions in Turkey and by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. It was staved for a moment in 1936 by the attainment of complete independence, British influence over Egypt being thereby converted from the dominance of a superior into treaty rights mutually agreed between two independent powers. But the old antagonisms and the sense of subjugation were to return only too soon with the Second World War. The necessity for the occupation of Egypt by the British Armies might have been accepted, but the tardy withdrawal of the forces from Cairo and the Nile Valley, long after peace had been secured, infected the nation with an exasperation which developed into active terrorism. Thus the stage was set for the Officers' Revolution.

The authors' view is that it was the poor showing of their army in conflict with Israel which moved the young officers to action. Lord Milner has described the Egypt of sixty years ago as the Land of Paradox. The title still remains appropriate.

There would have been nothing illogical in a military dictatorship effected by the officers of an army flushed with military success. But not so in Egypt. In 1949 it was the officers of a discredited army returning from defeat by Israel who set up the Committee of Free Officers.

In the first chapter of Part II we have a 'Short History of the Free Officers' Movement,' leading up to the *coup d'état* of July, 1952, when the group of young officers led by Nasser seized the headquarters, and forced King Faruk to make General Neguib head of the army. "Apart from a short struggle outside the G.H.Q.—where two soldiers were killed, the only victims of the *coup d'état*—the army and city passed from Faruk's hands into those of the Free Officers with hardly a shot being fired."

With the conquest of the military command, the second step—that of setting up a sound government—was put in progress. The third, Faruk's elimination, was to prove more delicate. The cautious skill with which this affair was carried out is represented as revealing Nasser's tactical genius. In order to avoid a stir over the Faruk issue, he selected Ali Mahir, the former head of the Royal Cabinet, "as the only man with enough sway over the King to force that violent man to abdicate. The young Lieutenant-Colonel intended using the old statesman as a kind of lubricant." It is unlikely that many readers will be familiar with these events in detail; the narrative is convincing as well as dramatic; and in a book full of many good things this chapter is perhaps the most absorbing. It concludes with the forced abdication of Faruk and his departure in the royal yacht.

"Take care of the army," he said to General Neguib. "It is now in good hands, sire," Neguib replied. The answer did not please Faruk, who said in a loud voice, "What you have done to me, I was getting ready to have done to you." Then, turning on his heel, he took leave of the conquerors.

We cannot here follow the story in detail, and without detail it becomes incomprehensible. The immediate and bloodless success seems to have taken everybody by surprise. Its origin and its effect were misapprehended in the foreign embassies not less than by the ruling classes and the political parties in Cairo. It is said that there was panic in the diplomatic chancelleries, while the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood each fancied that their own great day had come. General Neguib became the popular hero of the moment, but Nasser and his Committee of Free Officers, whether by design or by force of circumstance, were working for something very different from what Ali Mahir or Neguib or the Wafd or the Moslem Brotherhood had designed. A satirical picture is drawn of bewilderment in the embassies, but "among the Americans, on the other hand, there was a certain open satisfaction." "The *Times* thought it sufficient to say that this was simply a matter of domestic politics."

There follows the confused but exciting story of the Officers' break with the Right, the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood, of the fall of Neguib, and of the victory of Nasser and "Nasserism." Up to this point the authors have been concerned mainly with the domestic events and the internal revolutions in Egypt herself. All but the general picture will be new to the British reader, and for that very reason will have a special value and a special interest. With the establishment of a régime completely under the control of Nasser and his officers, the story moves on to world politics. The agreement in 1954 for the evacuation of the Canal Base; in 1955 the Israeli raid in Gaza, the attendance of Nasser at the Bandung Conference, and the contract secured by Egypt to obtain arms from the Iron Curtain countries; in 1956 the agreement signed in principle by the International Bank to provide 200 million dollars for the High Dam at Assuan and its subsequent withdrawal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in order to finance the dam, the invasion of Sinai by the Israeli army and the forcible intervention by British and French forces—all these have been reported in the world press and canvassed with tedious elaboration. Equal publicity has been given to Nasser's relations with the Arab League, the Baghdad Pact, the revolutionaries in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and finally the union with Syria and the Yemen; but however hackneyed the discussion has become, there is still much of value and interest to be found in this assessment of Egyptian reactions, aims and prospects by reasonable observers on the spot. Far be it from this reviewer to express a judgment!

A word should be added in justice to Part III, which describes with sympathy



and understanding various aspects of working life in the Valley. Such are the chapters on Agricultural Reform, Economic Growing Pains, Industrialization, and the Problem on the Assuan Dam. These are admirably studied and are, of course, entirely relevant to the historical narrative. On the other hand, it must be said that the short passage on the Sudan Mirage is inaccurate in its facts and tendentious in its implications. To give an example—the large-scale growing of cotton in the Sudanese Gezira (which has proved the backbone of the Sudan finances) is represented as part of oppressive reprisals following the murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General, when “Egypt had the Sudan taken from her.” The murder was in 1924, but the Gezira Scheme was promoted by Lord Kitchener and the concession negotiated with the Sudan Plantation Syndicate in 1913-14. The authors have evidently been misled by the crudest propaganda.

The book ends on a pessimistic note. In the United Arab Republic “there is no longer an Egypt.” The Nasser state is henceforth threatened with disequilibrium. “Is Egypt no more? It is too real to disappear. But the United Arab Republic is perhaps too mythical to survive.”

NIGEL DAVIDSON.

(The authors' transliteration of Arab names has been adopted.)

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**Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-81.** By Richard Hill. Issued under the auspices of Chatham House. Published by Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. 188. Index; map; bibliography. 25s. in U.K.

Mr. Hill points out in his introduction that no really objective and impartial study of Egyptian rule in the Sudan from 1820 to 1885 has ever been written. British writers, preoccupied in defending the memory of General Gordon, have been inclined to write off that rule as one of oppression and graft; whilst Egyptian writers have been obsessed with the idea that Great Britain deliberately pursued a policy of denying to Egypt the control of her hinterland and natural patrimony. This book is an attempt to fill the void left by the controversialists.

Although the records and archives on which a full picture of these years can be built are incomplete, or not yet available, Mr. Hill has succeeded in producing a scholarly and most valuable book, and all those who have served in the Sudan, and others interested in that vast country, will find on almost every page something new and arresting.

Your reviewer remembers once discussing with an old sheikh who well remembered the days of the old “Turkiya,” as the Egyptian Government of those days was called, what he thought of it as an administration. He said he regarded it as a good government, giving as his reason that, as far as they were concerned, it hardly existed at all and they were left in peace. This confirms what Mr. Hill has to say as to the difficulties the administration had to contend with in controlling the nomad tribes.

The author shows that after the death of the Khedive Mohamed Ali the administration lost much of its dynamism, and latterly internal troubles in Egypt, culminating in Arabi Pasha's revolt, deprived the government of reinforcements and supplies. He gives credit to the Khedive Ismail for his grasp of the vital importance of communications, and for his efforts to suppress the slave trade.

Of particular interest is his description of the Europeans of all nationalities who found their way to the Sudan in those years; many sent up by Mohamed Ali to prospect for minerals or to open up trade. What a motley crowd they were and how different to the carefully selected staff of the Condominium administration of later days. To one who served in Kordofan in the thirties of this century, it is of peculiar interest to read of the party of British iron-foundrymen who were sent in the 1830s to investigate the alleged deposits of ore in Gebel Harāza. Four of the six died, and they are described as having been “restive and truculent and clamouring for tea and their back pay.”

Another group of expatriates were the American officers serving in the Egyptian

army, many of them disbanded officers of the Confederate forces after the Civil War. Their employment and achievements are often forgotten.

In Chapter XXII the reader will find a most interesting and impartial appreciation of both General Gordon's character and of his administrative capacity. His statement that Gordon was an unorthodox soldier, rather than a political administrator, is probably a just assessment.

Mr. Hill has filled in a gap of historical research which was badly needed. It is to be hoped that his book will lead to a better understanding of the history of those years and to a more balanced view of the Turco-Egyptian administration of the Sudan.

The book is admirably produced and is provided with a useful map and an excellent index. Also a note on sources.

J. H.

**The English Utilitarians and India.** By Eric Stokes. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Pp. 350. 45s.

This book deals with the ideas of the English utilitarians as they affected India during the eighteenth century, and its general theme is that although the utilitarian philosophy failed to make much impression on political institutions in England, it was of very great importance in moulding the Indian administrative machine. James Mill and his more famous son, John Stuart Mill, both had long careers at the old East India House, and had utilitarian principles always in mind when dealing with Indian affairs. Their practical application was made by such men as Macaulay in the sphere of the law, and by Holt Mackenzie, Sir Thomas Munroe, and many others in land revenue administration, though the personal character of the rulers, and still more the hard facts of India, tended to give them a somewhat authoritarian bent.

The most important part of the book deals with land revenue administration, the details of which, however important and fascinating to those who have had to deal with them, can now hardly make much appeal to the general reader. It is also limited to the eighteenth century, and so perhaps lays too little stress on the fact that the development of land revenue policy has been a continuous process, of which the main principles were in operation long before the utilitarians came on the scene, and have been further developed in the present century. The right of the State to take the rent of land was insisted on by the Hindu kings, and the Moghuls merely took over and developed that system. Both in theory and in practice, the share taken by the State varied within very wide limits. The defect of the system was that revenue was levied on the gross product of the land, instead of the real rent, after allowance had been made for the costs of cultivation and for the maintenance of the cultivator.

Mr. Stokes does not sufficiently insist on the importance of Malthus, now best remembered for his theory of population and as a pioneer of birth control. For it was Malthus who first propounded the law of rent, which Ricardo, with whose name it is associated, merely elaborated. And Malthus was, from 1805 to 1834, Professor of Political Economy at the East India College of Haileybury, which then had almost a monopoly of supplying English administrators to India. This meant that for at least half a century, say from 1810 to 1860, the men who were ruling India were men who had passed through Malthus's hands and had imbibed his ideas. Sir William Sleeman, writing more than a hundred years ago, says, "Of all the instructions which the Honourable East India Company have ever brought with them from their parent land to India, that which they derived from the lectures of that truly amiable man, Dr. Malthus, on Political Economy has been perhaps the most substantially useful to the country." The result of Malthus's teaching has been that, although his pupils came for the most part from land-owning classes in England who would strenuously have resisted any payment of rent to the State, in those parts of India which came under British control since his day, land revenue in India has been based on the true rent of land and not on the gross produce, and the State has generally preferred to deal with the actual cultivator rather than with a middleman squeezing himself in between the cultivator and the State. In some parts of India,

this practice has been further developed during the last twenty years by assessing the land revenue annually with reference to the ascertained value of produce instead of fixing it for a period of years.

Mr. Stokes's book deserves careful study by those who are now responsible for the administration of India.

HUGH DOW.

**India, Pakistan and the West.** The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 242. Index. 7s. 6d.

This is a book of essays in which Dr. Spear repeats and expands some of the material, especially in "The Indian Response" and "The New India," of his contribution to the Oxford History of India. As such it is a better book, even if we cannot accept his general view as an adequate and valid interpretation of India as a whole.

His account of Islam leaves an uncomfortable impression of being somewhat "glib" and superficial, but penetrating in places, and lacking in sympathetic understanding. It is not likely to be well received by Islamic scholars. His account of Hinduism leaves a similar impression and, if more sympathetic, omits some aspects of Hinduism associated with the everyday worship of the masses, which offer a contrast to the philosophies of more cultured minds on which he concentrates.

Dr. Spear develops three favourite themes: "the Hindu-British synthesis," the "Anglo-Islamic synthesis" and the "new middle class." All of these seem to require more critical examination than he gives to them. It is far from certain what he means by the "new middle class." If he means the English-educated classes, they include, beside the middle-class traders and industrialists, many Brahmins, who, with the ruling families and certain tribal chiefs, constituted the élite of the aristocracy in British India.

He has important and interesting things to say about the influence of British thought on India, especially that of the Utilitarians and the Evangelicals in the beginning and middle of the nineteenth century. He has not examined the possibly more important developments, from Gladstone to Lansbury and Attlee, of that strain in British thought which, as Lord Radcliffe has suggested, has been, in its extreme forms, manifested in Puritanism and modern egalitarianism. It has a sympathetic relation with the strain in Hindu thought which is to be found in Jainism, Buddhism and in Gandhi's *satyagraha*.

If a reviewer may add a footnote from personal experience, I would make this comment:

Like all who met Gandhi, I fell under the spell of his magnetic personality and his great and friendly charm, the convincing sincerity of his belief in his *satyagraha* and his desire to hasten the advent of self-government. I spent many hours in interesting and delightful discussion of many relevant matters with him at the time of his agitation against the Rowlatt Acts. Experience of the war-time security legislation had proved that it facilitated effective measures to deal with terrorist conspiracies (which often involved the murder of Indian officers of the police for political reasons). After an inquiry by Mr. Justice Rowlatt, it was decided to arm the Viceroy and the Provincial Governments with similar powers after the lapse of the war-time legislation, but with restrictions on their use except in emergencies caused by outrages. On one occasion I went through these Acts, section by section, with Gandhi, and he stated categorically that he did not object to any one section; but at the end he said, in the terms of his current agitation, that they deprived India of freedom. He made no attempt to explain this in any way, although in all our long discussions he had always argued patiently and reasonably on the many points which came up.

From this, taken together with all the discussions, I drew the inference that he regarded these Acts—because of the partial departure from ordinary judicial pro-

cesses—as a convenient handle for appealing to liberal and legal opinion in Britain, while giving a reason for *satyagraha* or non-violent agitation in India about which he had an *idée fixe*, as it seemed to me. I have no doubt that he thought that the processes envisaged in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms would only lead to very gradual developments and that his methods would encourage the demand for self-government among Indians and re-act in favourable quarters in Britain. He knew that powerful influences and initiatives towards Indian self-government came from “progressive” writers and thinkers in Britain, from Oxford and Cambridge, from the Inns of Court and from the House of Commons. His aim was to hasten the advent of Swaraj by directly and indirectly playing upon them.

This aspect of history is not developed in this book. There are more aspects of many-sided India and Pakistan and more aspects of their relations with the British than appear in its pages.

J. C. CURRY.

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**The Oxford History of India.** By the late Vincent A. Smith, C.I.E. Third edition, edited by Percival Spear. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 849. Index; maps; illustrations. 42s.

This edition has been completely revised and re-set. In Part I the prehistoric section is by Sir Mortimer Wheeler, the Hindu period by Dr. A. L. Basham of the London School of African and Oriental Studies. Part II is by J. B. Harrison, and Part III, the period of British rule, has been entirely re-written by Dr. Spear and brought up to date.

Parts I and II illustrate the immense additions to the knowledge of the subject which have been made by scholarly research in recent years, but it is not obvious why Vincent Smith's name has been retained. Much of the charm and grace of his work has been overlaid by the mass of material now available, and the book indicates the difficulty of writing a sufficiently full account, based on that material, in 849 pages.

An adequate review might occupy several pages of this journal and only a few comments can be attempted.

At the end of the introduction, presumably by Dr. Spear, we read that “knowledge of the older history will always be a valuable aid in the attempt to solve the numerous problems of modern India. Indian history must be seen as a whole if we are to understand any part of it, and especially its recent period, aright.” There seems to be some reason to think that in writing Part III, Dr. Spear has overlooked some of the hard facts of autocratic kingship during the Hindu and Muslim eras. There were periods of grandeur as under the Empires of the Mauryas, the Guptas or the Moghuls. Even these were not free from tyranny and an abuse of absolute power. The great dynasties soon fell into decay, to be followed by numerous petty kings and adventurers who carved small kingdoms for themselves. In hundreds of cases, over long periods and throughout India, ferocious struggles for these minor kingdoms took place, brother frequently slaying brother and sons sometimes killing their fathers in order to obtain or keep supreme power. Such conditions left an enduring influence on the minds of rulers and ruled.

Dr. Spear leaves the impression that he does not appreciate the significance of this or of the greatness of the change brought about by the British introduction of the Rule of Law, which he only mentions in an almost casual way. His history of the British period is predominantly political, and there are some aspects of many-sided India to which he seems to be blind or indifferent. He treats the Sepoy Mutiny on mainly political lines, with generalizations apparently intended to cover the whole of India. He does not bring out the fact that it was almost confined to Hindustan and the Hindustanis—a small part of the whole—while Punjabis, Sikhs, Baluchis, Rajputs, Marathas, Madrassis and others took no part, but often and very effectively helped to suppress the mutineers; several regiments, including Irregulars such as the Khansdesh Bhil Corps earning the medal “India 1857-58.” He perhaps does not know

that a Punjab Police Battalion disarmed a wavering regiment of the Bengal army, and other police detachments destroyed dangerous bands of Sepoys who had deserted. He has nothing to say of the importance of the Indian Army in Indian life or, for instance, of its valour and endurance in the war of 1914-18, to which he only makes a brief reference from the point of view of the small politically minded classes, who, almost without exception, took no part in the fighting. Here he evades one of the most complex and paradoxical problems of modern India. Nor does he refer to the other side of the medal presented by the martial races: their blood-lust which finds vent in outlawry, dacoity and outbursts of savage rioting. There is no indication in this history of the extent of the mutual slaughtering of Hindus and Muslims, which became appallingly frequent after it was evident that the British Government intended to proceed with the development of self-government, a process which the Muslims realized must almost certainly mean Hindu dominance. He makes an incredible error when he states that dacoity (looting by bands of five or more) was suppressed in the middle of the nineteenth century. (He cannot be referring to open banditry by large bodies of robbers like the Pindaris which, he has explained, was brought to an end by the British under Lord Hastings in 1818.)

Another side to this blood-lust, to rioting and dacoity, was the long series of deeds of great gallantry performed by the police of all ranks, including many of the superior British officers as well as Indian constables, often acting on their own initiative and too often losing their lives in the performance of their duty. As the police are painted (in this history up-to-date) in terms used by Lord William Bentinck in 1832 (p. 627), the credit side might have been mentioned. It is clear, however, that Dr. Spear has not read the voluminous material available in the shape of annual and special reports on the police, and knows nothing of the great and largely successful efforts made by British and Indian officers to improve the moral tone and the efficiency of the force, especially after the report of the Police Commission of 1902, the only document in the long series with which he seems to be acquainted.

In general he accepts the point of view of Indian nationalism in the campaign in which Gandhi played a prominent part from 1919 to 1947. This point of view in a book published in 1958 is an anachronism. The most intelligent and balanced minds which have been directed to the subject now realize that Gandhi made a grave mistake in trying to hustle the West—and the East—after the announcement of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. With more patience more Indians could have gained greater experience in the complicated administration of a modern state on constitutional lines for which their past under autocratic kingship had provided no moral or intellectual preparation, while the masses had no precedents to guide them in matters of parliamentary government. That Dr. Spear has no conception of the practice of higher administration and statesmanship will be evident from a comparison of history as written by him and by Sir Winston Churchill—a comparison not quite fair, perhaps, to any academic historian, but one which has become inevitable.

Dr. Spear is at his best in the early part of the British period, but it is amusing to read his almost condescending and generally shrewd, if academic, judgments on some of the great statesmen who presided over the expansion and consolidation of the British "raj." He does not condemn this expansion, except in the cases of Lord Dalhousie and—inexplicably—of Lord Ellenborough in Sindh; inexplicably, because here, more emphatically than anywhere else, his "new middle class" in embryo, the Hindu officials and traders, as well as some of the Sindhi Mahomedans earnestly desired and encouraged it as a relief from the tyrannies of their foreign conquerors the Baluchi Mirs. His more detached historical writing is concerned with the earlier British period before he comes to the *parti pris* attitude resulting from his psychological involvement with the Indian National Congress and his Mahatma.

Further criticism of the matter of Part III must be resisted for reasons of space, even if it seems to call for it in many places; but reference may be made to a defect in manner: that is, to the way in which a few essays on special subjects are interpolated in such a way as to repeat from a different angle points which have been made in the more chronologically arranged narrative; and sometimes with the effect of confusing the chronological sequence and making it necessary to re-read more than one part to clear up the confusion.

**Malaya.** A Political and Economic Appraisal. By Lennox A. Mills. Oxford University Press. Pp. 234. Index. 30s.

This is a picture of the modern Malayan scene—Malayan in the widest sense of the term—as seen through the eyes of an intelligent foreigner, an American Professor at the University of Minnesota. Professor Mills has a clear grasp of his subject, his comments are friendly and appear unaffected by the normal American obsessions about Colonialism.

We have a reasonably accurate account of the events leading up to the creation of the independent Federation of Malaya, and the attainment of internal self-government by the new state of Singapore; but the account is superficial, and particularly in the opening chapter, where an attempt is made to describe the Malayan polity before the Japanese invasion, Professor Mills makes a slip or two.

The desire for freedom from Colonial "bondage" is natural, and it awakes in almost all ruled people when an educated and politically conscious minority comes into being. Professor Mills speaks of "hostility towards the British Colonial Government," but to a penetrating observer this hostility is a momentary historical fact of less importance, and of less lasting effect than those spiritual things which Great Britain has bequeathed to the Malaysians (as to the other peoples) and which bind them with strong, but not physical, bonds within the ambit of the Commonwealth. We need not postulate "loyalty" to the British in a political sense in the Asian races, yet the educated have largely absorbed the ways of thinking of their Colonial mentors.

Our legacy to them includes democratic parliamentary government, the rule of law, etc., and all those things from Shakespeare to Football, which three or more generations of the English-educated part of the population has absorbed into its system; and this class is for the time being the ruling one. Thus, in Singapore the real problem for the future is not one of British versus Chinese, but the problem of the antithesis between English-educated and Chinese-educated Chinese. If the future is to fall completely into the hands of the latter—who are in a big majority—then indeed we shall come to the parting of the ways.

When he speaks of special privilege for the Malays and the formation of Malay Reservations, the author might well have pointed out that legislation to preserve its peasantry from turning into a feckless, landless proletariat is one of the normal acts of good government in a simple society. Rice growing was not confined to the Malays by any imperative mandate; it was traditional to them, and few others wanted to indulge in an activity which was so much less remunerative than rubber planting.

Professor Mills stresses that the British only felt it an obligation to educate the Malays in their vernacular. He might well have made out a much stronger indictment against our system of education—a system which failed—when we had the chance: to educate *all* the peoples of the country to be "Malayans."

The significant thing about the Communist rebellion in Malaya is that as such it has failed. For this reason the Malayan Communist Party now tends to be a discredited force even amongst left-wingers in Malaya. In Singapore the significant driving force is Chinese Chauvinism, with an anti-Colonialist but not necessarily a pro-Marxian bias. It is well exemplified in the young radically minded Mayor Ong Eng Guan. The author has some pertinent things to say about the Chinese attitude to this rebellion in its early days, and he quotes from a very interesting letter from the late Sir Henry Gurney to Mr. Tan Cheng Lock.

Professor Mills should not call the "kris" a Malay sword.

In his concluding chapters on the economics of the country, the author emphasizes the immense importance of the rubber planting industry to Malaya, and how it must renovate itself with high-yielding new trees in order to survive against the competition of synthetic rubber. He has one curious sentence in which he says that "it would seem that the attainment of self-government in the Federation will be followed by the partial collapse of its principal industry involving many of the estates and a high proportion of the small-holders." One can find no logical reason for this statement, nor, in fact, has this eventuality occurred. The rubber industry may suffer from economic ailments, but surely not from the fact that the Federation is now a self-governing independent nation.

He sets out clearly the dilemma from which Malaya, in common with all young

emergent territories, suffers—the desire for economic progress as against the lack of capital and adequate resources to finance such progress. The government must have revenue to carry out its projects; revenue comes from taxation; taxation tends to grow so high as to kill the bird which lays the golden eggs.

This book can be recommended to the general reader as a very fair and sound account of what has been happening in this part of South-East Asia since the end of the Second World War. It does not attempt to “crystal-gaze” into the future, but it does set out many of the problems which have to be tackled by the new emerging governments. It fails to dig deeply below the surface in seeking for the ultimate motives, but then let us remember that it only comprises a little over two hundred pages and Professor Mills has done some clever compressing.

W. C. S. CORRY.

**Aden.** By Sir Tom Hickenbotham. Constable. 1958. Pp. xii + 242. 13 plates; 1 map. Index. Price 21s.

This, though it is not meant to be, is a very sad book, for it illustrates only too well how impervious we can be to the teachings of history. We do not seem to have begun to understand that Arabism shows its defensive reflexes as soon as the Arab world is subjected to political or military control, and that when it assumes its modern guise of Arab nationalism there is really nothing much that can be done with it. We entered World War I with Egyptian nationalism to contend with, but got Arab nationalism on our side by our promises to the Arabs. The sad story of the Mandates and Israel ought to have convinced us (and the French) that we would have maintained our Middle East interests better if we had let the Arabs have their independence.

Aden and the Protectorate emerged from World War II with its Arabism lively but as friendly as it had been for a century. Good relations had been the consequence of the Indian policy of treating South Arabia as a peripheral, “foreign” interest. Through Colonial spectacles this was seen merely as neglect, and the fact that it had resulted in a *laissez-faire* policy which completely suited Arabism was overlooked. Much had been done since 1937, when Aden became a Colony, to remedy the grosser aspects of neglect, but by the time the author of this book became Governor a sort of delayed-action Lugardism had been started in the Protectorate. This was really a consequence of the post-war flood of Colonial nationalism in Africa, which was being met in the only way possible—with an intensified programme of democratic and social development and economic aid in the form of Colonial development and welfare. Its application in Arabia was, as must now be evident, quite inappropriate, for it inevitably involved more “rule” than Arabs are prepared to stand from foreigners.

Aden itself was changing rapidly. This was due to the expansion of trade and communications and industrial development which, combined with a much more intensive Governmental activity, created an atmosphere bound to be difficult to handle and potentially explosive. The increase of Western education, press, and radio—particularly Cairo radio—provided a fuse. The world and all its ideas, if not all its ideologies, came to Aden, and, in particular, with the rise of Nasser, Arab nationalism. Only a match to light the fuse was now needed, and this came early in 1954 with the federation proposals. Sir Tom Hickenbotham gives an officer from Northern Rhodesia the main credit for these, and it seems clear that the fact that federation in Central Africa had been a lively issue since 1951 must have resulted again in what was thought good for Africa being thought equally good for Arabia.

The situation was gravely worsened by the effects on the Zeidi Government of the Yemen. Sir Tom admits this, and tells how the Imam feared it might result in the Protectorate people joining up with his own disaffected Shafi population. He had also the belief that oil would be found in the Protectorate, and therefore stronger reasons for maintaining his ancient claims to the Protectorate. These had been put into abeyance by the Treaty of Sana in 1934, and the Imam held that the Federation proposals were a breach of that treaty. Sir Tom discusses the point at issue, the interpretation of the word used for frontier, though he does not state that the

treaty expressly provided that only the Arabic text is valid. This gives the word in the plural, in which, like "*finis*" in Latin, it is commonly used for the whole country and not merely the boundary line. The Imam held that the *status quo* provision meant that nothing in the whole country must be changed.

Certainly none of those concerned on the British side thought of this at the time; indeed, in 1934 there was no question of a forward policy, but I think Sir Tom is mistaken in asserting that "the old Imam most certainly understood" that the article in question referred solely to the frontier position. I confess I did not realize in 1941, when he upbraided me for an alleged breach of the treaty, that he was referring to the *status quo* of the whole country; but, in the light of what has happened since, the following extract from a letter which the late Mr. Salih Jaffer, who was with me at my interview with the Imam, seems to show that others did: "The Yemeni Government is not pleased with the forward policy which H.M.G. is making in the Aden Protectorate, as she takes it as a violation of the *status quo*. . ."

Sir Tom gives what is admittedly intended to be the merest summary of introductory Yemeni history, but since its effect is to strengthen the Imam's claim to the Protectorate it is well to emphasize that the Zeidis only held the present Western Protectorate from 1640-1728. In 1066, and at other dates quoted, they were very small beer, and the ruling dynasties had no affinities with them at all. The only ruler quoted by name is Malik Ali, dated mid-fifteenth century. This was presumably Malik Ali of the Banu Tahir, who took Aden in 1453, but he was never "on the Imamic throne," and, in fact, no Zeidi at all. Nor can it be truly said that the Protectorate "came into being by mutual agreement." Though its benefits were certainly accepted by the Arabs at any rate from the 1870s, I do not think it has been claimed before that we were "in effect invited to become the paramount power." Official accounts make it clear that treaties were first sought by the British because the neighbouring tribes interfered with the land-borne trade, and that in spite of treaties the first year of the occupation of Aden showed a turbulent record with a good deal of fighting. Moreover, there was no question in 1839 of the tribes having "to resist the increasing power of the Yemen," nor was the Imam in a position to turn his attention to the establishment of his authority further afield. All through the 1830s the Tihama was out of his hands; in 1840 he lost Taiz for a while; in 1841 and 1843 he even sought British help; in 1844 and 1845 he lost Taiz, Ibb and Jiblah. Besides, from 1840 the Turks were moving towards their second occupation of the Yemen. The author dates this as 1872, but that was their capture of the highlands.

As for the future, Sir Tom conceives of Aden, with the Federated Protectorate, becoming either a "Dominion," a now unfashionable word, but presumably meaning a member-nation of the Commonwealth or an independent Arab state. Even outside Arabia's 112,000 square miles of desert, of which only 1 per cent. is said to be cultivable, and a population of about 800,000, would hardly be thought a viable proposition as a nation. It is, however, inconceivable that even our very elastic idea of what a Commonwealth nation can be could include a country which would be bound to be in the Arab League, not to mention its probable domination by the U.A.R. and the Yemen. If its total independence is to be the aim, one must presume that the British would have no further use for the base; it could not exist as British if Aden were not in British hands. Arab pressure to get rid of it would begin the day after independence and, being Arabs, the people of Aden could not resist it. It would be the evacuation from the Canal all over again.

The truth is that Aden and the Protectorate survived so long because British and Arabs had common interests; those interests have been increased since the war and might very well have continued to be shared peacefully if Arabism and Arab nationalism had not been provoked. Indeed, although the British are said not to rule the Protectorate, Sir Tom consistently speaks of "Governing the Protectorate," of its being "under British domination," "a colonial area," and so on. He emphasizes there was no coercion about Federation, though instructions to the advisers told them to use "persuasion," and persuasion by officers of a governing power often looks very like compulsion to others. One can hardly wonder at anti-colonial and nationalist feelings.

Indeed a sad tale.

HAROLD INGRAMS.



**The Near East.** By William Yale. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1958. Pp. 486 + xix.

This book is one of a series to be published by the University of Michigan under the general title of "History of the Modern World." Its author's intention is to present a combination of political, social and cultural history which will provide for the general reader a comprehensive and scholarly yet readable background. Professor Yale brings to his task very considerable authority and experience: as American Liaison Officer to Allenby, later an official of the King-Crane Commission, and more recently as a consultant for the State Department and United Nations. His study is immensely detailed, often informed by first-hand personal recollection of events and the terrain; and it provides a compendium of facts underlying the bewildering shifts of policy and situations that have characterized the present-day Near and Middle East.

A principal merit of the volume is its frequent detailed exposition of the personalities and local circumstances associated with historical events: it is unusual and welcome to have the impact of human relations retailed at first hand. The best sections of the book are probably those that relate to the First World War and a decade after—as regards the later periods, Professor Yale is on slightly less congenial ground. His commentaries on the rise of Israel and Nasserism are penetrating and informative, but a number of important aspects of present-day relations are lightly passed over—for example, conditions in Syria, the Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf area.

Professor Yale's study is a considerable contribution to understanding the region and its problems; but its effectiveness is diminished by the astringency with which he writes—it would seem that for him history is clearly a record of the follies of mankind. As a principal theme, there is the rise and eclipse of imperialism—Ottoman and European—with the parallel development of specifically Arab nationalism. It is rare for Professor Yale to impute any motives of enlightenment or generosity to individuals or groups involved other than Arabs; and whilst such views may often be justifiable, there is perhaps a little more to be said in favour of outsiders than Professor Yale would allow. Further blemishes are somewhat excessive colloquialisms, occasional downright errors in names and places—especially in maps, and perhaps a sidestepping of the question where Near becomes Middle. Nevertheless, this is without question a timely and important study, summarising a lifetime's preoccupation with, and participation in, the problems of the region.

W. B. FISHER.

**Major Governments of Asia.** Edited by George McT. Kahin. Published by Cornell University Press (Oxford University Press, London), 1958. Pp. 607. Index, maps, bibliographies. 45s.

This book is presented as "a study in comparative government devoted to the major states of Asia." It consists of five sections outlining the political history, the constitution, the government and political structure and the social framework of, in turn, China (by Harold G. Hinton), Japan (by Nobutaka Ike), India (by Norman D. Palmer), Pakistan (by Keith Callard), and Indonesia (by the Editor). The authors also discuss the major contemporary problems of these countries, in particular those of their foreign policies and economic development.

The book is much wider in scope and consequently more generally useful than the suggested sub-title "a study in comparative government" would indicate. The authors have taken a broad view of their task, encouraged by an imaginative editor who was responsible for the original "plan of organization." They have brought together the main aspects of each country's history as they have affected the present constitutional and governmental structure, the ways in which social and religious attitudes have developed into political alignments and conflicts and the influences of outstanding national leaders. They have examined in considerable detail the many and diverse political groups exercising and contending for power, highlighting the different characteristics and objectives, frequently so obscure to outside observers,

of the political parties. They have considered the part played by the less clearly defined social and pressure groups at all levels of political activity. And they have explained electoral procedures, discussing the attitudes of the electorate and the nature and influence of public opinion. On to this social and political framework that they have built up, they have grafted a careful and illuminating analysis of the contemporary problems of each state—the problems of attaining internal stability, of overcoming poverty and achieving economic growth, of their relationships with other Asian states and the West. The result is a series of papers which are, in themselves, exceedingly useful introductions to these diverse countries, but which, together, form a cohesive whole. This is no mean achievement; at a time when there is a rapidly widening interest in what is frequently referred to as the “problem of Asia” a book which conveys by its presentation the inter-relationships of the region, yet so clearly illustrates the diversity within it, is an important contribution to the literature on the subject.

It would be a mistake to be deterred by the fact that so much has been covered in so small a space. The authors have been surprisingly successful in maintaining a continuous, easy to read narrative and in avoiding the more common dangers of compression; apart, perhaps, from the early purely historical chapters, this book is no mere catalogue of events, forms and personalities. Indeed, each section is almost as much analytic as it is descriptive and, although the book is primarily intended for students and the general reader, there is much in it that will be of interest to the specialist.

For the general reader and for students new to the problems of the area this work cannot be commended too highly as an introduction to the subject. The interested “outsider” is now being faced with an ever-growing stream of writing on particular and limited aspects of the Asian countries considered in this volume. It is easy for him to be induced to make partial and ill-considered judgments about the political attitudes and policies of the eastern states and about the requirements for western policy in relation to them. These objective and informed studies provide the opportunity for a much more balanced and understanding attitude towards the major Asian states to be acquired with very little initial effort. They will also assist in breaking down widely held prejudices which are responsible for so many of the strains in the relationships between East and West. The scholarship, authority and skill of the authors are continually apparent, not least in their success in stimulating the newcomer to further reading, for which they have provided extensive annotated reading lists.

T. D. Ross.

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**Himmelstier und Gletscherlöwe.** Mythen, Sagen und Fabeln aus Tibet. In langjährigen völkerkundlichen Forschung unter den Amdo-Tibetern aufgenommen von Prof. Dr. Matthias Hermanns, S.V.D., Bombay. “Das Gesicht der Völker,” der zentralasiatische Kulturkreis, tibetische Dichtung. Im Erich Röth-Verlag, Kassel, 1955. Pp. 260, with one frontispiece illustration, two maps and six artistic initials. DM. 4.80.

This book of Tibetan myths, tales and fables is by a Bavarian member of the Viennese Missionary Society of the Divine Word, today settled in Bombay, but long acquainted with the north-eastern part of Tibet called Amdo (Chinese: Tsinghai). It is artistically set out with a colourful cover by Diether Röth, showing the Buddha and his two disciples over the fierce figure of Mahakala, against a background of red flame.

In German, the book forms part of the collection “The Face of the Peoples” of the Erich Röth-Verlag, Kassel, whose object, we are told in an announcement at the end, is “to bring together the people of different nations . . . in order to discover the human element hidden behind different forms of being and varying personal ways.”

The title translated into English means “Sky Ox and Glacier Lion” and is intended, no doubt, to convey to the reader the particular feeling of Tibetan litera-

ture. Nowhere in the text, however, is there any further reference to these picturesque animals.

The Rev. Fr. Hermanns has spent many years in north-eastern Tibet and obviously knows both the language of the region and the area well. He has painstakingly collected many intriguing stories which he presents here in the following order: creation songs, an ancient Tibetan tradition, stories of origin (among them, those of marriage, of clothing and of the cap), speeches of praise at popular festivities, the traditional fable of the Ka shi dzes ga land, and other Tibetan fables.

Among these, the fable of the Ka shi dzes ga land has perhaps the greatest popular appeal. It concerns the threat of a war between birds and monkeys over a certain territory, happily avoided through the intercession of a hare and a domestic cock. It is singularly reminiscent of present, similar, tense international situations of human making, and there is a lesson to be gathered from the Tibetan wisdom of this tale.

There is a great wealth of stories, well presented by the author and in an agreeable manner. Many have a distinct Indian flavour to them, which cannot fail to cause surprise considering how remote the province of Amdo is. The Indian connection is apparent in allusions such as those to the Malaya folk (hill people, certainly, but perhaps the present-day inhabitants of that name in contemporary Kerala?) to Brahmins and to Wa ra na se, which the Rev. Fr. Hermanns omits to inform the unenlightened reader is the Tibetan name for Banaras (Benares).

Because of the Indian echo of the tales, it would have been of interest had the author given more precise information concerning their origin. For instance, the stories of old Lo-lhsang (inconsistently and incorrectly spelt Lob zang in many places) are given detached from any kind of literary background, and the reader is left to conjecture concerning their place in Tibetan literature as a whole.

There is no doubt that the translations have been properly made, but it would have been helpful to have been given some idea of the system of transliteration adopted for Tibetan words and names. Most of the time, although writing in German, the author uses English phonetic spelling for such words as chen-po, chu, and names like Ka-shi and She-rab.

The manner in which Tibetan folk tales are told often appears strange and incomprehensible to the Western reader. It is monotonous and repetitive and its symbolism is often obscure. The Rev. Fr. Hermanns has faithfully rendered these characteristics, although without the references to the original texts which one would expect of a German scholar. The result is that the book falls between two stools: it is either too Tibetan to please the general public, or not technical enough to satisfy serious Tibetologists.

In the bibliography at the end, the Rev. Fr. Hermanns gives the names of a number of well-known Tibetan books. Most of them have already been translated by European scholars of different nationalities, yet the author, in many places, has added in brackets "partly translated by me," or even "completely translated by me," as in the case of the Gesar saga concerning the War against the Hor.

In the notes, page 245, he states that Tibetans do not eat pork—an amazing remark, considering the predilection of the central Tibetans for this meat. But then, the Rev. Fr. Hermanns always speaks of Tibet in terms of what he saw and heard in only one part of the vast country, namely Amdo. This failing was already very noticeable in his previous books, and here again it has caused him to give the names of Tibetan provinces in the dialect of the area that he knows (Tod for Tö, Bus for Ü), and not in the way that they are pronounced in Lhasa. He does not take into enough consideration how very special, and even at times un-Tibetan, some of the mixed population of Amdo really is. He would do far better to present his otherwise quite exceptionally good material as only indigenous to the north-east; this would give it the scientific value which it deserves, and avoid the shade of inaccuracy which a too hasty generalization seems to bring with it.

There is a good explanation of the etymology of the name Amdo (as coming from the opening of a valley in the shape of a capital Tibetan A) and the connection which the author sees between Tibetan so-called devil dances (masked) and ancient bull dances is worthy of attention.

**Amiran-Darejaniani: A Cycle of Mediæval Georgian Tales** ascribed to Mose Khoneli, translated by R. H. Stevenson. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1958. 8vo, cloth, pp. xxxiii, 240.

R. H. Stevenson has made a notable contribution to oriental studies in rendering into English the cycle of mediæval Georgian tales known under the style of *Amiran-Darejaniani* ("Amiran son of Darejan"). In 1834, the existence of this work was made known to M. F. Brosset, the pioneer of Georgian studies in western Europe, but more than sixty years were to pass before Z. Dchidchinadze published a Georgian edition of the text. S. Kakabadze's version, which appeared in 1939, has not been available to Stevenson, and for his translation he has had to make use of the earlier edition in which he finds many defects. Apart from some extracts put into Russian, *Amiran-Darejaniani* has never previously been translated into any language in its entirety.

Stevenson is a poet of quality, versed in the comparative study of heroic literature, and it is a happy accident that he should have been attracted also to the study of the Georgian language. He recognizes that "the structure of Georgian is so far removed from that of the IE languages as to present the translator with quite peculiar problems," but in his own fine English he is able to convey "the vigorous terseness of style that is the special character of *Amiran-Darejaniani*." The adventures of *Amiran-Darejaniani* and his fellow *chabukis* (which may be rendered perhaps as "champions") do not make easy reading since the innumerable incidents of the cycle are often repetitive in form and content, but there are passages of real splendour. The very formalism of the traditional narrative and the episodic fantasies sometimes produce the effect of ballet (as in *The Story of the Stars*).

In a learned introduction (20 pages), which is a model of compression but which many readers will find all too brief, the translator discusses problems of derivation and dating. Although the text has never previously been accessible in full in any language except Georgian, the cycle has already attracted a veritable library of scholarly criticism which is ably summarized by Stevenson, with the addition of valuable bibliographical notes. Persian influences in the stories are clearly strong (Firdawsī, etc.), but Stevenson does not accept the views of such formidable authorities as Marr, Kekelidze and Blake that the work is an adaptation from a Persian original. He prefers the conclusion of Bleichsteiner, Karst, Ingorovka and the modern generation of Georgian scholars that the cycle is essentially Georgian in character.

In content and style, *Amiran-Darejaniani* is less sophisticated than the more famous "Man in the Panther's Skin" of Shota Rust'haveli, which is circumstantially dated to the turn of the twelfth century. Stevenson (in my view, rightly) prefers an earlier dating for *Amiran-Darejaniani*, and indicates the latter half of the reign of David II, the Builder, 1089-1125. "The superb vigour and the martial achievements of that age would seem to be in harmony with the spirit which informs (the cycle)." He adds with insight: "The comparatively few names in *Amiran-Darejaniani* of peoples, lands and cities known to history seems to reflect obscurely an epoch some two or three hundred years prior to that at which it was composed: a world in which the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad is at its zenith, in which Basra, which began to decline in importance towards the end of the ninth century, is a leading commercial centre, and in which the ruler of the Khazars, a people whose power has generally been held to have been virtually extinguished by the raid of Sviatoslav, lord of the Kievan Russians, in 965, is a monarch to mention in the same breath as those of Greece and China." In an appendix, the translator cites Kekelidze's comparison of accounts of single combat between champions in *Amiran-Darejaniani* with those in the earliest components of the *Georgian Chronicle* which again supports an older dating.

Certainly many elements and details derive from cultural strata of great antiquity in the common background of the Caucaso-Iranian world. Amiran himself is described by his matronymic. And in the view of J. Karst (*Mythologie Armeno-Caucasienne et Hérito-Asiatique*, 137) his mother Darejan corresponds to the goddess Itrujan of the pagan Georgian pantheon. The matrilinear theme recurs in the several references to "sister's sons" and in the repeated concept of the wandering *chabuki* winning power and wealth by marriage with the king's daughter or, as in

"The Story of the Talismans" with the queen's daughter. The antelope "with golden horns, eyes and hooves as black as jet, a white belly and a red back" is a folk memory, perhaps, of a ritual beast with gilded horns (p. 2). There is a curious reference, too, to a chestnut Tokharian horse (*t'okhariki*)—"there was no horse like it on earth." One recalls the magical blood-sweating horses of the Tokharian Altai, sought by the Chinese court. The fame of noble animals can outlive their masters by centuries. (Compare Chaucer, *Knt's T.* 1290: "About his Chaar ther wentet white Alauntz"—a reference to the hounds of the extinct Alans from whom the English mastiff descended.)

The book would reward the attention of students of magic and comparative religion. As Stevenson notes, Karst, in his *Mythologie*, 135 ff., has already analysed the proper names in *Amiran-Darejaniani* and drawn attention to the provincial and tribal versions of the cycle current in Georgia and the Caucasus. (These were published originally in some numbers of *Collection of Materials for the Description of the Localities and Tribes of the Caucasus*.) The proper names, which appear superficially to be Arabic or Iranian with Georgian terminations (e.g. Baqbaq, Badri-dze, Yamani-dze, Usip, etc.) Karst derives from the remote background of the Asianic pantheon. *Amiran-Darejaniani* is a mediæval document of extraordinary merit and interest and in making it available in English, Stevenson is to be congratulated on a fine achievement. In his introduction, he makes a charming reference to Mr. A. Gugushvili, a learned Georgian long resident in London, who by his aid and counsel to English scholars, has done much to further the pursuit of Georgian studies in England.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

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**The Rebel Emperor.** By Lady Flavia Anderson. Published by Gollancz. Pp. 356. Index; biblio. 25s.

This important book describes a phase of China's history which merits the attention that the author has given it. Evidence of meticulous research is here in abundance. The ordinary reader has little conception of what it means when he talks of the "Taiping" Rebellion. Few realize that the early eighteen hundreds saw the birth of a Christian movement of the proportions described in this book. It is true to say that the form of Christianity fostered by Hung Hsiu-Ch'uan was perhaps an unorthodox form, but of its appeal to the Chinese of that day in the provinces of Kwang-Si and Kwang-Tung there is no doubt. It had sufficient drive to inspire an advance of the Taiping rebels of something like 1,500 miles from Yung-Nan to Tsing-Hai, only about 20 miles south of Tientsin. Who knows that but for Chinese Gordon they might not have reached the imperial city of Peking itself.

Hung's early struggles for scholarship are vividly described, and how discouragement seemed only the spur to further effort. Before he was thirteen he had mastered and memorized the whole of the Four Books and the Five Classics.

He struggled on through the labyrinth of Chinese studies, at the same time absorbing, where possible, the tenet of the Christian religion. Jesus Christ was to him "Elder Brother," though Hung himself did not claim divine origin. He did consider he had been taken up to heaven and that revelations had been made to him. His followers were known as God-worshippers, and at one time it looked as if they would become strong enough to change China into a Christian nation. Central China was definitely under the sway of the Heavenly King—T'ien Wang—as he styled himself. As a Christian he could not be described as the Son of Heaven, but he wore the Dragon Robe of imperial yellow satin. This was a crime in the eyes of the Manchu Government in Peking. It was treason, and even the Manchu Emperor could not rescind the sentence for such an offence.

The whole of the Yangtze Valley gradually came under the control of the Taipings. The famous Three Cities were theirs, and in 1853 Nanking was captured. Great Britain was doing her best to avoid being drawn into the struggle—Taiping vs. the Manchu Government in Peking—chiefly owing to her preoccupation with the Crimean War.

It took two years for the Taipings to make their great northward march to threaten Peking, but Hung's position went from strength to strength, and in 1851 he was crowned Emperor under the style of the Heavenly King.

It was not until 1864 that the Northern Government regained control of Nanking, and that after much fighting.

The whole atmosphere of the book is an example of how deep study and reading can create that "ambiance" that is usually only achieved after many years in a country and in association with her people.

The author is to be congratulated on having written a book which accurately presents a period of history in China which few writers have attempted. One hastens to congratulate her on this absorbing work.

H. St. C. S.

**Mountains and a Monastery.** By Peter Holmes. Published by Geoffrey Bles, Ltd. Pp. 191. Ill.; index. 21s.

The interest in Thibet and its future intrigues an increasing number of people in Great Britain, and this book, describing a small expedition to the mountainous—and also desert—province of Spiti, should find many readers who are interested in these wild and little-explored regions.

The author calls Spiti "The Middle Country," with reason, for it has been a kind of buffer state for many years. It is north of the great Himalayan Divide and has, like Thibet, cold dry winters, hot summers, and no monsoon. Climbing is possible from June to December, the other eight months being entirely snowbound. If any part of the world can be described as "off the beaten track" today, Spiti is certainly one. The author describes the "Pitoons" as being friendly, good natured, extremely dirty; adjectives which could be used to describe many of the Himalayan hill tribes. One outstanding character turned out to be a young man—Siring—of about sixteen, who attached himself to the expedition and proved himself to be a tower of strength on many occasions. He spoke Hindi as well as the local dialect, and was a veritable Man Friday in every sense. He had escaped the priestly life, as it was obvious that his citizenship was of the world and not of the monastery.

The reader is admitted to the financial conditions of a modest expedition, and it appears to be dangerous to attempt anything unless one reckons £500 per head—and that admits of no undue luxury.

They took 766 lb. of food, and a list of supplies is given in Appendix C. In addition, they ate three sheep and two goats—a fairly modest menu.

The photographs are good and the maps informing; the appreciation of the people sympathetic, and reveal that the travellers made their expedition with the right approach. Your reviewer strongly recommends the books of all those whose eyes turn towards the mighty Himalayas.

H. St. C. S.

The author is young and Irish, probably very Irish and very likeable, enjoying every minute of circumstances which tend to offer a greater appeal on one's first visit than later.

Irishmen are happy travellers. Not for them elaborate itineraries or even those bed-rolls so long essential to Europeans in Asia. May be a bit cold in hill stations and borrowing may be a bit of a nuisance. But who cares anyway?

G. M. ROUTH.

**Preface to Cairo.** A Survey of pre-Cairo in history and legend. By Kenneth P. Kirkwood. Mutual Press Ltd., Ottawa.

The visitor to modern Cairo, and even those who may have spent half a life-time there, are apt to think of its ancient history in terms of what they can still see—the tremendous works of those earliest Pharaohs who founded Memphis and built the Pyramids, and near at hand, the glories of Cairo proper, Al Kahirah, founded in 969 A.D. by Jawhar, the general and minister of the Fatimid Caliph, Al Mo'izz. Between the establishment of Memphis as the first capital of all Egypt, and the building up of Jawhar's mosque Al Aghar and Saladin's fortress citadel, lies an interval of 4,000 years and a succession of cities raised on adjoining sites. And it is the story of those historic sites during those four millennia that the author of *Preface to Cairo* sets out to recapitulate. His work has been manifestly a labour of love, which renders him a pleasant guide through the sequence of foreign powers who ruled in Egypt's capital, Persian, Greek, Roman and Arab.

It is not the author's fault if the story is a tantalizing one. So little trace is left of so much splendour. Gone is the new Babylon founded by the Persians in their 200 years of domination (525-332 B.C.). Alexander and the Hellenic Ptolemys made their new capital of Alexandria the finest and most cultured city of the age; and little remains of their Roman successors on the Nile except the name and the massive walls of Trojan's Fortress of Babylon. Gone also is all trace of the splendid city of El Fustat, established by the first Arab conquerers of Egypt's Babylon (640 A.D.), and used later as a second capital by the famous Abbasid Caliph, Harun al Rashid of Babylon. It is even claimed by our author that the true stage of the Thousand and One Nights was "Babylon" on the Nile rather than Baghdad on the Tigris.

The Preface ends with the foundation of Al Kahirah, or Cairo proper, by Jahwar. Though all Fustât has perished there is still one great monument preserved of the era of the Arab conquerors, the mosque of Ibn Talun, but this was not built within their fading capital. Fustat had already fallen into decay when it was destroyed by fire (1168 A.D.) in the invasion of Amalric, the Latin King of Jerusalem.

The tantalizing story of all that we might have seen is told with imagination, and the book is well produced. The transliteration of Arabic names is always a stumbling-block and no attempt is made here to correct the customary usage. The illustrations are appropriate, and the best are very good indeed.

N. G. D.

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THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

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ANDREWS, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

Qatar: R. COCHRANE, ESQ., M.B.F.

## Secretary :

MRS. K. G. PUTNAM, M.B.E.

## IN MEMORIAM

LIEUT.-COL. H. R. P. DICKSON, C.I.E., F.R.G.S.

**L**IEUT.-COL. HAROLD RICHARD PATRICK DICKSON who died in Kuwait on June 14, 1959, at the age of 78 was one of the last of the diminishing group of English men and women who spent their lives by choice among the Arabs and recorded the charm and magic of the desert lands in books.

Harold Dickson was born in Syria where his father was British Consul, and ascribed his lifelong success with the Badawin to the fact that as an infant he was foster-mothered by a Badawin woman of the desert and thus, by time-honoured custom, became a blood-brother of her tribe, the important and aristocratic Anizah.

After education at St. Edward's School and Wadham College, Oxford, he was commissioned in the 1st Connaught Rangers and served in India, transferring to the Indian Army, 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse), in 1908. Until 1914 he was on special service in Kashmir and Bikanir. At the outbreak of the European War he rejoined his regiment and served with them in Mesopotamia, taking part in the action which led to the capture of Basra and the surrounding country. In 1915 he transferred to the Indian Political Department and was appointed a Political Officer in the Muntafiq district. From this date until his death in 1959 he spent his whole life among the Arabs round the head of the Persian Gulf, with the exception of a year as private secretary to the Maharaja of Bikanir.

Dickson, like other Englishmen who served in those parts, was deeply interested in the Badawin who range over this area and acquired a mine of information about their customs and folklore, which he recorded for posterity in two books, *The Arab of the Desert*, published in 1949, and *Kuwait and her Neighbours* published in 1956. In these books is revealed his love for the Arab people and their lands and his understanding of the Arab mind and unrivalled knowledge of their way of life.

The books contain a wealth of interesting information about the desert and its fauna and flora, in acquiring which he owed much to the devotion and help of his wife Violet.

In these books, both written in the latter years of his life, he recorded with acute sympathy, observant eye and tireless diligence the daily life of the people, their customs and traditions and the fauna and flora of their desert home.

Many of the details he noted down may seem trivial individually but taken in the mass they build up a complete picture of the Arab way of life which forms an important contribution to the sociology of the Arab lands. Although like many English writers about Arabs, Dickson tends to exaggerate the romance and charm of the Badawin life and to ignore the squalor, hardship and ignorance which often characterize it, he is

meticulously accurate in his detail of tribal lineages, religion and custom and domestic habits.

In the course of his long association with the area Dickson encountered many famous personalities who figure in Arabian history. The late King of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, was his friend, as were Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah and Abdulla Salim al Sabah, both famous rulers of Kuwait. Dickson served under Sir Percy Cox and knew Faisal al Duwish, the famous Wahhabi warrior and head of the Mutair tribe, and Abdulla al Saadun, the paramount chief of the Muntafiq. He was the guest of Ibn Saud at his palace at Riyadh and he attended the famous conference at Uqair when the boundaries of Arabia with Iraq and Kuwait were defined.

In his thirty years at Kuwait, first as Political Agent and for the last twenty-three years as chief local representative of Kuwait Oil Company, Dickson was much assisted by his wife, who shared his interest in Arab ways and affection for Arab people. Indeed her friendly relation with the Sabah ladies, on whom she was on close terms, was a great help to her husband and a strength to the British cause. The Dicksons were genuinely attached to their Arab friends and took pleasure in camping in the desert and talking to the Badawin in their own language. For it is by the Badawin that Harold Dickson will be particularly missed. He won their confidence by his honest and matter-of-fact approach and to these simple desert folk the Dickson's solid white house on the harbour front, one of the few remaining landmarks of Old Kuwait, was a haven where they were always sure of a friendly reception and practical help and advice.

E. A. V. de C.

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SIR KINAHAN CORNWALLIS, G.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.,  
Order of the RAFIDAIN C.I.

**T**HE announcement of the death at his home in Hampshire on June 3, at the age of 76, of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis will have come as a grievous shock to a host of friends in the Royal Central Asian Society, of which he had been a member since 1920, and a Member and Vice-President of Council from 1940 to 1953.

Kinahan Cornwallis was educated at Haileybury and University College, Oxford. A fine performer in almost every branch of sport, his outstanding early success was as a half-miler, and the present writer recalls his quiet pleasure when, in 1925 it must have been, the news came through that his record for this event in the Oxford and Cambridge Sports had "come of age" unbeaten. From Oxford he was selected for what was then considered perhaps the plum of openings for an official career abroad, the Sudan Civil Service, the qualifications for which were athletic prowess combined with a good degree.

Still in his early thirties and with eight years of experience behind him he was thus well placed, when Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, to take an active part in the formulation and execution of British policy in the Arab world, first as Director of the Arab Bureau in Cairo and then as a political officer in Syria.

In June, 1921, he accompanied the Amir Faisal, the candidate sponsored by His Majesty's Government for the throne, to Iraq and, after the favourable plebiscite, naturally stepped into what was the key post in the mandatary administration, that of Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry which controlled the provincial administration and the police as well as the system of justice dispensed under the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations and the Departments of Agriculture and (at first) Land Revenue.

The name of Cornwallis is of course linked with those of Faisal, Cox, Wilson, Dobbs, Nuri and Ja'far as one of the principal architects of the modern state of Iraq, men whose claim to the gratitude of Iraqis of all classes no amount of the communistic propaganda now being put out by the Baghdad wireless and press can obscure. His outstanding achievement was, perhaps, the creation out of many disparate elements of a smooth and efficient administrative machine. The principle underlying the relations between the two Governments had been defined as "co-operation towards a common end, namely the establishment of an independent Iraq friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligation to His Majesty's Government." British political officers now had to surrender their extensive executive powers to inexperienced but elated Iraqis, while staying on at their sides as "Divisional Advisers" or "Administrative Inspectors." Many of the new men were ardent nationalists who had served with Faisal in Syria; they were now not only anxious to show that they were not tied to British apron-strings but also persuaded that their first duty was to reward those tribal chiefs and others who had joined in the rebellion of 1920, and this at the expense of those who had remained faithful to the administration represented by these same British officers. Among the influential Iraqis themselves, too, there were men who would have preferred a republican form of government or who resented the setting up over them of an outsider, descendant of the Prophet though he might be. Furthermore the King and the High Commissioner did not always see eye to eye.

It was to the imperturbable Cornwallis that the task fell of reconciling all these conflicting forces. The miracle was accomplished; and there grew up, bound together by a strong *esprit de corps*, a service in which the executive Iraqis, with very few exceptions, came to regard their British opposite numbers, not as agents from outside set to restrict their liberty of action or to watch them, but as faithful counsellors and friends. Even after the attainment of complete independence in 1932 the Government invited many of them to stay on for long periods, and not only in the technical departments. The unforgettable scenes at the Baghdad air-port when the time came for him to give up his post in 1935 furnished convincing demonstration, if any were needed, of his great prestige and hold on the esteem and affection of all classes.

But Cornwallis's work in Iraq was not yet finished. In April, 1941, at a critical moment in the war, he returned to Baghdad as British Ambassador; it thus fell to him to fortify the morale of the British community during the trying period of the Rashid-Ali revolt, and to negotiate the generous settlement that brought back the lawful Regent and inspired a

new period of Anglo-Iraqi co-operation, particularly in the economic sphere of the war effort.

In this connection a special tribute must be paid to Lady Cornwallis who, at this time, sustained him in his delicate and exacting task and is remembered for her constant solicitude for the welfare of the British and Indian troops quartered in or passing through Iraq, for a memorable hospitality, and for an example which did so much to cement the restored friendship, especially on the distaff side. To her and to his daughter, who shared in these activities, members of the Society will wish to offer their deepest sympathy.

To Cornwallis the revolution of July, 1958, disfigured as it was by the murder of most of the royal family and of his old friend and colleague Nuri, by the arrest on capital charges and humiliation of so many of the officials, since become ministers, whom he had helped to train, and by the disruption of the administrative machine he had done so much to create, came as a bitter blow. Many attempts, not always very well informed, have been made to apportion praise and blame for what has happened. Judged by any standard the meteoric rise of Iraq within a period of forty years from the status of three forlorn provinces of a decaying empire to an honoured place among the nations was a remarkable phenomenon, and some credit must have been due to somebody somewhere; and, in assessing the policy with which Cornwallis was so closely associated, we need only pause to ask what ministers would give today to be able to devise a policy which they could be sure, while ensuring a comparable rate of progress for Iraq and the Iraqis, would safeguard all legitimate British interests for the next thirty-seven years and stand up to a crisis as grave as the Second World War.

C. J. E.

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SIR GILES SQUIRE, K.B.E., C.I.E.

**G**ILES SQUIRE was an example of the type of public servant that leaves a deeper mark on affairs than his seniors or even his contemporaries suspect, and wins the affection of his juniors by fairness and an equable temperament. A typical son of the Rectory he was noticeably quiet and unassuming in manner, but concealed behind a modest exterior a firmness and sincerity of purpose that revealed itself to all who knew him. When the time came in 1943 to choose a successor to Sir Francis Wylie as Minister to Afghanistan, Lord Wavell at first demurred, saying that Squire did not look the part (at that time the Head of the British Mission at Kabul was taken from the India service.) He was persuaded, and his judgment was endorsed by no less a person than Sardar Mahammed Hashim Khan, for 16 years Premier of Afghanistan, who told this reviewer how steady and reliable Squire's advice had always been on occasions of difficulty.

Giles Squire was one of those India political service officers most of whose experience lay in Persia. He was five years Consul-General in Meshed and for two years during the war Counsellor at Tehran. His knowledge of Persia and Persians served him in good stead in Kabul

where, although the Durranis affect to regard their neighbours as over-civilized, there is below the surface a deep-seated regard for the inspirations of Persian culture and language.

The British Legation was raised to embassy status in Squire's time. He had a most difficult furrow to plough in that the transfer of power in India fell in the middle of his tenure—no longer could he look to Delhi or Peshawar for advice; no longer could the Afghan Government steer an even course between Russia in Turkistan and Britain in India. His time saw the flowering of the Pashtunistan movement; that its consequences were not more catastrophic is largely due to his prescience and moderating influence.

Never robust in appearance—he served in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia—he will be remembered above all for equanimity. He refrained from saying more than he meant or meaning more than he said. As a companion he was always gentle and kindly and—a little unexpectedly—a most redoubtable opponent on the tennis court.

O. C.

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SIR CHARLES INNES, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.

THE Royal Central Asian Society lost an old friend with the death on June 28 of Sir Charles Innes, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. He joined the Society in 1935, was for a long time on the Council and was until recently one of the Society's Trustees.

Innes joined the Indian Civil Service in 1898 and was appropriately posted to the Madras Presidency, with which he had long hereditary connections. He left his mark on the Presidency with his authorship of the *Malabar District Gazeteer*, but he will chiefly be remembered in India as one of the ablest Commerce Members of the Government of India, an office which he held from 1921 to 1927. It was under his membership that the important measure of separating the Railway Budget from the general finances of India was carried through, and his work on the implementation of the Indian Fiscal Committee's recommendations set India on the road to developing an independent fiscal policy of her own.

When Innes succeeded Sir Harcourt Butler as Governor of Burma in 1927 he had no reason to think that the appointment was to present problems as baffling as any which he had encountered in his career. The rebellion which broke out in Lower Burma in 1930 proved intractable in the extreme, and long and difficult operations, with reinforcements from India, were necessary before the situation was brought under control. He had the satisfaction of seeing peace restored before his retirement at the end of 1932.

After retirement he was for many years Chairman of the Mercantile Bank of India.

J. H. W.



# THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

The following is the third of a series of articles describing recent works published in the Soviet Union on the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of the U.S.S.R. and their neighbours, Persia, Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet. The present article deals with books and longer articles received between January and June, 1959.

## I. THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

### *How independent are the Muslim republics?*

**E**ACH of the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union is a Soviet Socialist Republic, which is the highest form of state independence within the Soviet Union, and each ranks as an equal among the fifteen S.S.R. that compose the U.S.S.R. Theoretically the Uzbek republic thus ranks equal with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, or Azerbaydzhan with the Ukraine. The fifteen Union republics have their own governments which are subject to the central all-Union government according to the terms of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. The question of republican independence under the Constitution is one of the points dealt with by Yu. G. Sudnitsyn in a recent pamphlet entitled *National Sovereignty in the U.S.S.R.* (Natsional'nyy suverenitet v S.S.S.R. State Publishing House of Juridical Literature, Moscow, 1958. 104 pp.). A product of an official publishing house—as indeed are all publications in the U.S.S.R.—the pamphlet is remarkable for its distortions and inaccuracies. As with much Soviet literature, half-truths are interlarded with sentiment and words are used for their emotional effect rather than for their logical meaning. Sudnitsyn assumes that *ipso facto* the victory of the working classes has enabled the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to achieve national sovereignty since by definition the working classes are incapable of national oppression. The Communist Party as spokesman for the workers ensures brotherhood among the peoples, and again by definition its national policies must be infallible. It follows that any separatist movement must be inspired by “bourgeois-nationalists.” A curious example of Sudnitsyn’s “double-think” is that he gives as a proof of the brotherly care lavished by the Party on minority peoples the *return* to their original homes of the Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, and Karachays who were forcibly deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan during 1943 and 1944. It is evidently not permissible to surmise by whose authority they were removed.

In the course of the second chapter of his pamphlet Sudnitsyn discusses the sovereign rights of the Union republics as granted under the U.S.S.R. Constitution. He writes: “The expression of the sovereign will of socialist nations was the basis of the sovereignty both of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union republics. The Union republics voluntarily renounced part of their

rights for the sake of the Union, that is, voluntarily limited their state sovereignty. This limitation is secured in Article 14 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. Outside the terms of this Article, the Union republics exercise state authority independently and fully retain their sovereign rights . . . Each Union republic has the right of free and unilateral secession from the U.S.S.R. . . . This right is the highest expression of the sovereignty of the Union republics." Sudnitsyn does not quote Article 14 which reserves to the all-Union government not only supremacy in questions of war and peace, state security and state defence, but also the right to determine all-Union national economic plans, to approve the Union budget, to determine the taxes and revenues which go to make up the Union, republican and local budgets; to administer banks, industrial, agricultural and trading organizations of all-Union subordination and to exert a general control of industry and construction of Union-republic subordination; to administer transport and communications of all-Union importance; to direct the monetary and credit system, to organize state insurance, to contract and grant loans; to control legislation concerning the judicial system and judicial procedure and the criminal and civil codes. In addition, under Article 20 (also not quoted by Sudnitsyn), in the event of a divergence between a Union law and that of a Union republic, the Union law prevails. In fact a republic is so bound economically to the central government that secession can hardly be imagined.

Sudnitsyn lists other rights which the republics enjoy. Each republic has its own constitution which "is adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Union republic and needs no further ratification (Article 60 (a) of the U.S.S.R. Constitution). It is precisely in this and not simply in the existence of a constitution that the sovereignty of a Union republic is apparent." He does not quote the text of Article 60 (a) which says that the Supreme Soviet of a Union republic adopts the constitution of the republic and amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. Article 16 says that each Union republic has its own constitution which is drawn up in full conformity with the U.S.S.R. Constitution. In fact it would seem that a republican constitution takes away more than it grants.

Each republic, continues Sudnitsyn, has its own "higher organs of state authority and state administration, which have wide powers. A Union republic is independent in administering the most important branches of the economy." This statement is, of course, hardly compatible with Article 14 which Sudnitsyn does not quote.

Each republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them, and to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives (Article 18a). Sudnitsyn adds: "The U.S.S.R. retains only the right to establish the general form of relations between the Union republics and foreign states." This is Article 14 (a). Under Article 14 (b) and (h) the all-Union government controls also questions of peace and war and all foreign trade. In fact today none of the Muslim republics has representation abroad.

Each republic has the right to maintain their own republican military formations (Article 18b). Sudnitsyn does not add that under Article 14

(g) the all-Union government has the right to organize the defence of the U.S.S.R., to direct all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., and to determine the guiding principles governing the organization of the military formations of the Union republics. Articles 18a and 18b were enacted in February, 1944, and it is possible that there may have been republican troops for the last months of the war, but there is no evidence to show that any exist at the present. The territory of the Muslim republics, like the rest of the Soviet Union, is divided into military areas controlled from the centre.

Each republic has its own citizenship and cannot have its territory altered without its consent. Each republic has its own coat of arms, flag, national anthem, and capital, all of which, Sudnitsyn comments, are symbols of its sovereignty. Under Article 15 the U.S.S.R. is bound to protect the sovereign rights of the Union republics.

Sudnitsyn writes that the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and its Presidium "have the right and are bound to annul any judicial act that violates the constitutional rights of the Union republics (Article 14 (d))." Article 14 (d) in fact says that the all-Union government has the right of control over the observance of the U.S.S.R. Constitution and of ensuring conformity of the constitutions of the Union republics with the U.S.S.R. Constitution; which is not same as Sudnitsyn's interpretation.

Sudnitsyn affirms that "the acts of a Union republic have special constitutional guarantees. For example, an act of the Council of Ministers of a Union republic, if it does not conform to the law, can be annulled only by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet (Articles 49 (e) and 69)." The texts of these Articles, which Sudnitsyn does not quote, read as follows: Article 49 (f)—Sudnitsyn's (e) is a misprint—states that the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet annuls decisions and orders of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and of the Councils of Ministers of the Union republics, if they do not conform to the law. In spite of Sudnitsyn's attempts to extol the sovereignty of the Union republics it cannot be denied that even on paper their independence is very limited. In practice it is, of course, even more limited by reason of the centralizing and authoritarian role of the Communist Party.

In a later section Sudnitsyn considers the economic independence of the Union republics. There is no doubt that in the last four or five years serious attempts have been made to alleviate chronic over-centralization by granting wider powers to local authorities. The result of the system of three types of ministry (all-Union, union-republican, and republican) was that all the most important economic enterprises in a republic were directly controlled from Moscow by an all-Union or union-republican ministry, neither of which was responsible to the republican government. Over-centralization, Sudnitsyn admits, "has begun to hinder the initiative of socialist nations and artificially to limit their sovereign rights in the economic field" (sic), and he claims that by 1957 55 per cent of all industry was controlled by the republics compared with 31 per cent in 1953. Apart from the abolition of many all-Union ministeries, further decentralization has been achieved by the establishment in 1957 of regional Economic Councils (sovnarkhoz). Each of the Muslim republics has one such

council, apart from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan which have respectively nine and four. The Economic Councils are subject to the republican Council of Ministers and are aimed at superseding some of the authority of the all-Union and union-republican ministries, many of which have been abolished, and at co-ordinating the republican ministries. There is little indication in Sudnitsyn's work of how far these measures have been successful, but there can be no doubt that even if administrative decentralization is achieved, Party control will certainly not be slackened.

### *Health services for the Kirgiz*

An impressive account of the progress of Soviet health services in Kirgizia is given by A. A. Aydaraliyev, a leading Kirgiz doctor, in *Chief Stages in the Development of Health Services in Kirgizia* (Osnovnyye etapy razvitiya zdravookhraneniya Kirgizii. Kirgiz State Publishing House, Frunze, 1958. 99 pp.). Although the traditional life of a Kirgiz nomad in the summer months was healthy, in winter, life in a yurt was damp, cold, and overcrowded, and the lack of any knowledge of hygiene made disease rampant. The traditional Kirgiz medicine man, the *tabib*, was frequently a charlatan, although the best of them had a store of traditional knowledge about the use of herbs and other natural cures. One *tabib* even carried out a successful Cæsarean section in the days before the Revolution. In the early years after the Revolution the Kirgiz were ravaged by appalling epidemics of typhus, typhoid, cholera, and other diseases which were not brought under control until 1923-4. Apart from epidemics the general health condition of the Kirgiz was such that in 1925 a leading Russian doctor could describe syphilis as endemic; malaria, trachoma, mange, goitre, and other skin and venereal diseases had an extremely high incidence. Such was the situation with which the Soviet authorities were faced. Aydaraliyev gives a full account of the development of health services in Kirgizia until 1955. He concentrates on describing treatments or giving figures for incidence of diseases. But he claims that since 1936 there have been no cases of small-pox, that today malaria, plague, cholera, typhus have been eliminated, and that the incidence of social diseases (venereal and skin), trachoma, and tuberculosis has decreased remarkably. By 1955 the death rate had declined 3.8 times compared with 1926, and in 1956 the birth rate was 34.3 per 1,000 inhabitants and the death rate 6.2. Aydaraliyev makes no attempt to conceal the fact that the successes of the health services in Kirgizia are largely due to the presence of Russian and Ukrainian doctors. The Kharkov Medical Institute was evacuated to Kirgizia during the war and united with the Kirgiz Medical Institute which had been formed in 1939. As a result the standard of medicine and the output of doctors increased sharply. In the years 1933-40 only nine Kirgiz, one of whom was the author, successfully completed their training as doctors, and they were trained in Moscow, Leningrad, or Tashkent. After 1942, however, thanks to the presence of the Kharkov Medical Institute, doctors began to be trained in Kirgizia itself. By 1955, writes Aydaraliyev, 2,511 doctors had graduated from the

Institute, of whom 187 were Kirgiz. In 1956 the student body numbered 1,724, half of whom were Kirgiz, 347 being Kirgiz girls.

Aydaraliyev admits that the ratio of hospital beds to population is still lower in Kirgizia than the all-Union ratio, but under the present Plan the situation will be remedied. The achievements of Soviet health services are indeed impressive, and Aydaraliyev drives home his point by concluding his book with a telling comparison between health services in Kirgizia with those of Persia, and other countries.

### *Law and philosophy in Kazakhstan*

Volume 3 of the Kazakh Academy's *Works of the Institute of Philosophy and Law* (Trudy Instituta Filosofii i Prava. Alma-Ata, 1958. 156 pp.) contains an interesting selection of articles. Four of the eight contributors are Kazakhs but all the contributions are in Russian. The content's list is as follows: "On the question of Kazakhstan's transition to socialism, avoiding capitalism"—a short theoretical article; "The influence of Russian democratic culture on the formation of Chokan Valikhanov's philosophy"—Valikhanov (1835-56) was one of the first Kazakhs to receive a Russian education. He is renowned as a liberal and progressive thinker; "Some characteristics of the development of Soviet criminal law in Kazakhstan before the publication of the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R."—a short consideration of criminal law in Kazakhstan between 1918 and 1922; "The first decrees of the Soviet state on family law in Kazakhstan"—an account of measures to abolish *kalyim* (bride-purchase), polygamy and other traditional Kazakh customs which violated the rights of women to equality; "Some questions of judicial practice in cases of petty theft"—a brief practical consideration of how cases of petty theft from state and communal property should be punished in view of the absence in the criminal code of a definition of petty theft; "Some questions of paying workers of M.T.S. tractor brigades"—this article was written before the M.T.S. (Machine and Tractor Stations) were abolished; "Direct talks as the most important means of resolving international disputes"; "Feuerbach's criticism of idealistic philosophy"; and finally "Kant's teaching on the gnoseological role of understanding."

### *Kazakhstan in the Second World War*

*Kazakhstan in the Great Patriotic War* (Kazakhstan v velikoy otechestvennoy voyne, 1941-45. Kazakh State Publishing House, Alma-Ata, 1958. 362 pp.) is a long propagandist account by G. Abishev of the Kazakh war effort. Chapter I describes the reorganization of the economy to the demands of war, the man-power position, and the reception in Kazakhstan of evacuees and evacuated industries. Chapter II describes the war efforts of the republic's workers, peasants, intellectuals, women, and youth. Chapter III describes the moral and material help given by the people of Kazakhstan to the soldiers at the front and later to liberated areas. Chapter IV describes the work of the Party during the war. Chapter V gives accounts of the part played by Kazakh soldiers in the defence of Moscow, at Stalingrad, and in the defence of Leningrad. There is a con-

clusion, a chronology of the most important dates in the war, and a long bibliography.

The general picture of the causes and development of the war is unrecognizable to a western reader. The U.S.A., Britain and France are said to have helped in unleashing the war against the Soviet Union. "With the direct connivance and complicity of the imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain and France, the Hitlerites enslaved most of the states of Europe. . . ." There is no mention anywhere in the book of the fact that Britain had been at war with Germany since September, 1939, nor is there any mention at all of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August, 1939. "The Soviet Union was the inspirer and creator of a single anti-fascist front of freedom-loving peoples and the organizer of the coalition of the three great powers. . . ." Thanks only to the Soviet army, Britain and the U.S.A. were able "in the course of 2-5 years" to put their economy on a war footing. In the chronology at the end of the book, there are given only dates which refer to the Soviet Union with the exception of the Normandy landings and the capitulation of Italy and there is no indication at all of what events led up to Italy's surrender.

It can be assumed that the account of the war effort in Kazakhstan is highly tendentious. In the section on evacuees there is no mention of the north Caucasian peoples deported there in 1943-4. In describing the vastly increased industrial output of the war years the book nowhere contains any reference to forced labour camps of which many are known to have existed in Kazakhstan. The Karaganda coal-mines in particular were largely manned by deportees. In the chapter on the moral and material help given to the front-line soldiers, there are descriptions lasting several pages of letters sent from factories and villages urging the soldiers to spare no effort, and of the food and warm clothing sent to the front; at the end of the chapter there is only the briefest mention of the fact that in 1943-4 the kolkhozes of Kazakhstan "gave" nearly half a million head of cattle to the newly liberated western areas of the Soviet Union.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is that devoted to the exploits of soldiers from Kazakhstan at the front. The Eighth Panfilov Guards Rifle Division, which was formed in Kazakhstan, distinguished itself in the defence of Moscow. The 73rd Stalingrad Guards Rifle Division was formed from the Alma-Ata district and fought at Stalingrad. The 310th Rifle Division from Akmolinsk showed great valour in the siege of Leningrad. There is no indication of what proportion of Kazakhs to other nationalities were contained in these divisions, but many Kazakhs showed exceptional valour and received high military honours. In February, 1944, the Soviet Constitution was amended to give each republic the right to its own troops; this fact is mentioned in the chronology but not in the text of the book. There is no indication whether in fact Kazakh republican troops were formed at the end of the war and if so for how long they lasted.

### *The effects of Soviet rule on the Uygur community*

Nearly 100,000 Uygurs live in Soviet Central Asia. Over half of them

live in the Alma-Ata and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts of the Kazakh S.S.R. while smaller communities are to be found in Uzbekistan and Kirgizia. The Uygurs migrated to Russian territory from the Ili district of Sinkiang after the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881, which ended Russian occupation of that part of the Manchu empire. The social changes that the community have experienced since that time are the subject of a long and detailed article by P. D. Khodzhayeva entitled "The social position and family life of the Uygur woman of Kazakhstan" (*Trudy Instituta Arkheologii i Etnografii*, 3, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1958. pp. 231-284). In the first section Khodzhayeva gives a brief history of the Uygurs before their migration, discusses their social and economic position after their settlement in Russian territory, and then proceeds to a full account of their social life and the position of women in the family and community in the period up to the Revolution. Although less strictly secluded than among other Islamic peoples, an Uygur woman was in total subjection to her parents, and after marriage to her husband and husband's family. Marriage took place before the age of 14 and preferably to a kinsman. Khodzhayeva gives a detailed and careful account of the customs and ceremonials surrounding marriage and childbirth. She considers divorce procedure and emphasizes the hard lot of women who were without any rights or freedoms and had little or no education or medical assistance.

Khodzhayeva devotes the second section to describing the social position of Uygur women in Soviet society. She describes the measures and propaganda to realize the equality of women and the bitter struggle to break down the old traditions. She gives numerous personal stories of Uygur women who now occupy prominent positions either in their own community or in other parts of the Soviet Union. She gives examples of Uygur women in industry, agriculture, teaching, and Party work. One Uygur widow in Alma-Ata has seven children all with higher education who work in responsible positions in many parts of the Soviet Union. Another Uygur woman played an important part in devising the new Uygur Cyrillic alphabet. Others are prominent in political and artistic life. In the third and final section of her article, Khodzhayeva describes the family life of the Uygur woman today. The modern Uygur woman, having equal rights with men and playing an important part in the productive life of her community, is very different from her mother or grandmother. Today marriages are usually arranged by the young couple themselves rather than as before by the parents. Some of the traditional marriage customs and ceremony are retained, usually to please the older generation, but in a greatly simplified form. Among intellectuals they are usually dispensed with entirely. Girls mostly marry between 18 and 20, and those with higher education later still. There are still instances of parents or grandparents denying their children freedom of choice or secluding their daughters, but these are growing rarer. Khodzhayeva mentions instances of mixed marriages: a leading Uygur woman actress married to a Ukrainian, an Uygur married to a Russian girl, and an Uygur girl married to a Kazakh, but as these instances are named personally it may be assumed that they are exceptional. Within the family the sub-

servience of women to men and to the older generation no longer obtains, and the work of the house and garden is shared among the sexes. Thanks to the establishment of day nurseries, women can work in the fields alongside the men. Education and medical care has raised their status. New customs have arisen such as the celebration of birthdays, and naming girls with Russian first names. Education has taught Uygur women modern methods of child-care: infants are now weaned at 7 or 8 months instead of at 2 or 3 years as before. Fathers no longer regard the upbringing of the children as purely woman's duty. In general, Khodzhayeva concludes, the removal of the old patriarchal and feudal order has opened new fields of opportunity before Uygur women with the result that life in an Uygur community increasingly resembles that of other peoples of the Soviet Union.

### *Art and literature*

In 1958 a Russian translation of Rudaki's poems was published in Tadzhikistan (Abu-Abdullo Rudaki. Tadzhik State Publishing House, Stalinabad, 1958. 198 pp.). The translations are by two Russians and the book includes fifty verses, mostly couplets, described as "unknown until our times." Unfortunately there is no introduction or comment to indicate where these verses were found, and the few brief notes at the end of the book describe only Rudaki's verse forms. Rudaki was a ninth century Persian poet, but in the Soviet Union he is always described as a Tadzhik. The title page of the present volume describes the verses as a translation "from the Tadzhik-Farsi."

The state is the only patron of the arts in the Soviet Union. State patronage has resulted in the preservation of certain traditional arts of Central Asia and all too frequently in their vulgarization. The applied arts of Soviet Uzbekistan are described in a finely produced book—*The Popular Decorative Art of Soviet Uzbekistan* (Narodnoye dekorativnoye iskusstvo sovetskogo Uzbekistana. State Publishing House of Art, Moscow, 1955. 156 pp.). The work, which consists of photographs, including ten colour plates, and brief commentaries, was compiled by Uzbek Institute of Art Studies. The editor and eight of the ten contributors are Russians. Uzbek decorative arts today are a combination of traditional methods and subjects with new realistic elements. "An important feature of modern Uzbek decorative art," says the introduction, "is the appearance of motifs usually connected with the aims of popular craftsmen to express the reality surrounding them, to embody favourite popular themes." Such themes are "the Moscow Kremlin, the hammer and sickle, peace emblems, and views of the transformed towns and villages of Soviet Uzbekistan." Even the traditional ornamental motifs have changed. "Elements taken from surrounding reality have been introduced into the traditional geometrical and plant forms." Such elements are "an open cotton boll" and themes from "Soviet heraldry."

The first section of the book considers alabaster and wood carving, and painting on alabaster and wood. The finest modern examples of alabaster and wood carving are to be found in the Alisher Navoy Theatre at Tash-



ken. Although the building was designed by a Russian architect, the very fine internal decorations were entirely carried out by Uzbek craftsmen, mostly working under Russian supervision. Carving has not yet succumbed to the portraying of realistic subjects and the methods and styles are still traditional. Not so with painting: in this art the traditional colour wash and tempera are increasingly giving way to factory-made oil and enamel paints, though some wood painters still make their own colours; subjects are frequently portrayals of "Soviet reality." Ceramics are considered in another section. The traditional art of architectural ceramics—mosaics and majolica used to decorate the exterior of buildings—had almost completely died out at the time of the Revolution, but has been revived in Soviet times primarily to restore historical monuments. More widespread is the production of ceramic dishes, the chief centres today being Tashkent and the village of Rishtan near Kokand; the motifs used are both traditional and Soviet. The third section considers textiles. The traditional cotton and silk cloths woven for clothes are rarely produced nowadays since, with the exception of Khorezm, native dress is rarely worn. However, silk bed-covers are still produced by traditional methods and with traditional designs, though the thread used is now factory produced. Hand-printed cloths are, however, frequently produced and widely used as wall and bed coverings. Embroidery and embroidery with gold thread are both flourishing arts, but the art of carpet-weaving is recovering but slowly from its decline. A final section deals with metal-working and jewellery. State encouragement has obviously been successful in preserving and developing the traditional applied arts of Uzbekistan. From the pictures in the book it seems that many, though by no means all, of the leading craftsmen are old, and it appears that efforts are made to train the younger generation in the traditional skills of their forefathers. Although many of the more publicized examples of Uzbek art are tasteless portraits of Party leaders or views of hydroelectric dams, it appears that a solid foundation of traditional works are still produced.

### *Archæology and ethnography*

The thirtieth issue of the Institute of Ethnography's Bulletin (*Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta Etnografii*. XXX, Moscow, 1958. 167 pp.) is dedicated to Professor S. P. Tolstov, the renowned archæologist, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday in 1957. The twenty-two contributors are his colleagues, friends, and pupils. The following are some of the subjects treated: "Natural factors determining the distribution of ancient man in the deserts of Central Asia"; "The early Kel'teminar settlement of Kunyak-I" (the Kel'teminar stone-age culture was first discovered by Professor Tolstov in the Khorezm area. It relates to the end of the fourth and first half of the third millennia B.C.); "A female statuette of the early Bronze Age from Khorezm"; "Lion's head handles on vessels from Khorezm"; "On Khorezmian statue ossuaries"; "The question of the Kidarites" (an obscure fourth-century A.D. people who ruled in Central Asia); "Some ritual objects from the excavations at Balalyk-Tepe" (near Termez); "From the history of political life of Khorezm in the fourteenth

century" (a study of contemporary coinage); "The Goklen madrase" (a description of the eighteenth-century madrase in northern Turkmenistan which is unique in style and architecture); "The Kara-kalpak epic *KYRK KYZ* as a historical and ethnographical source"; "Traditional rivalry between districts of towns in Uzbekistan (end of nineteenth to beginning of twentieth centuries)"; "On the characteristics of Shamanism among the Kirgiz" (a discussion by S. M. Abramzon, a leading specialist on Kirgiz ethnography, of information given him by two living Kirgiz shamans or wizards); and "An ancient Turkic stone figure from the region of Mungu-Khayr Khan-Ula" (a description of a recently discovered seventh- or eighth-century statue in the Altay district).

### *Central Asia before the Arab conquest*

The late Professor A. E. Shmidt, the distinguished Soviet Arabist, left a manuscript of translations from the works of ninth-, tenth-, eleventh- and thirteenth-century Arabic chroniclers which describe the history of Central Asia before the Arab conquest. To the translations Shmidt added his own full notes and interpretations. This most valuable source has now been published in full in the *Learned Notes* of the Institute of Oriental Studies (Uchenyye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya, XVI, 1958. pp. 441-513) and is designed for scholars studying the early history of Central Asia and Persia.

### *The history of Central Asia (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries)*

Another valuable posthumous work on the history of Central Asia is P. P. Ivanov's *Outline History of Central Asia* (Ocherki po istorii Sredney Azii. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 247 pp.). P. P. Ivanov was a leading Soviet orientalist who died in the Leningrad siege in 1942. His *Outline History* was started in 1938 and finished in 1941, but publication was postponed because of the war. The present volume consists of Ivanov's text minus the three last chapters which dealt with Central Asia under Russian rule and which were, according to the present editor, A. Borovkov (who quotes Ivanov on this point), unoriginal and schematic; Borovkov has substituted his own prefatory notes in place of Ivanov's brief introduction. Ivanov's work was the first attempt to write the history of Central Asia from a Marxist angle; although not published until 1958 the manuscript was apparently well known and has been used by other orientalists. At the request of his publishers, Ivanov wrote his work in "a scientific-popular" style, but it is nonetheless a work of serious scholarship. Ivanov spent many years studying the historical documents of the period, and was the first to have done so.

The book is divided into two parts: Central Asia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and the Central Asian khanates in the first half of the nineteenth century. The first part contains chapters on "The Uzbeks and Kazakhs before their settlement in Central Asia," "Shey-bani-khan and his conquest. The formation of the Bukharan and Khivan khanates" and "Bukhara and Khiva in the eighteenth century. The formation of the Kokand khanate." The second part devotes a chapter

to each of the three khanates with a final chapter on cultural life in Central Asia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is an annotated list of the most important sources and a very full bibliography which has been brought up to date by the editor. This is an essential work for the study of Central Asian history.

### *The Revolution in Turkestan*

In November and December, 1905, the railway workers on the Central Asian railway called a strike. Thirty-two documents relating to this strike and the prosecutions that followed it have now been published with a commentary in the journal of the Turkmen Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography. (Trudy Instituta Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii. IV, 1958. Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Ashkhabad. Pp. 111-207). The documents consist of personal statements made to the police, official telegrams and orders, interrogation and legal reports, intercepted telegrams, and revolutionary manifestos. The documents are all from the Turkmen State Archives and were presumably found in the archives of the Tsarist police during the revolution. This is one of the few occasions on which archive documents have ostensibly been quoted in full, the usual course for a Soviet historian being to refer to the archives but not to quote them. B. Kurbanov, the author of the commentary, attempts to give the strike significance against the general background of the 1905 Revolution in Russia and says that the strike was "supported by the working class and the working masses of the whole country." It appears, however, to have been a purely Russian affair, very few, if any, Turkmen being involved.

Yet another work has appeared on the 1917 Revolution in Turkestan (for others, see the two previous articles in this series). *The Victory of the October Revolution in Turkestan* (Pobeda oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii v Turkestanе. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1958. 104 pp.) is a chapter from a forthcoming book by Academician Dodonov and was written with the assistance of the Uzbek Institute of Party History. It deals only with 1917 and the first few months of 1918. It differs from other works on the subject in that it attempts a thorough study of the distribution of Bolshevik groups in Turkestan at the time of the Revolution and of the spread of Soviet authority in the different localities of Turkestan after the seizure of power in Tashkent. The common practice until now has been to deal with these subjects in general terms. Unfortunately the sources that Dodonov quotes are almost entirely later Soviet works; if he has used archive materials—and this seems likely as he was working under the auspices of the Institute of Party History—they are not mentioned. As it stands the work is entirely one-sided; once Dodonov has described how the Tashkent Soviet won power on November 1, 1917—after four days of street fighting which are well described in detail—he gives no consideration to any opposition. The account of the spread of Soviet organizations into Fergana in the early months of 1918, for instance, is given without any mention of the Kokand autonomous government or the many years of fighting that were to ensue before the Bolsheviks finally gained control of this area. Such omissions may, however,

be because the work is only one chapter from a longer book. More serious are the omissions directly concerned with the period described: Dodonov gives an account of the III Regional Congress of Soviets held at Tashkent in November, 1917, which established the Tashkent Soviet Government; he even mentions that the Declaration of the Congress "mistakenly" excluded all Muslims from participation in the revolutionary government. He does not, however, describe other measures taken by the new government against the native population such as unequal food distribution and measures against Islamic institutions. Following the usual line, Dodonov throughout emphasizes native support for the Soviets and even comments directly after he has described the Declaration of the Congress of Soviets that the Declaration "was an assurance to the Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, Turkmen and Karakalpaks that from now on they would have their own native Soviet authority" (*svoya rodnaya i blizkaya im Sovetskaya vlast.*)

## II. THE BORDERLANDS

In the period under review, few new works have been received on the borderlands. There is nothing on Persia, and only one article on Sinkiang; but the one volume on Afghanistan is of exceptional interest and importance. D. Tikhonov published an article entitled "Some questions of the internal policy of Yakub-Bek" (*Uchenyye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya*, XVI, Moscow, 1958. pp. 109-137), which is the first recent Soviet attempt at an evaluation of Yakub-Bek's rule in Sinkiang, and remarkable for its consistent attempt to denigrate his regime. Yakub-Bek was a Muslim ruler of exceptional powers who welded together a kingdom in the space of very few years. He was renowned for his statesmanship and enlightenment. Tikhonov, however, is concerned to show only the sufferings of the peasantry and the corruption of the officials, many of his assertions being based on the slenderest evidence.

Of far greater actual significance is the symposium *Independent Afghanistan* (*Nezavisimyy Afganistan*. Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1958. 269 pp.) prepared by the Afghanistan Sector of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. As a summary of the current Soviet attitude to Afghanistan in all fields of national life, the book is essential reading. There are thirteen contributions. Six articles are devoted to Afghan history: "The Herat rising of 1716-1732"; "The independent Afghan state of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his successors (1747-1819)"; three articles—one devoted to each of the three Afghan wars of Britain; and one on the internal and external policies of Muhammad Nadir Shah. There are two articles on modern Afghan writers, one on Abdurrauf Benava and one on Gul Pacha Ulfat. One article is devoted to descriptions of the Afghan people in Soviet literature. There are two articles on Afghan foreign policy—one on Soviet-Afghan relations since 1917, and one praising the Afghan policy of non-alignment. There is a substantial article on the current Afghan Five-Year Plan which started in 1956. Two themes run through these works: one is that Soviet Russia is and always has been Afghanistan's best friend,

and that Tsarist Russia, for all its faults, never had serious designs on Afghanistan; the other is that Britain is Afghanistan's traditional enemy, Britain's role today being carried on by Anglo-American imperialism. The Soviet Union is today the one country where serious studies are being made of all features of Afghan life and history. In spite of its tendentiousness, the symposium contains a wealth of most valuable research material; because of its tendentiousness, it is probably hardly less valuable as an exposition of current Soviet thinking on Afghanistan.

# TRAVELS IN BASHKARDIA

By DR. ILYA GERSHEVITCH

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 8, 1959, Mr. Wilfrid Seager in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my very pleasant duty to introduce Dr. Ilya Gershevitch, Lecturer in Iranian Studies at Cambridge University. Three years ago, he and Mrs. Gershevitch spent some months in South Persia in the Makran, a quarter of the globe which is even less known than the "lost quarter" of Arabia. I have been to Bandar Abbas to the West of the Makran, and to areas to the North and East of it. Apart from Dr. Gershevitch, however, there have been few travellers who have been to those parts of Persia about which our lecturer is to speak this afternoon. He went particularly to study the ancient Iranian dialects still spoken in the area, and he has both maps and slides to show us. It is with the very greatest pleasure that I now call on Dr. Gershevitch.

**D**R. ILYA GERSHEVITCH: The urge to enter the subtropical zone and investigate the dialects of Bashākard, of which nothing was known, came to us rather suddenly in Teheran during the cold February of 1956. At that time we had not read Dr. A. Gabriel's account of his journey through Bashākard,<sup>1</sup> nor his remark that the region is "the most ill-famed of the Shah's dominion on account of the hostility of its inhabitants."<sup>2</sup> In Teheran no information whatever was available about conditions in that remote corner of Iran, but through the kind efforts of His Excellency S. H. Taqizadeh and Dr. E. Yarshater permission was obtained to visit the area, and instructions were wired to the *gendarmerie* of Bandar Abbas to offer us any assistance we might need.

Equipped with an odd assortment of clothes—to meet climatic conditions that seemed to be anybody's guess—as well as with a tape-recorder and plenty of paper and pencils, we travelled by rail to Ahwaz, and embarked at Abadan on the oil tug on which we were to sail, through the kindness of Mr. M. Homayoun Pour, as guests of the Iranian Oil Company. Four days later, as a result of an exceptionally violent gale, we were literally thrown ashore at Bandar Abbas. Mr. Mohamed E. Geladary, a prominent citizen of the town, offered us generous hospitality and help in preparing the expedition. The chief of *gendarmerie* of Bandar Abbas, under whose jurisdiction Bashākard lies, insisted that we should accept an armed escort, and provided transport as far as the hamlet of Kariyān, some 16 miles south-east of Mīnāb. From there, over a period of more than three months, our only means of conveyance were donkeys and occasional camels.

Our itinerary across the largely unsurveyed wilderness of Bashākard was decided upon at Mīnāb—which is easily the most charming and unspoilt town we saw in Persia—in consultation with the one resident Bashkardi, an exiled chief, who could be traced in the town at that time. From him I collected my first information on some of the Bashkard dialects.

Both he and the natives we were to meet later, usually referred to their country as Bashkard; of this name the Persian form *Bashā kard* appears to be merely an Arabic plural.<sup>3</sup> In a narrow sense the term *Bashkard* applies only to the inland region you see on the map to the south of the Mārẓ range. The name is, however, often used, except by the natives of the additional regions concerned, to include also areas north of the Mārẓ range, extending as far as Manūjān to the north-west, and Rameshk to the east. To distinguish this comprehensive meaning from the restricted one which more properly attaches to the name *Bashkard*, it is convenient to refer to it by a different term; *Bashkardia*, the classicizing name I have invented for this purpose, is longer than *Bashkard* by about as much as the region we shall understand by it exceeds *Bashkard* proper. We may then describe the limits of *Bashkardia* as follows: in the west the region is bounded by the district of Rūdān and the coastal strip known as Biyābān; this strip, which is inhabited by Baluchis, bends round the southern boundary of *Bashkardia* and merges in the solid bloc of Persian Baluchistan, which limits our region in the east; in the desert area north of a line joining Rameshk to Manūjān, Rūdbārī tribes lead a nomadic existence.

Few explorers have penetrated into the heart of *Bashkard*. In 1876 E. A. Floyer, coming from Jask, visited Angohrān, Sardāsh̄t, Shahr̄bāvek, Jaghdān, Darpahn, and Senderk.<sup>4</sup> Fifty years later Dr. and Mrs. Gabriel saw the same places, except Shahr̄bāvek, and explored in addition the direct route from Darpahn to Angohrān. Finally Dr. J. V. Harrison in 1932-3 reached Garāhven from Jask,<sup>5</sup> and in 1937 made a thrust north of Angohrān as far as Shahkahān, across the western spurs of the Mārẓ range.<sup>6</sup> We seem to be the first Europeans on record to have seen the Biverch district north-west of Angohrān and the area situated between Angohrān and Garāhven, and to have crossed the central and highest part of the Mārẓ range on the direct route from Angohrān to Mārẓ, in order to follow from there the caravan routes which respectively lead to Rameshk and Manūjān. Rameshk, according to Gabriel,<sup>7</sup> had not been visited by Europeans since 1898, when Sir Percy Sykes was the first to see it. Up to Angohrān and on our trip into Biverch we enjoyed the company of a courageous French art-photographer, Mme. Antoinette Perrier; her timetable compelled her to return to Mīnāb on her own, with an armed escort, via Mārẓ and Manūjān; she was thus unable to go with us to the remote south-eastern part of *Bashkard*, and to Rameshk.

If we covered more ground than our predecessors, this was due partly to the impossibility of ascertaining the distribution of the local dialects without visiting their speakers *in situ*, and partly to our having been relieved of all preoccupations regarding our safety. We spent a total of 105 days (March 26 to July 19) in and around *Bashkardia*, while Floyer and the Gabriels each only had about three weeks to explore the country. In their days *Bashkardia* was a dangerous region to travel in. By now the *gendarmerie* have requisitioned all rifles they could lay hands on, and instances of armed raids, for which the *Bashkardis* used to be notorious, have become rare. The linguistic pursuit in which I was engaged amused and flattered the natives, and enabled us to converse and live with them on friendly terms.

In the short time at my disposal today no detailed account can be given of what we saw and heard on our journey, the itinerary of which is marked on the map; but I shall try to convey to you a few impressions of the country, its inhabitants, and their way of life.

To the south of the Mār̄z range the view from any height is one of desolate grandeur. Valleys and mountains are closely packed together, and the vast panorama of bare hill tops suggests a moonscape (picture 1). Dr. Harrison, a geologist, describes the mountains as "basin shaped or synclinal, their solid structure being hidden under a litter of harsh angular sandstone blocks loosely set in sand and dust." Stratification and erosion have created the weirdest rock-shapes, including some which resemble man-made fortresses. The rocks provide a remarkable range of colours in the morning and afternoon sun: from white to a beautiful green, from a greenish-blue to violet, from dark violet to black. Such contrasting colour schemes offer ample compensation for the dreary precipices, and river-beds choked with boulders, along which we were carried by donkeys such as we had never seen. Their agility, endurance, and intelligence are beyond praise. Floyer described them as "preternaturally active," and suspected that they were a cross between monkeys and ibexes.<sup>8</sup> Their line is an ancient one if we are to believe Onesicritus, according to whom in the fourth century B.C. the donkeys of our area were used in lieu of war horses.<sup>9</sup> The region in Carmania which Ptolemy calls Kanthōnikē, "donkey-land," is very likely Bashkard.<sup>10</sup> A well-groomed Bashkard riding-donkey lives largely on dates, and richly deserves every handful of them.


Such rugged country involves the traveller in continuous ascent and descent. Valleys across his path usually mean considerable diversions from the chosen direction, as they have to be followed until a pass is found by which the next valley can be reached. Thus even distances that are short as the crow flies, take a long time to cover. The inspection of the whole of Bashkard would require a much longer stay than even we could afford.

The mountain passes and defiles leading up to them are bleak, except for a few shrubs and odd clusters of sage, or an occasional wild almond tree. The broader valleys, which in spring mostly consist of semi-dry, gravel-covered river-beds, are pleasantly dotted with tamarisks and the beautiful poisonous oleander. Along the terraces flanking them, and the lower hill slopes, various shrubs and grasses grow, of which the donkey and camel drivers deftly pick armfuls in passing, to administer to their charges at the next halt. Everywhere, except high up, the dwarf-palm (*pīsh*) is seen, from whose oblong leaves mats and baskets are plaited and ropes twisted, while the heart of the stalk provides a cherished vegetable. The flora has been expertly listed by Gabriel. The fauna includes fox, jackal, hyena, porcupine, bear, and leopard or panther (Persian *palang*). The last is known to the natives by the ancient Iranian name of the wolf (*verkh. vorkh*). Though we did not meet the creature itself, we saw footprints of it in the sand, larger than saucers. Poisonous snakes are common; most families have been bereaved of some members through snake bites.




KEY TO PLACE NAMES INDICATED BY FIGURES:

1. DĀURT
2. GWAŠIRĀZ
3. HŪNVAST
4. JAHRBĀVEK
5. DARBŌV
6. GAČSIYĀH
7. POŠT-GAR
8. PĀHTAK
9. AŠKON
10. SARHŪR
11. BEŠNŪ
12. SEGONLONDT
13. NĀŠKĪ
14. GWAJKAK
15. GĪMAJG
16. ŠAHRŠTR
17. MOLKAN
18. BONRTZG
19. LEKKŌN
20. DAHDAR
21. DAHVAST
22. SEGHERKEN
23. ŠT
24. MĀSETT
25. KŪNŌTT
26. SAGAN
27. GWAJG-KARK
28. BĀVEK
29. DŪLĀP
30. TRĀR
31. YAUŠŌR
32. BĪKA(H)NU
33. DARMĀR
34. DARKĀH
35. KĀRDŌN
36. KORČAKŌN
37. AVORTIN
38. SARZE ŠAKKOLĪ
39. SOMSILT
40. KANGARŪ
- 40a. DARZEN
41. ARKOREN
42. ŠAKKĀHĀN
43. SEKKĀN
44. MARTČ
45. DŪRKĀN
46. PATKĀN
47. GĪMORD
48. TIYĀB



MAP OF BAŠKARDIA

After a long ride through such wilderness the appearance of a cultivated oasis provides welcome relief. Here date-palm gardens stand, periodically flooded from mud-dammed canals or hollowed-out tree trunks. Nearby are small plots of wheat or maize, often disposed on terraces. Vegetables grown in small quantities include beans, onions, garlic, and pepper; among occasional fruit trees we noticed oranges, pomegranates, apples, figs, mulberries, and grapes. Along the irrigation canals peppermint grows, and where the water supply is ample the *jag* tree (*Dal-*



*bergia sissoo*, Roxb.) rises to impressive heights; it was worth going to Bashkardia if only to discover that this is the tree whose teak-like timber was known in the days of Darius the Great as *yakū*, and exported from the Karman province to Khuzistan for building purposes.<sup>11</sup> The cultivation is, of course, much reduced in the many oases that subsist on a mere trickle of water, which is collected behind a small dam and thriftily led to one plot at a time.

The cultivated oasis is called by the natives *shahr*, which amuses Per-

sians, to whom this word means "town." The term *shahr* does not include the dwelling sites of the cultivators, which are usually removed from it at distances varying from a few hundred yards to several miles. Throughout Bashkard the only type of dwelling is the so-called bee-hive hut, whose native name is *lahar*. Its frame is built by thrusting into the ground two parallel rows of date stems, and joining with *pīsh* string the sticks that face each other, in such a way that the resulting arches are progressively lower the further they stand from the middle. The arches are then connected by horizontal and transverse date stems which run along the sides and the top. Once the frame is ready it is covered with *pīsh* mats. The shape of these huts, as can be seen at least dimly on picture 2, resembles an egg cut lengthwise. The side mats can be raised to let in light and fresh air, see picture 3.

It is rare to find more than ten *lahar*-s on any one site, but often the cultivators of a particular *shahr* or group of *shahr*-s are distributed over several dwelling sites, which may be quite far from each other. The sites are more aptly described as camps than villages. When a community attends to different *shahr*-s the practice is to change camping ground in accordance with the task in hand; moreover, in winter, when the land rests and the valleys are flooded, many communities move with their flocks to higher altitudes. Whenever a move is decided on, the covering mats of the *lahar*-s are rolled up, and the frames taken to pieces; date stems and mats are loaded on donkeys and transferred to the new site, where new frames are quickly erected.

The *lahar* is thus in principle a tent, with *pīsh* mats replacing the usual felt or canvas; its use reflects a semi-nomadic attitude to dwelling. Nevertheless there are sites which seem to have become permanent. This is notably the case at Angohrān, the so-called capital of Bashkard, which consists of ten groups of *lahar*-s totalling more than one hundred; they are disposed on terraces over a wide floor which is formed by the meeting of three valleys. Even the forty gendarmes of the garrison of Angohrān camp in *lahar*-s, and the residence of Shahverdi Khān, chief of all Bashkardis, is a fenced-off compound containing two stately *lahar*-s and a few smaller ones for his dependants and slaves. The fort of Angohrān also belongs to the Khān, but has long been in ruins (see picture 4); it was said to have been built a hundred years before our arrival by his great-grandfather Alahverdi Khān, father of the famous "guest-murderer" Seif-Ollāh Khān.

North of the Mārẓ range the landscape changes only gradually. The Mārẓ district at the foot of the range is hemmed in to the north by an imposing parallel range, the Band-e Sefid. As one leaves the district the hills, although decreasing in height, remain rugged and precipitous until one reaches level ground beyond Sargarū<sup>11a</sup> to the north-west, or emerges to the north-east in the desert (*lūt*) which belongs to the depression of the Jāz Mūriyān. In this latter tract, at Gwanchān and Rameshk, the *lahar*, which in the Mārẓ region is still ubiquitous, has given way to a more permanent hut, round and domed, called *tūp*<sup>11a</sup> (see picture 5). The dome is covered with *pīsh* branches which are held together by a net made of *pīsh* ropes. The circular wall is a lattice made of reeds and date stems,

which is sometimes covered on the outside with mats, sometimes wholly or partly coated with mud; in the latter case a solid two-leaved door made of carved *jag* wood is fitted to the entrance. The *tūp* thus closely resembles the Mongolian *yurt*.<sup>12</sup> While *lahar*-s are grouped even at Angohrān in small units, each of which is well separated from the others, the *tūp*-s of Rameshk, nearly one hundred in number, are dotted all over a more or less circular area of little more than a quarter of a square mile.

Beside *tūp*-s Rameshk also counts several *ḡavār*-s, flat-roofed kiosks consisting of a square wooden frame which is covered, lightly at the sides, with *pīsh* branches. As they admit plenty of air these door-less shelters (see picture 6) are well suited for social gatherings or collective naps when the sun is high. In Bashkard proper we came across only one *ḡavār*, but north-west of the Mārẓ range and in Rūdān this type of dwelling is fairly common. A similar structure, bearing an older form of the same name, *ḡapar*, is found in Bandar Abbas, and according to Mr. P. W. Avery<sup>13</sup> even west of Kazarun. The name is connected with an ancient root meaning "to cover."<sup>14</sup>

Before riding from Manūjān to Mīnāb on the last lap of our return journey, we were taken by a *gendarmerie* jeep to Kahnūj, the capital of Rūdbār, where we spent a few days trying to get hold of and interview Rūdbārī tribesmen. Both at Manūjān and Kahnūj we made use of an air-conditioned dwelling known as *ādūr-band* or *ḡhār-ḡhāna*. It consists of a wooden frame similar to that of the *ḡavār*, but completely encased, except for the entrance, in a large tumulus-shaped heap of camel-thorn (*alḡagi*, local name *ādūr*). The heap is surrounded by a ditch, from which a slave spends the hot days throwing water on the camel-thorn with a bowl. The fast evaporation produces a substantial drop of temperature inside the shelter. This type of summer hut is used also elsewhere in the Karman province. We too, like the Gabriels, were told that the refreshing property of wet *ādūr* was discovered in Baluchistan by Nāder Shāh's secretary Mīrzā Mehdi Khān, who had been ordered by his master to provide cool shelters on the way to India.

To return to Bashkard proper, despite the profusion of stone, little use is made of it for building purposes. Angohrān has two small stone-built mosques, one at the foot of the fortified hill, the other on the top. Neither of them has minarets, but the latter carries instead two turrets, each of which is topped by a bottle. Otherwise, apart from walls supporting terraces for cultivation, the only common stone structures are small, square chambers for storing dates, and round enclosures for graves. The former are called *ḡat*, a word which existed with the meaning "store-room" already in Achæmenian times. Measuring about six feet in height they sometimes stand free, but more often are built against the mountain side, as in picture 7. After the date harvest the fruit is packed in *pīsh* bags, which are then trampled until the dates form a solid brown mass. Once the bags have been stored the low doorway of the *ḡat* is closed with a *jag* door against which stones are piled.

The circular stone walls, each of which encloses three to six graves, are about three to four feet high. They are said to have the purpose of preventing animals from desecrating the graves. This explanation, however,

conflicts with the presence in some of them of a low doorway, as if to admit such animals as cannot jump walls. We were told at Kahnūj that such enclosures are also found in Rūdbār.

The population seems to consist mainly of three racial types: Semitic, negroid, and a type which according to Gabriel has affinities with the natives of Australia or the South Sea islands. Socially Gabriel's distinction of four classes still holds good: Khāns, minor chiefs, freemen, and slaves. It is difficult to tell how far the social and racial distinctions are linked, except that members of ruling families often look Semitic, and negroids are usually slaves. The freemen are, according to Gabriel, free subjects who pay taxes and till their own land; they were described to me as "gentlemen" (*āqā*). In the Bashkardi dialects they are called *balūch-kāra*, a compound in which *kāra* is an obsolete word meaning "people." Early Muslim writers usually mention the *Balūch* in one breath with their foes, the *Kūch* or *Kūfich*, whose home has been surmised to have been Bashkardia. Nevertheless, in the class name *balūch-kāra* the reference is hardly to Baluchis; for when used alone the word *balūch*, as distinct from *Balūchī*, has no ethnical connotation in the dialects of Bashkard, but simply means "shepherd." This meaning agrees with the description of the *Balūch* as "herdsmen" in a tenth-century Persian text. Elsewhere in Iran a similar semantic development affected at an early period the Kurds, whose name in Fārs came to mean "nomad."<sup>15</sup>

Bashkardis of lower rank respectfully kiss the hands of their superiors on meeting them. Distinguished guests are made to sit on mats on arrival, so as to form a circle with the host and any local men who happen to be about. Tea is brewed, and a water-pipe filled and lit. The host takes the first puffs and hands the pipe to the chief guest; thereafter it changes hands in order of seniority. Women never join such circles, but an exception was made for my wife. The Bashkardi women merely watch the procedure from the nearest *lahar*, or huddled together in the open a few yards way. When they are among themselves, however, the women, too, are not averse to the water-pipe (see picture 5). There was no difficulty in my talking to women out of doors, or in *lahar*-s belonging to ordinary Bashkardis; but the *lahar*-s which serve as women's quarters of chiefs were usually accessible only to my wife.

The majority of women go about open-faced, but wives of rank wear a mask, both indoors and on the rare occasions when they go out. The mask is embroidered all over with red and orange silk, has wide slits for the eyes, and ends above the mouth. A midrib stands out one inch over its full height, producing an odd, insect-like profile. Masks are also worn in Minab and Bandar Abbas, but there they generally cover the mouth, are black and unadorned, and have less protruding midribs; they make the women look more sinister than their colourful Bashkard equivalents.

The mask is tied behind the head over a veil which covers a bonnet trimmed with braid (see picture 8). The dress, made of cotton or muslin, has very wide bat-wing sleeves. It is usually black, and elaborately embroidered at the front and shoulders in red, orange, green, violet, and a little white. The three-pronged motif which is visible on picture 8, is a recurrent element in the pattern of the embroidery. At Angohrān my wife's

offer to buy a dress and a mask, brought to light many worn-out specimens which had been kept inside goat-skins and padlocked saucepans, until the daughter of the Khān came to our rescue and generously sold us her own well-preserved outfit. The dress reaches below the knees, showing the bottom of narrow, green or red silk trousers trimmed with braid at the ankles.

The hair falls down the back in two braids, whose ends are either held together by a broach, or jointly passed through a rhombic silver ring, three inches long. In addition, three or four shorter rings, each with a slight bulge round the middle, are strung on either braid above the junction. To the front hair, combed straight from the parting to the ears, a gluey paste is applied, which consists of rice boiled for a long time, and rubbed between two stones until it is perfectly smooth. Before the paste hardens a gold ribbon is stuck to the edge of the hair along the forehead and parting.

The teeth are painted black with a compound varnish; its main ingredient is rust, which the women carefully scrape from spades made wet for the purpose. In the ear-holes my wife counted up to eight holes; picture 8 shows what kind of ornaments are fastened to these. Four holes are pierced through the nose: one through the septum, for rings; the second and third each through one of the wings, for broaches; the fourth from above the tip into one of the nostrils, for rings to stand up as on picture 8. Noses thus pierced can serve as pin-cushions. It was disconcerting at first to converse with women whose noses were spiked with threaded needles.

The attire of men is simple. They wear either a long coloured loin-cloth, or the black trousers peculiar to the country. The latter are extraordinarily wide, each leg measuring five yards across. This mass of cloth is gathered on to the hips by a cord, which is passed through the turned-down hem at the top of the trousers (see picture 2). As the men gallop on their fast donkeys the trouser-legs, being wide open at the bottom, swell with air, and flutter like the gowns of fast-cycling undergraduates at Cambridge. The shirt is worn outside the trousers or loin-cloth. It may be black or white; in the latter case it is sometimes heavily embroidered with white thread. The traditional head-gear is either a turban, or an embroidered cap, or both, the turban being wound round the head in such a way as to enclose the cap. The foot-wear of men and women alike consists of *pīsh*-woven sandals; these cover the sole only, and are tied to the foot by strings passing behind the heel and between the first and second, and third and fourth toe (see picture 9).

The staple foods of the Bashkardis are dates, curds, and bread. The last is made afresh for each meal, and only as much corn is ground at a time as is required for the occasion. The dough is beaten by hand into a flat round shape, and cooked on an iron disc which rests on three stones surrounding a small fire. To leaven the dough, which is not usually done, curds are added, north of the Mārz range also dried camel dung dissolved in water.

Meat is eaten infrequently, although most communities keep goats, some also sheep and cows. The chickens are remarkably lean; to protect them from jackals they are kept at night in baskets hanging from a post,

see picture 3. Game has become rare after the requisitioning of rifles. Some Bashkardi men are, however, so nimble-footed as to be able to run after wild sheep or ibexes and kill them with the knife.

Rice and tobacco are luxuries imported from Minab or Jask; the only part of Bashkardia where both are grown is Rameshk. Other imports include tea, sugar, cloth, lockable saucepans which can be used as safes, and aluminium bowls for drawing water. Drinking water is kept in goat-skins, which either rest on low wooden stands, or hang from a post, or a crossbar supported by two posts; they are shaded by mats, so that the water remains quite cool (see picture 3). Earthenware is almost exclusively confined to the water-pipes, which come from Minab; the smoke passes into and out of the water through two reeds on which local designs are carved. Matches are common only at Angohrān. Usually fire is struck from flint, and a date-log is set smouldering for days, from which the occupants of the camp help themselves to fire as required.

While the men attend to the cultivation, the main tasks of the women consist of grinding corn, making bread, preparing curds, fetching water, and plaiting mats. The long, fibery *pīsh* leaves are halved along the stem, and plaited with astonishing skill and speed to form well-made and serviceable mats. This is the chief industry of the country. Once every few weeks the spare mats are loaded on donkeys, and taken to Jask or Minab for sale.

Rugs are rare. The few we saw had more or less the same design: a white square in the middle, surrounded by alternating red and white bands of a simple, geometrical pattern, on a black background. Experienced carpet-dealers in Isfahan, to whom we showed the rug we had brought back, had not seen this pattern before, and were disappointed that we would not sell them the rug, even at a good price. Saddle-bags are woven from goat-hair, and the better ones have a characteristic woven-in pattern of red and white wool. When not used on the backs of donkeys, they are kept as wardrobes inside the *lahar-s*.

The Bashkardis are Shiites, and their cultural background is entirely Islamic. Unlike their Baluchi neighbours they have no ballads or epic poems in which memories of the past are related, and we came across very few good story-tellers, or even good stories. The dialects are Iranian throughout; wherever outside Iran any racial group in Bashkardia may ultimately hail from, its members have evidently long forgotten their original speech. The southern vernaculars differ greatly from the northern ones; each of the two dialect groups is historically most interesting, and occupies a unique position among the Iranian languages. To Persians all forms of Bashkard speech are largely incomprehensible, but most natives understand Persian.

The music we heard in Bashkardia is of considerable interest. Some songs, and tunes that are played on a solo flute, are entirely European in character, unlike any folk-music we heard elsewhere in Persia or on our way through Turkey. The Gabriels, too, heard a flute tune which reminded them of a song out of "Tristan." A more Islamic type of song is the popular *ḡordī*, which the Biyābānī Baluchis also sing to the accompaniment of a flute. Its long tune has as wide a range as a tenor voice

can span, and is repeated many times with increasingly complicated modulations. We recorded as much music as my requirements of speech-recording would permit.

To end this necessarily selective account of the peculiarities of Bashkardia, I may mention certain stone-heaps called *renz*, the significance of which seems to have escaped previous travellers. In southern Bashkard such *renz*-s as we met were invariably situated singly on mountain passes, and the height of the heaps varied between four and six feet. It was explained to us that in former times "justice" was rendered by ambushing the offender in a mountain pass, tying him in a kneeling position, covering him with stones, and leaving him there to die. Although we heard the story repeatedly from different people in different places, we could not make the obvious test, as it proved impossible to persuade our donkey drivers and gendarmes to stop long enough on any mountain pass to dismantle a *renz*. North of the Mārz range the word *renz* denotes a much smaller pile of stones, which clearly serves as a mere landmark, and is not confined to mountain passes. Yet even there we were assured that south of the range the *renz* used to be an instrument of lynch-law. There is thus reason to think that this tradition is genuine, the more so as it is supported by the likely etymology of the word *renz*. In early Islamic times there was a custom known as *rajm*, which is defined as "a ritual stoning as a punishment for fornication."<sup>16</sup> By postulating an intermediate form \**ranj* it is easy to derive the Bashkard word *renz* from the Arabic *rajm*, since *j* after *n* has become *z* also in the Bashkard word for "rice," *berenz*, which in Persian is *berenj*. Moreover, in support of what we learned from our Bashkardi friends, Professor Minorsky tells me that when he travelled in Kurdistan before the First World War, he, too, came across piles of stones on mountain passes, each of which was believed by the Kurds to contain a stoned person, a *rajim*.

(Dr. Gershevitch concluded his talk by showing a number of excellent colour slides taken by Mrs. Gershevitch, illustrating the colourfulness of the area and its peoples.)

The CHAIRMAN: I can remember seeing the donkeys which have been mentioned in Bandar Abbas. People used to be very proud of them, and they were extremely beautiful.

Are the slaves children of other slaves, or are they brought in from across the sea?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: The negro slaves must have been imported in previous generations, because they all speak the native dialects perfectly and have no other language. The slaves that are not negroes were captured in internal wars of by-gone days, or are descendants of prisoners. In Gabriel's days a slave could still be exchanged for a rifle. To buy a slave nowadays is an expensive luxury. We were offered one for 2,000 tomans, that is about £100, or twice the cost of a camel, which speaks rather well for the man. They seem to have no desire to run away. When we tried to tempt them they did not see why they should not go on being owned. Apparently this does not expose them to much inconvenience.

Mr. GRAHAM: Is the country connected to the railway from India into Persia? Is there any connection by caravan?



The CHAIRMAN: That is considerably north to the country of which we have been speaking.

Mr. EGERTON: Are any of the people literate?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: Mullahs are found in some villages. The chiefs are generally literate, but ordinary people are not.

Colonel ORLEBAR: How effective is the administration of the central Government?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: The only signs of Government administration we noticed consist of a number of *gendarmerie* posts. We counted six on our route, at Darpahn, Jaghdān, Angohrān, Mār̄z, Geshmīrān, and Manūjān. They are manned by three to six gendarmes each, except at Angohrān and Manūjān, where the garrisons are more substantial. There are no public services of any kind. However, if two Bashkardis have a legal quarrel, instead of taking out knives or covering each other with *renz-s*, they nowadays tend to go to the *gendarmerie* chief of Angohrān and let him settle the matter. There is some form of taxation which the chiefs pay, but I gathered that it is collected rather haphazardly. No tax-collector is very keen on entering Bashkardia.

Unfortunately I am not quite clear about the year in which the *gendarmerie* took possession of the country. We were told in Bandar Abbas that the occupation took place three years before our arrival. I accepted this at the time and never inquired again, but now I wonder whether it may not have been a matter of reoccupation, or consolidation of a few posts already in existence. It should not be difficult to ascertain the date from the *gendarmerie* headquarters in Teheran.

Mrs. H. JOHN COOK: Is trade conducted in money or animals?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: In money. We bought all our things with small cash, which we carried with us.

Miss KELLY: Were these small carpets and mats woven?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: I do not know if "woven" would be the word, although the natives use their verb for "weaving" in both cases. The mats are plaited. The rugs are knotted.

Miss KELLY: Are they done locally by local women?

Dr. GERSHEVITCH: Yes, but in the case of rugs only in very few inaccessible mountain villages. Most people have no rugs or carpets. They sit and sleep on mats.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid that we do not have any more time. Thank you very much.

#### REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> A. Gabriel, *Im weltfernen Orient* (1929), pp. 80 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> A. Gabriel, *Die Erforschung Persiens* (1952), p. 279.

<sup>3</sup> The origin of the name *Bashkard* is obscure, cf. W. Eilers, *Archiv Orientalni*, 24 (1956), p. 187, and *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3rd ed., col. 876 (where a connection with the name of the ancient *Asagarta* tribe is suggested).

<sup>4</sup> Floyer's journey through Bashkard is described in his book *Unexplored Baluchistan* (1882).

<sup>5</sup> See *Geographical Journal*, 1941, pp. 1 sqq.

<sup>6</sup> The route Dr. Harrison took in 1937 became known to me, after our return to England, from an unpublished map drawn by him and generously placed at my disposal, on his kind suggestion, by the British Petroleum Company Limited. Among




*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

2. AN OLD BASHKARDI STANDING ON A MAT AT DARKĀH. "LAHARS" ARE VISIBLE IN THE BACKGROUND, TO HIS LEFT AND RIGHT.



*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

3. ON A CAMPING GROUND AT GARĀHVĒN. THE SIDE-MATS OF THE "LAHARS" ARE RAISED. A SHADED BASKET FOR CHICKENS HANGS FROM A POST. LARGE BASKETS FOR GRAIN STAND ON THE GROUND. IN FRONT, ON THE RIGHT, WATER-SKINS SHADED BY A MAT HANG FROM A CROSSBAR WHICH RESTS ON TWO POSTS.



*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

5. A "TŪP" AT GWANCHĀN. WOMEN SITTING ON A MAT AND SMOKING THE WATER-PIPE.



*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

6. A "KAVĀR" AT RAMESHK, WITH A DOMED "TŪP" IN THE BACKGROUND, AND PART OF ANOTHER ON THE RIGHT.




*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

7. "KATS" AT GARĀHVEN.




*Photo by Mrs. L. Gershevitch.*

9. GOOD COMPANY AT KANGARŪ.



1. BASHKARD LANDSCAPE TAKEN FROM  
THE TAYI PASS (SOUTH-WEST OF AN-  
GOHRÂN), FALANG NORTH.



4. THE FORT OF ANGOHRÂN.



8. YOUNG MARRIED WOMAN AT AN-  
GOHRÂN.  
*Photos by Mme. A. Perrier.*

the places located by Dr. Harrison whose exact position is not to be found on any other map, are Ashkon, Beshnū, Shahkahān, and Garāhven, which were also stages on our route. Having entered Dr. Harrison's location of these places on my own map, I was able to locate on it with closer approximation than would otherwise have been possible, some of the other hitherto unknown or ill-defined places through which we passed.

<sup>7</sup> *Die Erforschung Persiens*, p. 250.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>9</sup> Strabo, XV, 2, 15.

<sup>10</sup> See W. Tomaschek, *Topographische Erläuterung der Küstenfahrt Nearchs (Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss.*, 121, 1890), p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> See *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XIX (1957), pp. 317 sqq., and XXI (1958), p. 174/7.

<sup>11a</sup> The *ū* of *Sargarū* and *tūp* sounds like a long French *u* or German *ü*.

<sup>12</sup> See the fourth picture taken by Group-Captain Smallwood, above, after p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> See *Royal Central Asian Journal*, 1957, p. 191.

<sup>14</sup> See H. W. Bailey, *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1954, pp. 146 sqq. [The Afghan-Persian name for a temporary shelter of branches or straw, *chapar*, appears to be a variant of *ḳapar*; cf. Klaus Ferdinand, *Preliminary Notes on Hazāra Culture (Hist. Filos. Medd. Dan. Vid. Selsk.* 37, No. 5, 1959), p. 28.]

<sup>15</sup> See V. Minorsky, *Hudūd al-'Alam*, pp. 124, 374 on the Balūch, and *Actes du XX<sup>e</sup> Congrès International des Orientalistes*, pp. 144 sq. on the Kurds. Professor Minorsky has pointed out to me that the formation of the class-name *balūch-ḳāra* has a parallel in the name of the Kurdish tribe of the *Shabān-ḳāra* (literally "shepherd-people"), cf. *Encyclopædia of Islam*, s.v. The suggestion that the *Kūch* lived in Bashkardia is due to W. Tomaschek, *Zur historischen Topographie von Persien (Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss.*, 102, 1882), pp. 189 sq.

<sup>16</sup> See *Encyclopædia of Islam*, s.v. *radjm*.

## ANNUAL MEETING

THE Annual General Meeting of the Society was held at the Hall of the Royal Society, Burlington House, London, W.1, on Wednesday, June 10, 1959.

The President, The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Scarbrough, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D., was in the chair and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Lieut.-General Sir John Glubb, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., who spoke on "Britain and the Arabs."

The PRESIDENT, on taking the chair, called on Group-Captain H. St. Smallwood, O.B.E., to read the Honorary Secretaries' Report.

### HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1958-59

During the year the Society's activities have been as well maintained as usual; a very much wider area, perhaps, than usual has been covered by our lectures, including Russian Central Asia, remoter parts of Persia. The Yemen and Outer Mongolia. One of the highlights was perhaps the talk on Hong Kong. Sir Alexander Grantham, you will be pleased to hear, will be one of the principal guests at the Society's Annual Dinner in July. We have been informed of the giant strides being made in the development of Kuwait. We do find, however, that there is a tendency to overcrowd the meetings for well-known speakers and films; we would like to see some of the lesser-known speakers given greater support. Recently we had excellent talks, not well attended but, happily, *Journal* readers will benefit and we hope enthusiasm for the *Journal* will increase still further. The circulation is now well over 2,000, and more college libraries are subscribing every year.

The Society's library has been more in demand this year, possibly because of events in Central Asia, although Persia has been the section most in demand.

Tibet has always been of special interest to the Society; perhaps newer members will not know of the excellent collection of books bequeathed to the Society by the late Sir Charles Bell. More and more areas, until recently of interest only to the specialist, have, unfortunately, been attracting world attention. From back numbers of the Society's *Journal* you will see how we have been stressing the importance of some of these areas; now, perhaps a little late, others are becoming aware of their importance.

We suggest that the work of the Society has been carried on to your satisfaction, but would like to urge the need for greater interest among the younger generation so that there may be those among them who will one day endeavour to take the place of such men as Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, for so many years a member of your Council.

It is with deep regret that I have to report losses among some of the

most distinguished of our members. Of those who have rendered very good service to the Society as well as to their country were:

Sir Alexander Gibb, an engineer of world renown and a very good friend to this Society; his end was probably hastened by the death, while playing polo, of his son, who was a member of our Council.

Colonel Schomberg, soldier and priest, a great traveller in Central Asia and author of a number of books.

Major Sir Duncan McCallum, M.P., a member for 35 years.

Lt.-Colonel F. W. Sterling, a colourful character well known for his exploits in the desert and the Middle East.

Sir Richmond Palmer, barrister, and one-time Governor of Cyprus.

Frank Kingdon-Ward, distinguished botanist, traveller and author.

H.H. Prince Mohammed Emir Haider.

Major-General Sir Dashwood Strettell, a great personality; Indian Cavalry.

Captain The Hon. Sir Archibald Cochrane, one-time Governor of Burma.

Sir Alan Pim, of the I.C.S., a member for more than 30 years.

Colonel Sir John Turner, of the Royal Engineers, and one-time Chief Engineer of the R.A.F. in India.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.

Colonel Schomberg, Major Sir Duncan McCallum and Major-General Sir Dashwood Strettell had all served on the Council.

There is one other matter in connection with the Society's affairs, and that is our wish to have a home of our own. If anybody in this gathering or in the wider gathering of the Society hears of any possible premises, the Council would be more than interested to hear of them. We should like freehold premises; if not freehold, then fairly long leasehold premises. We have certain funds in hand which would now be very well invested in bricks and mortar in London. I leave that idea with you, ladies and gentlemen. And that concludes our Report.

#### THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

Major E. AINGER, in presenting the accounts and the Honorary Treasurer's Report, said the Balance Sheet and Income and Expenditure Account have been in your hands for some little time. I think I should break my report into two parts: the position last December, which is the date of the Balance Sheet, and the position so far in 1959.

At the end of December the position was greatly improved as compared with the previous year, and I congratulate Mrs. Putnam, our Secretary, on her success in keeping expenditure for the year even below the figure spent in 1957, despite the fact that the cost of printing the *Journal* and the cost of lectures had risen well above the figures for the previous year.

During last year we received back the money (which was called pure income) in Tax returned by the Inland Revenue Authorities, although we received no return of our normal current taxation. Even so, thanks to Mrs. Putnam's skill, the Society ended the year in the black, and it was



possible to put £500 to the Reserve Fund. Those are points on which the whole of our staff require very great congratulation.

Since the date of the Balance Sheet, thanks to the great kindness and skill of our Honorary Solicitors, we have at last obtained a decision on the part of the Inland Revenue Authorities in favour of the Society. The Board of Inland Revenue have reviewed the question of members' subscription paid under Deeds of Covenant in the light of recent decisions of the Special Commissioners in other cases, and I may tell you as a matter of interest that the Society has received repayment of a sum of just over £1,000 for our outstanding claim. The £500 we succeeded in saving during last year and the £1,000 recently received together with sums previously invested by the Trustees which showed at the end of December a book value of £6,000, but which at the last valuation showed a capital value of £7,000 before investment of the new money, will help to build up a Reserve Fund in case we have to find the new premises to which the Honorary Secretary has referred.

I feel that I shall be voicing the opinion of the Society as a whole if I again say—although I know the Chairman of the Council has already expressed this to the Solicitors—how extremely grateful we are to Messrs. Nathan Oppenheimer and Van Dyke for the work they have, voluntarily, undertaken, and particularly to Lord Nathan who took up not only our case but that of many of the other learned societies.

The overall position of our finances is really quite sound. The Society now has a Reserve Fund with which to meet contingencies and, thanks to the admirable work done by our staff, we are keeping well within the limits of what we regard as reasonable expenditure for the service given by the Society.

I now move the adoption of the accounts and my report for 1958.

Mr. L. W. AMPS formally seconded the motion, and the accounts and report were adopted without discussion.

#### ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had elected for the ensuing year: as Chairman, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C. (of the Kuwait Oil Company); as Vice-Presidents, Lieut.-General Sir John Glubb, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C. (known to everyone); Mr. L. W. Amps (an engineer who has seen service with various projects in Afghanistan, Hong Kong and Kuwait); General Sir Richard Gale (now Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe).

The President added that the Council had recommended the following to fill vacancies for the ensuing year: as Honorary Secretaries, Group-Captain Smallwood and Colonel Routh; as Honorary Treasurer, Major E. Ainger; all of whom offered themselves for re-election; and as members of the Council: Sir Olaf Caroe, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Mr. C. J. Edmonds, C.M.G., C.B.E., Air Chief Marshal Sir John Whitworth-Jones, C.B.E., K.C.B.

The President proposed and the meeting unanimously agreed that these members be elected *en bloc*.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes the items on the agenda, ladies and gentlemen, but, if I may, I would like to say that a Society such as this only carries on because of the work undertaken by its Honorary Officers and the members of its staff. We do owe a very deep debt of gratitude to the Honorary Secretaries, the Honorary Treasurer and the staff. I know you will warmly endorse that sentiment. (*Applause.*)

The meeting then terminated.

# THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

## BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1958

	LIABILITIES		ASSETS	
1957	£	s. d.	£	s. d.
<b>I. Capital Funds:</b>				
Life Subscription Account	377	5 0		
Add: Amount recd. 1958	30	0 0	393	0 0
Entrance Fee Account	1,604	8 0	1,132	14 8
Add: Amount recd. 1958	66	0 0	1,151	7 7
Legacy Account				
Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund			941	1 6
Persia Fund			960	4 0
Sykes Medal Fund	150	0 0	1,079	7 3
Add: Accum. Interest	23	0 3	906	13 3
Less: Cost of Medal awarded in 1958	173	0 3	6,564	8 3
			418	18 0
			6,963	6 3
<b>3,656</b>				
		<b>3,751</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>II. Income and Expenditure Account:</b>				
Balance, 1st January 1958	1,389	12 6		
Add: Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year	493	1 2	6,031	
			169	
			45	
			199	
			6,444	
<b>1,390</b>				
		<b>1,882</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>III. Reserve for Contingencies:</b>				
Balance 1st January 1958	3,470	0 0		
Add: Amount transferred from Income and Expenditure Account	400	0 0	6,031	
			169	
			3,870	
			1,169	
			174	
			1,387	
			70	
			102	
			1,234	
<b>895</b>				
		<b>3,870</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>IV. Liabilities:</b>				
Sundry Creditors			110	19 3
			62	15 0
			1,656	3 11
			76	0 11
			104	7 0
			1,680	16 3
			3,517	6 1
			9,411	6 7

£10,674 8 7

9,411

**INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED, DECEMBER 31, 1958**

1957	EXPENDITURE	£	s.	d.	1957	INCOME	£	s.	d.
£	<i>Office Expenses:</i>				£				
1,600	Salaries and National Insurance .. .. .	1,614	7	10	2,555	Subscriptions .. .. .	2,624	17	2
162	Rent, Rates, Light and Heat .. .. .	201	0	6	657	Journal Subscriptions and Sales .. .. .	519	14	3
28	Telephone .. .. .	27	17	6		Dividends and Interest Received:			
144	Stationery and Printing .. .. .	116	6	1		Without deduction of Income Tax .. .. .	56	16	9
76	Postages .. .. .	67	12	4		After deduction of Income Tax .. .. .	154	12	10
282	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises .. .. .	253	7	4	287				
10	Audit Fee .. .. .	10	10	0		Income Tax Repayment Claims:			
8	Insurances .. .. .	6	7	2		On Interest and Dividends Received .. .. .	120	2	11
17	Bank Charges and Cheque Books .. .. .	16	13	2		On Covenanted Donations .. .. .	245	18	7
59	Sundry Expenses .. .. .	65	9	6		On Covenanted Membership (Subscriptions (estimated) .. .. .	400	0	0
2,386		2,379	11	5	675	Uncovenanted Donations Received .. .. .	766	1	6
	<i>Less:</i>				687	Excess of Expenditure over Income carried to Balance Sheet .. .. .	715	6	3
205	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund .. .. .	205	4	0	251				
2,181		2,174	7	5					
	<i>Journal:</i>								
		£	s.	d.					
1,158	Printing .. .. .	1,281	4	5					
71	Postages .. .. .	132	18	9					
58	Reporting .. .. .	69	17	2					
		1,484	0	4					
238	Lectures and Study Groups .. .. .	215	19	3					
18	Library .. .. .	15	19	7					
42	Legal and Professional Charges .. .. .	52	10	0					
2	Subscription to "Iraq" .. .. .	1	11	0					
	Loss on Sale of Investments (Less Transfer from Investment Reserve Fund) .. .. .								
684	Transfer to Reserve for Contingencies .. .. .	400	0	0					
660									
5,112		4,344	7	7					
	Excess of Income over Expenditure, carried to Balance Sheet .. .. .	493	1	2					
5,112		£4,837	8	9	5,112		£4,837	8	9

**AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.**

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.  
(Chartered Accountants).

LIVERPOOL HOUSE, ELDON STREET, LONDON, E.C.2.      March 31st., 1959.

# BRITAIN AND THE ARABS

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN GLUBB, K.C.B.,  
C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.

Anniversary Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on June 10, 1959, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

**B**EFORE such an obviously extremely well-informed audience I do not propose to waste time by drawing your attention to the importance of the Arabs in the Middle East or to their past history. I plunge straight into the centre of my subject by saying that the suggestion which I wish to put before you is this: that the present situation in the Middle East cannot be rectified by force but can be rectified by ideas.

Prior to 1919 all the Arab countries, with the possible exception of Egypt, had been for more than four hundred years the most backward provinces of the Ottoman Empire. One could almost say that they were four hundred years behind the social development of Europe. Then, all of a sudden, during and after the First World War, Europe arrived in their midst, and we still have to remember what a tremendous impact that produced. Unfortunately, the number who witnessed it is growing less but it is, to a great extent, the key to what is happening today.

The Arabs were probably influenced at that time by two factors. Firstly, the sudden discovery that they were centuries behind other nations and, secondly, at the same time, with their establishment of Arab governments, the resurrection, the renaissance, the remembrance, which was diligently propagated, that at one time they themselves had been an imperial race. These two ideas together, the fact that the Arabs realized suddenly how far behind they were and at the same time that they once had been in the lead, started to produce the ferment. Unfortunately, we, the British, were the first to encourage this, and afterwards at the end of the First World War we, to some extent at least, disappointed their hopes. Those disappointments have never been allowed to rest, the grievance is actively nursed today. This is a factor also worth emphasizing. I do believe that in many ways the Arabs got a bad deal; but, after all, during the years which have elapsed since the First World War, the United Kingdom and many other countries have been virtually ruined by wars and all sorts of acts by other nations. But there is nothing to be gained by continuing to nurse one's grievances. However, that is what has happened out in the Arab countries. Since 1945 they have all been independent, but the grievance is still kept alive by the existence of Israel, and this is probably the principal factor which enables Arab countries today still to feel that they have been badly treated.

During the last seven or eight years all the more advanced Arab countries, by which I mean Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, have suffered some form or other of internal convulsion. Several have had com-

plete revolutions; others have had civil wars, frequent seizures of power by their armies, strikes, riots, and every other form of disturbance one can think of. An interesting sidelight on this unending succession of disturbances is that they nearly all started off with a group of men in their 70's in power and they all finished off with a man of 40 in power. It is remarkable that thirty years should be dropped in that way in the age of the leaders. One expects a man of 70 to be succeeded by a man of 60, but on going over the names of those in power it will be found that in almost every case the man of 70 has been succeeded by a man of 40 years of age.

Thinking backwards we realize that a man aged 65 to 70 today is the youngest man who completed his education under the Ottoman régime. A man of 40 was only born in 1919. I associate this with the violent impact to which I have referred; the sudden arrival of Europe in the middle of these mediæval provinces produced an impact which naturally resulted in the fact that the men born and bred up after that were quite different to the men who had been born and bred up and completed their education before 1914. It was those who had been educated under the Ottoman régime who had been in the high seats of power up to the last six or seven years.

That is one way of looking upon this endless succession of violent convulsions as being the take-over by the young generation educated on European lines from the old men whose education had been completed before the irruption of Europe into the Arab countries, that is in Ottoman times.

Another factor which emphasizes this prominence of youth is that, since the Second World War especially, the northern Arab countries have made the most tremendous efforts to increase education. The speed with which they open new schools is quite surprising. They always start the right way by opening a new school before there are any teachers. Nevertheless, although in some cases the academic standards may not be very high, they have achieved an amazing success in teaching people to read and write. Millions and millions of Arabs whose fathers and ancestors were always illiterate can now read and write. Reading and writing may be called the portal to an interest in politics; or we can put it the other way and say reading makes people accessible to propaganda. If one could take a census of the number of people actively interested in politics in these Arab countries owing to the sudden rapid spread of literacy, it would probably be found that those in their 20's immensely exceed the number, let us say, who are in their 30's, but vastly exceed the number in their 40's, 50's or 60's. So we see both these factors going on together. As a result of these disturbances, groups of men all round about 40, some between 35 and 40 years of age, in all the key positions. One can almost say that in some of the Arab countries nearly every man over 40 has been thrown out; there is nobody in power of over 40, and at the same time the great majority of their supporters are in their 20's, these being the newly literate people who have grown up since the Second World War. To some extent the temperamental, emotional, excitable course of their politics can be attributed to this unbalance between the ages, the extreme youthfulness of everybody who is now in politics.

I believe that all the Arab countries, basically, wish to be neutral between the Western powers and the Iron Curtain countries. A point of interest is whether neutrality is possible from this point of view. These young Arabs seem to want two things which are not quite, though certainly to some extent, incompatible with one another. Firstly, they want complete independence; one might almost say 110 per cent. independence. Many of them claim that independence means complete freedom from all foreign influence. He would be a bold man who claimed we possessed that in Great Britain. Secondly, these young Arabs want at the same time immediate modernization. To modernize, industrialize and to get all the newest things is impossible for them without technical and financial assistance, yet they hesitate to accept technical or financial assistance lest they introduce foreign influence. So to some extent these two requirements appear to be incompatible with one another.

Extremely interesting developments took place during 1958. Until a year or two years ago nine young Arabs out of ten to whom one mentioned Russia would say "Oh, we don't worry about Russia at all. Russia is no danger to our countries. You see, the Russians are not imperialistic; they are not greedy; they are just philanthropic. The only menace to our independence comes from Britain and America." As a result, perhaps, of that almost universal belief amongst the young political people in a number of Arab countries the Communists made common cause with the Nationalists to resist the influence of the West. So successful were they that Western influence has vanished in many of the Arab countries. But what is interesting is that as the Western influence disappears the Russian influence comes in, and as the Western influence disappears and the Russian influence comes in so the Nationalists tend to part company with the Communists. If after all the definition of independence is complete freedom from all foreign influence, then it applies as much to the Russians as to the British or the Americans. Therefore there is liable to be an increasing breach between Nationalists and Communists who were formerly allies when the West was the enemy, but now that the West has disappeared their paths tend to separate. From our point of view the only unfortunate aspect of this situation is that we still remain enemies of both sides. Whether we shall continue to do so depends rather on ourselves.

An unfortunate aspect of the rise of these young men is that they all believe that we were supporting the former régimes. A short time ago I was giving a similar talk to this in an industrial city in the Midlands, and as I was leaving an Iraqi student accosted me and asked: "Why does Britain always support mediæval forms of government?" I said "I do not know, but do you think she really does?" He replied: "Of course she does. Now, take your case, you were in the Middle East for 36 years and you were always opposed to revolutions." To which I replied: "I was not particularly involved one way or the other," whereupon he said: "Please do not try to get out of it. Put it the other way: can you honestly say you ever started a revolution?"

Of course it was not so simple as these young men think. I imagine that what happened was that after the First World War these Arab countries were thrown open to Europe, and various governments, oil companies

or anything else, wanted to make treaties, commercial agreements or obtain concessions for oil. They obviously entered into such agreements with whatever government they found in power. I rather doubt that it was ever deliberately thought that we must keep this or that man in office, although that seems to be the universal belief amongst these younger men. The fact remains that when the young people were growing up they got this idea, and there is no doubt that Communists and other such like folk made hay while the sun shone. The general feeling was that the West only supports old-fashioned systems, and the Russians were ready to say: "We are the people who are progressive; we want to see you get on; we like young people; the West only likes old people." It is not really so simple as these young men think. Yet, as a matter of fact, there is a certain amount of truth in it. Almost everywhere in the Middle East the people over 40 years of age are pro-West; those in their 20's, until quite recently, have been mostly pro-Russian, and it seems to me that is because we failed ever to take any trouble with young people. There were our agreements with the governments in office; they were perfectly legal governments; we were not supporting them by armed Forces or anything of that nature. Having entered into the agreements we just sat back.

I remember that in 1953 when the Communists started to try to get into Jordan the instructions they gave to Party members were that they should only concentrate on the young, and have nothing to do with the old people who were in office at the time. All their efforts were devoted to students, schoolmasters and young people. That lesson is as true today as it was in 1953. We still do not concentrate on young people.

Another revolution which has taken place since the Second World War is evidenced by the fact that international relations are no longer limited to the channels of diplomacy. Particularly the Russians very often neglect the governments of countries completely, and they direct all their efforts to the general public. This process of speaking to a whole nation instead of to its Minister for Foreign Affairs has never previously been possible in the history of the world. That is an interesting point to bear in mind. This is an entirely new field for which no precedents can be found in history. It has, of course, been made possible by the present ease of communications, but it has been particularly devastating in its results in Arab countries owing to that very phenomenon which I mentioned earlier, namely, the rapid spread of education. The spread of elementary education has produced millions of people who can now read and write, who are accessible to propaganda and to newspapers, who are extremely lively and intelligent, who are passionately anxious to catch up, but who have no experience of public affairs and really no conception of how the rest of the world lives or works. Such a population constitutes a fertile soil for any ideas which anybody likes to project at them. They are not sufficiently experienced to be able to differentiate the true from the false; in other words, they will swallow any story.

It is worth noticing also that when anyone wishes to place foreign affairs before such an audience it is no use producing statistics, and neither is it of any use to produce logical arguments; they are all much too dull.



Nobody wants to hear that kind of thing. If one wishes to get a policy across to a public of this kind it has to be emotional and not logical.

Many people in European countries misunderstand the Arab or Middle East dictator. Our own Press, perhaps, is rather given to treating dictators as ruthless tyrants ready to shoot all who hold a different opinion from their own. It seems to me much nearer the truth to say that an Arab dictator is somebody who has the technique for arousing and, we hope to some extent, swaying the emotions of his public. It is by working up their passions that the dictator rides on the crest of his wave.

It is interesting to try to look back 120 to 200 years in Europe when a similar stage was being passed through. Much of what we have read about the crowds in Baghdad reads rather like 1789 happenings in Paris. In both cases the crowd surged through the streets shouting for the enemies of the Republic to be executed. Very fine. In due course, according to the precedents, the crowd become slightly more experienced or perhaps somebody obtains a certain amount of control over it. It took the French 26 years to get round to bringing the Bourbons back, but the point here is that although the Bourbons returned, nothing was ever the same again. In other words, the suggestion I am putting forward is that at a certain stage a country which has always been autocratically ruled goes through a stage during which the public appears on the scene, and the public arrives on the scene as a result of just this process of hasty and elementary education thinly spread; the public bursts on the stage in this highly embarrassing manner, hanging people on lamp-posts and so on. The point is that once the public have come on to the stage they cannot be got off again. Whatever swings of the pendulum there may be, whether there is a Republic, an Emperor or a King, it is never the same again. Henceforward the public are on the stage and all that can be done is to hope that they will become better instructed. No one can push them off the stage again. I incline to think that something of this kind is happening in the Middle East, a new era similar to the new era which dawned on Europe in 1789. There is no use in hoping that there will be a return to the previous position.

The unfortunate part of what has happened from our point of view is its effect on the world situation. If the world situation were different we might say: "Well, all nations go through these stages; it is just too bad; they will have a rough time but perhaps in a number of years they will settle down to some new system which suits them." But I assume that the general situation now is that the West and the Russians are deadlocked in Europe. As they have weapons which can exterminate everybody, there does not seem to be much use in starting up a war. When any reasonable man comes up against an immovable object he does not run his head against it but goes round it. Or, to change the simile for my contemporaries, some remember, after the battles of the Marne and the Aisne, how we and the Germans both had our flanks in the air, and both raced to turn the other flank. Every day more men were being sent to the British left and more and more to the German right until eventually they got to the sea. An illustration of when deadlocked at one sector, all one can do is to go round. A study of the map shows that the way to

turn the deadlock in Europe is through the Middle East and Africa. So the coincidence that the Arabs are going through the stage at this moment unfortunately provides the Russians with an opportunity for turning our flank. They are succeeding in this because we and the Arabs are at loggerheads in our ideas. It is incredible to me that the majority or even a great number of Arabs can want to be Communists, but there is undoubtedly this profound misunderstanding between us and them. It is that which is offering the other side their opportunities.

It may be argued, perhaps with considerable plausibility, that all these people were much better off when the British were really in control. Certainly they were more secure than they seem to be now; but I think we are all agreed that it cannot be done any more. We are faced with two alternatives: either we must do it with force or else abandon force altogether; we have either to do it by force or, alternatively, by friendship. It is extremely difficult to combine the two. Once we apply force we sacrifice the friendship. But surely the worst of all possible worlds is to maintain an attitude of superiority, to continue to be condescending when one no longer has the force. In that way, surely, you lose everything. You no longer have the force to impose your ideas, although they may be very good ideas indeed. But if you continue to act in a supercilious manner you will be hated. It is not unlike the situation which often faces parents. Personally, I do not think we need apologize much for the past although we made terrible mistakes, mistakes now only too obvious. In the case of parents surely there is a stage at which force has to be used. One cannot philisophize with infants, but continuously parents have to be gradually relaxing authority until, in the end, they have to go over from authority to friendship. If parents try to assert authority when their children are grown up the result is usually unsuccessful. So it is only necessary, it seems to me, to make a small adjustment, to give up a superior manner, and yet it is an adjustment which is difficult to make because we are so used to another system.

I believe the key to this vital problem is just in a small change of approach. Firstly, it is essential to realize that in the Arab countries now the public is on the stage. Other people have realized that much more quickly than we have, and they have taken advantage of it and have won the most sweeping victories because they have appreciated early enough that they have to put over a popular appeal. It seems to me the first essential is to realize that this is happening.

Secondly, looking at the scene today it seems that the extraordinary successes achieved, basically, by the Russians, but also by the Egyptians and other people of the same kind, show that this is a new art, a new technique. There is some tremendous power here. It is possible to raise a whole nation into a frenzy of excitement. How is it done? All action is based originally on research, and yet again and again one seems to see examples which show that we have not a clue to what it is all about. Should not we start by research? It is a technique of mass psychology and of manœuvring. It seems absolutely vital that some of the best brains in this country should be turned on to finding out about all this: how countries, even continents, can be swept off their feet in this extraordinary

manner. There is obviously a general technique which is applicable to everybody. It could be done to us just as well.

If some power were in the position to do what can be done in the Arab countries through the Press, through books, through broadcasting or whatever else, if something such as that could be turned on to us, the human mind could not resist it. There is nobody in this country at the moment in the position which enables them to wield the necessary tools, but I believe if this can be done to any race it cannot be resisted by the human mind. So there is no use our blaming the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Iraqis, or whoever else it may be. Forces have been brought to bear on them which cannot be resisted, psychological mental pressure. Others have learned how to use these tools; we have not. That is why it seems to me so essential that we should start finding out how it is done.

Although it was neglected until a few years ago, to some extent the power of broadcasting has now been discussed or, we may say, to a slight extent appreciated—I am not saying that any action has been taken—and one does see reference to it. And so I draw your attention to something else. Anybody who has been in an Arab country while a broadcasting campaign has been carried on, appreciates what a tremendous power it has. I myself, and probably many here, can remember instances of its power, when owing to just one single broadcast one evening from a different country, one woke up the next morning to find all the shops shut and the people throwing stones in the streets. This, again, is something we never seem to investigate scientifically. I do not know how long the effect lasts. After all, broadcasting is words on the air. They may put people into a frenzy over-night, but a fortnight later, a month or three months later, how much of what has been said on the air is remembered? I should have thought that was one of the things we should be investigating.

Then there is the power of the printed word, firstly, in the form of newspapers and, secondly, in the form of books. Newspapers to some extent have a short-term power like broadcasting. The effect of books is far more difficult to estimate. Unfortunately, Arabs read very few books. The literate Arabs read half-a-dozen newspapers, and when you visit their houses you hardly ever see a shelf with books. Yet a book, in a sense, has a potentially far greater long-term effect. People throw newspapers away every day. Those who buy books usually keep them. A book can be read again, perhaps the family read it, or the sons do, and it is lent to friends.

I was interested recently—this may sound a different department—to find what seemed to be a similar case. Nearly 150 or 160 years ago something similar to that which has taken place in the Arab countries was happening in Britain. Large numbers of people were learning to read, and at that time, apparently, a whole class of people grew up who printed nasty little books, chiefly on highly immoral subjects, which they took from door to door. They hawked them round and sold them for one penny or twopence each. This new business came about as a result of the creation of this vast new class of hitherto uneducated people who had just been taught to read. In so far as this new aspect of the matter is concerned, the damage that was thought to be going on here was moral rather than political. Little books containing dirty stories were being sold at

every cottage door. In order to combat that a voluntary society was formed called the Religious Tract Society, which printed nice books and hawked them from door to door.

What is interesting in this regard is the point we never seem to get. Not only in the Arab countries but perhaps more in colonies, we teach the people to read and write; and that's that. We pass on to something else without appreciating that as soon as a man is taught to read there are opened up to him vast new worlds, worlds which may lead him to religion or to atheism, may teach him statesmanship or communism. It is not possible to control what that chap is going to read once he has been taught. A system usually followed seems to be that we teach people to read and the Communists supply the literature.

Does not it seem extraordinary that nobody seems to have thought of this although in past history in all other countries the same process has constantly been repeated? As soon as there happens to be a really wide spread of education, then it is the immoral, the nasty, people who produce the reading matter. I should have thought it would be well worth while not only to subsidize books in Arabic or other local languages but even to employ authors to produce the kind of books needed, and they need not necessarily be a medium of British propaganda, they might be novels. Surely it is necessary to make available to this new vast reading public something which is not Communist propaganda or low journalism? Nevertheless, those are, roughly speaking, the only two forms of literature available to these millions who are learning to read.

One word in conclusion. It always seems to me rather curious that the Western powers when they approach these people never seem to mention the future. Communists, of course, do talk about the future. The story they produce about the world they are going to make may not be very attractive to us. But there it is. They are promising a better world. I do not think we ever speak of the future at all. We seem to live only day-to-day. In fact, I do not think it much of an exaggeration to say that the impact we produce on the Arabs is that we want to safeguard our oil, or this or that. That may be fair enough. But it is not a very inspiring approach from the point of view of the other people. It does not make them terribly enthusiastic when we write a note saying: "Please notice we have the right" to do this, that or the other. To a great extent this happens just because we have not thought about the problem. Surely we are working for a far better approach, a far better future than the Communists? We are actually doing something about it. Unfortunately, we never draw attention to what we are doing.

I should like to see us producing a little picture of the world we think we would like to see. Fifty years hence if you like, twenty-five years hence, what is it going to be like? What do we want it to be like? I assume the first thing you will have to say is that it is going to be an equalitarian world. As I have said, the public are on the stage, and you cannot get away with one lot being superior to another lot. So that must be the first basis.

It always seems to me remarkable that when we do wish to recommend ourselves to the Arab people we tell them that we have a higher

standard of living than they have. Also not very inspiring from their point of view. Sometimes we even suggest that if they work with us they will get a higher standard of living. But is not that extremely mistaken psychology? I can remember the days when it used to be said: "Oh, you will never have any trouble with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Persians need money; they cannot make any trouble." But they did.

These are all profoundly emotional questions; tremendously emotional. When people are worked up they could not care less about money or material benefits. For that matter, no one in life is really stirred up by material advantages. It is only much deeper human passions which arouse people, and all those passions have been worked up against us.

Only two days ago I read in one of the leading British newspapers that in the Middle East force is no longer applicable; there was something about propaganda, but that in itself was said to be passing. What is important now, the paper said, is the commercial aspect. As to that I could not differ more completely. In fact, it is exactly the other way round. Because the emotions of these people are aroused they attempt to bring in the Russians on a commercial basis. But it is the emotional side which is the key, not the material and the commercial sides. Therefore I feel sure that we must make an appeal to these people by telling them what we are trying to do. I do not think I ever met an Arab who had any conception that the British Commonwealth was working for equality of races, for a Commonwealth of Nations, objects which after all started being talked about in Britain one hundred years ago. The Arabs have never heard about our efforts. Their belief is that Britain hangs on to everybody, but is now being thrown out.

Surely we could present a picture of this equalitarian world which we are actually making, something sufficiently idealistic to arouse the emotions of the Arab people, but not so idealistic that it does not seem as if it could be carried out. There is tremendous evidence to prove what has been said. Although we are extremely philanthropic, with the best of intentions and so on, we still tend to help these people as though they were poor relations and we are being rather charitable. I do not believe that friendship can be based on one wealthy side which gives and the other side which receives. Friendship can only be based on an equal partnership, working for a common ideal.

If you put across your picture of the world you want, one should then go so far as to say to the Arabs: "These ideals cannot be realized without your help." I think you will appreciate what I mean by that. Until they feel that they are playing a useful part, the thing is of no interest to them. One cannot feel enthusiastic about receiving charity; but if there is a feeling of being wanted, then one gets down to it.

And so, briefly, what I find frustrating is not that we made a mistake, that we have supported the wrong man. Everybody accosts me here with questions about minor tactics: Ought we to have supported Nasser? Should we have helped King Hussein? What are we to say now to Kessim? This is day-to-day tactics. I do not believe that is of vital importance. What you want is only a minor but vital change in your psychological approach. If only we could bring that off I believe we could again

win the friendship of the Arab people and that we and they really could once again work happily and enthusiastically together to bring about this ideal world, not only a world with a higher standard of living but a more secure world, which is, after all, what we and they so urgently need.

The CHAIRMAN: It only now remains for me to thank, on your behalf, ladies and gentlemen, Sir John Glubb for what has been a most stimulating talk. In any case, it seems it is not the kind of talk which lends itself readily either to asking short questions, still less of giving short answers. The lecture will, through the Society's *Journal*, be read by a wider public than represented here. If I might venture a personal hope, it is that it will be studied by the pundits of the British Council.

Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles and reviews and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual authors and contributors.

# ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Royal Central Asian Society was held at Claridges, London, W.1, on Wednesday, July 8, 1959. The President, The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Scarborough, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D., presided and 208 members and guests were present. The guests of the Society were H.E. The Jordanian Ambassador, Ihsn Hashim and Mme. Hashim; H.E. The High Commissioner for Pakistan, Lt.-General Mohammed Yousuf; General Sir Francis Festing (Chief of the Imperial General Staff); Sir Alexander and Lady Grantham; Sir Neville Gass, and Miss Gass; Sir Gilbert Laithwaite; Sir Wilfred and Lady Jackson.

The toast to Her Majesty the Queen was loyally honoured.

## ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

The Rt. Hon. THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D.: The Royal Central Asian Society once again holds its Annual Dinner—this time in a temperature which can make its humble comparison with those many of you have known in different parts of Asia; and this time without the shadow of tragic events such as those which hung over us at this time last year. Once again we can welcome to this annual festival of the Society a goodly number of those who have played their part, in one way or another, in the countries of Asia. They come either as our guests or as members of the Society; and they all are welcome.

If I may say a word or two about the affairs of the Society, I think I can claim again this year—as I was able to do last year—that the Society has had another useful year; through its meetings to hear talks of topical interest and through its Journal; and I think its members can feel that the Society is in a sound condition and contributes usefully to the links which bind British people to their many friends in the countries of Asia.

Nevertheless, we should do well, as I know your Committee is doing, to take thought for the morrow. In ten years' time there will be few, if any, administrators joining our Society—as they used to do in the past—for the simple reason that we have ceased to be responsible for the administration of many great countries of Asia. There will perhaps be rather more diplomatists to offset, in some degree, the decline in membership which would seem inevitable; but surely we can also expect that the principal connection which we shall have with Asian countries will be—what we began with—trade, and it is to the younger men of our great firms which do business in the East that this Society could be useful. It might be worth considering whether the Society can take any special action which might make it easier for young men in firms to take up membership of the Society. There are other societies, not unlike our own, who no doubt have similar problems; perhaps the day will come when all such societies might see advantages in some kind of amalgamation. But that can only come about naturally. I am not thinking this evening of making a take-over bid!

During my tenure of office as President of this Society I have always avoided making a *tour d'horizon* of Asia, and I think you must agree that it would not be in the public interest to go very far round Asia on an evening like this. Nevertheless, I have two or three points to make which should be made.

It has been a satisfaction to those who are interested in the affairs of Asian countries to notice some old friendships in better shape. Jordan, for example, whose Ambassador we are so glad to see here tonight. (*Applause.*) And the recent private visit by H.M. King Hussein to London gave much pleasure to the many friends of Jordan in this country. ("Hear, hear.") There was also a State visit—much appreciated in this country—by H.I.M. the Shahanshah of Iran. (*Applause.*) The Ambassador, who was to have been here but unfortunately prevented by pressing official duties, knows how successful this visit was for the relations of the two countries.

Then I certainly will not omit to say what immense pleasure was given to this country as a whole by the great welcome which was given to H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh in India and Pakistan and Ceylon, in Hong Kong and many other places in Asia. (*Applause.*) Sir Alexander Grantham, who is to propose the toast to the Society, was a ship-mate with His Royal Highness throughout a good deal of that tour.

Visits such as those I have mentioned do a great deal to support the work of Cabinets and Ambassadors, and help to brighten up the relationships between countries and nations; in so doing they make old friends feel happier.

There is something else I wish to tell you, and it is a kind of fairy story, concerning the Society. Like all good fairy stories, it is true. In September last year Her Majesty the Queen received a telegram from the only two Englishmen, as far as was known, in the Mongol Peoples' Republic. Of those two, one was an Honorary Secretary of the Royal Central Asian Society, Group-Captain Smallwood; the other was Dr. Bawdon of the School of Oriental and African Studies. The incident which gave rise to that telegram was as follows. At Kiltegen in a very wild part of Western Mongolia there was an archaeological mission composed of Mongols and Czechs. These two Englishmen were taken to the diggings, which are of immense historical interest, and following their inspection of the work in progress they were entertained in the *yurt* of the senior Mongol official. Towards the end of the repast one of the senior Czechs (the only one who spoke English) rose, lifted his Chinese bowl, which was full of Russian champagne, and said in English: "We in Czechoslovakia admire England and I wish to propose the health of the English Queen." When this was translated into Mongol it was received with acclamation by a body of people comprising Mongols, Czechs, Russians, French, Germans and English.

The moral of that story seems to me to be that it shows, as it were in a miniature, what the Royal Central Asian Society stands for. It reminds us that we have the title "Royal"; it shows that there is no part of the continent of Asia to which our members do not go and no part in which they are not interested. It shows, too, that our interest in those countries



is genuine, we are interested about their past, their present and their future. It shows, moreover, that the relationship which we in this Society try to promote is one of friendship with all peoples in that great continent. (*Applause.*)

My Lord Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Although I have already handed over as Chairman of Council, I am very glad to be still permitted the privilege, at this Annual Dinner, of proposing the toast to our Guests. As is customary on these occasions, I shall only mention a few names, and among the very distinguished company that have favoured us with their presence tonight, I think I should first welcome some who are not only here as *our* guests, but as guests of our country, while they represent the interests of their own. We are very glad to have here, so soon after his arrival in this country, H.E. Lt.-General Mohammed Yousuf, High Commissioner for Pakistan. He comes to us after a career of great distinction in his own country; he has already many friends in this country and I am sure that he will make a great many more. We also welcome the Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. H.E. Ihsn Hashim in an old friend, and there are many here beside myself who have known him during the troublous days when he was Governor of Jerusalem, and who have pleasant recollections of his cheerful hospitality, and much admiration for the address and vigour with which he has been able to cope with difficult situations.

We are fortunate to have with us the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, GENERAL SIR FRANCIS FESTING, and are particularly glad that we do not meet tonight under the shadow of any such tragedy as kept his predecessor in office from joining us last year.

There was a fourteenth-century judge who said that the mark of a good judge was his ability to extend his jurisdiction; and by that criterion this is a good Society, for we have included in Central Asia every country from Turkey to Formosa and from the North Pole to the Equator. We need no better justification, although plenty is available, for including among our guests tonight SIR ALEXANDER GRANTHAM, who, after a brilliant career in the Colonial service, ending with his extended Governorship of Hong Kong, has recently returned from accompanying H.R.H. Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, on his Far Eastern tour. Both the Society and its Dinner Club are already indebted to Sir Alexander for two very lucid and informative talks, and I am sure that we are all looking forward to, and will not be disappointed with, what he will have to say to us later on this evening.

Another ex-colonial civil servant whom I feel I ought to mention is SIR WILFRED JACKSON. Since 1922 he has held in succession five governorships under the Colonial Office, finishing in Tanganyika. I think this must be something like a record, and we are very pleased to have him with us here tonight.

As a representative of big business, we are glad to welcome SIR NEVILLE GASS. He belongs to a class who are often referred to as tycoons, but I thought that before making use of that term I had better look it up in the dictionary to make sure that there was nothing opprobrious about it. I find it was the word by which Englishmen a hundred years ago referred

to the Shoguns of Japan, for it seems that Englishmen abroad have always been as bad at pronouncing foreign languages as some of the announcers of the B.B.C. are today at pronouncing their own. At any rate, the British have always been rather good at turning derogatory epithets into titles of honour—there are people here tonight who are not ashamed of having once been members of a “contemptible little army”—and no one is more fitted, or more likely, to remove any sinister significance from the word tycoon than Sir Neville Gass.

I must also mention SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE, who is not only a guest, but a member of the Society of long standing. Many of you will know him as one of the most versatile of men, and perhaps half the people in this room tonight have at some time or other been brought into contact with him in the course of his varied career, from which he is now about to retire as Permanent Under-Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Department. I hope that he is not going to expand as rapidly as his department has done lately. There was a time when I was rather envious of him; that was when I found him able to dictate two different letters at once to two stenographers, as well as able to carry on a conversation with a visitor, but no doubt that is an accomplishment which he now has sufficient leisure not to require.

There is one other guest whom I feel that I ought to mention, and that is our indefatigable Secretary, Mrs. Putnam, upon whom has devolved, with much other work, the main work of arranging this function tonight. I am sure that all members would wish that work not to go unacknowledged tonight.

My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to rise and drink to the toast of our Guests.

General SIR FRANCIS FESTING, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), in reply to the toast, said: I am greatly honoured to be asked to reply on behalf of “The Guests.” I am in a slightly anomalous position because I have been a member of the Society, though perhaps nobody has been aware of it, for about ten years. However, I would like to thank you very much indeed for having me as your guest and for giving me such a very good dinner.

I am particularly pleased to be with you because I have met a good number of old friends tonight, friends I made all over the world in all sorts of places, people like Lt.-General Mohammed Yousuf, Sir Alexander Grantham, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite and many others. It is great fun for me, and for all of us, to meet here on such a notable occasion.

Ladies and gentlemen, I certainly would not dare in this company or any other to pose as an expert on Asiatic affairs. I have been lucky enough to have had a certain amount of experience of the East, and particularly the Far East, and perhaps I might be allowed to presume to address you a little from the point of view of a soldier.

Now there is something I would like to say—I do not know that it is particularly palatable, but it is to me the most extraordinary thing that I have been in London for nearly a year and I am still amazed by the extraordinary ignorance and the extraordinary disinterestedness that occurs about the East, and particularly the Far East.

There was a time, I think some while before Christopher Columbus made his voyage, when people thought that if one sailed in a westerly direction one would ultimately sort of sail off the edge of the world. I sometimes think that many today in London believe if you set forth, in an aeroplane perhaps, in an easterly direction that once you got past the eastern confines of India you would also fall into oblivion. It is most extraordinary how seldom one hears the word "Japan" ever mentioned. People, admittedly, are aware of the tremendous problems posed by China, but in rather a vague and often rather an alarmist form. Hong Kong is occasionally mentioned, usually as a sort of tourist centre. Indonesia occasionally mentioned when they change a Government or make some other move there, but not really seriously arousing much interest.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, it is societies, if I may be bold enough to say so, like ours that do much to correct this deplorable state of affairs, and it is deplorable; it is the most shocking thing that this state of complete, or partially complete, ignorance exists. I do feel that all of us who have the luck to travel to these Far Eastern parts of the world should do all we can to try to bring the existence of about half the world to the notice of our own people.

Many people today are extremely gloomy and pessimistic about the part that the British still play in the East. Admittedly, the days are gone when we have had an immense Empire in the East. The day has gone when we had a large Army, the Indian Army, which was invariably engaged in any operations that we became involved in in the East. But I personally do not think that that has altered the fact that we can still play a very big part, not only us but the Commonwealth. The days of numerically large armies are, in my submission, past or passing. Armies and forces brought up to date, small, efficient, mobile and with air mobility, are an absolute *sine qua non* of anything in that direction that we can now do. I believe that their days are far from finished.

But it is not, of course, armies, force and power and so on that actually will play the big part in the future; it is far more a question of the influence that we and the Commonwealth can bring to bear on all those areas. There is a tremendous potential to be developed by the British Commonwealth, extending as it does through Pakistan and India, Ceylon, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand. It is the representatives of that Commonwealth, not so much military representatives but the representatives in business, in trade and diplomatic representation, who must carry on the traditions that have been going for two centuries at least. I think through these people, those who are engaged in the Asian countries, a tremendous fund of goodwill can be exerted. And after all there are many young countries in the East which, although they have gained their independence and although they may not be particularly susceptible, in a way, to grandmotherly advice, still, *au fond*, are prepared to listen to some of the advice that can be given, provided it is offered in a tactful fashion. In my view a tremendous amount could be done in that way. I am sure that the young men to whom your President has referred who are serving in business and trade in those areas have a great part to play. Their part is one that in the past was, perhaps, more obviously discharged

by rather more obviously potent forces, but I do not think in any way more important forces than we can exert today.

I believe it is societies like ours that can do a lot of good in that way, and I am certain it will be done. It now only remains for me, in my other capacity of replying for "The Guests," to thank you all for a very nice evening and for the most delightful dinner that you have given us. Thank you all very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

#### THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

The toast of "The Royal Central Asian Society" was proposed by SIR ALEXANDER GRANTHAM, G.C.M.G., who said:

In proposing the health of the Society I should like to make a few remarks, in a very general way, about Asia, particularly the Far East, which I have known on and off for the past fifty-five years, which is longer than most of the ladies here present! For the sake of brevity and lucidity I shall divide my remarks into six main points.

Firstly, in what manner, generally speaking, does the East regard the West? Those who do not know the East, or may have visited it only very cursorily, may be surprised when I say that there is a feeling of resentment against the West, because of the domination that the West has exerted over the East, the humiliation that the West has inflicted on the East, and the aggression that the West has practised upon the East. The aggression was most noticeable in the nineteenth century, and it became about because the West then was scientifically and technologically far superior to the East. Unfortunately, that led to a general assumption amongst westerners that the West was superior in all things to the East. Quite naturally, Asia with its very high cultures, its ancient cultures, took that somewhat amiss—and that is putting it mildly. Their cultural pride was hurt. Then in the latter part of the nineteenth century Asia absorbed from the West the spirit of nationalism, and that gave added resentment against the West. Today all those dominations and aggressions are a thing of the past. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, French Indo-China, Indonesia, the Philippines and so on, have achieved or have been granted their independence; but the leaders in these countries were born and grew up when Western domination was still predominant, and it is with them, the present generation, that we have to deal; the future generation have been, so to speak, born free and therefore will not feel this resentment. I suggest that this present feeling of resentment against the West must be borne in mind by our political leaders and our business leaders whenever they are dealing with Asian peoples. That is my first point.

My second point concerns the neutralism which exists in many countries of Asia, neutralism or "non commitment," of which India is the prime example. A few years ago people in the United Kingdom, but more particularly in the United States of America, were apt to inveigh against these uncommitted Asian countries: "He who is not for me is against me." I think they were wrong; they should have said: "He who is not against me is for me"; in other words, to put it in practical language, "He whose country is not Communist is part of the free world." I can

appreciate the point of view of these so-called neutral countries. Moreover, there is no hope of them changing. So do not let us inveigh against them. There are, of course, also a number of countries in Asia which are what I call "positive anti-Communist countries." That is shown by their having joined pacts such as the Baghdad Pact, S.E.A.T.O., or the U.S./Japan Mutual Security Pact. My second point then is that the so called uncommitted countries are part of the Free World. They are on our side.

My third point is that in certain parts of Asia, more notably the Middle East, of which I have no direct experience whatever, but one has seen it happen in Japan towards the end of the last century and in Thailand in the early 1930s, there has been an overthrowing of feudalism: the revolt of the middle classes and the overthrowing by them of absolute monarchy and the landed aristocracy. This movement was internal, and had no anti-Western content, unless a Western power or powers identified itself closely with the old feudalistic régime. In some countries in Asia there was no feudalism to overthrow, but in any case throughout Asia today it is the middle classes who have the power. Numerically they only comprise a small proportion of the population, eighty per cent of which are poor peasants, whose main concern is, just as it was fifty, one hundred or two hundred years ago, how to get the next meal for themselves and their families. It is those who lead the country, the politicians, those who vote them into office, those who create trouble, it is those, the middle classes, who have the power today. That is my third point: the overthrowing of feudalism in Asia.

My fourth point concerns democracy. When these newly emergent countries in Asia got rid of or threw over, as they thought, colonialism, they said: "We must be democratic; we must follow the example of Westminster and Parliamentary democracy." We and the United States of America thrust that down their throats. We made a fundamental mistake. We regarded democracy as an end in itself, whereas to my way of thinking democracy is merely one of the means to an end—the liberty of the individual and the rule of law. For the attainment of that end it is not essential that there should be democracy on the Westminster model. That is now being realized in Asia. China tried democracy, and as a result of the complete failure of it she has gone Communist. Democracy on the Parliamentary model is temporarily suspended in Pakistan, in Burma and in Indonesia. It may well be that something on the lines of guided democracy—which may well differ from country to country—may be the solution from many states in Asia. But for goodness' sake do not let us try to thrust our Westminster ideas down their throats. That is my fourth point: I challenge that Parliamentary democracy is automatically suitable for all countries, whether in Asia, Africa or elsewhere.

My fifth point is in regard to industrialization. The countries of Asia are determined—it is almost a creed with them—that they must industrialize themselves in order to solve the problem of poverty; and believe me, they are very poor indeed; it is a problem they need to solve. They feel they have to modernize themselves or else they will perish in the world of today. To industrialize themselves they will need a great deal of capital. Where on earth is that capital to come from? Eighty per cent.

of their people are living at subsistence level. The Asian countries need capital in order to improve their communications. Those who have been to Asian countries will realize how poor their communications are by modern standards. For their power, for their irrigation, they need outside help, and we have got to help them. Why have we got to help them? First of all, because we are the "Haves" and they are the "Have-nots." The countries bordering the North Atlantic comprise sixteen per cent. of the world population. Those sixteen per cent. enjoy nearly three-quarters of the wealth of the world today. Is it not incumbent on the sixteen per cent. to do a little bit of sharing? Then to put it on a lower plane, is it not also a matter of self-interest? Poverty is the breeding-ground of Communism. If these Asian countries are going to be left to remain poor, without help from the wealthier countries of the Free World, they will go Communist. I might be challenged on that, for I said earlier that Asia has rejected Western imperialism. Why then should she be attracted by an even more formidable imperialism, that of Communist Russia? But look at the problem from the point of view of the newly-emergent countries. Russian Communism and Chinese Communism have a great deal to offer them. In the first place Communism appears as a great brotherhood; there is no race consciousness; no Notting Hill, no Little Rock, no *apartheid* in Communist countries. Communism is also anti-Western and anti-capitalist. And perhaps what is most impressive from their point of view is that they have seen Russia lift itself from a backward country in 1917 to the second industrial power today. The under developed countries of Asia are going through the same experience, they are trying to lift themselves up. The same has happened in China. But already some Asian countries are awakening to the dangers of Communism. We see it in Egypt, we see it in Burma under General Ne Win, and most recently in the small kingdom of Laos.

I repeat my fifth point: the determination of Asian countries to industrialize themselves as the only way of solving the problem of poverty.

My sixth point is the prejudice in most Asian countries in favour of the public sector as against the private sector in industry and commerce, and the denigration of private capital whether local or foreign. This strikes me as foolish, for as I have said, they need all the capital they can lay their hands on. What are the reasons for this seemingly strange attitude? The first is emotional. When these Asian countries were struggling for their independence they got more sympathy from the Socialists in Britain and Europe than from anyone else. Then, too, capitalism is to them synonymous with Western imperialism. But there is also a practical reason for their fervour for the public sector. It is this: Asian countries are extremely short of people of a managerial calibre: Japan is an exception. The governments have so much to do that they absorb all or the greater part of these with executive ability. The third reason why they are so sold on the idea of state control as against private enterprise is the example of Russia and China. Here they overlook the important point that whereas in these Communist countries you have a powerful and wealthy state, you also have a very poor people. It is the State that counts for everything and not the individual for nothing.

Those are the six points I wished, briefly, to make as to what seems to me to be happening in Asia today. Asia is going through a period of great ferment and change. And periods of change are extremely uncomfortable for all concerned. The peoples of Asia have got to work out their own salvation, but we have got to help them to our maximum capabilities, and help them with a friendly understanding of their problems. From what I know of the Royal Central Asian Society I am quite certain that no one has more sympathy and understanding of their problems than have the members of this Society; so I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to rise and drink to the health of "The Royal Central Asian Society." (*Applause.*)

The PRESIDENT: And now it only remains for me, on behalf of the Society, to thank Sir Alexander Grantham for giving us all a great deal to think about. It is not the first time he has done that, and I am sure it is extremely good for us all, whether we are old or young, to have listened to the forthright manner in which Sir Alexander has told us about the present position in Asia. We are very grateful to you, Sir Alexander, for coming tonight, and for giving us such an excellent address. (*Applause.*)

# ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN CEYLON, INDIA AND ON THE BORDERS OF TIBET

By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK,  
LL.D., G.C.R., R.E., C.B.(MIL.)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 25, 1959, Lt.-Colonel The Lord Birdwood, M.V.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I seem to remember when at school regarding anthropology as concerned with bones, stones and queer stories about savages. I am not sure which aspect is about to be dealt with but I do know that we have with us a great authority, one who is well known to our Society and who can be regarded in every way as an international figure. His Royal Highness Prince Peter served in the Danish Army as an officer. He has studied in London and in France; worked as liaison officer with the Greek Army and with the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1945. He is now busy in London studying at the London School of Economics for his Ph.D. degree in the subject of polyandry, which I understand is a sub-section of anthropology. We are looking forward greatly to light being thrown on what to all of us, I feel sure, is a completely obscure subject.

**M**Y Lord Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first say how happy I am to have Lord Birdwood as Chairman; he certainly introduced me in very kind words. Incidentally, I would say that polyandry is a subject of anthropology; not a sub-section of it. I have so far abstained from addressing the Society on this subject because it seemed to me it was not quite relevant to the Royal Central Asian Society, but since you have invited me to speak on the subject—perhaps having grown curious—I will give a short account of the research work I have been undertaking during the last few years in India and Ceylon.

It may be that the audience is rather considerable on this occasion because the subject is that of polyandry; at any rate, I notice a number of ladies in the audience! In this connection it might amuse you to know that during the war a group of doctors in Cairo asked me to speak on the psychological aspects of polyandry, but that lecture was banned by the Egyptian Government for fear that it might give Moslem ladies ideas. I do not think there is any danger of this happening here.

I will first explain why I chose the subject of polyandry; then give a short description of the polyandry practised in Ceylon, South India and on the borders of Tibet. It will only be possible to touch briefly on the subject because it is so very vast. I shall, of course, be pleased to answer questions later, if the Chairman allows, provided of course that the questions are of the answerable kind!



### I. *Why Polyandry Chosen*

There are two reasons for my choice of the study of polyandry, one is psychoanalytical and the other anthropological. You are, no doubt, aware of the progress which psychology has made since the beginning of the present century, largely owing to the discoveries of Professor Sigmund Freud. I studied psychoanalysis in Paris in 1934 and 1935, because my mother happened to be a close collaborator with Professor Freud, so that since my youth I have been interested in the subject. A difficulty in regard to psychological findings through psychoanalytical methods in the West is that we do not quite know, as a result of discoveries made in connection with the human psyche, how much is due to the biological make-up of man, how much is due to the fact that he lives in society and how much is due to the cultural aspect of the society in which he lives. In fact it is necessary to differentiate between the biological, sociological and cultural aspects of man's psychic structure.

We know that all human beings have id, ego and super ego characteristics, but the contents of these three elements of the human psyche depend largely on the form of the culture in which the individual lives. The only way to differentiate between the three is to carry out comparative ethnographic research among people living in entirely different cultural conditions; especially to study the development of children, how they live in a different type of society, and what happens to the main complexes which have been discovered in Western psychology. For instance, how do these complexes fare in an entirely different culture such as the matriarchal.

With the idea of making this type of comparative study, I came to London to study anthropology at the London School of Economics in 1935-36 with a well-known Professor, Professor Malinowski. During the course of my study, it appeared to me that the choice of a society different from ours in the West meant limitation of the comparative research to two types of societies, the matrilineal and the polyandrous. In the matrilineal society the children inherit through their mother, who gives her name to the family; in the polyandrous society a woman has more than one husband. Eventually, the matrilineal type of society was rejected because it is avuncular, the mother's brother taking the place of the father as the authority. In such a family the father is a nice benign creature whom the children love very much, but who never asserts his authority. It is the mother's brother who has authority, who punishes the children and eventually the children inherit from this maternal uncle. In spite of these interesting aspects, the social organization and authority exercised in the family were not sufficiently different, fundamentally, from that in Western society.

Polyandry, on the other hand, appeared to be quite different because in such a society there is more than one father and authority is distributed over all the fathers. Furthermore, it was not usual to believe, at the time when I was studying the subject, that the mother had much to say in such a family. This seemed to be such a different society that it appeared worth while studying how children develop in it. If a little boy has three fathers

and one mother, what happens to his complexes, his development, his psychic structure when there is such an entirely different cultural and social set-up?

From the anthropological point of view polyandry is not very well known, possibly because it is regarded as being unnatural; we have become so accustomed to the habits of chickens and rabbits that polygamy seems to be more natural; also possibly the fact that the near Eastern people, the Moslems especially, practise polygyny makes that appear to us a more natural human organization than polyandry. Nevertheless, polyandry has interested many anthropologists in the past; in fact the early anthropologists looked upon polyandry as a stage in the evolution of human marriage. Darwin mentioned polyandry as a stage in the development of human relationship; McLennan, Herbert Spencer, Henry Maine and Robertson-Smith all took an interest in the subject. Moreover, polyandry was once practised in Britain, the authority for this being no less than Julius Cæsar who in *De Bello Gallico* (v. XIV) said: "In their domestic life they [the British] practise a form of community of wives, ten or twelve combining in a group, especially brother with brother and father with son. The children born of such wedlock are then reckoned to belong to that member of the partnership who was the first to receive the mother as a bride in the household." So some of your ancestors customarily practised polyandry.

It is known also on good authority that the pre-Islamic Arabs practised polyandry, the authorities being Strabo and the Holy Koran (iv, 26), the latter prohibiting polyandry between fathers and sons except in the case of marriages which have already taken place. In Central Asia polyandry is believed to have been customary; records show that the White Huns were polyandrous, as were also some of the tribes of the Hindu Kush, the Gaetae and the Massagaetae. In Russia the Yaroslav Slavs are reported to have been polyandrous, and even in my own country the Spartans and Athenians are said to have practised polyandry in a minor form in classical times. Another example is that of the Vedic Indians, and the Indian epic, the *Mahābhārātā*, mentions the five Pandava brothers as sharing one wife, Draupadi, between them. Nearer home, the Gaunches of Lancerote in the Canary Islands were polyandrous until their conquest in the fifteenth century. Thus it can be seen that even from the anthropological point of view the subject is well worth investigating in order to learn whether there is still more to be learnt about it.

## II. Field Research

My wife and I at the conclusion of our studies in London in 1936 considered where best to go to study polyandry as practised in modern times; obviously Britain, Athens and Sparta were no longer on the list. We referred to authorities who had given accounts of polyandry in modern times, the greatest of whom was Professor Westermarck, who had for a long time been a professor at the London School of Economics. His lengthy list of polyandrous peoples included many of the Indians of South America, some of the Red Indian tribes of the United States, some Eski-

mos and the Aleuts of the Aleutian islands. In Asia, in which he included the Pacific, Westermarck mentioned some Siberian tribes such as the Chukchi, the Tibetans, some of the hill tribes on the borders of Assam, also some Himalayan tribes. Westermarck mentioned the South Indians, including the Todas of the Nilgiris, and those in Malabar along the south-west coast of India. In Ceylon, there were supposed to be some polyandrous people, too, some in Malaya, and some Philipinos, while Professor Linton of Yale University, U.S.A., has given a long description of polyandry among the inhabitants of the Marquesas islands in the Pacific.

Polyandry has been reported from Central Australia and from Queensland, but there is doubt as to whether it is true polyandry because there appears to be no marriage. As we progressed in our study of polyandry we came to the conclusion that it was important that polyandry should be a form of marriage, otherwise one could confuse it with other forms of union in which women live with more than one man.

It would have been possible to study polyandry also in Africa, in Madagascar, or among the Hottentots, the Bantus, Basutos, Banyankole, Baziba and Bapedi tribes and the Ifon in Nigeria. We decided that possibly the most interesting and pleasant areas in which to carry out our investigation would be the Himalayas, South India and possibly Ceylon, because there would be groups of polyandrous people not too far from each other and readily accessible.

Therefore in 1937 I set off overland with my wife to motor from London to India, and we covered the London to Colombo stretch from March, 1937, to September, 1939, so you realize that we took our time about the journey, which included a ride on horseback of 600 miles from the Punjab, to Srinagar the capital of Kashmir, through Western Tibet during the summer of 1938. Then the war brought us back to Europe in 1939, and I was in the Army for eight years. Thus it was that ten years later, in 1949, we went back to Ceylon to start where we had left off. After remaining the whole of 1949 in Ceylon and South India we moved to Kalimpong, in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal on the borders of Tibet, in 1950, and there we remained until 1957. We returned that year for my studies at the London School of Economics, and I hope very much to complete my thesis and obtain my Ph.D. at the end of the present year.

Now I will go into the details of our work in the field and try to give some idea of polyandry as practised in Ceylon; in the state of Kerala (which used to be Travancore-Cochin and the Malabar district of Madras); on the south-west coast of India, among the Todas of the Nilgiris; and then also among the Tibetans and others living on the Indian side of the frontier in the Himalayas.

#### A. *Ceylon, 1939 and 1949*

We left Ceylon in 1939 and returned there in 1949. We worked in an area known as Ratnapura, 60 miles inland from Colombo. Polyandry is restricted to the inhabitants of the interior of Ceylon, to the Kandyan province. The Sinhalese living in the maritime provinces have long since ceased to be polyandrous, but polyandry persists among the Kandyans

possibly because their culture has not been so much affected by contact with overseas peoples, with Europeans and Arabs and so on, who do not practise polyandry.

The Kandyan Sinhalese are polyandrous in two classes; there are the poor paddy-growers still living in clearings in the forest and between large rubber and tea plantations, and the families of the rich former chieftains, the *Rate Mahatmaya* as they are called in Sinhalese. The type of marriage among these people is of two kinds: marriage in *diga* and in *binna*. The first is marriage similar to the European in which the woman takes the name of her husband or husbands and goes to live with him or them. In other words, it is patri-lineal and patri-local, as we say in the jargon of anthropology. In *binna* marriage the man goes and lives with a woman, his children inherit from her and he is subject more or less to the authority of the wife, the wife in this case usually being an heiress who takes a husband and carries on with her branch of the family in her own house inherited from her parents. The husband is there only to help her produce children.

The Sinhalese speak of polyandry as associated marriages, and they have no real wedding ceremony as we in the West understand it. It is sufficient for a woman to cook for a man to be considered as his wife. A woman married to other men polyandrously will say "I cook for them all," meaning "I am the wife of all of them." The husbands are usually brothers. In some areas we visited it was regarded as immoral to have more than two husbands; two brothers only should be husbands.

The *diga* form of marriage, in which the woman goes to live with a husband, is preferred. There is a proverb that the *binna* marriage is dangerous for a man; it is "like standing behind a man with a hoe"; in other words, he could be left out in the street and the woman remain with the property and the children.

I am often asked: How is the relationship between husbands and wife regulated? I was told before I left for Ceylon and I had read in accounts by early writers that the Sinhalese left their cropper on the door-frame as an indication of who was with the wife, but I was unable to find any proof on the spot of that practice. When I mentioned it to the Sinhalese they thought it a good idea but said that tact was now all that was needed.

The property of the family is owned usually collectively by the men in the *diga* marriage; in the *binna* marriage the woman remains the heiress; the children of a wife married in *binna* take the name of their father and not of their mother. All fathers of children are known as *apucha*, which in Sinhalese means "father," but there are distinctive qualifications: big father, little father, etc. I met one who was known as "opium eating *apucha*" because there were four husbands and it was necessary to have a distinctive name other than "big" or "little."

When asked why they practise polyandry the poorer people say they cannot afford to divide the property; there is not enough to go round; if they keep the property together they can all live on it; they share the property with wife and children, and this is a solution of their difficulties. When asked if that is the reason for the poorer people practising polyandry, why do the rich and the former chieftains practise it, the answer

is: "Because they are powerful and have wealth; polyandry is the only way to keep the wealth concentrated and to retain power." So there are economic reasons for both classes carrying on polyandry. The rich practise it for economic reasons, as the poor do; the rich in order to keep power and wealth concentrated and the position of the family maintained. When I asked in one of the poorer families: "Why do you practise polyandry?" one of the husbands replied: "If one of us marries this lady she will certainly seduce the other brothers and we might as well accept her straight away as a wife."

With the annexation of the Kingdom of Kandy all Ceylon came under British rule and the British recognized the customs of the Kandyan and included polyandry in that recognition by the Convention of 1815. However, in 1859, under Sir Henry Ward, polyandry was abolished at the request of some of the chieftains who, at the instigation of Sir Henry, insisted that marriages should be registered and that only one husband should be recognized. From then on the Kandyans registered only one husband; the brothers remained bachelors nominally for the rest of their lives without the custom having changed because of legislation by a colonial power. Recently the Sinhalese Government brought out a new law known as the Kandyan Marriage Act No. 44 of 1952, by which polyandrous marriage became illegal. I do not know to what extent the custom continues and whether only one of the husbands is registered today, but I rather think that is still happening and for this reason, that in spite of polyandry being illegal from the point of view of native legislation the custom will not die out.

### B. *Kerala*, 1939 and 1949

In 1939 we were at Tellichery in North Malabar. In 1949 we went to Cochin, Ernakulam, and a town in South Malabar, Shoranur, where we carried out most of our field work. Former authorities have reported certain people of Kerala to be polyandrous, namely, the Nayars, Thandans and Tiyas (Izhuvus), Kammalans and other low-caste artisans on the coast of south-west India. I do not, however, agree that all are polyandrous, because of the necessity of defining polyandry in terms of marriage.

The coast of south-western India is a most complex one in which people who are entirely different in culture live in close proximity. One of the main differences is that some sections follow father inheritance, others follow mother inheritance. Those who follow mother inheritance are known as *marumak̄kathayam*; those who follow the father inheritance are known as *mak̄kathayam*. The Nayars of Malabar always inherit through the mother's brother and the Tiyas of North Malabar are also *marumak̄kathayam*. The South Tiyas (Thandans) are *mak̄kathayam*; they follow the father inheritance. These are the people who are polyandrous, so that in the case of the Tiyas, the section in the north are *marumak̄kathayam* and not polyandrous, whilst those in the south are *mak̄kathayam* and polyandrous.

To cut a long story short, research has shown that the Nayars are not polyandrous because they have a wedding ceremony known as *tali*-tying,

whereby a small piece of metal is tied round a woman's neck by one of her clan when she comes of a certain age, and this is regarded as a symbolic marriage. Following this wedding ceremony the "wife" can consummate the marriage if she so wishes, and she is then free to live with men of her own caste or of the higher caste of Nambudri Brahmins in accordance with an ancient system known as *sambhandam*, which means marriage but of a much looser type.

It has been said that this Nayar custom of *sambhandam* is due to two causes: first, because the Nambudri Brahmins forbade the marriage of younger sons; only the eldest son was allowed to marry and inherit all property, including the wife or wives of his father. Younger sons could only live with Nayar women in *sambhandam* and have children by them. Since the Nayars are *marumak̄kathayam*, it follows that these children belonged to the Nayar caste and were Untouchables to their father. I have seen a Nayar child fall down and hurt itself and the father unable to pick it up because the child was of a different caste than he.

Another reason for this system in force in Malabar is that in ancient days the Nayar rajas of Malabar had militias of Nayars and in order to keep those soldiers properly disciplined they were not allowed to marry. The result was that two or more took one woman in common with whom they took it in turn to live in *sambhandam*. That custom is no longer practised.

The Thandans and the Tiyas of Cochin practise fraternal polyandry, that is, as in Ceylon, all the brothers in a family marry one wife. The wedding takes place in the compound of the house of the bride; she sits at one end of the row and all the brothers sit next to her in a line. They are feasted with *kanji* or rice porridge and all drink coconut milk in front of the assembled families of the people of the village. That is the wedding ceremony. When I enquired if they had any signal in connection with the regulation of their marriage I was told that sometimes one of the husbands occupied with the wife would leave his clothes on the verandah as a signal.

The brothers form a labour group; the property is owned collectively by all of them, but nowadays in the Thandan and Tiya families there is splitting up and three brothers will live with one wife in one part of the property, for instance, and two others will live with one wife in another part of the property. All the brothers of one of these families are known as the fathers of the children; they are known as *achan*, with distinctive appellations, as in Ceylon.

The artisans (who are in some way closely connected with the Kandians), the Kammalans, as they are called, have the same type of polyandry though more vigorous than the Thandans and Tiyas, possibly because the Kammalans have been less Europeanized. They are mainly goldsmiths and *dhobis* (washermen). They are less ashamed of their polyandry; they do not feel that they are backward, but that they are carrying on with their natural customs.

Other castes in Malabar, the primitive people who live in the forest, the Moplahs, Christians and Jews do not practise polyandry. This is what makes the region so complex from the point of view of study and investi-

gation, there being different layers of population all living and practising their own customs side by side.

The reasons given by the people of Malabar for the practice of polyandry are the same as those given in Ceylon, and they say it is because originally these castes came from Ceylon; that they went for a long stay in Ceylon where they acquired the custom of polyandry. They tell the story of a Perumal, one of the kings of Malabar, who was so pleased with his *dhobi* that he promised him a girl from the Ansari (carpenter) caste. It seems that the caste resented this to such an extent that they boycotted His Majesty, left Ceylon and refused to return and work for the King. The Perumal was most upset about this because he could not get his work done. It was only because of his insistence that the people should return to Malabar that the King of Ceylon agreed to send the Kammalans back with a Kandyan escort of Tiyas (Thandans). It seems that they brought with them to Malabar the custom of polyandry, so that it apparently has a Sinhalese origin. However, there are no historical records. That is just the tradition.

Polyandry was abolished in Cochin, before the State of Kerala came into being, by the Cochin Makkathayam Act, 1940; this was the outcome of representation by leaders of the Tiya community in Cochin urging the abolition of polyandry by legislation, and because the community itself wished this, the law has been observed. Today, of course, the new Hindu Code forbids polygamy in general; hence both polygyny and polyandry are illegal in modern India.

### C. *Todas of the Nilgiris, 1939 and 1949*

In 1939 we spent most of the summer amongst the Todas of the Nilgiris; in 1949 we spent the whole of the summer with them. The Todas claim to be the original inhabitants of the Nilgiris. We worked in the midst of them at Coonoor and at Ootacamund, the capital. The tribe is a small one. There are some 500 original individuals. They have been studied and mentioned by many anthropologists. The Todas have extraordinary customs and are a most fascinating people. Every book on anthropology mentions them and they have become extremely well known, especially since the study of them by W. H. R. Rivers, whose book on the Todas is a classic. The problem is that the Todas, because of their contact with so many anthropologists, have themselves become anthropologists, and when questioned they give just the answers they realize the anthropologist wants. That makes one's study of the Todas all the more difficult.

When I arrived in the region for the first time in 1939 I followed an American anthropologist, Dr. Emeneau of the University of California in Berkeley, who had spent three years studying the Todas' language and songs. When I began my study they asked: "Are you the man who has taken on in succession to Dr. Emeneau?" They seemed to think this a post to which one was appointed. Rivers in 1908 experienced other difficulties when studying the Todas. An earlier anthropologist had come upon these people at the end of the last century, a man named Marshall,

and Dr. Rivers, when checking some of the names of the Todas gods which this earlier anthropologist had given, noticed that some of them were somewhat peculiar. Through his Toda interpreter Dr. Rivers discovered that the name of one of the gods in the language of the Todas, as recorded by Marshall, meant "Give me another rupee and I will tell you his name!" It is easy to understand what had happened.

The Todas are a pastoral people; they live a semi-sedentary, semi-nomadic life; they have large graded herds of sacred buffaloes, their pedigrees being known through the cow buffaloes. The processing of the buffaloes' milk into butter and buttermilk in the dairies is a religious ceremony, the dairy-man being a priest of the tribe. The priests are also graded; they have their high temples and their lower temples, corresponding to the various herds of buffaloes and their relative sacred characters.

During our stay amongst the Todas I noted fourteen gods of Sumerian origin which indicates a very ancient connection between the culture of the Todas and that of Mesopotamia. The Todas have no real wedding ceremony. This is one of the difficulties common to all anthropological research, in that a European expects to find some religious ceremony for the consecration of marriage. It is by no means general. Among the Todas the ceremony consists only of the man offering a piece of cloth to the girl whom he has chosen, or whom he has to marry because the parents wish it.

Another way of obtaining a wife is by *terershti* or the stealing of other men's wives. When a man wants somebody else's wife he goes with a friend and steals her from the man who has her; then he negotiates with the man from whom he has taken his wife to pay him the value of that wife in buffaloes, the price usually being fixed by the tribal council. It was interesting to note the valuation of the various ladies of the tribe in buffaloes. Those most highly valued, say ten buffaloes have great exchange value. I have known of a marriage of a very small boy to an elderly woman because it was hoped she would be stolen by some other man and the little boy would get the appropriate number of buffaloes.

Of course polyandry is another way of solving the problem of the shortage of women, because this really is the problem, there being among the Todas about three men to one women. Polyandry means that a number of brothers marry one woman. Apart from this, there is the Toda practice of having official lovers. Nearly all the women have official lovers and are expected to have them. Where there is no official lover one has to be appointed for a dead woman because such a lover has a definite rôle to play at her funeral ceremony.

Another curious feature of Toda culture is that the recognition of fatherhood is separate from marriage; there is a special ceremony by which a woman who is seven months with child has to appoint a father to that child, and he is not always one of the husbands. This is known as the *pursütöpimi* ceremony, or the bow-and-arrow ceremony. The man chosen to perform the ceremony gives the woman a bow-and-arrow and she has to pronounce the name of the tribe to which the man belongs and henceforth that man is regarded as the father of her children, and he will always



be the father of all her children, unless the ceremony is repeated with someone else.

The Todas have no signals to regulate their polyandrous marriage. They rely on tact. The property is divided, so there is obviously no economic reason with them for the practice of polyandry. When I asked them why they were polyandrous they said that they were descendants of the Pandava brothers of the *Mahābhārata* and that was why. That was an anthropological answer. When I pointed that out to them, they told me that after all the real reason was that if each brother had a wife, the women would quarrel and drag the brothers into the quarrel; as they did not wish to quarrel it was better to have one wife only.

#### D. Tibetans, 1938 and 1950-57

The Tibetans are the largest polyandrous group in the world and the people the most interesting of all. About five million Tibetans live in an area of 600,000 square miles, about six times the size of the British Isles, extending from Szechwan to Kashmir, and from Koko Nor to Bengal. In 1938 we studied the Tibetans in western Tibet—in Lahul, Rupchu and Ladak, in the Himalayan foothills. We were in Kalimpong from 1950 to 1957.

Tibetan society consists of monks, lamas, Buddhist monks and ancient nobility, who have survived the taking over of the Government by the monks and who work in an uneasy alliance with the monks to govern the country; also there are agricultural herdsmen serfs, beggars and outcasts. The herdsmen serfs serve both the Church and the big houses of the nobility; the beggars and outcasts do not play a great rôle outside Lhasa.

All Tibetans practise polyandry in all the stratas of their society; they also practise polygyny and monogamy, and even conjoint marriage; that is a number of men are married to a number of women. Choice seems to depend on the economic advantage of the particular system. The Tibetans have elaborate wedding and betrothal ceremonies, quite different from those of the other peoples studied, ceremonies which last for many days and during which much food is consumed. Like the Sinhalese, the Tibetans have a marriage in which the men join the woman, and another in which the woman joins the men. The one in which the woman goes and lives with a man is known as *bag-na- (na-ma)* and the marriage in which the men join the woman is a *mag-pa* marriage. In fact, one should think of Tibetan marriage as revolving round an axis, the axis being the house and the name of the family; the desire is to keep the family name and hand it down from generation to generation, so that it may never die out. Property remains undivided and is inherited whole. All the brothers marry one wife and their children inherit the property and the name. If there are no boys, then the eldest daughter, the heiress, inherits the property alone and so keeps the name of the family, handing the property on to her children by the man who takes her name. The woman stands in when there is no male heir. This system is not unknown even in Europe. In Britain there are families in which the husband takes the

wife's name; in Spain also that is not unusual, while in some of the European Royal Houses it is a way of maintaining the succession.

The Tibetans also call the brothers "fathers" but, curiously enough, they call the younger brothers uncle or *agoo*. There is the strange idea that if a woman does not bear children that is the fault of the man, not of the woman. Rather than take another wife, they will bring in another man in the hope that he will sire a child. He is known as a *porjag* and is usually treated as one of the brothers.

If secondary wives are brought in; the men cease living in polyandry, for these wives make it a conjoint-marriage. There are no signals to regulate relations between the sexes; tact is sufficient. In winter, in Ladak, there is not enough fuel to heat the whole house and so all live communally in one room; in the case of the nomads all live in one tent, and conditions are much more public than one would expect. Property is undivided among the brothers; they own it collectively and have no wish to develop it. The tendency of the Tibetans is to economize; to restrict consumption rather than to expand production by acquiring more land.

The Tibetans economize in everything that they have; they restrict births because polyandry leads to less mouths being born. In Central Tibet (in the provinces of Ü (*dbUs*), of which Lhasa is the capital, and of Tsang) the Tibetans share one wife between fathers and sons. I have seen some families living in this way, the most famous being that of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tibet, who died some time ago. We met him in 1951 in Kalimpong when on his way to the United Nations as Tibet's representative; he, however, did not reach his destination because the question concerned was shelved. He was married to one Tibetan woman of noble family by whom he had four sons; he divorced her and married another woman by whom he had a son. She died and he was left a widower. He was then appointed governor of one of the eastern provinces where he met a minor official whose wife he thought attractive. He went to the husband and asked if he could marry her; the minor official thought it would be an honour for his wife to be married to the governor and he accepted him as second husband. Then, curiously enough, the governor's son by his second wife came to visit his father, and he fell in love with his stepmother and eventually joined the marriage, so that, in the end, this woman who had already a husband and children, was married secondly to the governor and thirdly to his son.

In another family the father's wife died and he married his daughter-in-law; that is, the girl to whom his two sons were already married. Finally, in a Tsang family which I knew, father and son had a common wife, the woman having been married originally only to the father.

The reason given by the Tibetans for this type of marriage is, again, economic; they do not want to divide the property; in fact, they say they cannot afford to do so. I was speaking to an old Tibetan who enquired how we in Europe managed to remain rich while not practising polyandry. I had not thought of that. It was an interesting question. I explained that when people in Europe married they tried to earn a living in order to found a new family. The old Tibetan said he had noticed what happened to Tibetans who became Moslems. For instance, some of

the families living in the neighbourhood had gone to work in the ruby mines in Burma; they were becoming poor because they had ceased to practise polyandry, and he looked at me in a sly way and added: "Now I understand why you Europeans come to India and other countries. If you practised polyandry you would stay at home."

The Chinese have always disapproved of polyandry in Tibet and have been very severe with the polyandrous people of Sikang and Szechwan, and also with those of Kansu and Tsinghai; they used to forbid polyandry on moral grounds and say that it was incestuous. Today the Chinese Communists are against polyandry for economic reasons; they feel that if more arms are not born they will not have sufficient labour to develop the country. By limiting mouths, arms also are limited; they need more arms to augment the labour force.

### III. *Results*

From the psychoanalytical point of view it seems that our observations confirmed that the people studied had the same psychic structure and the same complexes as we in the West have. The differences are seen in the development of the children because of their education and the cultural environment in which they live, and the emphasis of the complexes which they share with us is different than with us.

I cannot now go into details. I did some tests on these people, both Rorschach and T.A. tests, and it was interesting to note how different were the reactions of the Tibetans to those tests when compared with the reactions to similar tests made on people in other parts of the world.

Anthropologically it seems the research work has made the concept of polyandry more precise; it has linked it more with the question of marriage. Hitherto people had covered a number of practices which did not include marriage and which today we would call *cicisbeism*, i.e., where a woman lives with a number of men but not in a marital state. We gathered a great quantity of ethnographic material which confirmed all this.

There is one point I can make, and that is that I do not believe there is any relation between polyandry and the disproportion of the sexes in a community. If there are more men than women I do not think that has any bearing on whether people practise polyandry or not. When I was working in Ceylon, one of my interpreters asked me if since the war there were not a greater number of women in Britain and Germany because so many men had been killed in the war, and he added: "Are you thinking of adopting polygamy in Europe as a solution to that disproportion?" Obviously we cannot. And it is the same with these people: it is not because there are more men in the community that they adopt polyandry; its adoption has nothing to do with the number of men and women in a community. You will ask what happens to the women left over in a polyandrous community. If there is no disproportion of numbers, obviously there are a number of women not married in this fashion.

It is difficult to refer to any census; in Tibet there is no such thing, and it is practically impossible for one anthropologist to take a census in such a vast area. My impression was that many women in these com-

munities do not marry; they stay at home with their brothers and never marry. Many Tibetan women die in child-birth, so that there is always need in a family for someone to take the place of the dead mother; also many Tibetan women become nuns in the various monasteries. Again on all the trade routes there are many prostitutes and these certainly absorb a large number of unmarried women.

That is all I have now to say in regard to the studies I have been pursuing with my wife in Asia during the last 20 years. I will conclude by showing a few slides depicting the peoples of the areas in which we carried out our studies.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, although there is no time left for questions I am sure you all feel that every minute of the last hour has been well spent. We would not for anything have missed the fascinating pictures and equally we would not have missed one word of what our lecturer had to tell us. For myself, all sorts of vistas have been opened up. My preference is for the Ceylon system which seems to look for the rich wife who can cook for one! It only now remains for us, Your Royal Highness, to join in wishing you all good fortune at the end of this year in the examination for your Ph.D. Personally I find it difficult to believe that there is anybody qualified to examine you. We thank you very much indeed for your lecture and the slides shown. (*Applause.*)

# LE TIBET ET LA CHINE

By ELLA MAILLART

UNE fois de plus un Dalai Lama s'est enfui de Lhassa, une fois de plus au cours des siècles la Chine s'efforce de siniser le Tibet afin de pouvoir le soumettre. Mais aujourd'hui la belliqueuse idéologie communiste vient renforcer cet expansionnisme traditionnel. En effet Pékin a toujours désiré contrôler la capitale du bouddhisme centre-asiatique, car les deux Mongolies, le Népal, le Sikkim, le Bhoutan, en plus de trois millions de Tibétains, vénèrent le prêtre-roi de Lhassa.

D'autre part depuis la fin de la guerre mondiale on sait que les richesses minières du Tibet—uranium y compris—sont vraiment considérables. Tout au nord le pétrole du Tsaidam est déjà exploité, sur le grand plateau désolé, près du Lac Bleu (Koko Nor) à 3000 mètres d'altitude, que j'avais pris deux mois à traverser à chameau.

En plus de cela, au prix de sacrifices inouïs, la Chine vient de compléter plus de quatre milliers de kilomètres de routes stratégiques à travers ces régions désertiques; entre autres buts, ces voies de communication faciliteront le contrôle de la frontière qui, sur près de 2,000 kilomètres, longe le nord de l'Inde. L'avenir de la suprématie asiatique est en jeu. Lhassa, où le premier avion se posa en 1956, est à dix heures de vol de Pékin, ou encore à dix jours de jeep, au lieu des trois mois de caravane d'autrefois. Radio-Pékin fonctionne sans arrêt dans toutes les agglomérations. Le problème représenté par le contrôle du Tibet se pose aujourd'hui d'une manière absolument nouvelle.

Qu'est-ce que la disparition d'une civilisation originale en face d'un problème pareil? Mais la répression de la révolution tibétaine n'aura-t-elle pas des conséquences tout à l'opposé de ce que la Chine escomptait: par solidarité pour le bouddhisme lamaïque du Tibet, les centaines de millions de bouddhistes asiatiques ne deviendront-ils pas antichinois? Des chefs d'Etat athées sont incapables d'évaluer l'influence exercée par un Dalai Lama, un Pape, ou même un Aga Khan. Car les communistes n'écoutent et ne croient que ce que disent leurs amis tibétains—sorte de cinquième colonne formée par les ennemis du Dalai Lama. Certains d'entre eux se recrutent parmi les fidèles du Panchen Lama. C'est en 1947 qu'eut lieu le dernier différend entre deux Régents rivaux pendant la minorité du Dalai Lama. Seule une réunion de l'Assemblée nationale (Tsongdu) ou un plébiscite pourrait déterminer la proportion des pro-chinois.

Les Chinois ont toujours été détestés dans les régions lointaines où ils se sont imposés—Turkestan, Kansou, Mongolie, Tibet—et où ils n'ont jamais su gouverner par personnes interposées. Reconnaissons que la Muraille de Chine symbolise une différence fondamentale entre les habitants des ces régions (commencé en 244 av. notre ère.)

Mépris réciproque entre les patients Chinois, acharnés travailleurs penchés sur la terre, et les Mongols ou les Tibétains, bergers nomades ou

caravaniers, armés et libres, vivant à cheval dans les steppes balayées par des vents sauvages. N'oublions pas que la charrue de millions de pionniers chinois venus pour cultiver de vastes steppes n'a fait qu'ouvrir le sol maigre à l'érosion; les vents terribles emportent la terre et le sol est perdu à jamais. Il faut cinq ans au désert de gravier pour s'installer.

Quand la Chine était faible, craignant les tribus étrangères, elle se repliait derrière sa Muraille. Lorsqu'elle était forte, elle s'arrangeait à ce que les tribus étrangères se fassent la guerre, puis elle affirmait une fois de plus sa suzeraineté jusqu'au Pamir, comme par exemple sous la dynastie des Han,<sup>1</sup> au début de notre ère, et sous les Tang, aux VI<sup>e</sup> et VII<sup>e</sup> siècle. (en 751, aussi incroyable que cela paraisse, l'Himalaya est franchi par un général chinois<sup>2</sup> et des forts sont construits à Gilgit, au Cachemire, au sud des gorges du Hunza que l'alpiniste genevois Raymond Lambert a visité en juillet 1959. Les Mongols, au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, et les Mandchous, au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, règneront eux aussi jusqu'au Pamir.<sup>3</sup>)

Depuis plus de quatre ans la Chine heurte de front le nationalisme tibétain, écartant les personnalités qui lui déplaisent, renvoyant les ministres du Kashag, ce Cabinet qui remplit les fonctions exécutives, judiciaires et législatives; à vrai dire, ce nationalisme est avant tout une religion très vivante. Or la souveraineté exercée par un Etat sur un autre répugne à nos lois actuelles. Ici les prétentions dynastiques d'autrefois sont remplacées par le plus simple des impérialismes. Le Tibet est à la Chine ce que la Pologne fut à la Russie.

Le Tibet actuel a 1.200.000 km<sup>2</sup>, plus du double de la France, et environ 3.000.000 d'habitants. En 1929 il a été amputé du Tsinghai (Koko-Nor), 700.000 km<sup>2</sup>, et du Hsi-Kang, 460.000 km<sup>2</sup>., la Chine de Sun Yat Sen, comme celle de Mao Tsé Toung, voulant intégrer le Tibet.

Lhassa, la capitale, à 3600 m. d'altitude, a 25.000 habitants sans compter les 20.000 habitants des trois grands monastères voisins de Sera, Ganden et Drepung. Elle est reliée au monde par trois voies principales, l'une au nord, par le Koko-Nor, l'autre à l'est vers Kangting (Tatsienlou, capitale du Hsikang, par où arrive le thé), et la troisième au sud vers Yatung et l'Inde, par où passaient les exportations de laine.

Le Tibétain, de race mongoloïde, s'est toujours senti bien différent du Chinois. Sa langue appartient à la même famille que le birman, son alphabet est venu du Cachemire indien avec des missionnaires bouddhistes; mais nombre de ses coutumes sont chinoises, de même que l'astrologie, la médecine, l'habillement et la cuisine des gens riches.

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Jetons un regard sur quelques points de l'histoire du Tibet. Au VIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, les Chinois capturèrent Lhassa. Mais peu après le roi tibétain Siong Tsen Gampo étend ses conquêtes militaires en Chine et au Népal, en sorte qu'il obtiendra en mariage deux princesses, l'une chinoise, l'autre népalaise. Ces deux reines bouddhistes contribuent à faire du bouddhisme la religion du pays.

<sup>1</sup> Le général Pan Ch'ao en écrase les Yue-Tchi en l'an 88.

<sup>2</sup> Nommé Kao Hsien Chu.

<sup>3</sup> L'empereur Kien Lung En 1755, par exemple.

Au VIII<sup>e</sup> siècle le roi Ti-Song De-Tsen fait venir des Indes le maître Padma Sambhava pour qu'il épure la religion encombrée de démons. Ce moine construisit le célèbre monastère de Samyé. Ce même roi régnera du lointain Pamir jusqu'à Sian-Fu; cette capitale de la Chine ne sera pas pillée ayant offert de verser un tribut au Tibet; mais celui-ci n'ayant pas été payé, le roi s'empare de la ville en 763 (fait commémoré par une obélisque de pierre à Lhassa; ce monolithe fut abîmé par les Chinois en 1912).

C'est au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle que le bouddhisme tibétain devint du lamaïsme. En 1270 Kubilai Khan, premier empereur mongol de Chine, invite le chef du monastère de Sakya à sa cour. L'empereur s'étant converti au bouddhisme donne à son visiteur la souveraineté sur le Tibet. Cette suprématie cesse en 1345, lorsque commence une seconde période monarchique.

Au siècle suivant le grand penseur et réformateur Tsong Kapa, l'homme du "Pays des oignons," va naître dans la région du Koko-Nor. En 1409 il fonde la secte des Bonnets Jaunes, laquelle, entre autres règles, imposera le célibat aux moines. A la mort de son successeur Ganden Truppa, on affirma que l'esprit du lama avait passé dans un enfant de deux ans. Ainsi débuta ce système de réincarnation propre au Tibet où l'on compte aujourd'hui plus de cinq cents lamas réincarnés.

C'est le grand lama Sönam Gyatso qui, ayant converti la Mongolie, va recevoir du prince Altyn Khan le titre de Dalai lama en 1557 (Dalai = Océan, synonyme d'infini). Ce premier Dalai lama s'opposa à la coutume du sati qui forçait une veuve à périr en même temps que son mari.

Arrêtons-nous au célèbre cinquième Dalai lama, fils d'un pauvre homme. Remarquons qu'au Tibet, où environ le cinquième de la population masculine entre dans les ordres—excellente coutume pour limiter l'excédent des naissances dans un pays pauvre—des hommes intelligents quoique d'origines obscures peuvent parvenir aux plus hauts postes du gouvernement, sorte de démocratie de fait.

Le Grand Cinquième, comme on l'appela, construisit en 1625 l'extraordinaire Potala, palais forteresse qui domine Lhassa. C'est lui qui, afin d'honorer son précepteur, lui donna le titre de Panchen lama, parfois nommé Tashi lama car il règne sur le monastère de Tashi Lumpo. Panchen veut dire maître.

Ici ouvrons une parenthèse. Le bouddhisme tibétain déclare que le Bouddha primordial se manifeste dans cinq bouddhas célestes. L'un d'eux, le bouddha Amitaba (Lumière Infinie, Opamé en Tibétain) a le Panchen lama comme émanation terrestre. Ce même bouddha Amitaba a une émanation céleste, le bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, Seigneur de la Compassion, représenté sur terre par le Dalai lama—en tibétain Chenrezi.

Ces deux chefs religieux descendent donc du même Bouddha et lorsqu'ils sont ensemble, c'est le plus âgé qui passe en premier. "Le prestige spirituel du Dalai lama et son monopole du pouvoir temporel ont fait de lui le chef suprême du Tibet." C'est à lui que s'adresse la prière "Om! Mani padme, hum." (Om, le Joyau dans le Lotus, hum.)

Par la suite une rivalité naîtra entre ces deux pontifes. "Les Chinois sont très attentifs à bien entourer le Panchen lama et à le tenir en réserve au cas où le Dalai lama cesserait d'être suffisamment docile," écrira l'ambassadeur Fernand Grenard dans son livre sur le Tibet, en 1898.

En 1935, lorsque je passai par Kumbum, à la frontière nord du Tibet, le Panchen lama y vivait en exil depuis 1924. Lhassa lui interdisait de rentrer chez lui car, craignant pour sa vie, ce lama exigeait d'être accompagné de mille soldats chinois armés. Il mourut là-bas en 1937. Son jeune successeur fut éduqué par les Chinois qui l'installèrent au Tashilumpo en 1951, après leur invasion du Tibet. Le Panchen lama actuel est le neuvième du nom; il n'a jamais été reconnu par les Tibétains.

Mais reprenons l'évocation de quelques points historiques. Le Grand Cinquième, venu à Pékin, fut reçu en égal par l'empereur mandchou qui désirait ainsi affermir son pouvoir sur les Mongols. C'est en 1661, avant la mort du Cinquième, que les premiers Européens entrèrent à Lhassa, les Jésuites Grueber et d'Orville.

Le Sixième Dalai lama sera tué par les Chinois en 1706 et l'empereur Kang Hsi envahit le Tibet en 1718 pour essayer d'y imposer son Dalai lama. En 1750 les résidents chinois à Lhassa tuent le Régent tibétain qui régnait alors; mais ils seront eux-mêmes tués après avoir instauré la politique de la porte fermée aux étrangers. C'est alors que les missionnaires catholiques sont forcés de quitter Lhassa.

L'empereur mandchou Kien Lung restaure la suprématie chinoise à Lhassa et y impose ses deux résidents. Le Panchen lama d'alors mourra à Pékin, invité là-bas par Kien Lung en 1779. C'était ce même Panchen lama qui en 1774 avait reçu la première mission anglaise au Tibet, dirigée par George Bogle, car l'East India Company et Warren Hastings cherchaient à tout prix à étendre leur zone de commerce.

Sachant que les Gurkhas du Népal avaient jadis obtenu le droit de frapper monnaie pour Lhassa, une dispute à ce sujet pousse les Népalais à venir attaquer Lhassa en 1788. Pour sauver la ville, les Tibétains consentent à verser un tribut annuel au Népal. Or cette somme n'ayant pas été versée, les Gurkhas envahissent Lhassa en 1790.

Petite cause, grandes conséquences: les Chinois de Lhassa prennent ce prétexte pour envahir le Népal et le forcer à payer un tribut, tous les cinq ans, à Pékin. Ainsi le Tibet est ramené dans le système impérial mandchou.

Un siècle passe. En 1855 les Népalais envahissent à nouveau le Tibet et forcent Lhassa à leur verser un subside annuel de 10.000 roupies. Ce paiement eut lieu pour la dernière fois en 1950.

En 1888 les Britanniques envahissent le Sikkim où, à Kalimpong, sur le versant sud de l'Himalaya, aboutissent les caravanes tibétaines. Deux ans plus tard un accord avec la Chine reconnaît que cette région est sous protectorat britannique et accepte le traité commercial alors établi. Mais le Tibet s'y oppose en déclarant que la Chine n'a rien à lui dicter; et depuis lors le Tibet se comportera en pays indépendant jusqu'en 1950, sauf pendant l'invasion de l'armée chinoise à Lhassa en 1911 et 1912.

C'est pour forcer le Tibet à traiter avec lui que le vice-roi de l'Inde, Lord Curzon, essaie de discuter avec Lhassa. Mais le Dalai lama fait la sourde oreille. Il se tourne vers la Russie, conseillé par le lama bouriate Agwan Dorjief. Pour finir, en 1904, la mission militaire du colonel Younghusband pénètre au Tibet pour s'emparer de Lhassa, tandis que le treizième Dalai lama se réfugie en Chine. Les Anglais se retirent après



avoir obtenu leur traité commercial. Mais en 1912 les Chinois ravagent Lhassa, pour y effacer le souvenir de Younghusband et le Dalai lama s'enfuit en Inde cette fois-ci pour passer 30 mois à Darjeeling, hors d'atteinte des Chinois.

En 1911 c'est la révolution chinoise.

Aussitôt le Tibet et la Mongolie extérieure proclament leur indépendance déclarant qu'en 1720 le Dalai lama avait reconnu la suzeraineté d'un empereur mandchou et non pas la suzeraineté de la Chine avec laquelle ils n'ont rien de commun. Les troupes chinoises en garnison à Lhassa se rendirent alors au Dalai lama, confirmant ainsi l'indépendance du Tibet. Et la Grande-Bretagne, par la Convention de Simla, en 1914, reconnaissait l'indépendance du Tibet.

Il n'y eut plus de résident chinois à Lhassa. Et c'est en vain qu'un décret chinois déposa le Dalai lama : celui-ci continua à régner.

Le treizième Dalai lama meurt en 1934 et ce n'est qu'à ce moment-là que Lhassa accepte la venue de représentants chinois à l'occasion des obsèques de ce Dalai lama.

En 1936 un chef de mission britannique est installé dans la capitale tibétaine qui entretient également des relations diplomatiques avec le Népal.

En 1939 Lhassa, dans la joie, accueille le jeune Dalai lama Phamo Dhondup âgé de 4 ans venant du Koko-Nor, ayant passé les épreuves traditionnelles le consacrant.<sup>1</sup>

En 1947 une grave bagarre entre Régents rivaux va créer des mécontents : ils iront augmenter la "Section réformiste" de Sawang lama et le groupe des sinophiles. En 1948 le gouvernement de Lhassa envoie une mission en Amérique pour demander que soit reconnue l'indépendance du Tibet—car la menace augmente, la Chine proclamant une fois de plus que le Tibet va être "libéré" pour faire partie de la Chine.

1949, dernier acte d'indépendance, Lhassa expulse Tous les Chinois qui habitent la ville. En 1950-51, venant de l'Est, l'armée communiste chinoise prend possession du Tibet tandis que le Dalai lama, âgé de 18 ans, se réfugie à Yatung près de la frontière indienne, laissant le champ libre à ceux qui désiraient négocier avec l'envahisseur. En 1951 les Tibétains doivent signer un "accord" à Pékin sans qu'il soit tenu compte de leurs objections. Le Tibet sera soi-disant autonome sous la direction unifiée du Gouvernement Central du Peuple à Pékin. La Chine garde l'autorité suprême. Par la suite, et progressivement, l'administration sera transférée à Tchamdo, capitale de la zone orientale, où l'on agit directement de concert avec Pékin sans en référer au Dalai lama.

L'armée de Libération Populaire contrôle le Tibet; pour la forme deux Tibétains sont nommés vice-commandants de cette armée. Fait remarquable, en avril 1957, Pékin déclarait que le Tibet n'étant pas mûr, il fallait abandonner les réformes socialisantes pour six ans. Mais les soulèvements très importants de 1958 et 1959 allaient prouver que la situation était devenue intenable pour un très grand nombre de Tibétains.

Et-ce l'U.R.S.S. qui s'intéresse de près à la situation et voit avec plaisir

<sup>1</sup> Cette fois-ci point n'est besoin d'une confirmation de Pékin, car Lhassa avait déclaré son indépendance en 1912.

la Chine avoir de gros ennuis en Asie centrale? Est-ce la Chine qui a tout fait pour se débarrasser de ce roi-pontife encombrant parce que trop intelligent et trop aimé? Que pense le Pandit Nehru de cette situation dangereuse où son puissant voisin nordique devient par trop belliqueux? On rappelle à Delhi que les atlas imprimés à Pékin montrent une Chine empiétant sur les territoires limitrophes, perpétuant par endroits d'antiques frontières: de tout temps des princes habitant le versant sud de l'Himalaya avaient des droits de pâturage sur le versant nord de la chaîne sauvage; une fois l'an, ils envoyaient en échange un tribut à Lhassa ou Pékin. Partant de ces faits passés, on essayait de prétendre que ces régions dépendaient de Pékin.

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On parle de la splendeur, de la pauvreté et de la cruauté du système féodal tibétain. . . . Oui sans doute, mais pauvres ou riches, les Tibétains avaient le rire facile; ils jouissaient de nombreux jours de fêtes au cours de l'année et leur sens de l'hospitalité était incomparable. Tous ceux qui les approchèrent les ont aimés. Sur les pistes du Tibet, qu'il était intéressant de voir ces muletiers, vrais marins de hauts plateaux, vivant loin de leur port d'attache pendant la plus grande partie de l'année! Au marché de Kalimpong à 1400 m. d'altitude, point le plus méridional de leur voyage, ils avaient trop chaud dans la fraîcheur de l'hiver indien. Chaussés de bottes de feutre ils marchaient à grands pas lents et désinvoltes, allant d'une échoppe à l'autre, le buste parfois nu ou débarrassé de la pelisse de mouton, coiffés du chapeau de feutre à large bord, ou encore du bonnet fourré à oreillères placé de travers au sommet de la tête. Nombreux sont ceux qui avaient encore leurs cheveux nattés enroulés autour de la tête ils venaient livrer leurs chargements de laine brute destinés à l'Amérique. Ils repartaient avec du sucre, du pétrole, de la graisse de coco qui tend à remplacer le beurre brûlé dans les temples dans les lampes offertes à la trinité du Bouddha, de la Doctrine et de l'Eglise. Il leur arrivait d'assister à un drame joué en plein air par des comédiens ambulants; assis sur le sol ils chiquaient du tabac et se taquinaient entre eux, riant comme des enfants. Certains rendaient visite à Tarchin, éditeur-imprimeur d'une feuille locale relatant les événements importants de la région.

Trois étapes au nord de Kalimpong ou de Gangtok, la piste atteint 4600 m. d'altitude à l'un des deux cols qui marquent la frontière, soit le Jelep, soit le Nathu La. En y arrivant les hommes jetaient un caillou au pied des drapeaux de prière raidis de givre dressés sur le col tout en s'exclamant: " Victoire aux dieux! "

Avant de repartir vers le nord et de quitter l'étape, chaque matin ils arrimaient les caisses rectangulaires transportées par leurs centaines de mules, anxieux d'éviter les éboulements ou avalanches dans le défilé de la gorge de Tchumbi. Le soir autour du feu du caravansérail les histoires qu'ils se racontaient passionnaient tout le monde car des changements spectaculaires avaient lieu dans le pays. Ils parcouraient 12 à 16 km. par jour pendant 20 ou 30 jours, leurs mules semblant connaître le chemin par coeur; mais lorsqu'elles restaient effondrées dans un trou de neige,

leurs cloches et leurs pompons s'immobilisant pour un instant, les hommes savaient les empoigner presque à bras le corps pour les remettre sur la piste.

En mars, sur la vaste plaine de Phari, il faisait si froid que tout en avançant contre le blizzard je marchais en abritant mon visage contre la croupe d'une mule chargée.

À 4300 m. d'altitude cette plaine est trop élevée pour qu'il y pousse des arbres, l'orge n'a pas le temps d'y mûrir, mais elle est cependant récoltée pour servir de fourrage. La neige ensoleillée y était si aveuglante que les grands muletiers protégeaient leurs yeux par une bande d'étoffe sombre fendue devant la pupille.

Quel contraste avec le pays d'où nous venions, cette vallée de Tchumbi profonde et boisée de cônifères, à seulement quelque 3000 m. d'altitude! A Phari, dénommée la ville la plus sale du monde, la plupart des maisons sont construites avec des briques de tourbe. Là les gais muletiers buvaient du thé au beurre tout en jouant aux dés sur un toit plat et ensoleillé.

La plupart d'entre eux travaillent pour de grandes entreprises de transport dirigées soit par le Tibétain Pangda Tsan ou par une entreprise indienne. Lorsqu'ils voyagent près de la piste, trop rarement à leur gré, s'élève parfois une auberge primitive où ils aiment boire de nombreux bols de thé au beurre de yak. Là se coudoient des voyageurs de toutes sortes tels qu'officiels en grands manteaux doublés de fourrure, ou simples pèlerins voyageant à pied. Je me rappellerai longtemps cette famille assise à même le sol, les pieds entourés de chiffons ficelés: ayant gravement souffert du gel ils attendaient patiemment la fonte des neiges pour aller dans une vallée voisine pour y bénéficier d'une célèbre source chaude; les passants leur faisaient l'aumône.

Au loin, dominant la plaine démesurée, un pic magnifique et isolé s'élève à 7300 m. d'altitude, le Chomolhari (Reine Divine des Montagnes). A son pied j'avais visité le monastère de Tchukya connu pour sa grande imprimerie et là, un moine et son apprenti nous avaient montré les feuilles de papier faites avec l'écorce de daphné où séchaient les caractères des livres sacrés imprimés grâce à des blocs de bois. A l'autre bout du panorama, perdus dans l'immensité, de petits points noirs étaient des yaks domestiques à la recherche de plaques d'herbe sèche parmi la neige fraîche.

Mes pensées évoquaient les vastes étendues de l'Amérique où les Indiens durent reculer devant la marée des pionniers venus eux aussi de l'Est. Il y a trop d'humains sur la terre pour que les nomades puissent continuer à y vivre selon leurs coutumes. Dans une génération, où donc seront les pasteurs tibétains et les caravaniers que Pékin est impatient de socialiser?

Mélangés à 4 millions de Chinois communistes importés du Hsi-Kang, ayant dû apprendre le chinois de force, et bien endoctrinés à coups de classes spéciales, la plupart d'entre eux conduiront des camions, répareront des routes et travailleront dans des mines. La même chose s'est passée au Turkestan russe parmi les Kirghises et les Kazaks obligés d'abandonner leur vie traditionnelle il y a trente ans, non sans avoir péri par centaines de mille au cours de ces violents changements.

# CEYLON

By B. H. FARMER

(Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 27, 1959, Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasant task to introduce Mr. Farmer who, so to speak, became friendly with Ceylon when he was an Officer in the Royal Engineers and found it a most fascinating country. He particularly interested himself in land questions with the result that later he wrote a book entitled *Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon*. Presumably it was largely due to the impression made on the Government of Ceylon by Mr. Farmer's book that he was invited in 1955 to become a member of the Land Commission. Mr. Farmer had returned to Ceylon in 1951, and during the year 1955-56 he spent some time studying questions referred to him by the Commission.

The report of the Land Commission has recently been published. Since 1956 Mr. Farmer has been again in Ceylon for a considerable period and so the information he is about to give us is up to date.

I HOPE, ladies and gentlemen, you will not feel offended if I commence by reminding you that Ceylon is by no means a small island. It is elliptical in shape, and the east-west distance is a little over that from Bristol to London; the north-south distance almost exactly that from Southampton to Newcastle-upon-Tyne. A journey across the whole island is similar to a journey across the whole of England. The total area is about 25,000 sq. miles.

## *The Four Main Areas of Ceylon*

Ceylon may be divided into two contrasting climatic Zones. The south-western quadrant is the "Wet Zone," wet in the sense that it is liable to receive rain from both monsoons and therefore to have rain at most times of the year. The northern and eastern parts of the island contain what is called the Dry Zone, not because it is dry like Sind or the Sahara but because it has a marked dry season. During each summer the Dry Zone of Ceylon is dry, with very intense searing heat which dessicates everything, but during the winter months of October to February it receives rain. In other words, there is in the Dry Zone marked alternation of wet and dry seasons. The lowland Dry Zone covers up to two-thirds of the island.

The central part of Ceylon, "Up Country" as they say, is highland, part of it modified Wet Zone, part of it modified Dry Zone. The country can, then, be described in terms of four main areas: (1) Lowland Wet Zone; (2) Up-Country Wet Zone; (3) Up-Country Dry Zone; (4) Lowland Wet Zone.

### (1) *Lowland Wet Zone*

In the lowland Wet Zone there is great pressure on the land. The villages are thickly populated and many of the peasants have either very small holdings or no land at all. A characteristic of the Wet Zone is that the peasants are no longer on a purely subsistence basis and many of them grow crops to sell. The landscape is made up of valley-bottom paddy fields, and mixed village garden, or rubber, or coconut on the intervening hills. One of the interesting facts about the lowland Wet Zone is that pressure on the land has, on the whole, taken place so recently. Until the 1890's or later much land not ten miles from Colombo would have been jungle or scrub, with very scattered cultivation. It was only in the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century that people began to buy up or to lease land and to plant it in rubber or coconuts. The present pressure on the land has come about partly because of this use of land providing space to produce commercial crops, and partly as a result of the rapid growth of the population of the villages. The little remaining unused land almost belies the name "lowland Wet Zone" because it is mainly on very steep slopes on the margin of the Up-Country. Because there is so little spare land in the Wet Zone, the improvement of yields here, and the colonization of undeveloped land elsewhere, are major aims of Government policy.

Although Ceylon is a rural and agricultural country it has the one big city of Colombo with a population in and around it of nearly half a million. An air photograph shows the nucleus of the place to be a little rocky hill which was fortified by the Portuguese and Dutch. To the east stretches the "Pettah," the bazaar area, and to the south the residential area, fairly near to the coast; in the hook of the rocky hill lies the harbour.

### (2) *The Up-Country Wet Zone*

We move on to the "Up-Country," an area with great beauty, but about whose landscape there is an economic story to be told. Below a certain contour the whole landscape is either light or dark green, the light green being terraced paddy with, in between, coconut and mixed village tree cultivation. Here there are crowded up-country villages with every scrap of land used up. Above the level of the green colouring there are pinks and greys in the landscape, and finally bear rock often in great cliffs. The pink and grey area is land that until about the 1840's or later was jungle or grassland or scrub; then that land was planted by estate companies and individuals, first, in coffee and, when that failed, in tea.

In the valleys on the outskirts of the hill capital of Kandy the peasants' cultivation tends to be cribbed, cabined and confined by the estates, so that feeling hostile to the estates tends to be generated, sometimes spontaneously, sometimes stimulated by politicians. It is said that estate land would have been cultivable by the peasants, who could thus have eased their present overcrowding. Some of the Kandyan hill villages certainly present the worst examples of landlessness and overcrowding in the island. Under these conditions, the Sinhalese peasants, who in early days were independent and would not work for hire, now provide as much as 50 per

cent. of the labour on some estates, the remainder being provided by Indian Tamils. In this, as in indirect ways (as by providing revenue to be spent on social services and development schemes), the estates benefit the peasantry on whose fields they press.

I must not give the impression that all tea grown in Ceylon is cheek-by-jowl with the peasant villages and thus contributory to agrarian pressure and political feeling. Above 2,000 or 3,000 ft. the Sinhalese village never went, and in pre-British days the higher areas were nothing but jungle. But up here, up to 5,000 ft. or higher, there now grows some of the finest tea in the world; the higher it is grown the better the flavour. This tea is grown on land never occupied by Sinhalese peasants and certainly not impinging on their villages.

### (3) *The Up-Country Dry Zone*

Going to the eastern side of the hills, the drier Uva Basin, the agrarian picture is much the same; many of the peasant villages are overcrowded; and there are many tea estates. There is, however, a large area of rough, hilly grassland known as *patana* and it might be thought that a solution to agrarian pressure could be found by putting the villagers on to this land. It is, however, very poor; there is hardly any soil, and erosion has done much damage. Many think it is formerly forested land which has degraded into grassland as a result of erosion, and reforestation is a possible solution.

In a typical part of the eastern side of the hills one can see the characteristic landscape of a dual economy: on the one hand, terraced paddy and village gardens, and on the other, at the limit of the cultivation of the paddy, tea estates. Beyond, there is the bare grassland with rock protruding.

### (4) *The Lowland Dry Zone*

It is most interesting to look down on the lowland Dry Zone from a hill-top like that at Mihintale, where Mahinda, the disciple of the Buddha, is supposed to have landed and brought Buddhism to Ceylon, 2,500 years ago. From such a vantage point one appreciates the jungle-covered character of the lowland Dry Zone, as one looks over trees and still more trees, spreading away as far as the eye can see. Occasional areas of lighter colour represent the irrigation tanks and the paddy fields of the villages. But, though the area is still largely in jungle, there is much less jungle than when I first knew it 15 or so years ago.

The lowland Dry Zone was once the centre of a great civilization. I realize that the Royal Central Asian Society is concerned with contemporary matters, but one would not do justice to Ceylon if one did not mention its ancient civilization, which produced splendid Buddhist shrines such as those at Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, the ancient capitals. The ancient civilization is thought to have broken down and disappeared, because of invasion from South India which disrupted the political system that had maintained the great irrigation works. Some also believe that malaria came in almost simultaneously; certainly malaria hung like a pall

over the area right up to 1945, when D.D.T. spraying began to be carried out. Now it can be said that malaria has been conquered.

Irrigation was, and is for the most part, by storage in reservoirs or tanks, as in any country that has seasonal rainfall, the rain being stored in the wet season to be used later in that season and in the ensuing dry season. An aspect of the climate of the Dry Zone is its dangerous variability. In 1955-56 the rain-bringing north-east monsoon virtually failed altogether, so that by January, when the tanks should have been brim-full, they were almost empty, and large acres of crops failed altogether. In December, 1957, and January, 1958, on the other hand, the rainfall was excessive; great damage was caused by floods, storage tanks being broken down and bridges destroyed. Apart, then, from the difficulty of *average* conditions (liability towards drought during the dry season, liability to excessive rain during the wet season) there is also the chance of great variability from year to year. On the whole, it is a singularly difficult environment for man.

Characteristic of the Dry Zone is a little village tank nourishing a small area of paddy field; then, at one end of the bund of the tank there are coconut trees sheltering the village, the point being that coconut trees are really Wet Zone vegetation which will not in general grow in the Dry Zone except when they are near surface water.

Apart from the paddy field and the little, water-nourished patch of trees, most Dry Zone villages have a *hena* or *chena*, a small patch cultivated by shifting cultivation; many people call this primitive, some call it pernicious, but it really is for many parts of the Dry Zone, and for areas which cannot be irrigated or which will not grow tree-tops, about the only method of land use so far known that is likely to produce a yield without doing irrevocable damage to the land.

I have indicated that much of the Dry Zone is jungle; but for some time efforts have been made by the Government to settle peasants there. Land is cleared and houses are built by the Government, who also select colonists and move them in. Most colonization schemes are centred on paddy, and by and large grow it successfully. The yield is not as high as is technically possible, the techniques of cultivation being haphazard and slipshod. If the peasants transplanted and used manures they could obtain better crops. But many colonization schemes do manage to produce a surplus of paddy, and there is no danger of damage to the soil. But each peasant has, in addition to paddy land, a patch of unirrigated land or "high land"; unless he is near surface water or unless conditions are otherwise unusually favourable, it is found difficult to grow crops on this land without damaging the soil or losing fertility.

This high-land problem is really the same problem as that of replacing shifting or *chena* cultivation. The problem is being tackled by the Dry Farming Research Station at Maha Illuppallama, whose findings will vitally affect the 2,000,000 acres or so of Dry Zone land which cannot be irrigated. If it were possible to provide irrigation by some means or other, paddy (and perhaps sugar-cane) could be grown. If it is not possible to irrigate but if there is water near the surface, coconut can be grown as well as other tree-crops. But to try to grow on such land maize, millet or any

such field-crop, is apt, with present knowledge, to end in disaster. The reason for this lie in the climate, soils and relief of the Dry Zone, so at Maha Illuppallama research is being done on these factors and on possible ways of using Dry Zone "high land" without losing the soil or destroying its fertility.

### *Economy*

The economy of Ceylon is very narrowly based. The country has no great diversity of natural wealth, and is essentially agricultural. Ninety per cent. or more of the national income comes from agriculture direct (from paddy, from rubber, from tea, from coconuts), or from the simple processing of such crops (fermenting and drying tea, compressing oil from coconuts and so on). It is not only a narrow-based economy in the sense that it is almost entirely agricultural but also because it is based on so few commodities.

Ceylon now produces something like half its requirements of rice and could produce more given fairly simple technical improvements. Apart from rice, there are only tea, rubber and coconuts of any importance, and these three make up 90 per cent. of the exports in an average year. In other words, Ceylon can only import what she needs in the way of rice, raw materials and manufactures if she can sell tea, rubber and coconuts. Of those three, rubber fluctuates up and down in price, and very violently. Tea is a little more stable, but subject to over-production, and subject also to loss when a manufacturing country like Britain is forced to cut down its imports. Coconuts also are not completely stable in spite of the fact that they are so often called "the Consols of the East."

There is not much scope for diversification. There are other crops which might be grown. It is physically possible, perhaps, to grow cotton in some parts of the Dry Zone, although the difficulty is that, dry as it is during the dry season, one cannot rely with sufficient certainty on dry weather at the right time for ripening. Cocoa might be grown, but there is not much possibility of expansion of the area under existing crops, at least under existing *commercial* crops, because there is little land in the Wet Zone that is not used; and, by and large, tea, rubber and, to a lesser extent, coconuts are confined to the Wet Zone country. There is, as will be clear by now, some possibility for the extension of paddy, the cultivation of sugar and one or two other crops by irrigation in the Dry Zone.

That is the sombre background. What are the problems that have to be faced by Ceylon against this background, economically speaking? In the first place, there is the population problem, Ceylon having one of the highest rates of increase of population recorded anywhere in the world—2.6 or 2.8 per cent. per annum during the last few years. It is quite clear that population is increasing at a faster rate than national income. It is always difficult to measure or forecast national income accurately, but it seems fairly certain that the national income of Ceylon is increasing at something like 2 per cent. per annum, certainly according to the last figures available; that is, much less than the rate of increase of population. In other words, the standard of living in Ceylon is gradually tending to lower. One of the assets of Ceylon, however, is that living standards,



although low by Western standards, are high by Asian standards. It is rare in Ceylon to find that terrible, hopeless grinding poverty so characteristic of the villages of Madras, or the Central Provinces, or Bengal, or many other parts of India. The people of Ceylon have a little more and in most of the villages they are well fed. Nevertheless, many of the people, in spite of these appearances, are living on the edge of disaster. It only needs a father of a household or one of the working sons to be ill or to be killed, or for a drought to come, for one to see poverty as in Madras. The point is, then, that there is some leeway, some tightening of the belt possible before Ceylon is reduced to Indian or Middle Eastern standards, but not very much leeway. All the time the population is increasing, and it looks as though the economy is losing in the race to catch up with population.

### *Ceylon's Assets*

The problem, then, is how to increase living standards faster than the population grows, how to get some kind of increase *per capita*. In Ceylon, fortunately, there is some spare land. In India as a whole most of the spare land is useless, more so than any of the land in Ceylon, with some exceptions. In Ceylon there are, perhaps, nearly a million acres of Dry Zone land which could be irrigated and grow crops, though increasing capital cost per acre as times goes on. There are some 2 million acres which cannot be irrigated under present conditions, but which may yield to the research of the agriculturists and grow something in due course.

Another asset of Ceylon in this connection is that people are more commercially minded than in, say, India. If one wishes to stimulate the growing of a particular crop in Ceylon a system of guaranteed prices has been shown to be effective; in other words, the simple working of the market economy tends to stimulate the peasants and others to produce. That is not always so in most under-developed countries where a cash economy has not gone as far as it has in Ceylon.

Another important asset of Ceylon is its efficient public service. I am always filled with admiration for the Civil Service, the technical services and the Public Works Department. When the disastrous floods hit Ceylon around about Christmas time in 1957 and continued into January, 1958, all the roads that were cut were restored to traffic within ten days of the disaster—an astonishing piece of work.

### *Ceylon's Liabilities*

The liabilities of Ceylon are the population problem, the limited agricultural potential (the latter being complicated by the politics) and also limited industrial potential. The fact of the matter is that Ceylon has few resources for industry: no coal or oil, a certain amount of hydro-electric power; no particular mineral wealth such as iron ore. The people of Ceylon are, it is true, surprisingly adaptable to new manual skills, but that does not mean anything in the absence of the other requisites and, above all, in the absence of capital. Foreign capital is likely to be affected

by the political situation, and so may I add a word about politics as a factor that is likely to limit economic development in the island.

### *Politics*

Probably to most people in Great Britain what has happened in Ceylon since 1956 must have come as something of a shock, for Ceylon was always being held up as a model colonial territory that passed by slow and ordered degrees towards independence; a model of communal harmony, it was also said, with Sinhalese and two groups of Tamils (those who had lived in Ceylon for generations, the Ceylon Tamils, and the Indian Tamils) living together in apparent accord. But since 1956 there has been the astonishing election result, followed by communal strife which rightly shocked the whole world; there has also been trouble over British bases and, during the last few days, a strange Cabinet crisis.

What has happened to bring this about? In the first place, those who were in power and who really ensured orderly progress up to 1956, those who were not only in power but almost the only people politically active, were the English-speaking *élite*; people who had been educated in the language of a colonial power, people acquainted with Western ideas on Parliamentary government and political thought through reading in English. The United National Party (U.N.P.), which Mr. Senanayake formed, was composed mainly of such persons, and probably it was because they were so English that people in Britain liked them so much. But in the General Election of April 1956 the United National Party suddenly almost vanished; it only had eight seats in the new House.

Why was the United National Party defeated? In the first place, it must be recognized that there was in Ceylon a great deal of legitimate dissatisfaction with the Party. It had become ineffective and corrupt, slack, out-of-touch with what the people were thinking, and, like so many parties too long in power, determined to stay in power without any clear aims or policies.

There were various politicians, including Mr. Bandaranaike, who had fallen out with the U.N.P. and who had decided to have done with them and to go all out to get into power. Bandaranaike formed, first of all, a coalition of a number of diverse elements, including a Trotskyist group, and called them the M.E.P. In addition to forming a coalition he made an electoral pact with certain other groups in Opposition, the parties to which agreed that they would not put up candidates against each other in the same constituency. Even given the dissatisfaction with the U.N.P. and even given this artificial arrangement of the situation, I doubt whether the U.N.P. would have been defeated, were it not for important social changes. The English-educated *élite* were by 1956 now the only politically conscious people; other groups in the population had become thirsty for political power. The new arrivals on the scene were not so much the workers or the peasants, but a sort of village middle-class, people who spoke Sinhalese and not English; they included Buddhist priests, schoolmasters teaching in Sinhalese, village merchants, and others. This sort of person has, during the last ten years or so, become extremely powerful in

the villages, able to mould village opinion through the vernacular, through religion, and through economic pressure, and altogether far more in touch with the people than the English-educated *élite*. It seems true to say that, apart from dissatisfaction and electoral arrangements, it was the recognition of the shift of influence to this particular group that put the M.E.P. into power. Whether the M.E.P. can repeat the performance is another matter. It may be that social change will go further and leave the village middle-class behind.

It is largely because of this shift of power that the language issue and communal issue have come so much to the fore. The particular Sinhalese group that has become politically active was often a frustrated group, made up of people who, because they only spoke Sinhalese, found themselves unable to get the best jobs and who, moreover, felt that the Tamil people were getting more posts in Government service than they themselves were. Because this group was frustrated economically, and because the M.E.P. leant so heavily on it, the communal situation became aggravated with disastrous consequences for the Ceylon Tamils. The Cabinet crisis of the past two days is another matter; it is a mixture of ideological and personal feuding between very different elements inside the Cabinet.

It need hardly be said, in conclusion, that the communal rioting, Sinhalese nationalism, labour indiscipline and general uncertainty that now hang over Ceylon politics have distracted attention inside Ceylon away from vital economic issues, and have also engendered suspicion in the world at large about the stability of the country.

#### DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: My knowledge of Ceylon is limited to a very pleasant three months' holiday spent there some 18 years ago. Ceylon is such a pleasant country in which to spend a holiday that I would like to ask Mr. Farmer whether anything is being done to develop the tourist industry. It occurred to me that it probably may have developed downwards now there are fewer British in India.

Also I would like to ask whether anything has been done in recent years to re-start the cultivation of coffee. Ceylon used to be a great coffee-growing country, and then the whole crop was wiped out in a very short time as a result of disease. I am not sure whether anything has been done to re-establish the growing of coffee as a money-earning crop.

Mr. FARMER: The answer to the question whether tourism is developing up or down is "Yes and "No." It is true that there are fewer British in India, but certainly during 1956 it was noticeable that Indians themselves were coming to Ceylon for their holidays; also Australians were coming to the island, as well as people in commercial or public service in Hong Kong or Singapore and many Americans from Kuwait and the other oilfields in the Middle East. Efforts have been made to attract tourists to Ceylon, both by the Government and by private enterprise interested in hotels, in coach tours, motor-car tours and so on. The Government took over some of the bigger and better-paying rest houses in the island and brought them up to a very good standard indeed. Naturally,

the political events I have described dealt a severe blow to the tourist trade: people did not want to visit the island when it was in disorder.

It is curious at first sight that so little has been done to bring coffee back to Ceylon. The reason is primarily that growers became so scared at the time of the great disaster to the crop to which the Chairman referred, that the land which could grow either coffee or tea was mainly planted in tea. Then tea became so successful and coffee was forgotten. Some villages do grow coffee; Ceylon coffee is delightful and quite distinctive. And only about a month ago I received news from Colombo that in one of the attempts to redress the balance of the economy the Government is trying to introduce peasant coffee-growing in one of the few remaining wet zone jungle areas. Coffee-growing can only be extended to any significant extent at the expense of some other crops, and whilst the other crops are so successful there is no incentive to plant coffee.

Mr. RIND: What is the intention of the Government in regard to spreading the tea industry of Ceylon?

Mr. FARMER: Many would like to know the answer to that question. It has become very much caught up in the general feud inside the Cabinet. My own impression for what it is worth is that the nationalization of tea was introduced, like many other things, into the election manifesto of Mr. Bandaranaike's party in the hope that it would bring in a few more votes. Mr. Bandaranaike so desperately desired to get into power that he formed his Coalition and made his electoral pacts and then nailed every conceivable plank to his platform in the hope of catching votes; and this was one of the planks. The person really pressing for the nationalization of the tea industry was the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Gunewardena, a Trotskyist and something of an extremist, who has now been sacked from the Cabinet. My suggestion is that the intentions of the Government at the moment are to leave the estates very much as they are. Mr. Bandaranaike is in a very strange position. If all the Opposition and all the nominated members of the House of Representatives vote together, he will be defeated. He obviously does not want to be defeated, so he will avoid any issue which would be likely to unite the Opposition. However, if he tries to woo at least some of the very mixed group who make up the Opposition by introducing measures which will interest them, he may have to woo the left wing group who include nationalization in their programme.

Mr. BAXTER: Is it possible for Dry Zone reforestation to take place in order to hold water in the wet season?

Mr. FARMER: When I referred to re-forestation I had in mind the *patana* grassland on the drier side of the hills. In such areas there is some attempt at re-forestation, and success in retaining the water, and so on. The dry hill-tops in the *lowland* Dry Zone present quite another problem. There *are* forestry plantations of teak, satinwood and other trees, but not always where they are most needed if they are to conserve water and soil. The need seems to be to grow trees on the steep slopes.

Mr. BEAVER: Is there any possibility of growing sisal in Ceylon?

Mr. FARMER: I do not know much about sisal but I believe I am right in saying that it would not grow in the Dry Zone, the snag being that

though the climate is very dry in the dry season, it is very wet in the wet season. There can be up to 10 inches of rain in 24 hours. Many crops which can be grown with or without irrigation in dry regions, and other crops needing rain all the year round, are alike ruled out by the great seasonal swing.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, you all wish me to thank Mr. Farmer on your behalf for a most interesting lecture. Our *Journal* in which these lectures are printed has a very wide circulation, and I am sure this lecture will be read with great interest by many of our members who have not been able to be with us now. We thank you very much, Mr. Farmer. (*Applause.*)

## REVIEWS

**Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892.** By R. L. Greaves. The University of London. The Athlone Press. 1959. Pp. 301; 5 maps; index. 42s.

This interesting and timely study of British preoccupation with the position of Persia in relation to the problem of the defence of India during the critical years between 1884 and 1892 is largely based on hitherto unpublished material which gives the work an authority that is lacking in earlier writing on the subject. The study relates chiefly to the period when British foreign policy was dominated by the personality and firm hand of Lord Salisbury, and covers the wider field of Anglo-Russian relations at that time. The part played by Persia in the diplomatic exchanges between London and St. Petersburg only becomes clear within the framework of wider issues such as Russian aims in the Balkans and in Turkey, and the strategic problems of the defence of India.

In addition to the very considerable records of the India Office and Foreign Office archives relating to that time, the author has had access to a number of private collections of personal papers. Among these are the private papers of the Earl of Granville, Secretary of State in 1880-85, a collection of the correspondence of the Earl of Iddesleigh who held the same post in 1886 and 1887, and the very voluminous papers of Lord Salisbury, now deposited at Christ Church, Oxford. The papers of Mr. W. E. Gladstone, now in the possession of the British Museum, have also been drawn upon and are a source of vital material for the period. Many other contemporary writings, including Russian, German and French diplomatic correspondence, documents and memoirs are quoted. An extensive bibliography suggests the wide range of study that has been given to the subject of this work. Five maps illustrate the successive stages of the Russian advance into Central Asia, and the various schemes proposed at that time for the development of Persian communications.

Dr. Greaves's comprehensive study of Anglo-Russian relations during the period under review throws a clear light on a situation which has been much befogged by controversy and conflicting views as to the motives and objectives of British policy in Persia. The paucity of authoritative data hitherto available regarding the attitude of H.M. Government and the Government of India towards the problems which arose from the Russian advance into Central Asia has given a clear field to those writers, Russian and others, who have represented the British reaction to the Russian drive towards the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan as a simple case of imperialist ambition at the expense of Persia.

The diplomatic correspondence and other contemporary documents quoted by Dr. Greaves show clearly that this was far from being the case. While adopting a firm attitude when Russian action threatened to precipitate war, Lord Salisbury's consistent aim was to maintain Persian independence and integrity, and to encourage her economic and political development. The Persian role as a buffer state could only be sustained by a healthy development of her economic life and internal administration. British efforts to this end were frustrated as much by Shah Nasir ad-Din's vacillations and resistance to change as by Russian obstruction.

While resisting attempts to subjugate Persia, Lord Salisbury made repeated efforts to reach agreement on all outstanding questions with the Russian government. His failure to achieve agreement was largely due to the equivocal nature of Russian diplomacy, and the shadowy control of the Czar's government over its frontier generals and officials.

The changes brought about in the political and economic situation in Western Asia since World War II have modified the pattern of military strategy in that area. British withdrawal from the Indian peninsula has brought to an end the historical contest for influence and power between two Empires in the area contiguous with the vast expanse of Russian Central Asia. This contest—the "Great Game," as it

was called—of political rivalry, of military ambition on the one hand and of conflicting policies and problems of defence on the other, continued from the first serious Russian advance into Turkistan in 1865 until the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. On the Russian side, the atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue was not completely allayed by the 1907 agreement, or even by the Alliance of World War I. With the change of régime in Russia in 1917, the old Anglophobia persisted, and found expression in Soviet hostility in Persia and Afghanistan, which continues even today, and is kept alive by a persistent and misleading propaganda among the population of Central Asia.

Yet despite the changes brought about by war, revolution and nationalism, the "Game" continues, although with different teams of players, new objectives and new tactics. Persia is still in the front line of international politics and strategy as has been exemplified by recent Soviet moves; the objectives and tactics of nineteenth-century Russia have been modified, but the motivation, although obscured by new slogans and ideological justification, remains basically unchanged.

Russian expansion into Central Asia in the nineteenth century was perhaps an inevitable development, no less, from a military standpoint, than the advance of the Company's troops northwards into the Punjab and towards the North-West Frontier of India. The Russian military appetite, however, was whetted by the comparative ease with which the Khanates and the Turkoman country had been conquered. Although checked by the risks and difficulties of crossing the frontier of Afghanistan, the "ripe pear" of a weak and corrupt Persia seemed ready for picking. The ingenuity with which the Russian Foreign Minister exploited the threat of a further Russian advance in order to gain agreement or compensation elsewhere (notably in the Balkans) was matched by the diplomatic agility displayed by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the British Ambassador in Tehran, in checkmating the schemes of General Kuropatkin and Prince Dolgoruki. The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Wolff, quoted extensively by Dr. Greaves, reveal a combination of caution, astuteness and determination to keep the situation under control, that contributed far more to the maintenance of peace than the "masterly inactivity" of Sir John Lawrence and his school of thought in India.

Salisbury recognized that the risks taken by the St. Petersburg government at the time of the Penjdeh incident in 1885 and on the Pamir frontier in 1891 were undertaken with the knowledge that Russia was relatively immune from military attack and could therefore remain indifferent to British protests. Her weakness was internal; her finances unstable, and her industrial and technical resources limited, so that her diplomacy, while adventurous and tortuous, was often at loggerheads with the military leaders with whom initiative often rested. They regarded no treaty as binding. While St. Petersburg gave assurances that no further advance was intended, the generals pushed forward, and always stayed. In fact, as the correspondence and documentary evidence quoted by Dr. Greaves shows, the Russian advance was halted on more than one occasion as much by the threat of trouble in the Balkans or elsewhere, as by the firm attitude of London and Simla.

The desire of the military authorities in India to forestall a Russian occupation of Herat and the Persian province of Khorasan by the construction of a railway from Quetta to Nushki and thence to the Seistan border of Baluchistan, and the creation of a defence line in that area, encountered many obstacles on the part of both civil and military spokesmen in India. Prudence gave way to necessity when the Russian threat to Herat and the discovery of Russian plans for an invasion of India brought about agreement between the principal parties concerned. Nevertheless, the line to Nushki was not completed until 1905, and the extension to Seistan was not constructed until 1917. Dr. Greaves's account of the conflict of views which attended this project, and indeed the whole question of the defence of India from a forward position in Baluchistan and South-East Persia, is a clear refutation of the Soviet Russian historical account of British "imperialist designs" in the 'eighties and 'nineties to seize Persia and advance into Central Asia.

The author of this valuable book ends her narrative with the fall of the Salisbury government in 1892. Although the question of Persia, the Straits and the defence of India continued to give anxiety to the successors of the Conservative government, the acute phase of Anglo-Russian relations in the Central Asian area was passing.

The attention of the Czar's government was now turning towards Manchuria and the Far East generally, and was to culminate in the construction of the Siberian railway and the disastrous war with Japan.

This book is a valuable contribution to a period of history about which little is known to the present generation, and which provides a clear and authoritative background to more recent events in an area which is of no less strategic importance today than it was at a time when conflicts between nations were more localized than seems possible at present.

C. H. ELLIS.

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**The Springing Tiger.** A Study of a Revolutionary. By Hugh Toye. Cassell. Pp. 184. Appendices; plates; maps and indices. Foreward by Philip Mason. 25s.

This is the story of the life of Subhas Chandra Bose, best known to us of the West as the Indian politician who acted as manager to the band of renegades, "patriots" and weaklings who formed the Indian National Army on the Japanese side in the years 1942-45. One cannot write "fighting on the Japanese side," because only a scattered handful were ever so bold or so committed to this particular cause of Freedom for India, as proclaimed by Bose, that they would have gone so far as to fight. To those who were in India at the time the name of S. C. Bose is well enough known and curiosity still lively enough for this book to rouse considerable interest: those who come new to the subject but desire to hear more of Britain's last years in India can be assured that Mr. Toye has made a very necessary contribution to the account, one that is pleasantly readable and never stodgy as are so many lives of political personalities. Perhaps he is lucky in having a man of so many parts about whom he is writing. Bose was not only a politician, highly intelligent and highly educated, but also an ambitious adventurer who lived at a time when educated youth in India had developed, under the British system and example, a lively nationalism. So Mr. Toye has a many-sided tale to tell and tell it he does, briskly and fairly.

Subhas was born in Orissa in 1897 and met his death in an air accident in August, 1945, on his way from Bangkok to Japan. In those 48 years he had attended universities at Calcutta and at Cambridge, and in the latter place had registered his bitter delight that English men should be performing menial tasks for him: he had passed brilliantly into the Indian Civil Service, flung up his office in 1921, and joined the Congress ranks behind Gandhi, then rebelled against the great Mahatma, seen the inside of a prison more than once for undesirable, violent political activities, until arrested by the British in 1940 for sedition, released perhaps unwisely; he fled to Germany and Russia to join Britain's enemies and to raise from among the Indian prisoners of war in Axis hands and émigrés residing in Germany a force to follow on the heels of any victor into India. He was a god-sent gift to the Axis when Japan fell into line with them, so was consequently sent post-haste to that country to do what damage he could to Britain on that side of the world through his Indian contacts.

Thereafter came what must be regarded as the most important period of his life, the two years in Malaya when he was raising and organizing from prisoners of war of the Indian Army taken in Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma, what came to be known as the Indian National Army or I.N.A. It is certainly the most interesting part of his career, and Mr. Toye opens his book with a necessary explanation of the nature of this organization. A regular officer of the contemporary Indian Army registers his contempt and the contempt of his brothers for this collection of weaklings and renegades, not only as traitors to their cloth but as cowards and poltroons when in the end they did take the field in Burma against their former comrades. It is impossible for anyone to realize what a farcical body this was unless he himself saw it in its natural surroundings in Burma in 1944-45. Numbers it possessed; heart, assurance, confidence, self-respect were not with it. Had it stood instead of surrendering wholesale the old Indian Army would have made mincemeat of it. But there was no reason why it should have stood, with no desire other than to return safe and sound to its homes in India.



To converse with the few hard-core I.N.A. men was similar to conversing with hard-core German Nazi S.S. prisoners of war whom one met from time to time in Africa and Europe. Their minds were clamped tight. That was the work of Bose, Mohan Singh, their lieutenants, and of their Japanese coadjutors. This hard-core was the instrument of brutality they shaped and through which they worked to terrorize their fellow Indian prisoners into joining the I.N.A. Any historian who starts from this hard, irrefutable fact, however unpalatable, will see the whole I.N.A. for the detestable thing it was and its leaders for the rogues and cowards they were. All the talk of high motives becomes suspect and falls flat. Leaders who paraded their desire to die for a cause, who were presented almost daily with every opportunity to fulfil that desire and who never took it but walked tamely and blithely into prisoners' cages, cannot expect to command respect or even sympathy. Bose, still chubby and bespectacled, met his death by pure accident in a passenger aircraft. At the time, and even more perhaps now as more becomes known, the whole subject of the I.N.A. gave one a feeling of futility, of unreality, yet its ripples may still persevere in the sub-Continent.

The author's opinion is that Bose was a dictator. Some who knew him personally have said that he was a man of overweening conceit and ambition, loath to play second fiddle to anyone and it is thus that he presents himself from the pages of this record. One feels that it was a pity that Netaji Bose was not spared by Providence to show his paces in an independent India in the company of such as Sirdar Patel, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon: we must be content with Mr. Toy's industry and success in bringing into the light in so interesting a manner the hitherto enigmatic personality, Subhas Chandra Bose.

F. S. T.

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**Orde Wingate.** By Christopher Sykes. Collins. Pp. 546; maps; plates and index. 35s.

The public now has the opportunity to judge for itself of Major-General Orde Wingate whose name was bandied about across the world during his short time of campaigning in Burma in 1943-44. Mr Sykes has, as was to be expected, written a biography of high quality, furnished with the results of a patient, comprehensive research. With it all, he has not written the last word on his subject, as he himself explains towards the end of the book, since it remains yet for some informed military student to assess the achievement of this man as a soldier. The author has ventured some assessment. Here is another, its authority a lifetime of battle experience, from the formal set battles of two world wars to guerrilla fighting from the Elburz to Assam. From the 1920's onwards, military developments seemed clear to a student for a period of years with air and the mobile arms predominant, particularly air with its dual role of weapon and freightage. Wingate, it seems, had not fully grasped the overall pattern thus presented. Probably he had applied himself to too many outside causes; for instance, Zionism became to him for years almost another profession. It is good to be catholic in one's interests, but war and its waging must be the first preoccupation of the soldier. Or, perhaps, ready of tongue and facile of pen, he was nevertheless not equipped to undertake the research and study required: after all, he failed twice to gain a competitive vacancy at the Staff College.

The author lists four military occasions on which Wingate's reputation depends. The first, in the Arab rebellion in Palestine in the late 'thirties. There he initiated night patrolling, more credit to him, but far more discredit to an army so ill-trained and so lacking in battle-skill that it left the night landscape to the guerrillas, its enemies—a cardinal elementary sin. Herein he could only claim to be graded as the best of an indifferent lot who took their laxity and complacency with them into the Second World War and persevered thus far too long, to our great grief and to their own suffering and early failure.

The second is as a leader of guerrillas in Ethiopia when he displayed his remarkable courage and daring but, disappointingly for him, against an enemy whose heart was anywhere but where the bullets flew.

The third was in Burma in the spring of 1943. The operation was a brave but ill-devised adventure. Almost, it seemed that he believed himself to be back in Ethiopia. Mules, a veritable curse in battle as we had written in military journals of the 'thirties, were taken—clumsy, vulnerable, noisy and panicky—into action in enemy-held territory; additionally, Wingate brought off what must be an all-time record in rotting out a Gurkha battalion, a young one withal, during these operations. The author castigates the battalion, so did Wingate in his report, for it suited him so to do. The battalion, with exemplary restraint, has written, "from the standpoint of the Gurkhas the training was faulty. Here the onus must be borne by the Chindit Commander . . . the Gurkhas should have been taught not only what they had to do but why they were doing it . . . the failure to appreciate general principles was accompanied by a similar failure to instil the fundamentals of jungle warfare. . . . (The) Battalion, swollen by an extraordinary influx of outsiders and thereafter carved up arbitrarily, with the segments in the majority of instances under command of alien officers, never was able to attain intimacy of leadership, the family relationship of officer and man. . . ." The Subadar major, a staunch, courageous, hardy soldier of much varied fighting experience, unburdened himself later to me in Gurkhali, a tongue of which Wingate, Calvert and others of the Chindit officers were ignorant. His main theme was that he and his men were accustomed to knowing what they were to do and to being led by officers who planned accordingly, and not by those who even left their wounded behind to die under Japanese brutality or by the wild beasts of the forest. Certainly, the Frithian and unsoldierly mess at the first crossing of the Chindwin must have dismayed the Subadar major and many others.

A few months later this battalion, under another brigadier, was fighting brilliantly in Burma in what an impartial observer describes as "an outstanding feat of arms."

Out of 3,000 who went on this expedition, only 600, the author tells us, ever again answered to a roll call on active service. To set against all this, Slim could find little achieved and his is the sanest opinion available emerging from the emotional clamour of the time. One of the brigade commanders, we are told, offered to resign from "2nd Wingate" rather than commit men again to such an unrewarding ordeal.

There had been Italian air supply in the Ethiopian campaign of the 'thirties; Axis airborne landings in Norway, in Holland and in Crete; MacArthur's forces, by air and sea, were beginning to step thus across the Pacific. It had always been recognized that by their nature airborne landings must, to be fully effective, have an adequate follow-up. In 1940 the Army in India's jungle-fighting pamphlet read, "That is to say, we will establish well-defended, well-sited, well-provided bases at strategic points over a wide area. From these our mobile infantry columns can move and strike rapidly in any direction and the consequent offensive action will paralyse the enemy's mobility. Infantry mobility can probably be best maintained in these circumstances by the use of highly trained porters and air supply. Mobility is relative. That is, whereas infantry on foot is comparatively immobile in country where M.T. can move freely, it is the most mobile in mountainous and forest country." Wingate's fourth occasion, later in 1943, comprised airborne landings far out and the installation of defended post-bases from which the soldiers thus landed would operate, the posts to be supplied by air. Wingate was killed in March, 1944, before this operation was fully under way, so it is unfair to judge him by its rather sad and costly outcome. In view of the precedents and already accepted precepts noted above, one cannot perceive wherein lay the ingenuity or inventiveness of this latest conception. One could more easily detect its likely short-comings in execution owing to its early lack of land support after the landings. The plan manifested his failure to grasp the essentials of area war as understood by more experienced students.

Ambitious, courageous, determined, talented and romantic, it was probably the last quality which thwarted him. War is not romantic: it is a hard and dirty business of overwhelming one's enemy with little loss to oneself.

As a military rebel, he would have been more successful and earned more respect, had he not been his own worst enemy: had he been scrupulous and persuasive in his dealings with those who could forward his ideas: had he laboured to be as

Alexander the Great rather than flattered himself, or been flattered by others, that he had already arrived.

The Army in India into which Wingate came in March, 1943, had been sadly depleted and injured by War Office ignorance, folly and wretched leadership in Malaya and in the early stages of Burma. After the catastrophe, the Burma theatre had, as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief put it, "been flung back at G.H.Q. India like a wet hen." Thus India was in the throes of raising and training a new army while fending off the Japanese. For Wingate, in this perilous situation, to go straight to the Home Government behind the Commander-in-Chief's back in order to force India to strip its army so that it might scrape up six Brigades of super-fit, highly-trained men for his purposes, was mischievous. Personal ambition had him by the nose.

In the summer of 1943 a young officer wrote from Burma, "The initiative therefore lies with us and we can get as much or as little fighting as we choose. To the chagrin of the Japs our choice is for all we can get." It was when units had reached this stage in physical and moral resurgence that India was being required to "milk" them once more. Little wonder that Auchinleck, witnessing the army in Burma being forged into the weapon that, a year later, crushed the Japanese, thought twice of the project, recalling the staggering losses in men and material of that expedition of early 1943.

These are some of the military reflections to which Mr. Sykes' masterly book has led a student and practitioner of war. I can think of a clutch of major-generals who proved themselves in Italy, North Africa and Burma as deft, resourceful, and successful fighting men with whom Wingate would have been hard put to compete, but who do not offer the out-of-the-ordinary, intriguing story which Mr. Sykes has provided for us.

F. S. T.

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**Ahmad Shah Durrani.** By Sardar Ganda Singh. Asia Publishing House. Pp. 457; maps; illustrations; appendixes and index.

It is ironic that the biography of the great soldier who founded the Afghan State should be written by a Sikh scholar. These gallant pages throw reflected honour on the very people and creed, the Sikhs, who most effectively opposed the Afghan's eight expeditions into the Punjab. For, in the large perspective, what Ahmad's campaigns really did was, by hastening and completing the process of disintegration of the Mughal Empire begun by Nadir Shah of Persia, to throw the Punjab into a state of anarchy which made possible the emergence of the Kingdom of Ranjit Singh. The fall in the early eighteenth century of the two great Muslim empires—the Safavi of Persia and the Mughal of Hindustan—led to the rise of two new states in the interspace—Afghanistan and the Kingdom of the Sikhs. And Ahmad Shah, building on foundations laid by his master, Nadir of Persia, played a double role, as builder of Afghanistan and destroyer of Mughal India. And so rose up the Sikhs.

Dr. Ganda Singh, working with immense pains and delving into a vast bibliography—Persian, English, Urdu, Hindi, Marathi and Punjabi—has produced a readable and compendious volume which not only attests his scholarship, but is witness to his tolerance. His English style is lucid and balanced, once and again employing phrases which might not fall from an Englishman's pen but are none the less pleasing. An example is a graphic description of a Sikh column in a running battle which "moved on fighting, and fought on moving," and there are other nice touches. Like so much Asian history the narrative too often becomes a chronicle of names, movements and battles, and there is then some lack of perspective and blurring of cause and effect. But Ahmad emerges as a great and lovable leader of men, whose work has endured.

J. D. Cunningham, historian of the Sikhs a century ago, summed him up by echoing Tacitus' epigram on the Roman emperor Galba. He called him the very ideal of the Afghan genius, hardy and enterprising, fitted for conquest yet incapable of empire. But Ahmad was more than that. He founded an Afghan monarchy which still finds its royal house from another branch of his tribe, the Durranis. He had

a bold and commanding turn of natural genius. He was an adept in the difficult art of the management of men and of tribes. Man of war indeed he was, but one disposed by nature to clemency and prone to policies of conciliation where the way lay open. He was a king who never lost the common touch; with his tribesmen he kept up the same equal and popular demeanour which was usual with their Khans before there was any question of royal dignity. He was himself a divine, and he wrote Pashtu poetry which survives and is still admired.

All this Dr. Ganda Singh relates with a fine chivalry and many human touches. In one particular he fails. He does not appear to know Pashtu—for example, he fails to cite any of Ahmad's poems—and his acquaintance with the tribes and locations of the Afghan area, including Peshawar, could be better. Kabul (p. 37) was not a capital when Ahmad took it, nor indeed when he reigned, for his capital was at Qandahar. Hashtnagar (p. 38) is not identical with, but adjacent to, the Doaba. The chief of Mandar (p. 39) should be written Mandanr; Mandanr is not a place but the tribal name of the Yusufzais of the Samah—the plains from Mardan to Swabi. Nor is there full realization of the fact that Ahmad's tribe the Abdalis, known from his time as the Durrani, had for centuries been feudatory to the Persian Safavi kings, and therefore had, and indeed still have, a Persian bias and indeed often talk Persian rather than Pashtu. In this respect they have a historical background different from the Peshawar Afghan tribes and, indeed the Ghaljis, whose ties have on the whole been closer with Hindustan and the Mughal Empire.

The maps tend somewhat to inflate the size of the Durrani Empire. Sind was only held for a very short time and was almost independent under a feudatory; Baluchistan was *de facto* independent under Nasir Khan; Ahmad never entered the Makran coast; and most of the tribal areas around Peshawar, including Swat, never owned more than a sentimental allegiance.

Finally, as is perhaps natural, the emphasis of the book is rather on Ahmad's campaigns in the Punjab and around Delhi than on his consolidation of Afghanistan.

Seen as a whole this book is a very notable contribution to Central Asian history and a further tribute to a hero who was undoubtedly one of the two greatest Afghans in history. The other was Sher Shah. Perhaps Sardar Ganda Singh will give us his life also.

OLAF CAROE.

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**Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans.** By Fredrik Barth. The Athlone Press. Pp. 143 and index. 25s.

We have here from the hand of a Norwegian scholar a most penetrating analysis of the structure of Pathan society in a characteristic and secluded portion of the Pathan country, the valley of Swat. It is true that nobody picking up Dr. Barth would suppose him to be writing of a region second only to Kashmir in the glory of its scenic setting, but we may suppose that the delicious scenes in which he worked helped to enlighten his seeing eye. For this is without doubt the deepest and most accurate survey of what may be called the skeleton of Pathan tribal organization hitherto made. If it has a rival it would be Sir Evelyn Howell's Monograph on the Mahsuds, *Mizh*, written in 1932; if there is to be criticism, it might be that the author fails to some extent to clothe it with the flesh and bones of the living Pathan. The reader is often left with the feeling that the workings of tribal society are as ruthless and inevitable as the administration of the bee-hive or ant-heap. Those who have lived among Pathans can correct this picture in countless memories of kindness, loyalty and mutual devotion.

Perhaps the most fascinating exposition is that of the several and complementary parts played by the Khan, the hereditary leader of a tribal segment, and the Sayyid Mian or Pir, the equally hereditary religious dignitary, here elevated to the rank of Saint. There are clear-cut descriptions of the systems of the guest-house (*huḡ'ra*)—called the men's house by the author—of the traditional system of land allotment and redistribution (*vesh*) and of the manner in which the tribal assemblies (*jirgas*) function. Nor is there lacking reference to the complex influences of patrilinear

descent, to marriage and affinity, and, perhaps most important, to the strata of the class (*nasb*) system, wrongly perhaps described by the author as caste.

The significant fact emerges that in many Pathan societies the Pakhtuns or Pashtuns are a minority, sometimes only 10 per cent. of the adult population. They are, as it were, the Normans ruling by conquest over a stratified series of layers of occupational classes overlaid by history. As Dr. Barth points out, "it follows that it is by becoming leaders of the non-landowners, not by turning them against himself, that a Pathan landowner maintains his position." This is exactly what Dr. Khan Sahib and his brother Abdul Ghaffar Khan did to build up their political power in the neighbouring Peshawar Valley. Their Red-shirt followers almost to a man consisted of the tenant and client classes, the hewers of wood and drawers of water. It is fascinating to speculate on what in the long term will be the effect of adult suffrage on such a society. How will the historical domination of a virile numerical minority survive the impact of one man, one vote?

For the lay reader this admirable study is a little marred by its profuse use of the pedant's jargon. Words such as *dyadic*, *apical*, *sibling*, *superordinate* are scattered about like sixpences in a Christmas pudding. And there is a wealth of rotund Gibbonism, as, for instance, on p. 134 when we are told that "the chiefs become the leaders of homologous localized men's house groups in a segmentary, acephalous system." And there are other gems which it would not be easy to put over to a Khan in his *hujra*. Again, though Dr. Barth has acquired an accurate knowledge of Pashtu in a short time—for example, his tables of affinity on p. 110 are first-class—he is guilty of lapses indicating a lack of knowledge of its Arabic and Persian background. The compound *Brakhakhor* is derived not from the Pashtu *Khor*, a sister, but the Persian *Khurdan*, to eat, and to write *Mujah-i-Din* for *Mujahidin* (warriors for *jihad*) is a serious solecism.

But, all in all, this is a suggestive study which should be of great value to the Government of Pakistan and its officers.

OLAF CAROE.

### **A History of South India from Prehistoric Times to the Fall of Vijayanagar.**

By K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, M.A. Second Edition. O.U.P. 1958.

### **Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh.**

By Albert Mayer and Associates in collaboration with McKim Marriott and Richard L. Park. With a Foreword by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, Home Minister, Government of India. University of California Press. 1958.

### **The Heart of India.** By Alexander Campbell. Constable. 18s. 6d.

*The History of South India*, heart of Hindu civilization at its purest, has been somewhat neglected, so that Mr. Sastri's work, which fully merits a second edition and a handsomer piece of the publisher's art than this rather shoddy production, helps to restore a balance. Mr. Sastri's is an able and scholarly account of the various peoples and cultures and successive empires, up to and including the Vijayanagar, which stood as a Hindu breakwater against the rising tide of Islam. The matter is, however, so compressed that the general reader may be deterred from a book which the serious student will find of the highest value. Yet the lengthy chapter on social and economic conditions, covering almost everything from caste to currency, is of surpassing interest.

Mr. Albert Mayer was an American sapper who, like others of his countrymen, fell under India's spell during war service. An architect and town and country planner, he took a part in the planning of Bombay, Cawnpore and East Punjab's modern capital, Chandigarh. His collaborators are distinguished in social studies and have also worked in India. Mr. Mayer met Sri Nehru during the war and in 1948 became Planning and Development Adviser to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, in which Pandit Pant, who has written the foreword, was Chief Minister. *The Pilot Project*, here described in fascinating detail, restored 10,000 acres of eroded soil, and brought inspiration to apathetic village communities. Mr. Mayer avoids the characteristic

errors of the "do-gooder." He urges the foreign technical adviser not to try to "sell" an ideology—"not religion, not the American way of life, not anti-communism, not anti-anything, and not even one's own services." If he does, he will deceive no one: "your attitude always comes through to the people no matter how clever you are, and you are discounted accordingly." But Mr. Mayer is unduly patronizing of the earlier efforts of district officers and others like Brigadier F. L. Brayne. What might they not have achieved if they could have devoted all their working time to such endeavours and had had the official and financial backing enjoyed by Mr. Mayer and his associates?

*The Heart of India* is journalism with a difference. It is a readable, amusing, yet penetrating pen picture of independent India, a tiny part of which is dissected by Mr. Mayer and his collaborators, an India of ancient splendours and squalor and village communities overlaid by democratic processes and socialistic planning.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**The Yellow Wind.** An excursion in and around Red China with a traveller in the Yellow Wind. By William Stevenson. Cassell, London. Pp. 368. Ill.; map. 30s. net.

This book tells a stark and disquieting story of Communist China. It appears that its author, William Stevenson, "was a Royal Navy fighter pilot during the War and developed his interest in Asia during service in the Far East. As Staff Correspondent for the *Toronto Star* he travelled extensively in Communist countries between 1948 and 1958, and was the first Western Correspondent allowed to travel independently in Red China in 1954."

In the spring of 1952, shortly after his return from Korea where he had represented the *Toronto Star* as War Correspondent, he was sent for by his chief. He was Mr. Harry Comfort Hindmarsh who is described by Mr. Stevenson as "a rugged individualist from Missouri who turned the *Toronto Star* and *Star Weekly* into highly successful and enormously wealthy newspaper properties."

Mr. Hindmarsh, after a reference to the theories of Pavlov on mental regimentation, put this question: "Suppose that Pavlov's theories could be applied to a quarter of humanity? . . . In many ways the Chinese might seem suited to this kind of regimentation. . . . Their leaders seem to have a new technique of terror followed by persuasion: something they call Indoctrination. It's a kind of substitution of brute reason for brute force. . . . They might have the underdogs of Asia, the Middle East and Africa within their reach."

In due course Mr. Hindmarsh gave Mr. Stevenson his instructions: "Just go back to Korea and take a look at those Chinese who refuse to be converted to Democracy. They've been Indoctrinated—that's what we're told. Just find out what the word means."

"And it was in this odd fashion," writes Mr. Stevenson in his Introduction, "that I became a traveller in the Yellow Wind blowing out of China. The prisoners in Korea led to other stories. . . . My base was Hong Kong. . . . From here I flew to places which once owned allegiance to the Dragon Throne. . . . Everywhere the tender trap of Chinese Communism seemed to be closing slowly, gently and irresistibly."

The book has a sub-title: "An excursion in and around Red China with a traveller in the Yellow Wind." This explains the form of the book. But the book reflects much more than an excursion. It is in fact a series of illuminating "close-ups" to reality at strategic points in the Far Eastern Communist scene.

In fulfilment of his instructions Mr. Stevenson makes a close study of Indoctrination with results which show that Mr. Hindmarsh's view went near the heart of things. He also analyses the influences behind the Chinese philosophy of Communism which he concludes is "fashioned out of Marx Lenin and Confucius." And he gives us a live picture of Mao Tse-tung. To many in the West Mao is a shadowy figure, not much more than a vague abstraction. Mr. Stevenson makes him as definite a figure as Stalin. It is true we haven't the intimate picture Stettinius drew of "Uncle Joe" at the Yalta Conference. But it is quite as clear in

relation to his interpretation of Communism and his independent contribution to its application. In an imaginative stroke the author compares Mao Tse-tung as he sits in the *once Forbidden City to the last of the great Imperial rulers, the Empress Dowager*. Mao stands out as ruthless a figure as Tzu Hsi in pursuit of which each of them stands and stood for.

In regard to the future a number of problems are discussed. One is that of how far China's industrial progress and ambition to take a place beside the great industrial nations will have to give way to the limitations imposed by the calls of food production for her increasing population. Another is whether national characteristics and native talent are not being stamped out to an extent which threatens China's future development. Wrapped up with these is the over-riding question as to whether the soul of China can survive. Perhaps "Old China Hands" are not quite the foolish optimists Mr. Stevenson seems to think them. If so they err in such good company as men like Dr. Leighton Stuart. Mr. Stevenson himself even appears to have twinges of doubt. "I wonder," he writes in a delightful and illuminating chapter on Peking barely two years ago, "if the trap could become so tender as to cease to be a trap at all. Would its designers mould it too carefully to the characteristics of their people? Could they unwittingly shape it into a mask instead, concealing behind its rigid features a prolongation of the past?"

But it has to be admitted that the iconoclasts have done their work too thoroughly to make the return to a way of life measurably characteristic of the Chinese people other than a slender hope. In the course of the shocking story the author tells in his chapter "Shanghai's Reign of Terror," he records as a generally accepted estimate that "some fifteen million Chinese had been killed one way and another in the first five years of the régime." This, of course, included many of those classes who were repositories of tradition and experience: scholars, landowners, industrialists and traders. Now time is of the essence. The sands are running out for the generations which grew up in pre-Communist China. Children are growing up who have known no other than the Communist régime. The best hope may lie with the tenacity of the women of the race.

*The Yellow Wind* is a book to read. It is well indexed and has an appreciable reference value.

P. H. B. KENT.

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**The Economic Growth of Hong Kong.** By Edward Szczepanik. Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1958. Pp. 186. Charts; tables; map. 25s.

It is difficult to avoid thinking about Hong Kong in terms of yet another corruption of the most widely used Orwellian dictum. The Hong Kong economy is, indeed, more unique than most, and for many reasons has a particular interest for students of Far Eastern affairs and of economic development. Some of its particular characteristics help to explain, and some make it difficult to understand how it has been so successful in adopting itself, in the short post-war period, to the radical changes that have taken place in its economic environment in recent years. This short volume—the text occupies only 144 pages—is yet another useful contribution by Mr. Szczepanik, Senior Lecturer in Economics in the University of Hong Kong, towards a fuller understanding of the factors underlying that achievement.

The book is, in part, analytic and is offered tentatively as a guide to the problems of economic development of more general application. It is, however, predominantly, and most successfully, descriptive. The author examines, in some detail, and with an eminently readable style, the colony's economic institutions, the role of government, the problems and consequences of the unprecedented growth of population and the limitations of its natural resources. There is a brief but clear summary of the changing pattern of Hong Kong's external trade, and the decline in the colony's traditional and most important source of income.

The third part of the book provides an account of the post-war "Industrial Revolution," covering the general background to industrial activity and the actual experience of each main sector between 1947 and 1956. The author is fortunate in

having such a workable unit to examine, for within a relatively brief span he can cover the salient features of the industrial scene and, by considering the trees, can give a very satisfactory account of the wood. Nevertheless, his success in conveying the essential dynamism of the economy, with its diversity and flexibility, is impressive.

Throughout the book there are references which demonstrate the author's pride in the achievements of the country of his present adoption. This enthusiasm has perhaps led him to over-emphasize the extent to which the forms and policies of Hong Kong could serve as a model for the rest of under-developed Asia. Clearly, there are important lessons to be learnt from any successful example. But the colony's remarkable post-war growth has been built upon the availability of abundant, hard-working labour, a plentiful supply of entrepreneurial talent, substantial and promising external and internal markets, and a capital inflow which, with large "invisible" earnings, has permitted a continuing excess of imports over exports amounting to about one-third of the national income. Indeed, compared with most of the under-developed world, Hong Kong has been generously endowed, and could well be an object of envy, regardless of its deficiencies of land and natural resources. That it has made such good use of its endowment may well reflect the high quality and perception of its government which recognized what was right for the colony, rather than the appropriateness of a particular type of economic policy for all circumstances of economic under-development.

T. D. Ross.

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**Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats.** The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China (1890-1952). By Paul A. Varg. Princeton University Press.

It is one of the strangest paradoxes of history that Voltaire in his wish to undermine the position of the established order in France should have chosen to describe the innate perfection of Chinese civilization and that much of his information should have been derived from priests who were sent to that country as missionaries.

Stranger still is the circumstance that the later Chinese reformers who heralded the end of the Manchu régime should have chosen to extol the advanced excellence of European civilization as a correction to their own shortcomings.

In *Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats*, Paul A. Varg, Associate Professor of History at Ohio State University, a student of American diplomatic relations, has examined the course of the American Protestant missionary crusade in China during the period 1832-1952. He has been assisted in his researches by the American Philosophical Society and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at Harvard University as well as by his own foundation.

He has tried to establish the relationship between the efforts and attitudes of missionaries and the development of U.S. policy in China; an extremely difficult task. The result is a scholarly and well-documented analysis of a question which although it now belongs to history still has an important bearing on the current situation in China. There can be recognized no real experts on Chinese affairs, American or European, past or present, but many China missionaries have been extremely prescient. For example, Bishop Charles Henry Fowler wrote in 1906:

"Her very numbers is God's promise of perpetuity. The yellow race will remain the menace of the world. It lies on the shore of Asia a vast club only waiting to be picked upon by some Hercules. China is the world's problem for the twentieth century and who will seize the club. It is a bear standing on the trail, his position does not change his nature. If Russia appropriates and assimilates China we are face to face with the most powerful Empire known among men. The world problem is this, Shall Russia be allowed to absorb China? This problem is full of Dragon's teeth, enough to seed down the world with century long strife."

It would have been surprising if, within the space of time with which this book is concerned, the missions in China could have succeeded in their task boldly described in the first chapter "The Evangelization of the World in this Generation."



After all, it took several centuries before Christianity consolidated its position in Europe. Also the task was made more difficult in these more recent times by the much greater number of interpretations of doctrine which have come to exist. It is none the less surprising that the Chinese people with their essential virtue and wisdom could have turned away from light into darkness. After all the emissaries of the Comintern and their converts amounted only to a few dozen in the late 'twenties. While Dr. Varg in his book does not explain this fatal lapse of judgment on the part of the Chinese his sincere and interesting work is a noteworthy contribution towards the understanding of the process.

A. H. S. C.

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**Buddhist' Cave Paintings at Tun-Huang.** By Basil Gray and John B. Vincent. Published by Faber and Faber, Ltd., at £6 6s.

Many people would like to own this delightful volume, but the ordinary individual, however interested in the Chinese arts, will be prevented from doing so by its price. Not that this is unreasonable, considering the quality of the manuscript and the beauty of the plates. Few people nowadays can set off for Tun-Huang, and from those who cannot a debt of gratitude is due to Basil Gray and to Mr. and Mrs. John B. Vincent for their indefatigable work in describing, photographing and bringing to London some ninety colour transparencies of the interiors of thirty-four different caves. The first of these paintings on silk and paper were brought to London by Sir Aurel Stein, and their presence here in the British Museum no doubt stimulated the research which is now represented in this volume.

Tun-Huang was most favourably situated on the land route from far Eastern China to Central Asia and India. A great entrepôt, it seemed to develop naturally as the home of this pictorial art. Financial help from great local families made the hollowing of the caves possible. It seems probable that only in such caves could the paintings have lasted so long. The existence of the Tun-Huang Institute gives hope that these gems of oriental art may be preserved for posterity.

It is impossible, in a review such as this, to particularize on the various coloured plates and beautifully clear photographs, but the reproductions of the painted vaults in caves No. 217 and 189 are startlingly beautiful. What carpet designs they would make!

In conclusion the art lovers' thanks are due to the authors whose work will give pleasure to many for years to come.

H. St. C. S.

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**Britain and the Arabs.** A Study of 50 Years, 1908-1958. By Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. Published by Hodder and Stoughton. 30s.

In his latest book, Sir John Glubb has taken the 50-year period from 1908 to 1958 to discuss the theme of British relations with the Arabs. These 50 years do indeed, as he says in his preface, constitute a well-marked period of history starting with the Turkish revolution of 1908, continuing into the era of British pre-eminence in the Middle East and ending with the loss of that pre-eminence in the 'fifties.

Sir John has already shown himself to be an engaging writer and he does not disappoint us now. Everything from his pen seems to come straight from the heart and he wins our respect not only for his knowledge but for his unaffected patriotism and his abundant sympathy with all manner of men, and especially, of course, with the simple Arab of the desert and the countryside. He tells a story remarkably well. A military campaign becomes alive and intelligible even to a layman under his handling. And he is eminently fair and objective in dealing with such controversial issues as the settlement of Syria after the first world war.

Two criticisms may perhaps legitimately be offered. In the first place it would have been a better book if Sir John had used his blue pencil more freely. He repeats his points so often that he is apt to end by wearying the reader. Conceivably he may have done so by design, remembering one of his themes about propaganda,

that to get a point across it must be repeated again and again. But what is right for the propagandist is not necessarily right for the author.

Secondly one could have wished that he had confined himself more rigidly to his theme and reserved the digressions for a separate volume. As it is, the book is so discursive, especially in the later pages, that in the end it becomes almost a series of essays on religion and politics. This is more than a single volume purporting to discuss Britain and the Arabs will stand.

His digressions will nevertheless have an admiring public, especially among those of his own generation who were brought up on Kipling and share his nostalgia for the simple enthusiasms of 1914. His great heroes are the empire-builders of the last century, and he cannot refrain from mentioning them by name. Those were the days when men were men, and as Sir John contemplates the world today he finds it very different. With almost the ring of an Old Testament prophet he denounces the drift and vacillation of successive British Governments in their handling of the Middle East, attributing it partly to shortcomings in the machinery of democratic government and partly to lack of spiritual inspiration. At times his strictures seem hardly fair. Why, for example, was so indignant about our concern for oil when he emphasizes over and over again that our whole interest in the Middle East flows from the need to keep the trade routes open for our commerce and industry? Is there something more "materialistic and selfish" in oil than in trade?

Sir John expresses so many views on so many subjects that it is impossible to do justice to them in a short review. Many are clearly wise and sensible, some perhaps not strikingly profound, on a few one may have greater doubts. Let one sole example be given. He suggests that village groups might be established in Arab countries and trained in guerrilla warfare in order to deal both with internal revolt and with raiders from outside. Raids from outside would be countered by similar raids across the aggressor's borders. Obviously, he adds, only a limited number of selected men of proved loyalty would receive such teaching. Sir John seems to have been thinking of his beloved Jordan when throwing out this idea. Yet even in Jordan it might not be easy to find the men of proved loyalty. Officers in that country, sometimes of high rank, seems to get arrested for treason with all too great frequency. Elsewhere the suggestion seems even more hazardous. Does one really want to encourage, say, Iraqis and Syrians to start guerrilla warfare against each other?

But it would be wrong to end on a carping note. Sir John Glubb has written a book from which all who are interested in the Middle East will receive great profit. Nor will anyone wish to quarrel with his "blue print" for regaining the friendship of the Arabs. It seems indeed to differ little from what British policy makers have long been trying to do, except that Sir John would support it with a far more intense propaganda. Whether it would succeed is another matter. The Arabs seem to have a way of rejecting even their best friends.

J. M. T.

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**St. Antony's Papers No. 4.** Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1. Chatto and Windus. 1958. Pp. 141. 16s.

This volume consists of seven miscellaneous papers produced under the auspices of St. Antony's College. They have one common factor, that they have to do with one aspect or another of the Middle East. For the most part they are addressed to the student rather than to the general reader, the chief exception being Mr. Albert Hourani's paper on the crisis of 1956.

For the rest Miss Ann Lambton discusses the influence of secret societies in the Persian revolution of 1905-6; Mr. Gabriel Baer contributes an interesting sidelight on the reforms introduced by the revolutionary government in Egypt—his subject is Waqf reform; Mr. M. T. Audsley has written an informative paper on Egyptian trade unions, without, however, attempting to discuss how the new legislation is working in practice; Mr. P. M. Holt expatiates on the limited value of the time-honoured sources of information on the Sudanese Mahdia and brings to light new sources to be explored by future historians; Mr. J. B. Kelly, in a paper of consider-

able current interest, sets out the background history of Britain's position in the Persian Gulf. This is a paper for the framers of policy as well as for the student. It may be commended to those who delight in offering advice as to the course Her Majesty's Government should pursue.

To return to Mr. Albert Hourani, his paper is the longest in the volume and a most interesting paper it is. The climate of British opinion at the time of the Suez crisis is well observed. "It was as if, at this moment, the real meaning of the loss of empire was felt, and felt with sorrow." There are challenging comments too on British relationship with the United States. "The whole purpose of the adventure (among those who had a purpose) was to assert the independent position of England vis-à-vis America." Mr. Hourani clearly believes that the action was for that very reason doomed to failure from the start. It was, he says, "an attempt to re-assert British strength as the final decisive factor in the Middle Eastern politics," and as such "a challenge to the essential interests of Russia and also of the United States." But Britain was no longer accepted as the master power in the Middle East. The conditions which had made the predominance accepted in the past had passed away. Indeed the Middle East is no longer the closed area of any one power's predominance, but once more an "open" area in which there is a limit to what each power can do. Britain seemingly has learnt that lesson. Mr. Hourani appears more doubtful whether it has yet been learnt by the United States Government. These are merely a few points, taken from a paper that provokes discussion on every page.

J. M. T.

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**The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-57.** By Fabian I. Qubain. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Series No. 6. University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Atlantic Books, London. Pp. 276; index. 35s.

When the old régime in Iraq was swept away last year, there were many to tell us of its shortcomings—its corruption, inefficiency, brutality, etc. Mr. Fabian Qubain's book will serve as a corrective and show that whatever its faults the old régime produced practical results in the economic and social fields unmatched in any other Arab state. In a few vivid pages he describes the foundations on which it had to build—a population 98 per cent. illiterate, formed of heterogeneous religions, linguistic, racial and tribal blocs, a land of which less than 5 per cent. was under cultivation, subject in turn to disastrous floods and droughts, its population and crops alike ravaged by disease, a country practically without schools, hospitals, industry, or all-weather roads. Forty years later Iraq was on the road to becoming a prosperous and progressive nation. Mr. Qubain describes how this was accomplished and how much still remained to be done.

His approach is admirably objective. He makes no extravagant claims but patiently discusses every aspect of Iraq's economic and social conditions, showing how the all too frequent Governments and the Development Board which was established in 1950 endeavoured to tackle the innumerable problems. It was, of course, the exploitation of oil and the revenues derived therefrom that made the Board's programmes possible. Yet money is only one of the necessary ingredients in carrying out a veritable transformation in a country and Mr. Qubain does not gloss over the human problems.

Among the many was that of how to protect development from the results of perpetual cabinet changes so that there might be some continuity of policy. The original arrangement, by which the Development Board was constituted as an autonomous agency, was perhaps more than any politically minded community could stand, and a change was made a few years later which went far towards destroying the Board's independence. Even so, development continued, and new programmes were introduced to keep pace with the ever-increasing proceeds from oil. One safeguard was the ready acceptance by the Iraqis of technical aid from abroad.

The story was far from complete when Mr. Qubain ended his book, and since then there has been the revolution resulting, among many other things, in the abolition of the Development Board and, if reports are true, the substitution of Russian

for much of the Western technical aid. In the foreword written after the revolution Mr. Strausz-Hupé, one of the editors of the series, remarks that regardless of the political complexion of the future régimes, Iraq's basic problems of development will remain the same. That is no doubt true. But the question one asks oneself is whether the new revolutionary régime will handle the problems as successfully as its predecessors. Should the programme collapse under the pressure of purges and other revolutionary exuberance, the last state of Iraq will be worse than the first. Well-wishers of Iraq will hope that sanity will somehow prevail, and those who knew the Iraq of the past will also hope that when the dust has settled the new generation of Iraqis will recognize how much they owe to the old leaders.

J. M. T.

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**Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership.** By Lord Birdwood, M.V.O. Cassell, London. Pp. 306. 30s.

Nuri as-Said is a big name in Middle East affairs, and anyone who has read anything about the Middle East since the nineteen-twenties must be aware of his pivotal position. His major role in helping Iraq to emerge as an independent country can not be in dispute. No small task, therefore, to undertake a study of such a man during 40 years of rapid change, and then be faced with an awkward choice because the subject is murdered just before the book is due.

It is fortunate that Lord Birdwood chose, not heavy recension, but only "to reorientate many phrases . . . in the knowledge of a final tragedy," and add two chapters. This gives the study of Nuri as the author came to know him and understand his role during his lifetime. His death produced no new data affecting the actual study. The dust must settle before the historian can see to work.

This book is easy to read, and should have wide appeal since the Pasha was one of the few strong and constantly recurring threads from the birth of modern Iraq. Also, many worthwhile facts, both old and new, are given.

The author has regarded the writing of campaigns and international negotiations as a necessary background to understand the man, as indeed it is. One could have wished, however, for quotations of the actual conversations with Nuri and corresponding pruning of the somewhat overlong abridgments of the Desert Campaign, the Peace Conference, etc., in Chapters II to VII. With various officers, both Arab and British, filling high posts in the loosely knit and divided Arab Command of 1916-18, it is not easy to pick out one man and show his due influence in Arab events, without being unfair to others. This has been done with considerable skill. On the other hand, the writing of the background of events tends to prevent the man's personality from breaking through.

The author tells us that Richard Casey suggested that "Nuri's approach to the Jewish problem was a 'blind spot' in the latter's usually measured judgement. . . ." If so, was it the only blind spot? Did Nuri really think that the relatively powerful Egypt would wait and play second fiddle whilst Iraq and Syria built up and orientated an Arab League? Also, would not pressure from the East have reacted upon Iraq before that from Egypt, if only for reasons of geography? In his strivings for Arab unity Nuri was honest and fair, and perhaps credited others with too much honesty and fairness.

By way of example in this study, the Pasha's political acumen is clearly brought out in his advice to Salih Jabr not to sign the Portsmouth Treaty 1948 too quickly before the Baghdad politicians had been brought into the picture. His advice ignored, the Treaty was violently attacked by the Opposition, and the Regent withdrew his support and repudiated the Treaty. The resulting confusion led to economic deterioration; it also brought the Pasha back to power for the tenth time, but Iraq had to wait another seven years for a new Treaty.

Nuri's great weakness seems to have been his failure to appreciate the enormous power of the radio. A regular listener himself, he slipped into the conviction that results, and long-term ones at that, spoke for themselves; not realizing that people have short memories and that "facts" reiterated on the wireless and left uncontradicted come to be believed. He was to a good extent "talked to his own doom."

For the essence of Nuri's nature, one can not do better than quote the author—"the Pasha's years of selfless endeavour"; and "Nuri was usually available to save the situation." If ever a man of power put country first and used all his great abilities and skill constantly to that end, it was Nuri.

The many footnotes are helpful and the index under "Nuri as-Said" is excellent. In the sources consulted, however, one wonders why the author used the abridgment, *Revolt in the Desert*, with eleven references to Nuri, rather than the full work, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, with at least twenty-nine references.

The author's opinions on many aspects of Iraqi affairs are thoughtful and open. Some are convincing, some not easy to judge; others one may just not agree with, but all merit respect for their honesty.

L. S. MORRIS.

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**The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire.** By Hassan Saab. Pp. xii + 322. Biblio. Djambatan, Amsterdam. £2 2s.

A very rambling book that goes back to pre-Islamic and Islamic times, not for a summary introduction but for rather detailed surveys that cover more than half the book. The substance of the book may be considered to be confined to pp. 142-280 or even less. From p. 283 to the end the space is covered by annexes and a general bibliography. It is a pity that in such a work there is no index.

Dr. Saab has no doubt read very widely, and it is obvious that he has taken immense pains to collect and marshal his material. His style is adapted to the subject matter, and on the whole smooth and graceful. There are, however, a few odd expressions, like "contiminator" (p. 167) which is not normally permissible English for the French *contingenteur*. Midhat Pasha, we are told, tried to "constitutionalize the Empire" (p. 185) and elsewhere (p. 200) we read of "the immediate particularistic effect. . . ."

A great deal of the material in this book is already known, but the author adds occasional if cursory reflections that enliven his account. Had he utilized original sources and relied less on secondary works whose authors likewise did not base their judgment on original sources, the author might have made a more valuable contribution to the subject of his book. As a lecturer at the American University of Beirut he is well-placed to undertake this arduous but well-rewarding task. He might have used in particular more evidence culled from contemporary Arabic periodicals and newspapers. He might have at least utilized to a much greater extent the published works of the pioneer of the literary and national revival.

Much as the gaps in Antonius are deplored by scholars, and no matter how strongly some may disagree with his emphasis (or sometimes lack of emphasis), his *Arab Awakening* remains the only coherent source in English on the early Arab national movement within the Ottoman Empire. Dr. Saab would have rendered a greater service if he had tried to fill in the gaps and to correct the emphasis in Antonius. The two books are, of course, not the same, but where they deal with the same subject there is no doubt as to which book is the more readable as an outcome of research or even as a literary essay.

The author's transliteration is haphazard such as *Ghassassina* (p. 1), *Boulak* (p. 14) and *Kahtania* (p. 255). There are some slips. For example, Gibb and Bowen are the authors, not the editors, of *Islamic Society and the West* (p. 13), and Sharif Husain was proclaimed caliph much later than his assumption of the title of "King of the Arabs" (p. 246). Furthermore, it is an exaggeration to say (p. 18) that from Muhammad to the twentieth century "public education throughout the Moslim (sic) world" meant first of all the acquisition of the capacity to read the Koran.

A. L. TIBAWI.

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**Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization.** Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp. Translated and edited with an introduction by Niyazi Berkes. London. 1959. Pp. 336. 35s.

There is much too little available to the Western student on Turkish nationalism and, for that matter, on the history of modern Turkey in general. There is still,

e.g., no definitive biography of Atatürk. After Atatürk the name of Ziya Gökalp is probably most widely known, but the same cannot be said of his writings. As a result, minor aspects of his thought have been overstressed. A good selected edition of his works is lacking even in Turkish. Professor Berkes has performed a great service in making this rich selection of Gökalp's writings available in a form which is a model for all collections of this kind. The translation flows smoothly. The volume is conveniently organized and free of pedantry. It is well indexed and relevantly annotated. A succinct essay on Gökalp's place in modern Turkish thought originally published by the author in the *Middle East Journal* in 1954 forms an introductory chapter. Not since Uriel Heyd's *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* appeared in 1950 has anything so useful been published on Gökalp. The present volume forms an excellent companion piece to Heyd's biographical and analytical work.

Reading the essays in this work, one is struck by the broad sweep of Gökalp's thought, by the deep and solid foundations in Eastern learning on which he based his ideas and by the great amount of Western learning and methodology he had absorbed by the time he reached his middle years. The example of Gökalp demonstrates how much more fortunate Turkey has been in the quality of her intellectual leaders than many other countries struggling to become modern nations.

There are passages in these essays which seem curiously naive and dated but, taken as a whole, what is surprising in them is not that some of the things Gökalp wrote in Diyarbakir nearly half a century ago should now be out of date, but that so many of them should still be relevant. It could do no harm if Gökalp were more widely read in Turkey today. Present-day young Turks, who see progress in terms of imitation of everything American, might do well to study Gökalp's assessment of the fundamental values of Turkish Islamic civilization and ponder his warnings against political and social experimentation that ignores the realities of historical inheritance and the true spirit of a people. The fact that most of what Gökalp had to say has a distinctly Turkish flavour does not render his ideas inapplicable to other countries which are experiencing political and social changes similar to those which Turkey has undergone.

One of the misconceptions about Gökalp which this volume should dispose of once and for all is the notion that he was a crusader for Pan-Turanism. Professor Berkes states in his preface that he was amazed to discover little of Gökalp's writing was devoted to this subject and these essays, representing the best of Gökalp's social and political thought, reveal little interest, except of a detached historical sort, in Turks beyond the bounds of the Ottoman Empire. Like Atatürk, Gökalp understood that the heart of the Turkish nation was now, and had to remain, in Anatolia.

American readers of this book will be surprised to discover that Gökalp, for all his knowledge of Western Europe, seems to have been practically unaware of the existence of America. This is ironic in view of the tremendous influence America has come to have on Turkey in the second half of the twentieth century. But it is perhaps indicative of the speed with which history has been moving in recent decades.

PAUL B. HENZE.

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**Rivers and Man.** By Robert Brittain. Published by Longmans. Pp. 288. Index; ill.; map. 21s.

This book tells how the great rivers of the Middle East have influenced the process of human evolution from the beginning of time up to the Middle Ages. The rivers of the story are chiefly the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Nile, but those of China, India, Europe and Central Asia are also frequently mentioned.

Beginning with a description of this planet as it was before life first appeared the author explains how rivers were formed and how primordial men had to live near the rivers because they "had no vessels in which they could store water or even carry it." Slowly they began to cultivate plants for food and then to build the first irrigation canals and to lift water from the rivers by the first machine, the "shaduf."

One of the more absorbing chapters explains how the responsibility of controlling the flow of rivers was one of the important duties of early rulers from the times when towns and cities were first established and when prosperity first depended upon irrigated crops. As an example the efforts of the great Assyrian King Sennacherib, who made his kingdom prosperous by means of irrigation works on the Tigris and its tributaries are described in interesting detail.

The influence of rivers and waterways upon ancient warfare is well illustrated by many instances including a description of how Cyrus captured Babylon by diverting the Euphrates away from the city walls and of how Cyrus's successor Xerxes crossed the Hellespont on a pair of floating bridges reconstructed after a storm had destroyed his first two. The superstition of the day is well illustrated by Xerxes "punishing" the Hellespont after the storm by whipping it with 300 lashes and branding it with hot irons. Before his army attempted the first crossing of the new bridges, however, he adopted a more conciliatory attitude and appeased the Hellespont by pouring wine into it from a golden goblet.

The development of trade routes along the great rivers of the East and the ancient sea-lanes of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf is described in different sections of the book. The descriptions include the early efforts to dig a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and it is explained how Darius, circa 500 B.C., was dissuaded by his engineers from completing (or repairing?) an old navigation canal from the Red Sea to one of the lower branches of the Nile because it was believed that the salt water of the Red Sea would flow by gravity into the Nile and ruin the irrigation water. No mention is made of the earlier canal which was traditionally started by Sesostris, a Pharaoh of the Twelfth Dynasty, who probably reigned some 1,800 or 1,900 years earlier.

An interesting section of the book, illustrated by clear sketches, describes the evolution of the various primitive mechanical contrivances by which water was raised from rivers or canals and by which corn was ground into flour. Most of these machines including the shaduf, saqiya, noria, and archimedian screw are still in everyday use in the East and never fail to fascinate outsiders, however well acquainted with these lands they may be.

The book is both interesting and absorbing and it could only have been written after much reading and study. The form of presentation, however, might have been improved by a better arrangement of the subject matter, and in view of the comprehensive title it might have been appropriate to have given more space to the rivers of China and India. Modern developments all over the world will no doubt be treated in the subsequent volumes which Dr. Brittain is understood to be planning. In one or two cases sweeping statements have crept in which are not likely to meet with general understanding or agreement as for instance the following sentence which occurs on page 265 on the subject of irrigation and flood control. "There are not many details . . . in the construction of waterworks which men did not discover before they had mechanical power. . . ." Better maps would have been of value to the more attentive reader. On the whole the book will make useful and informative background reading to anyone who is interested in the ancient story of the Middle East or in the history of irrigation development.

J. L. W.

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**Babylon.** By Albert Champdor. Translated from the French and adapted by Elsa Coult. London Elek Books. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Pp. 184 Index; ill. 30s.

To the uninitiated, the name Babylon brings to the mind a series of incidents gleaned mostly from the Bible stories of Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar and of such events as the burning fiery furnace, the lion's den and Belshazzar's feast. But the book of Daniel covers less than the lifetime of one man and it is therefore only a very small part of the history of the city of Babylon, which extends over a period of 1,500 years, and that of Mesopotamia which goes back in time a 1,000 years still further. This momentous period of history, which witnessed the very beginnings

of civilization, ended in 323 B.C. with the premature death of Alexander the Great, the last great ruler of Babylon. It is the history of this period of 2,500 years that M. Albert Champdor in his book *Babylon* so skilfully pieces together and tells with such admirable lucidity.

M. Champdor has obviously spent much time in diligent research into the complex sequence of Babylonian history. He vividly describes the dramatis personæ of conquerors and kings, their entrances and exits, their always dynamic personalities, their varying policies—some peaceful and constructive, others warlike and utterly destructive—their learning and laws, their religion and mythology.

The author writes in adequate detail and with an ease of manner which makes the book readily acceptable and interesting to the ordinary reader. He frequently weaves into his descriptions apt quotations from the Bible, from Josephus and from the contemporary cuneiform tablets, so adding authenticity and realism to the 2,000-year-old story. In the case of his description of the Hanging Gardens, however, he perpetuates, as do the Iraqi guides at Babylon itself, the fallacy that these gardens were situated in the north-east angle of the palace adjacent to the Ishtar Gate; in fact the most reliable authorities on this subject show that the ruins that exist on this site are those of the quarters for important prisoners of war and were used as such for the heir to the Jewish throne, Jehochin, and his court who were taken into captivity after the fall of Jerusalem in the sixth century B.C.

The book is illustrated with excellent photographs, chiefly of stone carvings and of clay tablets bearing cuneiform inscriptions of importance. It is a pity, however, that the author has not included any picture of Babylon as it now is; for in spite of what he implies, the ruins are more than mere rubble and mounds of earth and many of the walls, building and gates, such as the Gate of Ishtar with its superb bas-reliefs of lions and dragons, exist today in easily recognizable form. From such it is not difficult to imagine the splendour of Babylon in its days of glory.

So readable and so unstilted is the prose of this book that it is hard to believe that it is a translation. For this Miss Elsa Coult is to be congratulated.

No one who is interested in the history of this part of Asia should fail to read this book; for those who as yet have let the ancient history of Mesopotamia pass them by, they will find by way of introduction that *Babylon* is a book of stimulating and absorbing interest.

J. O.

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**Armed Diplomat.** By Brigadier J. V. Davidson-Houston. Published at 21s. by Robert Hale, Ltd.

Here is a volume which will capture the interest of anyone who wants information on the Russia of today. The author only left Russia late in 1957, and as your critic was in Moscow a very few months ago, it would appear that there has been very little change since the Brigadier's departure.

Considering the suspicion that falls on every foreigner, official or otherwise, it is surprising that so much of the country was covered. Knowledge of the Russian language is no passport to the goodwill of the provincial Russian, but is more inclined to engender suspicion in his mind. Not that the ordinary citizen is ill-disposed towards the foreigners, British or otherwise, but fear in large letters is in his mind.

The author's considerable travels in the country covered trips to the Black Sea, the Caspian, Tashkent, Lake Balkhash and Alma-Ata and north to Leningrad. When leaving, on transfer to China, he went through Kazan, capital of Kazakhstan, and over the weary tãiga and steppes through Peru and Sverdlovsk. The origin of such names are interesting. Perm used to be called Molotov—perhaps "Temp" would have been a better name! Sverdlovsk, which used to be Ekaterinaburg, was the site of the slaughter house of the Tsar and family. The author was refused a transit visa by the most direct route from Moscow through Ulan Bator in outer Mongolia, and he crossed the frontier at Manchuli into Manchuria.



The author's description of life in Moscow is an amusing and informative one. Life in the Russian capital would be difficult to support without a sense of humour and our military attache's never seemed to desert him. Under trying circumstances he always kept his flag flying, and when threatened with all sorts of penalties for doing things for which he had received official permission, his reply was to say that his tormentors would be reported on when he returned to Moscow. This was a very successful technique, as fear was always present in the mind of the official. Fear that he had been too lenient, and again fear that he had not exercised sufficient authority.

This is a valuable and readable book and will, I hope, give as much enjoyment to others as it has to me. A critic must not be all praise and it was surprising to read the author's use of the word Chinamen in referring to members of the celestial race. The Chinese say, "You do not call yourselves Englandmen, we are 'Chinese' and not 'Chinamen.'" Apart from this small complaint, I congratulate the author on having produced a very worth-while book.

H. Sr. C. S.

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**Smelling the Breezes.** A journey through the High Lebanon. By Ralph and Molly Izzard. Hodder and Stoughton. 8½" x 5½". 1959. Pp. 253. Map; 24 illustrations. 18s. net.

This is one of the most satisfying travel stories one could ever meet. Most of our readers have done a lot of camping in their time, but none can have combined so many of its delights all at once. Kashmir, Switzerland, mountains, jungles and forests, all have their particular fascinations, but none could possibly combine them so effectively. The Lebanon, only 50 miles by 150, combines complete daily changes of scenery, people and religions, easy or arduous travel, stimulating surroundings, historical and archæological background, and above all virile, friendly and hospitable inhabitants.

Ralph Izzard was the *Daily Mail's* audacious and competent newspaper man on the Everest Expedition. Molly had likewise a varied and competent background before marriage. Together, with four children (and their donkeys) they faced calculated risks which called for experienced travelling. So equipped, one wonders, Livingstone might not have needed a Stanley to dig him out. The whole set-up inspired immediate confidence and the kindest hospitality everywhere. "Elias," as factotum, friendly, efficient and knowledgeable, ensured the right kind of liaison throughout an area where he was known and liked.

As one would expect from a trained journalist, the pages are concise and easy to read, but one could wish that the height map, about 12 miles to the inch, was extensible for reference—that it marked the routes and names more distinctly and gave contours or height figures more clearly. 8,000 feet, even at this latitude, involves certain relevant problems.

The Lebanon has more concentrated interests and relics in its boundaries than possibly any other area in the world. It is of special interest to this reviewer, who attempted some such tour in trying to cycle from Port Said to Ostend in 1906. Under the Turks, the risks, to a very raw subaltern, were too great. The advice he got at Beirut, to "shoot first," shook him, and after an arduous climb over the "Theouprosopon" (Face of God), south of Tripoli, he thankfully hailed a fruit tramping steamer off Tripoli, which took him to Smyrna. Twenty-eight years later, travelling by bus from Aleppo to Beirut, he encountered exactly the same friendly uninhibited hospitality as the Izzards. The Tripoli headland had then been compassed by a road cut out of the rock, more comfortable, if less exciting.

Most Anglo-Saxons have a natural liking for Arabs of these parts, be they Druzes or Maronites or any other relics of the crusaders or the comings and goings of nomadic peoples over many centuries. Most of us, given a cosmopolitan outlook and perhaps a little Arabic, would enjoy a like journey in these parts, within perhaps, at any time, an hour of civilization, better than they could expect in any other country.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Elephant Kingdom.** By H. N. Marshall. Robert Hale. 1959. 8¼" × 5¼". Pp. 190. 21 illustrations; index. 18s. net.

This is a very illuminating and readable story of seven years as a Teak Wallah in the forests of North Siam, for the Borneo Company, Ltd.

To this reviewer the subject has great interest. Before the first war he had friends in the Bombay-Burma Corporation and Steele Brothers, who between them spent many years in similar adjoining teak jungles. The reader should note that the choosing of personnel for these exacting and lonely tasks, with all its risks and temptations, calls for very careful selection, on a par, in those days, with banking in China and certain other posts. If the recruit survived five years of these demanding tests, he was good enough for the highest posts in the Company. Few did. Too many succumbed to the personal temptations of lonely pioneers. The few survivors were worth the prizes then available.

The author was one of these. His forestry qualifications in Wales, Borneo and now in British Columbia point to a man who has chosen happily the life suited to him. He loved his elephants. Pity he can't train the grizzly bears to deal with log jams in Canada. But one would imagine elephants, bears and Western lumbermen are not yet really interchangeable.

One thing every reader will want to know is what is happening in Siam *now*. How are the Siamese replacing the white man? And how goes the present Company Balance Sheet? The same problem arises in tea, mining and other industries. What is the Asian doing to replace the irreplaceable? The Suez Canal makes one think.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Beds in the East.** By Anthony Burgess. Heinemann. 1959. 8" × 5½". Pp. 237. 15s. net.

This is a penetrating and amusing study of communal life in post-British Malaya. The outgoing Britons, especially Victor Crabbe's troubles in handing over to his Malayan Assistant as Chief Educational Officer, are a lively story. The theme follows the author's earlier successes *Time for a Tiger* and *The Enemy in the Blanket*, spotlighting the diverting social relations among Malays, Tamils from Jaffna, Chinese and other colonial relics. An atmosphere of elegy, farce and uninhibited studies of human frailty. Very intriguing light reading and a fascinating picture of the Malayan scene in 1959.

Though light and superficially superficial, the reader can glean much that is interesting on the social atmosphere of Malaya today.

G. M. ROUTH.

**The Kurds and their Country.** A History of the Kurdish People from the Earliest Times to the Present. By Major Sheikh A. Waheed. Lahore: University Book Agency, 2nd edition. 1958. Pp. 190. Sketch map. 6 Rupees.

This is a painstakingly compiled little book by an officer of the Pakistani Army, who appears to have been stationed in Iraq some time in the early 1950's (he is the author of an earlier book on the Shatt al-Arab) and to have made the acquaintance of the Kurds in their home-lands in the course of a tour with his wife on both sides of the Iraqi-Persian boundary.

There are chapters or sections, not all of equal merit, on Geography, Ancient History, the Middle Period from the Conversion of the Kurds to Islam to the close of the Eighteenth Century, the Recent Past, Religion, Language and Society, and finally, the Tribes. Those in which the author endeavours to trace the Kurdish thread through the tangled web of Western-Asian history in the Middle Period are perhaps the most interesting. Less satisfactory are those dealing with language and the unorthodox religious groups, and least of all the chapter on the Tribes

where, among other things, we are told: that "the famous Barzani Kurds live around Kirkuk . . . and are mostly Saiyids more educated and enlightened than the other Kurdish tribes"; that the principal market towns of the Hamawand, "an essentially nomadic type," are Mahabad and Riza'iya; and that "the majority of the Pizhdar live in Iran, thoroughly mixed with the Hamawand and the Hawraman sub-tribe."

Although, as one would expect from the son of a member of the old Political Department with a record of service in the North-West Frontier Province, the author conceived a deep understanding of and affection for "this great and brave . . . and magnificent people," he makes it clear that he has little sympathy with Kurdish nationalism, which he compares to "the Pathanistan stunt," and which he deplures, less as a movement unwelcome to the established governments of Turkey, Persia and Iraq, than as an outrage against the ideal whereby "distinctions of tribe, language and race would be drowned in the bigger and higher brotherhood of Islam."

C. J. E.

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**Khirbat al Mafjar.** An Arabian Mansion in the Jordan Valley. By R. W. Hamilton. With a Contribution by Dr. Oleg Grabar. Palestine Archaeological Museum. Clarendon Press. Oxford University Press. Pp. 350. Illus.—9 in colour. 8 guineas.

This is a very fine publication indeed, worthy of the Clarendon Press tradition and a credit both to the author and to the numerous other contributors. It is a full and complete record of an excavation project which lasted for twelve winter seasons, from 1936 to 1948, and of many more years' study and reconstruction work in the Palestine Museum.

The ruins of Khirbat Mafjar, which lie about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles due north of modern Jericho in the Jordan Valley, are the site of a palace or hunting-lodge, built by an anonymous Arab prince during the reign of the Caliph Hisham (A.D. 724-743). After being visited by F. J. Bliss of the Palestine Exploration Fund in the final years of the last century, they came increasingly to be used as a quarry for building materials. The appearance of rich architectural ornament soon drew attention to the importance of the ancient building whose ruins were gradually being dismantled in this way; but it was not until the early nineteen-thirties that the Department of Antiquities was able to take the site under its protection. Excavations were then undertaken which lasted until the end of the Palestine Mandate; and from then onwards work continued on the vast collection of architectural material brought to the Palestine Museum.

As for the presentation in this book of the architectural remains and their reconstruction, one cannot speak too highly of the skill and patience with which the abundant material has been treated. Adequate line-drawings, clear illustrations in halftone and colour and a lucid text, are what one would have expected from this author and his collaborators. But in this case all three are quite exceptional. Occasionally the ultimate intricacies of reconstruction have almost defeated the ingenuity and skill of so rare a draftsman as Mr. G. U. S. Corbett, as in Fig. 2, which does not, I think, perfectly explain itself. But the balance and clarity of his drawings generally come near to perfection, and those by the author himself deserve praise, particularly for the ingenious technique arrived at for the presentation of carved relief in stone and plaster.

SETON LLOYD.

**No Friends for Travellers.** By A. J. Wightman. Robert Hale, Ltd., London. 16s. net.

"Most people today," the publishers of this book tell us in an introductory note on its paper cover, ". . . enjoy crime stories of one kind or another." This time the topic is thugs, their terrible crimes and their extirpation. The author wrote his account because, after spending a period in India, partly as director of textiles in Bengal, partly as branch manager for a business firm in the East, he "decided to make a living out of books." The material for his present volume he gathered from the several earlier official reports and other books which have been written on the same subject.

Thug, or thag, is a term not uncommonly applied to any disreputable person by people who are ignorant of its true meaning. For their information it may be explained that the thugs were hereditary assassins whom the East India Company's officers, in the early part of the last century, found to be terrorising main lines of travel throughout large parts of India. They were bound together as a community by a solemn oath based on the rites of the ancient goddess Kali—the Black One, the Fierce, the Terrible, the Bloody Toothed. Touring about the country in groups large or small, they engaged unsuspecting travellers in friendly association and, when circumstances became favourable, suddenly and treacherously slipped a noose of twisted cotton fabric over each victim's neck, from behind, and by quickly tightening it caused instant death by strangulation. Each murder was supposed to be an act of worship to the goddess, and what was robbed from the dead body was taken as reward for the deed.

The practice is authoritatively supposed to have been a survival of human sacrifice, which was performed by certain indigenous Indian tribes in the far distant past, as it was elsewhere in the world.

Thuggee, or thagi, came to light in its true significance as a communal practice, rather than as mere common wayside robbery, through the accident of circumstances. Sepoys of the East India Company's army mysteriously disappeared on their way to or from leave. Consequential inquiries dragged out the fact of the fanatical murder brotherhood. As Mr. Wightman shows, in 1829 "the notorious approver Feringhia saved his miserable life by betraying all the secrets of the society to Colonel Sleeman. . . ." This officer, afterwards Sir W. H. Sleeman, was appointed in charge of operations to stamp out the evil. Lord William Bentinck, who became Governor-General in India in 1828, established himself, by his earnest support of the campaign, as sharing with Sleeman the credit for its extirpation, a process which took more than ten years.

Mr. Wightman gives realistic descriptions of the blood curdling atrocities of the thagi confraternity and pays high tribute to the great perspicacity, courage and energy with which Sleeman pursued his task—a task which so exhausted him that it was almost certainly a prime cause of his premature death immediately after he had brought it to completion.

A. H. B.

**India and Modern Art.** By W. G. Archer. George Allen and Unwin, London. Pp. 143; 61 plates, index. 35s. net.

This is but the latest of several books which Mr. Archer has written about different aspects of Indian art. The field is wide and to find any more interesting would be difficult. The peoples of India have for centuries shown a genius for painting and sculpture. Their good taste and skill in both directions have always enjoyed high renown. Unfortunately, the climate and insect population of India have destroyed most of the country's ancient paintings on cotton and linen fabrics or paper. From today's viewpoint it is sheer good luck that in ancient times heartening patronage was extended to fresco and tempera painting, of which brilliant examples were executed in the famous caves of Ajanta and in other places where conditions ensured long life. Artists today appreciate that those olden achievements were the culmination of hundreds of still earlier years of cultivation and practice.

Sir John Marshall, out of his unrivalled archæological and artistic knowledge in India, has told us that the school from which the paintings at Ajanta and those at Bagh, in Gwalior, represent was the source and fountain head from which half the art of Asia drew its inspiration. He approvingly quoted from Signor A. Cecconi, whom he mentioned as probably the greatest living authority on Italian fresco painting, that "they will bear comparison with the best that Europe could produce down to the time of Michelangelo."

The peoples of different parts of India practised their art in several different styles. One may hazard the guess that the variations sprang partly from local circumstances but also in part from contacts with the outside world. Sailors and other travellers ventured far and wide over the seas from the numerous ports along the thousands of miles of the Indian coastline. Indian merchants and others journeyed far westward of the Indian westward land frontier. And Indian painters, like those of other countries, readily borrowed from outside what suited their purpose. The Mahomedan Emperors of India introduced into India strong Persian artistic influence. A little later, European influence was introduced by Jesuit missionaries and gained attention through the Moghul Court's appreciation of it.

Mr. Archer gives an admiring review of the ups and downs and changing style of Indian painting in modern times and shows how French example and teaching and the "modernism" of British painters have played significant parts. By way of illustration, he cites the work of several recent Indian painters and gives sixty admirably reproduced black and white plates of their achievements. Thus, under the heading "Art and the Unconscious," he discusses in a 30-page chapter, plus plates, the work of Rabindranath Tagore, which he notes as the "first modern art to be produced in India." Rabindranath had, we read, reached by 1927 a self confidence which enabled him to say that no Indian mode of expression in painting impressed him as relevant to modern needs. He grew to think of form as essentially unbeautiful. "The shapes which fascinated him were grotesque . . . the most powerful were also the most terrifying, the very reverse of what was conventionally regarded as graceful. . . . Even nature struck him as a monster or animal. . . ." His modernism along such lines won him the highest praise in London, Paris, Berlin. Says Mr. Archer, his "paintings had for Indian art the same kind of revolutionary and vitalizing function as Henry Moore's sculpture has had for English." Which reminds one that Moore in his "The Three Graces," one of his best-known works, showed each of the Graces with one eye in the middle of her forehead instead of with two eyes.

Not all Mr. Archer's readers will join in his approval of his latest trend in India. Some will be as critical as the late Sir Alfred Munnings was of similar fancies by British painters. But that others will as heartily agree is certain. Hence, his review is valuable as a faithful account of what is going on in at least some sections of Indian artistry.

A. H. B.

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**Classical Sinhalese Sculpture.** c. 300 B.C. to A.D. 1,000. By D. T. Devendra. Alec Tiranti, Ltd., London. 1958. Pp. 48, 128 plates, index. 30s. net.

This small volume of 48 pp. letterpress and 43 other pages containing 129 admirably reproduced illustrations deserves a special welcome, for it belongs to a class not only highly interesting but of international value. The British Government, in order to develop better understanding and appreciation of this country abroad, are spending huge sums in facilitating the oversea publication of books telling of British history, life and policy. But to increase international acquaintance and friendship needs mutual exchanges of the kind and in no case is this more desirable or important than between Britain on the one hand and India and Ceylon on the other. Now that Britain has handed on to those two countries that imperium, meaning complete independence and freedom from external interference, which has since the days of the earliest Britons been her own pride and her instinctive gift to every other country which has even technically come into colonial relationship with her, the link formerly provided by British men and women in the public services of Indian and Ceylon no longer obtains.

Mr. Devendra, for some time Assistant Archaeological Commissioner (Publications) in Ceylon, provides a lively description and pictorial review of the still visible symbols of the grand civilization and culture which gradually developed in that famous island after the arrival there of the Indian Prince Vijaya and his followers 2,500 years ago. The Sinhalese of today claim descent from those immigrants, and it is about recent archaeological discoveries of their achievements, primarily in Anuradapura, the former great metropolis of Ceylon, but also widely scattered about the country, that his book tells us.

The abundant sculptures, the architectural materials and triumphs and the inspiration which they reflect are all skilfully brought before us in the story. The Sinhalese, as he shows, had a passion for stone and their sculptors' pivotal theme was the Buddha image. There is a tradition in Ceylon that the first sculpture of Buddha ever made was produced there. Some of its statues of the great teacher are monumental in size, the tallest of them being between 40 and 50 feet high. Many others are large, but none equally so. The beauty of the craftsmanship in these ancient trophies reminds one of the magnificent specimens of the art revealed in the impressive Indian art and sculpture exhibition held at the Royal Academy in London a few years ago.

Mr. Devendra discusses their style and the peculiarities of their special features and draws interesting comparisons between them and their opposite numbers in India. He notes, for instance, how the conservatism of design in Sinhalese sculpture contrasts with the variety in the Indian. The collection of perfectly reproduced photographs in his book, which were taken for him by more than one expert friend of his, show in their faces an unmistakable likeness to the people of the country, but he points out that a close scrutiny of the figures "reveals surprising differences in the sculptors' methods of treatment of robe, face, eyes, mouth, sole, hands, fingers and those several details which are, so to say, the special stamp of each worker." He appreciates the careful avoidance of anything lascivious in the nude figures and exemplifies this sense of propriety by pointing out that in the photograph of a statue of two people entitled *The Lovers* "noteworthy is the almost induced modesty of dress in the woman."

In ancient Britain the language of culture was Greek—and in those days, when Roman legions were trampling over most of her continental neighbours, Britain was the focal centre of European culture. During the subsequent long Roman occupation of Britain the intellectual link with Greece became a tradition which continued until our own times. Research has now carried the relationship beyond Greece to Sumer, as the southern part of Mesopotamia was called, where several thousand years ago there prevailed a civilization so high, progressive and enduring that its laws, literature and thought spread throughout Babylon, Assyria, Asia Minor, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Sir Leonard Woolley, in his "*The Sumerians*," tells us that "from the Sumerians the Hebrews derived the ideals of social life and justice which informed all their history and have by Christian races been regarded, in theory if not in practice, as criteria for their own customs and enactments."

But he approvingly quotes the Sumerian tradition cited by Berossus, priest-historian of the fourth or third century B.C., that a race of monsters, led by one Oannes, arose out of the Persian Gulf, and, settling in Sumer, introduced there the arts of writing, agriculture and metal working. "In a word," wrote Berossus, "all the things that make for the amelioration of life were bequeathed to men by Oannes." The sailors who traversed the seas of that part of the world in those ancient days were the sea-going people of India. They carried passengers and trade between India and Sumer and Babylon even as they took Vijaya and his people to Ceylon. It is today claimed in India that the source from which Oannes conveyed the way of progress to Sumer was the home of what is now roughly called the ancient "*Indus Civilization*." Mohenjo Daro was its great metropolis. Ancient Anuradhapura in Ceylon is similar. During more than 30 years which the writer of these lines spent in India and Ceylon no visible work of human hands struck him as more impressive than these two cities or, from the viewpoint of our own civilization, more significant.

A. H. B.

**Nehru: A Political Biography.** By Michael Brecher. Oxford University Press. 42s.

**Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947-1955.** By Dr. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta. Djambatan, Amsterdam. 35s.

**The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations.** By Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi. Oxford University Press. 30s.

The fullest biographies of Jawaharlal Nehru, like those of his fellow-Harrovian, Sir Winston Churchill, have so far been by himself. Dr. Michael Brecher of McGill University, where he is Associate Professor of Political Science, has now written a valuable life of a great nationalist who, like General Smuts, has understood Britain better for resisting her rule and may be acclaimed with him as one of the greatest Commonwealth statesmen. Dr. Brecher records that Sri Nehru, like General Smuts and like Mr. Holland of New Zealand, to whom the phrase is attributed, realize that "membership in the Commonwealth meant independence plus, not independence minus" (Nehru to the author in London, October, 1955).

Nehru's life has been given single-mindedly to political struggle. Why then "A Political Biography"? What Dr. Brecher has written is the story of a career and a summary of the times it helped to shape. It is the times which emerge the more vividly from an array of interesting detail marshalled with scholarship and lucidly presented.

At times Dr. Brecher appears too uncritical of criticism lightly made of imperial rule—too uncritical also of those myths so essential to insurgent nationalism and recent independence. It was not merely "some Indian officers" who were horrified at the indulgent treatment of I.N.A. leaders responsible for the death and torture of comrades in captivity. Dr. Brecher writes of Major-General Shah Nawaz as though he were a general officer of the Indian Army. He also errs in stating that Sir Evan Jenkins was the "only person to sense disaster in the Punjab." Your reviewer has seen official reports which show that warning was given of grave communal disturbances. If it were true that the last Governor of undivided Punjab had been so exceptionally percipient, he might have given more realistic counsel to his Ministers. Once it was clear that the British arbitrator was withdrawing his power there was no future for the Unionist *Raj* in the Punjab and everything possible should have been done to achieve agreement between the Muslim League and the Sikhs. This which might have prevented the present unhappy division of the Province between two sovereign states.

\* "Dr. Brecher again errs in saying that Sir Francis Tuker was 'G.O.C. in eastern India' in the disturbances of 1942, whereas throughout the years 1942 and 1943 he was commanding the 4th Indian Division in the Middle East.

In general, however, Dr. Brecher is a trustworthy authority. India's decision, and the Commonwealth's, that she should be a republic within the family is a tale here well told. As one might expect from an erudite Canadian, Sri Nehru's diplomacy of detachment from Great Power politics is judicially examined. The notion of "an area of peace" is only possible because an attack upon India would be an attack upon the Commonwealth and would presumably invoke American retaliation. Yet it is a policy which has provided constructive as well as negative, and what India professes today might be Commonwealth policy tomorrow.

Many of the facts of the transfer of power in the Indian Empire and the relations of the two successor nations are competently but somewhat aridly presented by Dr. Jyoti Gupta. Superficially objective, his book in fact gives, as one would expect, the Indian side of the disputes over canal waters, Hyderabad and Kashmir which so unhappily poisoned the relations of two Commonwealth republics who need to work together for the safety of their sub-continent.

India's foreign policy as put forward at the United Nations Organization is the subject of Mr. Berkes' and Mr. Bedi's study. Their collection of facts is useful but their book suffers from too many demoralizing observations.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

\* The author and publishers have since regretted this error and a correction has now been made in the reprint.—*The Times*, 19 November, 1959.—EDITOR.

**The Message of Milarepa.** By Humphrey Clarke. Wisdom of the East Series. John Murray. Pp. 104. 8s. 6d. net.

These "poems" are translated from the *Tibetan* by Sir Humphrey Clarke, many of them for the first time, and they give a distinctive Tibetan background to the Buddhist advices.

Milarepa is the St. Francis of Tibet: and as the preface puts it, the sage learnt compassion from knowledge, and the saint wisdom through love, typifying the Buddhist and the Christian approach respectively.

Milarepa's story is a household legend in Tibet; an orphan, robbed by a wicked uncle, he ran away, and after learning Black Magic from a Bon sorcerer, successfully called down hailstorms and disaster on his uncle, then repented of his revenge, and set out like Buddha to find the truth, becoming first the disciplined disciple, and then the successor of the great teacher Marpa. Marpa had introduced the Naropa ritualist system of Buddhism to Tibet, where its yogi principles of superhuman power, with spells and incantations and raising of spirits, appealed to the Tibetans with the demonology of their primitive Bon worship, so that it spread rapidly.

The poems are translated literally, without rhythm, and there are some distinctive and charming Tibetan touches, as the poem describing the conversion of the hound Red Lightning.

When the hound follows the hunted stag which has taken refuge in Milarepa's cave, he is charmed by Milarepa's song, and the sage is teaching them both the six doctrines when the astonished hunter Gonpodorje turns up to find the animals lying on either side of the sage, and is himself converted and becomes a disciple.

Asceticism is a voluntary matter to the Buddhist monk, and included in "Occasional Wisdom" Milarepa's commentary, also typically Tibetan, is delightfully recorded.

At first a wife is a goddess wreathed in smiles  
 and her husband never tires of gazing at her face.  
 She soon becomes a fiend with corpse-like eyes;  
 if he cast a reproach at her she gives two in return;  
 if he takes her by the hair she has him by the leg;  
 if he strikes her with a stick she beats him with a ladle.  
 In the end she becomes a toothless old hag  
 and her fiendish look of anger preys upon the mind.  
 I have renounced such a devilish scold  
 and I do not want a maiden bride.

**Hinduism.** By Swami Nikhilananda. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 189. 16s. net.

One of the World Perspective Series, this gives what the author claims in his foreword: "a lively account of Hinduism in its actual and practical aspects."

The Swami as Director of the Ramakrishna Vivekananda centre in America is a qualified, and actually a most lucid, exponent of Indian mysticism and philosophical speculation.

His consideration of the Hindu expression of non-dualism as India's most important contribution to world culture is endorsed by his book, and though the metaphysical clouds enveloping the Indian dialectic are almost impenetrable to the West, as the tortuous winding of the Indian mind is almost indescribable, the background of modern Indian history from Gandhi to Nehru endorses his finding, as indeed does the life pattern of any prosperous Calcutta babu, retiring from British pattern business at the birth of his first grandchild to seclusion in his garden house, in his Calcutta backyard, accompanied by his yogi.

The non-dualism of the Hindu parallels the non-attachment of the Buddhist, and though the rigid Hindu social structure, caste system, custom and religious ritual is responsible for much of the injustice and selfishness in Hindu society, the author



points out that to lay the blame of these conditions on the teachings of the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita is like putting the responsibility on Christ's teaching for what he calls the "lack of humanity and consideration for others' rights apparent in avowedly Christian nations."

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**Tao Tê Ching.** A translation by Ch'u Ta-Kao. George Allen and Unwin. 1959. Pp. 95. 10s. 6d.

No one is absolutely certain that the *Tao Tê Ching* was written by Lao Tze, but there can be no doubt that he was the source of the remarkable ideas expressed by it. This most Chinese of all the sages who died so long ago, considered his life a failure as did Confucius. It is permissible to wonder some 2,500 years later what he would think, if he were in a position to know of this edition of his work. It might surprise him greatly to discover that a Chinese scholar exiled among Western Barbarians could bring out a first edition in 1937 and now publish a fifth edition. However, he was confident, and with reason, of the eternal nature of the "noumenon" which he described.

It is doubtless the feeling that we are treading close to a mystery and an inner world of Reality beyond the perception of the senses and even Space and Time that is responsible for the spell cast by the description of the "Way and its Power."

The best soldier is not soldierly  
 The best fighter is not ferocious  
 The best conquer but do not take part in war  
 The best employer of men keeps himself below them  
 This is called the virtue of not contending  
 This is called the ability of using men  
 This is called the supremacy of consorting with heaven.

The introduction by Dr. Giles is of particular interest, and he is happy in his choice of a simile which describes the *Tao Tê Ching* in astrophysical terms as the "White Dwarf" of philosophical literature.

A. H. S. C.

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**Lu Hsün and the New Culture Movement in China.** By Dr. Hang Sung K'ang. Djambatan, Amsterdam. 1957. Pp. 158.

Dr. Huang Sung K'ang has written a readable and informative account of the life and works of an author who for obvious reasons is in the highest favour in the New China.

Lu Hsün was probably the leading figure in the New Culture Movement which was a part of the ferment of ideas produced by the impact of Western thought on the old China which resulted in the fall of the Manchu Dynasty.

Not much has, as yet, been written in an accessible form about this subject and it is quite useful to be able to learn more about the pressures of intellectual adaptation which led to such sweeping changes and reforms in China and also to the ascendancy of Marxist thinking among important groups of intellectuals. Never has a more resplendent literary and cultural tradition been abandoned in good faith for a less prepossessing alternative.

What is so regrettable about this process is that results of the changes of outlook have proved so unworthy of the causes which these intellectual radicals imagined they were serving. Lu Hsün himself was well intentioned and terribly moved by the innate worth and sad lot of China's peasantry. A most gifted author to whom

could be attributed the evolution of a new style, he will always be remembered for the pathetic yet immortal figure of Ah Q whom he created.

The fact would never be admitted by the learned author of this book that if Lu Hsün were alive today he would probably not be in such high favour since his feelings of compassion for Ah Q would be even greater.

There is an introduction by Professor Pulleyblank of Cambridge University.

A. H. S. C.

**Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927.** By Conrad Brandt. Harvard University Press and O.U.P. 1958. Pp. 224. Index and bibliography. 25s.

Today is it not remembered often enough that the failure of the Comintern in China just after it had similarly failed in Germany spelt the beginning of the Stalin era of "Revolution in one Country."

With the abandonment of the concept of "World Revolution" as advocated by Trotsky the stage was set for the all-out development of the U.S.S.R. as the crucible of Communist arms and the pattern for the China which is now developing.

In his approach to a fairly detailed analysis of the complex political processes which led to the interlude during which Chiang Kai-shek attempted to build a nation and himself failed, the author has provided an accurate and noteworthy contribution to that little-known but most important period of recent history. Sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Russian Research Centre and the "Research Program in Chinese Economics and Political Studies" of Harvard University, it is a typical product of the scrupulous scholarship of works belonging to that region of effort.

It is no easy task to treat these complexities; however, armed with the Trotsky archives and authoritative information provided by the exiled Chang Ku t'ao, an actor in the drama of the nineteen twenties, Mr. Brandt has been extremely suggestive in his appreciation of the contributions made by such Soviet emissaries as Pavel Mif, Borodin Voitinski, Maring, M. N. Roy and others.

He is at his best when describing the extraordinary dogmatic inflexibility which led Stalin to a series of miscalculations well apparent to his subordinates in China which, owing to their lack of discretionary powers, they were unable to arrest.

"Mao must have seen no less clearly than did those around him that Stalin's policy in China would presently defeat itself. The leading Communists in Wuhan, Chinese and Russian, had for some time been losing faith in the Kremlin's wisdom. Forebodings of catastrophe had permitted the proposal to pull the party out of Wuhan and escape north-westwards. Now that such thoughts of escape had been ruled unorthodox, the only hope for survival lay in skilled procrastination, but Stalin's wire of June 1 demanded just the opposite, the forcing of a test of strength with the Wuhan Government.

When Borodin received the wire he convened a meeting between the Chinese party chiefs and the Soviet Mission. The new instructions he explained were obviously ludicrous but one could hardly tear them up, one could only shelve them. The party dignitaries nodded their approval and went to tell their fellow leaders what had been decided. . . ."

Small wonder that Borodin should say, with Chiang Kai-shek in mind, after his own disgrace and exile, "When the next Chinese general comes to Moscow and shouts 'Hail the World Revolution' better send at once for the G.P.U."

His disillusionment was undoubtedly shared by Mao in his caverns in Yen-an where the concept of World Revolution was obliged to seek cold storage.

There is an excellent bibliography and exhaustive footnote material to the chapters.

A. H. S. C.

**The Wisdom of Lao Tse.** Pp. 237. 21s.

**The Wisdom of Confucius.** Translated and edited by Lin Yutang. Michael Joseph, 1958. Pp. 302. 21s.

Lin Yutang is so well known as a most gifted interpreter of the philosophies and mannerisms of his race that comment seems superfluous.

Written in his extremely engaging style and conceived on more ambitious lines than those of his previous expositions of the thought of these two primary figures in Chinese history contained in his earlier work, *The Wisdom of China and India*, the author here gives us a ready means of access to some of the most important and profound observations on life ever written.

It may be thought that, belonging as they do to the remote ages, and out of touch with, indeed diametrically opposed to, Chinese thought as it is allowed to be expressed today that they are hardly of topical interest. The reverse is true. When a country behaves in a manner utterly unlike itself it is as well closely to study the ancient well-springs of philosophy which have moulded its life and being through the centuries. In this Lin Yutang greatly assists by these two eminently readable studies.

In both, there is an adequate portrait of the sage himself and very ably compiled texts by which their ideas are communicated. The reader who has at times been obliged to use other translations has often deplored the nature, style and arrangement of the footnotes and commentaries which tend to be out of harmony with the spirit and the epigrammatic glories of the ancient idiom of China. This fault is here avoided by the learned translator and the result has been the preservation of the balance and symmetry of the language without such dissonance.

In the light of present events it is interesting to be reminded of Lao Tse's "Rhythm of Life."

" He who is to be made to dwindle in power  
Must first be caused to expand  
He who is to be weakened  
Must first be made strong  
He who is to be laid low  
Must first be exalted to power  
He who is to be taken away from  
Must first be given  
This is the Subtle Light  
Gentleness overcomes strength  
Fish should be left in the deep pool  
And sharp weapons of the State should be left where  
none can see them."

In the exposition of the Confucian Ethic which is displayed in the *Wisdom of Confucius* there is reassurance to be found in the feeling of the eternity and the truth of the immortal message of this truly great soul.

Tseking asked Confucius "What would you say if all the people of the village like a person?" "That is not enough," replied Confucius. "What would you say if all the people of the village dislike a person." "That is not enough," said Confucius. "It is better when the good people of the village like him and the bad people of the village dislike him." (When you are disliked by a bad person you are a good person).

A. H. S. C.

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**Accounts of Western Nations in the History of the Northern Chou Dynasty.**

Translated and annotated by Roy Andrew Miller. University of California Press. 1959. Pp. 84.

This work is the sixth in the Chinese Dynastic Histories translation series of the

East Asia Studies issued by the Institute of International Studies of the University of California.

It is likely to be of interest to the students of Chinese history who would wish to gain an impression of Chinese views on their neighbours expressed in the idiom of the sixth century A.D. The text is a series of extracts from chapter 50 of the *Chou Shu*, the official History of the Northern Chou Dynasty (A.D. 557-581) written by a number of authors and compiled by Ling-hu Te fen; it was presented to the throne in 636.

The countries are taken serially in terms of distance from Ch'ang-an, the capital of the period, stretching across Central Asia and into Persia. These were the countries of Kao-ch'ang (Turfan), Chan-shan (Kroraimna), Yen-chi (Qarashahr), Cu'u-tz'u (Kucha), Yü-t'ien (Khotan), Ya-ta (The Ephthalites), Su-t'e (Sogdiana), An-hsi (Bukhara), Po-Ssu (Persia).

The chapter also contained material on the Eastern Turks (T'u chueh) and the T'u yü Lun but they have been omitted.

It is stimulating to be given in these modern times an account for example of the appointments in the civil service of ancient Turfan. In spite of titles such as "Establisher of Martial Spirit," "Terror of the Remote," "Pacifier of the Billows" there is quite an air of modernity about this government with its cabinet of eight senior officials of the Board of Personnel, the Board of Sacrifice, the Board of the Treasury, the Board of Establishments, the Board of Entertainment of Guests, the Board of Rites, the Board of Population, and the Board of War.

Besides administration, the Chinese students of political science of the day were plainly also interested in resources. In the survey of Persia there is mention of ivory, lions, ostrich eggs, genuine pearls, mock pearls, glass, coral, amber, ceramic glazes and many other commodities calculated to appeal to the trading interests of the merchants of the time.

And then there is their compelling description of the eternal desert in Shan-shan, "Northward of Chü mo these are shifting sands for many hundreds of li. On summer days there is a hot wind which is disastrous for travellers. Only the old camels know that the wind is about to strike, then, crying and huddling together, they stand, burying their mouths and noses in the sand. Whenever this happens the men recognize it as a sign and themselves take felt and press it over their noses and mouths to cover them up. This wind is swift, but after a while it is completely calm. Still, those who do not take precautions soon come to grief and perish. . . ."

There are excellent footnotes, a comprehensive bibliography and the Chinese text is included. The map is perhaps a little too diagrammatic but frontiers were doubtless as indefinite to the Chinese then as they are today.

A. H. S. C.

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**Documents on International Affairs, 1956.** Selected, edited and introduced by Noble Frankland. Oxford University Press; issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pp. 768. 84s.

For anyone who deals primarily with Asia, 1956 is the Suez year. But for those who prefer to look at world affairs as a whole, it is also the year of Mr. Kruschev's Nijinsky-like leap to the front of the stage with his attack on the personal cult whereby Stalin had been deified. It was a year in which, momentarily, the lid of the communist pot was lifted and the world given a glimpse of human minds simmering away inside. Towards its end, thought in the satellite countries so far out-paced Soviet thought as to lead to the revolt in Hungary.

But for Asian preoccupation with the Suez crisis, the Hungarian affair would no doubt have had a more immediate impact than it did on the underdeveloped world that the Soviets were wooing. As things were, this impact was gradual, whereas that of Suez was immediate. It is only human to feel more deeply about experiences one has shared than about distant cataclysms, however tragic. Mr. Nehru's reactions, as here revealed, are therefore typical of much of the continent with which this journal is concerned. At the outset, he is scandalized and distressed

by Britain's "reversion to past colonial methods" in order to change a régime, and merely "much concerned" at events in Hungary. He saw the two situations as quite different, and says so. But as the weeks go by and he discusses the matter with Indian and Colombo plan colleagues, he begins to change his view. Both are transgressions—"interventions by great powers against weaker countries." But, despite pressure, he does not change it absolutely; India votes for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt but not from Hungary. The difference is symptomatic of Asia's much greater sensitivity to manhandling by bad old ghosts than by brash new thugs.

The saddest fact about 1956 is that no one comes well out of its ordeals. Britain loses Asian esteem; it is also forced by the exigencies of the Baghdad Pact into applying one set of arguments to sales of arms for Arabs, and a conflicting set to sale of arms for Jews; it upsets its N.A.T.O. allies and jettisons its right to "reactivate" a base at Suez that had taken it years to negotiate. The United Nations and United States are heroes in Egypt but impotent chatterboxes in Hungary. Soviet Russia is ordering its troops to rake the streets of a foreign capital with gunfire from one room in the Kremlin, while drafting sanctimonious reproofs about Anglo-French bombing from another. France mars good work in Morocco and Tunisia by its conduct in the Ben Bella affair. In spite of nuclear stalemate, no one is in the mood to recapture the so-called "Geneva spirit" of the year before. The success story of the year is singlehanded Egyptian operation of the Suez Canal.

Who uses these Chatham House volumes? They are growing heavier and dearer. Yet they are irreplaceable in any scholastic library, public or private, that lies outside a capital city and has not access to the diplomatic and parliamentary records from which they are drawn. They include useful footnotes to other material bearing on the points covered, and they are splendidly cross-referenced. They used to be issued as a matching volume to each year's Survey of International Affairs. Now, they are coming out some years ahead of that series, and their editor, Dr. Noble Frankland, has done well to introduce each topic, and put it into its context, with a few incisive pages of fact and his own comment. These are good, and greatly help to illuminate and justify his selections.

Some of the documents he had to choose are dull reading, but others are intensely human. A Nagy press conference in Budapest on October 31 carries all the staccato agitation of that day; the unusual, slangy jollity of the language chosen by Nasser for the speech, toward the end of which he nationalized the Suez Canal, also carries its message of excitement at the discarding of shackles. "Documents" is a dull name for words that are often the reverse of dull.

ELIZABETH MONROE.

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**Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines** or *Seven Books of Wisdom of the Great Path* according to the late Lāma Kazi Dawa-Samdup's English rendering. Arranged and edited with Introductions and Annotations to serve as a commentary, by W. Y. Evans-Wentz. With forward by Dr. R. R. Marett and Yogic Commentary by Translator-Professor Chen-chi Chang. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. 1958. Pp. xlii + 389. 9 illustrations. Price 42s. net.

The *Seven Books of Wisdom*, edited by Dr. Evans-Wentz and recently reprinted after 23 years, are: The Supreme Path of Discipleship (the Precepts of the *Gurus*), the *Nirvanic Path* (the *Yoga of the Great Symbol*), the Path of Knowledge (the *Yoga of the Six Doctrines*), the Path of Transference (the *Yoga of Conscious-Transference*), the Path of the Mystic Sacrifice (the *Yoga of subduing the Lower Self*), the Path of the Five Wisdoms (the *Yoga of the Voidness*). All are translations from Tibetan block-prints or manuscripts.

In the Foreword, Dr. Marett gives a brief sketch of the work of the editor who was one of his former pupils, testifying to his diligence, ardour and veritable abandon in the search for truth. In the Preface of the Second Edition, Dr. Evans-Wentz expresses his messianic conviction that the Occident is at the early dawn of an age of

a truly New Science that which is now called occult, as he states, because it is transcendent. Translator-Professor Chang Chen-chi (whom the reviewer knew well in Kalimpong in 1950, and with whom he used to play tennis when the learned Buddhist scholar was not in retirement (*tsam*) as he often was), in his *Yogic Commentary*, makes a very clear and logical exposition of the substance of the book, dwelling principally, however, on the practical aspects of *yoga* and of Buddhism rather than on the doctrine.

Dr. Evans-Wentz's contribution to knowledge is indeed very serious and important as can be seen from the ample and exact fashion in which he expounds upon the virtues of the *Seven Books of Wisdom* and comments upon their contents in innumerable footnotes. In the General Introduction, he gives a most remarkable and clear account of the doctrine. The book is agreeably ornamented, as were others which he has edited, with poetic citations and apt quotations from Buddhist literature. Further on in the text he describes in interesting fashion the relation between the Ka-gyüt-pa sect and Bhutan, gives an excellent explanation of the origin of the so-called devil (masked) dances of Tibet, and exposes the contents of the Prajña-Paramita in magistral fashion.

The doctrine of the *Seven Books of Wisdom* is, briefly, that Matter is crystallized mental energy which, because it is merely a reflection of the Mind, can be shaped and disposed of at will by the mind. The purpose of the *yoga* exercises and disciplines is then to teach the disciple how this can be achieved, under the guidance of a *guru* or spiritual master. The secret of the practices lies in the control of unawakened nervous centres believed to exist in everyone in order to stimulate the circulation of energies which appear largely to be of sexual origin.

Thus in the production of Psychic-Heat in the *yoga* of that name (one of the *yogas* of the Six Doctrines), we read (p. 198, No. 122): "Entering the median-nerve, at the navel nerve-centre from the region of the perineum, the vital-force moveth through the middle of the four psychic-nerve centres, and becoming the fire-force of the Wisdom of the Psychic-Heat, permeateth all the seminal nerve-channels, and thus untieth the nerve-centres." The vital force is next described in the Fundamental Practice 3: Transcendental Psychic-Heat, p. 200-1, as moving upwards into an invisible psychic protuberance on the crown of the head, whereupon (No. 143): "... the upper extremity of the median-nerve is set into overwhelming vibration of a blissful nature." In this manner (No. 145): "... one attaineth the transcendental boon of the Great Symbol." And, (No. 146): "Simultaneously with this realization, the white-fluid issueth in an intensified manner from the base of the organ of generation and floweth upward to the crown of the head and permeateth it completely." In Applied Practice 2: Obtaining the Benefit of the Bliss, p. 204, in the same *yoga*, it is recommended that in the Preliminary Practice one should visualize the Spiritual Consort of One's Mind as follows (No. 164, p. 204): "In front of thee visualize a human female form, endowed with all the signs of perfect beauty and so attractive as to fascinate the mind." In note 3 on the same page, Dr. Evans-Wentz makes the sexual aspect of this practice even clearer when he remarks: "This visualization is particularly intended to excite the 'moon-fluid' (the seminal-fluid) 'through arising desire.' Obviously, what is being sought is to create a state of near-orgasm which quite plausibly is generative of heat. Besides, the *yogin* must observe the strictest sexual continence before beginning the exercises, we are told, p. 157-8.

For anyone familiar with orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis, a very obvious interpretation of this doctrinaire outlook and these practical exercises is immediately suggested. It is that, in the hope of controlling the phenomenal world (the outside reality) which is so very inimical and indifferent to man's aspirations, the Indian, and after him the Tibetan, *yogin* projects, in the same manner as psychopaths, the order of his own mind outwards and attempts to influence it through mental activities of a high, esoteric quality. Sexual energy is called upon principally to influence outside phenomena (identified now as noumena) because, called libido by Freud, it is the source of man's vitality and enjoyment. The error of this outlook is, of course, that the phenomenal world is not the noumenal one, and that taking the latter for the former will not help to influence it at all. Only an objective scientific outlook which, by definition, consists in the dispassionate observation of facts can

ever be of use in this way—actually the way Western thought has been going ever since the individualizing pragmatism of Aristotle was formulated. It has since led to the amazing material achievements of which man is capable today.

For this reason, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Evans-Wentz when he states on the last page of the book (p. 364) that the Prajñā-Paramita or "Boundless-Wisdom" (the Path of the Transcendental Wisdom: the *Yoga* of the Voidness) represents a method "as Scientific and rationalistic as any of the laboratory methods employed by our scientists of Europe and America." The latter is an objective method of observation through experimentation, while the *yoga* is merely subjective and can only be tested in accordance with the personal reactions of the disciple. It thus seems absolutely fantastic for the editor even to imagine, as he does at the end of note 2, p. 211, that: "There yet remains for the physicists the discovery of mechanical means to materialize, or give objectivity to, thoughts, in the same way as the *yogin* does by natural means. A further step will be for the scientist to invent a method not only to integrate matter around a certain thought model, but to disintegrate any material object, and, in its electronic, invisible form, transmit it from one place to another, and then reconstitute its objectivity, or aspect as a solid."

It is difficult to take Dr. Evans-Wentz seriously when he says that the West is as the threshold of a New Science, where the occultism of the East will at last be accepted and proved correct. Actually, what is happening really is that the West is beginning to understand what is the objective, scientific explanation of Eastern occultism and, in terms of experimental, clinical observations, to analyse and to grasp its physical and psychological mechanism. This is indeed an advance which can only be welcomed by all true scientists of Hellenic tradition.

P. P. of G. & D.

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**The Doctrine of the Buddha.** By George Grimm. Geo. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 536. 42s.

The past thirty years have witnessed a great advance in the Western knowledge of Buddhism in its manifold forms, but no better introduction to the teachings of the Lesser Vehicle has been written than Grimm's. It is authoritative, clear and cogent: authoritative because there are copious quotations from the Canon, clear because they have been judiciously chosen and well knitted together, and cogent because the essential tenets are developed in their logical simplicity. A convincing picture emerges of the Buddha as a psychologist of profound subtlety as well as the diagnostician of mankind's tribulations and their cure. Moreover, the reader is encouraged to increase his knowledge by a study of the texts themselves.

There is an interesting preface which attempts to relate the Buddha's doctrine to Western thought, with especial reference to Schopenhauer, and a closing chapter in which it is presented as the final culmination of the Indian religious tradition. It is difficult to agree with this conclusion, for it overlooks the fact that the Buddhists were regarded as a heretical sect by the Brahmins because of their disbelief in the soul, and it is hardly tenable to argue that such disbelief is in effect equivalent to belief. It would have been better to have left the emphasis upon the Buddha's rôle as the founder of a new religion. But this is a minor blemish on an otherwise excellent book.

H. C.

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**Call to Istanbul.** By Constance E. Padwick. Longmans. 1958. Pp. 209. Five illustrations. 16s. 6d.

A Canadian, the child of missionaries, was born in Erzerum, went to Istanbul to visit his parents and stayed there for the rest of his life in the service of the Bible

Society. His story belongs among the lives of the saints. He saw the beauty of the world and could describe it, he came near to working modern miracles—using cigarette paper to print Bibles on, and was friends with all men while remaining a sturdy, not to say an obstinate, Christian. He had a sense of fun; he could say "it was a joy to hear him describe the view from the summit (of Mt. Argæus) knowing that he never got to the top"; and, after impressing a Roman Catholic with his accordion to help with the singing at a religious service, could say that the very partial success was not due to "deliberate sabotage." Naturally the Bible is prominent in this book, the revision of the Turkish version, one in modern Greek made by the Orthodox Church, the Old Testament in Arabic, which for political reasons could not be described as "translated from the Hebrew," and an Armenian which, it was hoped, would penetrate the U.S.S.R. In ecclesiastical politics there is the union of the American and British Bible Societies. There is something for everybody; a climb up the Bithynian Olympus with the men who have the right to cut snow there, their ancestors having been given the first charter before the capture of Constantinople; Turkish music gave to one hearer a glimpse of the eternal verities; and an old lady did not believe the Gospels to be a revelation because she could understand them and no prophet ever spoke like that.

A. S. T.

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**The Siege of Peking.** By Peter Fleming. Rupert Hart Davis. Pp. 273; index; ill.; 25s.

The author's book is a valuable aide-memoire and brings into perspective the events of sixty years ago which then disturbed the minds of most of the civilized world. As the author says, in his foreword, such world events are forgotten in the mists of memory so quickly and so easily.

Eleven countries were diplomatically represented in Peking and the Commander-in-Chief was the British Minister Sir Claude Macdonald. Amongst the outstanding characters of the siege were Sir Robert Hart, the British Head of the Imperial Maritime Customs, and Mr. G. E. Morrison the correspondent of the *London Times*. Both individuals who should have been in a good position to evaluate the situation and to give a reasoned estimate of the position of the Foreign Legations and their Nationals.

In the *Last of the Empresses*, Daniele Varé (later to be the Italian counsellor and minister in Peking) says:

"A characteristic of foreign communities in Eastern lands is their incredulity concerning the danger of an attack from the population among which they live."

How well was this not illustrated in British minds before the 1857 mutiny in India? It is often overlooked that the Boxer rebellion was not only anti-foreign but definitely anti-Christian. The absence of rain was caused by "the Catholic and Protestant religions being insolent to the Gods," according to a Boxer edict, and revenge demanded the extermination of all foreigners and *all Chinese converts to Christianity*.

Despite the seething unrest in and about the capital, foreign families went to their isolated residences in the Western hills, apparently oblivious of the menace to their lives which so patently existed.

In April, though secretly encouraging the Boxers, the Dowager Empress issued an Imperial Edict which satisfied the British minister, in which she denounced the Boxers' Societies, ending it with the words, "Let all tremblingly obey." The only people who would have trembled were the foreigners in the legations.

Monseigneur Fainer, the Vicar-Apostolic, issued a grave warning to his Minister, and when this was passed on to his British colleague his reaction to the Foreign Office was to write "that little has come to my knowledge to confirm the gloomy anticipations of the French Father."

Enough has been said of the woeful unpreparedness of the foreign mind for the danger which threatened them.

In June the Empress wrote to Prince Tuan "The foreigners are like Fish in the



Stew pan." quite a large stewpan as it contained twenty officers and 389 men, as well as women and children. British, Russians, Americans, Germans, Austrians, French, Italians and Japanese were all represented and with such a *mélange* of nationalities, it is easy to see that the command was not an easy one. Lack of knowledge of the relief efforts contributed to the difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief and in many ways it is surprising that he was able to hold his force together at all.

The conduct of the French Minister was not very praiseworthy, but M. Claud Pelliot, a member of the French Legation calmly climbed over the barricades one evening and informed Jung Lu, at his quarters, that the besieged were in good heart, but were short of fruit. He returned to the French Legation with his pockets stuffed with peaches. During a semi-official truce the Empress Dowager sent carts laden with vegetables, melons, rice and flour. There was communication between the besieged and the Tsungli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office) showing that there was a wish to remain on good terms with the foreigners though at any moment the Chinese artillery could have wiped them out of existence.

We must read the book carefully to understand the shilly-shallying—and difficulties of the relieving force.

The failure of the Chinese to push home their advantage is perhaps to be explained by the Chinese proverb "It is easier to gain a victory than to secure its advantages." They could have gained their victory but what problems would it not have brought in its wake?

The book is most attractively presented and shows painstaking research and will always be amongst the standard works pertaining to Chinese history of the time. Every Eastern library must have this book and the author has merited the thanks of all those interested in this period.

H. St. C. S.

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**Archaeological Discoveries in South Arabia.** By Richard leBaron Bowen Jr., Frank P. Albright and others. American Foundation for the Study of Man. Baltimore, the John Hopkins Press. 1958. Pp. 315. \$10.00.

The American Foundation for the Study of Man presents in this volume the first instalment of its findings in the South Arabian excavations of the early years of this decade, the first important section being devoted to the detailed account of part of the ancient canal irrigation system at Wadi Beihân. This is prefaced by a general survey of the region, and a discussion of the chronology of "tell towns." An essay is added, attempting to show that a number of ancient trade routes northwards from South Arabia may have existed; this would have been made more complete by the consideration of the strong competition for the meagre grazing available, encountered from the Bedouin tribes.

In his exploration of this canal system the excavator has done much useful work in a little-known field, and his account is clear and scholarly. The "seil" system was the dispersal by main and subsidiary canals of the flash flood water resulting from the rains which occur twice yearly in the region. The canal banks were chiefly of soil, and the stratification of these and of the sand and silt canal bottoms is considered at length. Much of the Qatabanian masonry survives, however, and the chronological emphasis here is on the relative size of stone blocks and quality of construction used at different periods. The excavator does not agree with the conclusion reached by others, that the ancients used adjustable flood gates at the entrance to the sluices, although he fails to suggest an alternative method whereby the flow might have been regulated. He does, however, postulate a general overhaul of the system at some particular time, with a reduction in the velocity of the water, and suggests that the width and direction of the sluices would be subject to variation. The layout of the cultivated fields is also described, with notes on other irrigation works, together with a fascinating digression on the possibly vegetable origin of some unidentified dark circles.

The book is primarily archæological and is not a travel book, and the author

of this section forfeits the reader's sympathy to some extent by many references to the work of several eminent travellers, whose sites he has not invariably visited, but whose arguments, conclusions, and even facts he often discounts with or without expressed reasons. Mr. Philby's *Daughters of Sheba* he is liable to misquote, sometimes with unfortunate results; what, one wonders, is an area " $\frac{1}{2}$  by  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile square"?

So valuable a metal was bronze in the Middle Ages that few large objects made from it have survived from antiquity; the discovery at Timna of some reliefs was the more interesting and unusual. After being damaged in transit to U.S.A., and being badly restored there while in the excavators' care, the bronzes are now described in an amending article following their second restoration.

The reliefs consist of two lions, facing each other, and each bestriden by a sportive child of the type representing the god Dionysus in Hellenistic times; in style they illustrate the tendency of the time to work backwards from the front plane, but the antithetical grouping is not common in Hellenistic sculpture. The place of the motif in the development of pre-Islamic religion is discussed, and its relation to Greek antecedents, but the suggestion that there may be a connection with the Dioscuri should be treated with caution as the internal evidence shows none of their characteristics whatever.

The third major section of the book describes the oval wall built between the seventh and fifth centuries B.C. at Mârib, and the entrance hall of the temple, with the mausoleum and tombs, with a wealth of architectural and mathematical detail.

The book is excellently produced, with the inscriptions and small finds well catalogued, and it is illustrated with a great many photographs of good quality. The place names on the maps have been reduced too much to be easily legible, however, and the sketches of the small finds are confusingly grouped with varying degrees of diminution on the same page.

R. M. MORRIS.

**Archaeology and the Old Testament.** By James B. Pritchard. London: Oxford University Press. Princeton University Press, N.J. Pp. xvi + 263. 77 illustrations. 30s.

Dr. Pritchard is a distinguished biblical archaeologist, whose name is probably best known for his editorship of *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* and *The Ancient Near East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament*. While these two volumes appeal chiefly to Old Testament students, the present one is written for a wider constituency, for all those who are interested in having an answer to the question: "How has history as written in the Bible been changed, enlarged or substantiated by the past century of archaeological work?"

Of the six chapters in the book, the first two are mainly concerned with Palestine; the others move out towards the Near Eastern periphery. Chapter I deals with Palestinian archaeology and Chapter II with Palestinian geography. "The science of Palestinian archaeology was born in the spring of 1890, when a rare genius, W. M. Flinders Petrie, found an ancient mound of buried cities worthy of his ability to observe and interpret" (p. 1). Petrie's pioneer work in pottery dating leads the author to a discussion of pottery types, which he calls "the essential alphabet of archaeology." Chapter II is entitled "The Making of a Map," and begins with the work of Edward Robinson. In addition to an account of the work done by Robinson and his successors on the actual terrain, there is a summary of the information supplied by Egyptian records for our knowledge of Palestinian place-names.

Chapter III, which deals with the nature-religion of Canaan, is devoted mainly to material from Ugarit. Chapter IV narrates the history of archaeological research in the land of the Assyrians. Chapter V discusses the ancient mythology of the Near East, with special reference to the stories of Gilgamesh and Adapa. The last chapter, on "Law and Wisdom," adduces parallels to the Old Testament from Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Hittite Empire.

Professor Pritchard has provided the layman with a lively and reliable introduc-

tion to the subject, and he indicates that the tale he has to tell is by no means at an end. "Near Eastern archæology does not yet seem to have reached the point of diminishing returns" (p. 249).

F. F. BRUCE.

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**All Things Made New.** By John Ferraby. George Allen and Unwin. 30s.

The author of this unusual book, the secretary of the Bahá'í faith in the British Isles since 1946, has given us an extremely clear and readable account of this, the youngest of the world religions. By so doing, and by his exposition of a subject obscure to most of us, he is rendering service to his cause by bringing his Movement into perspective.

A Persian nobleman, Bahá'ulláh (The Glory of God), founded the Bahá'í faith in 1863, and he, together with his followers, suffered severe oppression from the first, and in many cases actual martyrdom. Bahá'ulláh had been preceded by a forerunner, the Báb (Gate), who was himself a martyr at the age of thirty years and who was the founder of the Bábí faith—one which preceded the religious movement now known and which has spread all over the world, having particularly strong support in the U.S.A.

Bahá'ulláh was succeeded by Abdul-Bahá (The Servant of the Glory), under whom the new and struggling religion began first to gain recognition in the western world before the First World War. There is in the book a wealth of information about the conceptions of these men, who are claimed to be the harbingers of a new temporal order of things for mankind as well as inspired messengers of the Deity. Their message is one which draws much inspiration from other religions and ascribes absolute truth to the teachings of Jesus. But, aside from metaphysics, the ideas of the Bahá'ís when they project them into the political field, are of much interest to those who try to observe the signs of the present day, indicating the steps of the progression towards a world order quite different from that of our present world, racked by its evidences of tensions verging on the intolerable.

The central foundation of Bahá'ulláh's teaching was that of the underlying oneness of mankind and of religion, and he was an advocate of world government, the practice of collective security, and the furtherance of aims such as these by the use of a fully international language to be taught in all schools. The attainment of the aim of world government has been entrusted by the leaders of this movement to an organization called the Administrative Order, which will promote, they believe, the ultimate complete acceptance of their religion by mankind and which will reconcile all true beliefs of the East and West and also achieve the new World Order.

The book should be of interest to all who are studying questions of comparative religion, of philosophy, and of the central problem of our time—namely, the reconciliation of the seemingly quite incompatible and seemingly unbridgeable differences dividing the world community. Any system of beliefs such as these centring around the resolution of this problem is worth more examination than that hitherto accorded it by the public.

A. H. S. C.

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## NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

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## NOMINATION FORM

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*(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)*

*being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL  
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend <sup>him</sup><sub>her</sub> for membership.*

*Proposed* .....

*Seconded* .....

*His* connection with Asia is:  
*Her*

(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 10s. for country and overseas members,  
£2 for residents in the London area.)

## NOTICE TO MEMBERS

For the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantages which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

### DEED OF COVENANT

I .....  
of .....  
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date of this Deed or during my life (whichever shall be the shorter period) I will pay to the said Society from my general fund of taxed income such an amount annually as after deduction of income tax at the Standard Rate yields the net sum of .....

The first payment is to be made on the .....

Dated this ..... day of ..... 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said .....

In the presence of: .....

Address of Witness to your signature .....

(NOTE—The Deed must be signed by the subscriber on a date prior to the date of the first yearly payment, as shown in the body of the deed.)



